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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
This thesis examines the way in which the patent system emerged 
in Great Britain and was accepted by 1883 as a legal instrument by which 
new technology could be controlled and exploited. Its purpose is to 
contribute, by means of a detailed historical case study, to the sociological_ 
understanding not only of the emergence of patent law but also, more 
generally, of law as a mode of reproduction of the social order. 
In the first chapter various approaches in the sociology of law to the 
study of the emergence and the reproductive role of law are considered. A 
model of how law could have been expected to emerge and what role law,, in 
conjunction with the state, could have been expected to play in an 
industrialising capitalist society such as Great Britain, is synthesised 
from these approaches. 
In subsequent chapters the model is used in the examination of the 
history of legal control of new technology. The manner in which patent law 
permitted units of technology to become 'commodities' within the capitalist 
system and in which the patent system (and the related system of registration 
of designs), through the active intervention of agents, gained acceptance 
as the 'common-sense' way of ordering the control of new technology is 
emphasised. 
In the final chapter a theory of technological commodities is advanced 
and its utility as an explanation for the emergence of patent law is 
critically examined. Comparisons are made with studies of other bodies of 
law that emerged as responses to the 'needs' of developing industrial 
capitalism and generalizations about patterns of emergence are suggested. 
In the light of the historical research general observations are made about 
the sociological conceptualization of law. The significance of these 
conclusions for future research is considered. 
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CHAPTER 1- SOME SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE EMERGENCE OF LAW 
1. Introduction 
The sociology of law like the sociology of any specific field has dual 
goals. 
I On the one hand it attempts to contribute to gene ral social theory, 
whilst on the other it attempts to provide an insight into the sociological 
significance of the specific subject matter, eg. law or the family. There 
are two dangers inherent in the sub-division of sociology. 
A) The first danger is that any 'sociology of ... ' will unquestioningly 
accept the boundaries of its subject matter as predefined.. This is particularly 
true of the sociology of 'theoretical sciences' such as economics and law 
where practitioners have built up a body of knowledge which is claimed to be 
discrete and internally coherent and which, at the same time, ex0lains other 
social phenomena. As Lukdcs has noted: 'Economics, law and the state appear 
Cin bourgeois thought3 as closed systems which control the whole of society, 
by virtue of the perfection of their own power and by their own built-in 
laws. " 2 
The sociology of law, even when focusing on specific areas of law, has 
often fallen into this trap by accepting that the lecal system ought to 
3 operate in accordance with the standards which lawyers claim for it. it 
has concentrated on exposing a 'gap' between the law in'books and the law 
in action. 
4 In so doing it has accepted unquestioningly the law in books - 
the 'higher law' - as the basis for its researches rather than attempting to 
determine for itself what facet of law is of sociological significance, or 
attempting to understand the sociological significance of the 'aap' itself. 
Empirical studies of the emergence of particular laws have not entirely 
solveý the problem of the legal culture predefining what is relevant to their 
objectives. They have the advantage of dealing historically. with law in 
differing (or at least varying) social contexts and thus beinq able to note 
changed relationships between law in general and society. Yet'too often, 
they have tended to concentrate narrowly on non-legal events surrounding the 
emergence of specific pieces of legislation. They have tended to ignore 
changes in the socially perceived meaning and content of legal forms which 
lawyers regard as constants. 
I 
2. 
B) The second danger is that the sociology of a particular field will 
inhibit the development of general sociological theory by concentrating 
its analysis on those social forces which seem to be directly related to 
its subject matter. In the sociology of law theory about the sociological 
significance of law as an object of study, has not always been clearly 
articulated. 
5 This has resulted in a concentration upon the most 'obvious' 
function of law - that of social control. In 'gap' studies it has been 
assumed that there is a general consensus about what norms law should 
enforce. 
6 The concern of the sociologist has been to see whether these 
legally sanctioned norms are enforced. While it is true that some legal 
norms are supported by a consensus in society it is apparent that such an 
approach can generate no t. heory of the relationships between law and society 
as it assumes that a particular relationship exists without investigating it. 
Existing emergence studies appear to provide an alternative to the 
implicit assumptions of a consensual sociology of. law. By describing how 
laws come into being they point to differences of opinion, to conflicts with-in 
society about specific laws. However, as shall become apparent from the 
discussion of a number of these studies below, they do not contribute as much 
to social theory as might be expected. In many of these studies there is a 
tendency to focus almost exclusively on interest groups and individuals who, 
in the light of the historical records they have left, saw themselves as 
directly involved in the shaping of th e law. Not only does this lead to an 
uncritical acceptance of their view of events, but their intervention is often 
regarded as the sum of the social forces relevant to the shaping of law. In 
its crudest form, social structure is seen as consisting only of interest groups 
Emergence studies, however, lend themselves to a more sophisticated form 
of social theory than that which has just been outlined. Implicit in the idea 
of emergence is the notion of social process -a notion which implies a 
dynamic rather than a static model of society. Hunt, in his essay, 
'Perspectives in the Sociology of Law'8 suggests that what is required in the 
sociology of law is an approach which would preserve the notion of social 
process. He argues that as starting point, law should be conceptualized 
as a mode of reproduction of the social order. Underlying this conceptualizati 
is the idea that society exists only because its composite relations and 
institutions are reproduced. As Hunt expresses it: 
'It is the fact that social activity is reproductive of a 
social order that makes it possible to give meaning and 
substance to the very concept of society itself. ' 9 
3. 
Since law is amongst the 'institutions' which are reproduced it is also 
conceptualized as a 'social process which is predicated upon the functioning 
of other social processes'. 
10 An emergence study would therefore focus on 
the changed role of law or of a particular body of law in the reproduction 
of social order and, at the same time, focus on the changes which law itself 
undergoes in this process. 
. 
The advantage of such an approach would be that it would preserve an 
openness about law which would avoid acceptance of lawyers' definitions of 
law. At the same time it would allow the sociology of law to contribute to 
the understanding of social processes in society in such a way that it could 
provide added insight into the major sociological problem of how societies 
reproduce themselves. Furthermore, the notion of the reproduction of social 
order is historically specific. As Hunt notes, 'it is not society in general 




Within what conceptual framework can historically specific analysis of 
law most fruitfully be attempted? To some extent the conceptualization of 
law as a mode of reproduction of the social order determines the answer to 
this question for it shifts analysis towards a focus on opportunities for 
and constraints on the evolution of law. Some of these (macro-) structural 
factors are contained in law itself. At this level some guidance can be 
obtained from social theorists who have examined the reproduction of a 
changing social-order within which the body of law to be studied was produced 
and reproduced. The work of Weber and various Marxists is examined below for 
such guidance. 
Overarching theoretical models of social change do not, however, solve 
the problem of historical specificity. Could it not be-that in a particular 
historical context the active-intervention of agents shapes the historical 
emergence of law in specific ways? Could it not be that interest groups, 
so often mentioned in empirical studies of the emergence of specific laws, 
do play a significant role? Graný theorists make some allowance for these 
possibilities. Thus Marxist theory, for example, allows that active 
intervention in the class struggle might be influential. It will be argued 
below, however, that theorists when developing their theoretical models, do not 
4. 
always make adequate allowance for the influence of agents on the emergence 
and reproduction of bodies of law. 
In contrast to grand theory, empirical studies of the emergence of law 
appear to stress the role of agents and to ignore structural forces. When 
such studies are analysed, however, it will be seen that this generalization 
does not hold for all of them. Accordingly, prior to the consideration of 
overarching theoretical models, a number of such studies will be analysed 
together with sociological writings which develop the concepts they use. 
Thus the adequacy of their assumptions about structural factors can be 
analysed. At theýsame time insights which would remain valid even if placed 
within a different model of society, will be noted. 
It is a key argument of this thesis that an understanding of the 
relationship between active agents and structure provides the basis for 
the synthesis of insights gained from the historical study of the emergence 
of specific laws with broader evolutionary views on law in general. In the 
section following the discussion of overarching theories of legal emergence 
a theoretical synthesis is provided as a basis for historical analysis. 
Finally, historically. specific analysis depends on the selection of a 
body of law for study. The area of analysis chosen in this thesis is the 
emergence of law relating to the control of new technology. The reasons 
for this choice are given in the last section of this chapter. Nevertheless, 
it can be noted at this stage that the reproduction of a mode of controlling 
and applying new technology would appear to be a significant factor in the 
reproduction of social order in industrializing and industrialized societies 
and that law (particularly patent law) plays some part in it. Accordingly, 
in the examination of theoretical frameworks, particular emphasis is placed 
on work which might provide insights into the social factors surrounding the 
emergence of law in the reproduction of industrial societies. 
II. Empirical studies 
. 
Empirical studies vary widely in the extent to which they attempt to 
relate the activities of the agents they describe to the structural context 
within which they operate: An early example of a study which emphasised 
the active role of interest groups but explained their activities in terms 
of the volition of those involved inthese groups rather than in terms of 
structural constraints on them was Aubert's investigation in 1953 of the 
5. 
effectiveness of new legislation to deal with the working conditions of 
domestic servants. 
12 Investigation had shown that the law was largely 
being ignored. AUbert found that the cause was not the inherent 'criminality' 
of the violators of the statute, but the striking ambivalence which the 
legislators had shown to the behaviour in question. This ambivalence was 
expressed in a statute which made provision for penal sanctions but at the 
same time was practically unenforceable. 
13 
The reason for the legislators' ambivalence ought therefore to be 
investigated. Aubert did so briefly. He speculated that the ambivalence 
was caused by two groups in the legislature, 'the left' and 'the right'. 
The statute as passed represented a compromise whereby 'the left' could 
claim victory in having it enacted at all, whilst 'the right' could ensure 
that the status quo was not disturbed. 
14 
Interest groups, i. e. 'the left' and 'the right', were not the final 
units in Aubert's analysis. They could be subdivided into'multiple, social 
hierarchiesland! diverse status systems, but these in turn would have to be 
explained-in terms of some other unit. 
15 This seems to raise a problem of 
infinite regress which Aubert is only able to solve with an individualistic 
(psychological) explanation. In his words: 
'Finally, the basic concepts involved in such a study 
should not be of a specifically criminological or 
legal nature but belong in a general theory of social 
psychology. ' 16 
The problem of reductionism in this explanation is a product of the 
underlying view of society which forms the basis of Aubert's explanatory 
model. This model is pluralist. Society is seen as consisting of various 
(random? ) hierarchies and status systems; and the differentiations of 
social life are seen as facilita-ting'_the playinq-off of interest in a 
fluent and egalitarian fashion' 
17 Such a model assumes that this playing 
off takes place within a neutral framework which does not 'bend' the rules 
but allows clashes to be acted out and comprises to be made between 
interacting groups. It implies in fact a view of the state as largely neutral 
and value free. The state then is held to provide a neutral and consensually 
accepted framework within which the acting out can take place. Whether this 
is ever completely true in a given society is doubtful. Certainly the 
6. 
neutrality of the state, of the structure within which decisions are made, 
cannot be assumed from the idealist, abstract models of constitutional (and 
procedural) law, but 
I 
can and should be studied empirically. 
18 
More recent studies of the role of interest groups have stressed that 
powerful interest groups are the most influential in the emergence of laws. 
This introduces the possibility of analysing how power is distributed amongst 
various interest groups in society. Unfortunately this aspect is not clearly 
pursued in empirical work. In spite of the use of the conceptipower, in such, 
studies, the model of society is similar to Aubert's. An example is 
Chambliss' analysis of the emergence of the law of vagrancy in England. 
19 
Chambliss summarizes his findings in the following, way: 
'Analysis of the vagrancy laws has demonstrated that 
these laws were a legislative innovation which reflected 
the socially perceived necessity of providing an abundance 
of cheap labor to landowners during a period when serfdom 
was breaking down and the pool of available labor was 
depleted. With the eventual breakup of feudalism the need 
for such laws eventually disappeared and the increased 
dependence of the economy upon industry and commerce 
rendered the former-use of the vagrancy statutes unnecessary. 
As a result, for a substantial period the vagrancy statutes 
-were dormant, undergoing only minor changes and, presumably, being applied infrequently. Finally, the vagrancy laws were 
subjected to considerable alteration through a shift in the 
focal concern of the statutes. Whereas in their inception 
the laws focused upon the "idle" and "those refusing to labor" 
after the turn of the sixteenth century an emphasis came to be 
upon "rogues", "vagabonds", and others who were suspected of 
being engaged in criminal activities. During this period the 
ýfocus was particularly upon "roadmen" who preyed upon citizens 
who transported goods from one place to another. The increased 
importance of commerce to England during this period made it 
necessary that some protection be given persons engaged in 
this enterprise and the vagrancy statutes provided one source 
for such protection by re-focusing the acts to be included 
under these statutes. ' 20 
This quotation does not do justice to the full complexity of Chambliss' 
analysis. In the course of his empirical work, Chambliss does make some 
attempt to isolate various stages in the development of English vagrancy 
law and to detail the nature of the powerful interest groups involved in 
each stage of the process. In this description Chambliss shows an 
implicit understanding of fundamental changes in the English economic 
structure. However, he makes no attempt to link his analysis of his data 
7. 
to a broad model of social and economic change. The interest group analysis 
is not referred back to any overarching social theory. 
One of the factors which serves to isolate Chambliss' approach from 
larger theoretical concerns is his choice ofa unit of law for analysis. 
In analysing the development of vagrancy law he assumes that linear 
developments postulated by legal history are sociologically relevant. 
However, had he considered the place of law in the reproduction of social 
order he would have been forced to consider the possibility that a legally 
delineated body of law, such as the law relating to vagrancy, might have 
had functions of differing relevance to the reproduction of a particular 
area of social life. For example, if he had examined the role of law in 
the control of labour he might have been forced to abandon the study of 
vagrancy law at the period when the law became dormant and to have examined 
instead the alternative means of social control then adopted. In this way 
he would have been able to answer crucial questions about the changing 
importance of statute law, uncodified law and custom in evolving social 
conditions. 
ChaMbliss'study has been widely quoted and reprinted and has been 
influential in shaping the analysis of the relationship between law and 
society. 
21 In the so-called conflict school of criminology explanations 
based on power as a central concept in the explanation of the genesis of 
criminal law have been particularly important. Thus, for example, 
Richard Quinney, a prominent representative of this school, who quotes 
extensively and with approval from Chambliss' study in his book 
The Social Reality of Crime, concludes: 'Lawmaking, according to this 
Econflict3 perspective, represents the'translation of specific group 
interests into public policy., 22 
Stated in its most extreme form the conflict approach comes close to 
claiming that law-making is a conspiracy of the powerful. As. Paul Rock 
points out such an approach 'poses an image of society which is dominated 
by an intellectualised version of International Freemasonry; a knowing, 
self-interested and capable elite'. 
23 Not only is this image unlikely to 
apply to any existent society, it is also incapable of producing any theory 
of the emergence of law because of the circular reasoning in its description 
of the exercise of power; i. e. law is made by powerful interest groups; 
8. 
we know they are powerful because they make law. A change in law must 
therefore indicate a change in the power structure. However, there is no 
explanation from within the theory as to why a change in the exercise of 
power will take place. Ultimately therefore the models of society on 
which conflict theory is based, are simi, lar to those of pluralists such as 
Aubert, since conflict theorists like Quinney also see society as consisting 
of an unspecified number of interest groups. 
24 
Two separate recent theoretical developments of the concept of power 
suggest that the conflict approach could, in spite of its apparent weaknesses, 
contribute to a broad theoretical understanding of the concept of law and 
of the social forces involved in its formation. I 
A development of the concept of law from the power/conflict perspective 
is advanced by AT Turk in his article 'Law as a weapon in social conflict'. 
25 
Turk points out that a conception of law as a means of dispute settlement, 
such as is found in theories which conceive of law as reflecting consensual 
public opinion, ignores the possibility that law might in some cases be 
disruptive and exploitative. Studies starting with the assumption that law 
primarily serves to settle disputes usually unquestioningly accept cultural 
definitions of law as 'natural'. Instead he aýgues that 
'ct3heempirical quality of law... seems ... to be that it is a set of resources for which people contend and with 
which they are better able to promote their own ideas 
and interests against others .... To say that people seek to gain and use resources to secure their own ideas and 
interests is, of course, to saythat they seek to have 
and exercise power., 26 
Turk distinguishes the use of law in a wide range of social fields. He 
defines five spheres in which power can be exercised - 'all represented in 
the cultural and social structural reality of law'. 
27 They are: 
A. Police power: 'Having the law on one's side' allows one rightfully 
to call on others to use violence on one's behalf. 
B. Economic power: A particular economic system is entrenched in law, 
e. g. tax law. 
C. Political power: The law provides the structure (parliamentary or 
otherwise) in which political decisions must be made. The shape of 
the structure could be biased to encourage or disc ourage a particular 
party. 
9. 
D. Ideological power: Definitions of reality embodied in law for 
historical reasons carry great weight. 'Megalism is the cultural 
bedrock of political order. ' 
28 
E. Diversionary power: The rhetoric and real workings of law distract 
men from other issues and at the same time 'reinforce the sense of 
law as an overwhelming, scarcely challengeable reality and criterion 
of reality. 
29 
Turk's extremely broad conception of law hints at a conception Of society 
far more sophisticated than a mere cluster of interest groups. Concepts such 
as economic, ideological and political power imply a sophisticated model in 
which law plays a key role in various spheres of the social structure. Yet, 
paradoxically, this is not the case. In Turk's conceptualization the 'social 
forces' who 'use' law remain isolated interest qroups distinguished only by 
their own relative positions of power. No attempt is made to understand these 
groups as part of a broader social structure which itself is reproduced in 
the very spheres of power Turk describes. Instead interest groups are 
implicitly seen as existing outside and relatively untouched by these spheres 
of power. 
In partial contrast to Turk's work the theoretical analysis of the 
concept of power advanced by Lukes30 (which does not deal directly with 
law) can serve as a tool to relate analyses based on power to deeper- 
lying social structures and processes. Lukes distinguishes between three 
concepts or dimensions of power. 
The one-dimensional view of power focuses on cases of observable conflict 
of inierests, i. e. the case 'where someone induces someone else to 
do something that he would not otherwise do. 
31 In the two-dimensional view 
the focus is slightly broader. The exercise of power is defined also to 
include the conduct of a person or croup who, consciously or unconsciously, 
creates. or reinforces barriers to the airing of conflicts. 
32 The two- 
dimensional view, Lukes argues, is however, still limited because it 
stresses the necessity that there be some observable conflict of interests 
for an exercise of power to take place. 
In contrast to these first two views, Lukes argues for a three-dimensional 
view of power. According to this view a truly sociological conception of 
power should totally reject a behaviourist focus - i. e. a focus geared to the 
10. 
study of observable conflict. Instead, it should concentrate on the way 
in which potential issues are entirely excluded from politics so that no 
conflict arises at all. In order, however, to suggest that any exercise 
of power has taken place there must at least be latent conflict. Lukes 
defines latent conflict in the following way: 
', [Cjonflict is latent in. the sense that it is assumed that 
there would be a conflict of wants or preferences between 
those exercising power and those subject to it, were the 
latter to become aware of their interests. '33 
. 
This formulation raises a great possibility for expanding the study of 
power in that the 'keeping out' of issues is determined not only by ' 
conscious decisions but also by the ideological and institutional structures 
within which power is exercised. A study of the exercise of power over a 
period would therefore have to take broad structural considerations into 
account. The three-dimensional view of power is, however, not entirely 
1structuralist' as one of its critics, Crouch, has suggested. 
34 it 
assumes that 'although the agents operate within structurally determined 
limits, they none the less have a certain relative autonomy and could have 
acted differently'. 
35 The concept of power is used to examine, in 
historically specific circumstances, how power is in fact exercised, i. e. 
directly or through structural constraints. 
- The delineation of the 'real' interests of those over or against 
whom power is being exercised presents a problem. Lukes argues that the 
delineation of real interests rests on an 'irreducibly evaluati've notion'. 
36 
In delineating real interests he makes an absolute evaluation based, it 
seems, on inalienable (or, in Weber's terminology, substantive) natural 
rights. It does not, however, seem necessary to do this. If one limits 
oneself to asking why particular interests were not perceived or were only 
partially perceived in a particular historical period, one can employ the 
concept of power in a more limited way without deciding what 'ultimate' 
(real) values are. 
The criticisms advanced so far of empirical studies of the emergence 
of law, centre around the argument that they were inadequately situated 
within a macro-sociological framework. However, this does not mean that 
all studies that analyse the emergence of law at a level-of competing 
interest groups must be rejected out of hand. Careful empirical studies 
ii. 
have succeeded in noting some immediate structural influences even where 
they have not been placed in a broader context. 
An example of such a study is Ingeborg Paulus' examination of the 
emergence of legislation dealinq with pure food and drugs in the 19th 
century. 
37 Like Chambliss, she concentrates on interest groups as her 
basic unit of analysis, but, because her analysis is at a more micro- 
sociological level, she notes the intricacies of interest group struggles 
far more sensitively. Particularly perceptive is her analysis of the role 
of bureaucratic structures of enforcement in shaping interests, and indeed 
in providing the conditions for the formation of groups of professionals, 
the 'public analysts' who themselves come to have vested interests in 
further development of legislation. 
38 
Similarly valuable is her detailed description of the way in which the 
courts made the statutes acceptable to powerful interests by reading in a 
requirement of strict liability where parliament had failed to specify the- 
form of mens rea required. 
39. She thus progresses beyond Aubert's implicit 
conception of a neutral parliament providing a forum for 'sensible' compromise 
by pointing to the fact that the actual power of law-making might be exercised 
elsewhere and that the forum might be structurally biased to produce particular 
solutions. 
- Given the detailed analysis to which Paulus subjects her data one might- 
expect important theoretical insights from her work. Unfortunately however, 
this is not the case as she does not situate her study in any major 
sociological theory. 
40 Instead she adopts a developmental model which the 
historian of. 19th century administration, 0 MacDonagh, had advanced. This 
41 model purports to sketch 'the most logical and usual type of development' 
which 19th century welfare law would have followed. She summarizes the model 
as follows: 
12. 
'During the nineteenth century the legislative process 
began by the public exposure of an aGuse. These exposures 
emanated from outside the government, and Parliament's 
concession was in the form of a remedial statute, which in 
most cases was quite inadequate to check th, e abuses because 
of'the lack of an enforcement apparatus. The next step 
provided for such, and the experiences and activities of 
those engaged in the enforcement of the statute exposed 
further ramifications of the social problem and the general 
ineffectiveness of the legislation to control it. The work 
of the law-enforcers established an authoritative case for 
more practicable and detailed legislation and for more refined 
and expanded activities, calling for more personnel and more 
delegated authority. Those to be controlled often changed 
their perception and, instead of opposing control, in turn 
called for further and more stringent control, generally 
supporting the. activities of the law-enforcers as long as 
the personal and social costs of such law-enforcing activity 
could be borne easily and without too great stigmatisation. 
Once the legislative and administrative reconstruction had 
reached such an accommodation between the law-enforcers and 
potential offenders, the whole process repeated itself, 
generating its own dynamic from the experience of the 
administrators and without the intrusion of outside agitation, 
until the problem had been brought under communal control. '42 
The value of this model as a heuristic device is that it captures the 
idea that law emerges in the course of a continuing social process, that it 
stresses the interrelationship between administration and law and that it - 
opens the way to an understanding of the formative role of the state in the 
law. -M'akipg process'. 
43 It can however, be criticized. On its own terms the 
model appears to be an unjustifiable generalization. for the period to which 
it refers. Thus Parris44 has pointed out that there are several areas of 
legislation in the middle of the 19th century which do not follow the 
pattern MacDonagh suggested. More i mportant is the criticism that MacDonagh's 
model cannot cope with macro-sociological concepts such as the influence of 
class or ideology on the social processes involved in the formation of law. 
The excl . usion of concepts of class and ideology is interrelated. Thus 
MacDonagh in his substantive study of the Pasýsenger Acts wrote: 'Time was 
to show that no wall of laissez faire could Permanently withstand the 
trumpet cry, "intolerable". 
45 By this he meant that -; deology in the form 
of political doctrine-was relatively unimportant once what Paulus calls a 
'dramatized exposure of an evil' had taken place. 
46 However, such a view 
of ideology is extremely narrow and depends on accepting the protestations 
of social reformers at face-value. Social reformers might also have goals 
which they do not always make explicit. Thus P Young in an exploration ofýthe 
13. 
historical foundation of probation 
47 has noted that the 'charity' supported 
by social reformers in this context also served the class function of making 
the working class accept entrepreneurial middle class values. It is at least 
possible that the types of social reform MacDonagh and Paulus describe could 
terve to reproduce a general ideal of laissez-faire and thus to further the 
hegemony of the middle class. 
48 I 
The argument is not that Paulus has so misunderstood the process that she 
describes, that she has failed to notice a giant conspiracy by the. middle class. 
What is suggested is that, because of her explanatory model, she fails to 
notice the possible significance of dealing with what she herself identifies 
as a 'middle class' social movement. 
49 The result could be that the changes 
of meaning which she describes took place within the structural limitations 
of middle class ideology to which all the participants broadly subscribe. 
Furthermore, it is at least possible that participants would be conscious 
of the effects of their utterances on those outside their class and might make 
them in a way designed to enlist their support. Analysis exclusively at the 
level of interest groups ignores the social processes which shape the social 
structures within which the interest groups themselves are situated. 
Not all work which deals specifically with the emergence of law, fails 
to consider the limitations imposed on interest groups by social and 
ideological structure. One of the classic works of English scholarship, 
Dicey's Law and Public Opinicn in England during the Nineteenth 0 
has direct relevance to this problem. It can hardly be described as an 
empirical study as Dicey himself says that ' it cannot claim to be a work 
of research; it is rather a work of inference or reflection'. 
51 
NeverthCAess, it is a pioneering attempt to analyse the link s between the 
emergence of law and ideology and therefore deserves to be set against more 
modern sociological conceptualizations. 
Dicey argues that legislative development in England in the 19th century 
can be divided into three approximately equal periods 'during each of which 
a different current or stream of opinion was predominant, and in the main 
52 governed the development of the law of England'. These were (1) the 
Period of Old Toryism or Legislative Quiescence, (2) the Period of Benthamism 
or T ndividualism and (3) the Period of Collectivism or Socialism. 
14. 
The crucial element in Dicey's analysis is the meaning he gives to 
'public opinion'. Sometimes he equates it with 'thought'. Thus, in the 
preface to the first edition of his work, he refers to his 'endeavour to 
bring the growth of English laws during a hundred years into connection 
with the course of English thought'. 
53 On other occasions he limits 
public opinion to that which he regards as relevant to the emergence of law; 
'that kind of public opinion which, since it has told on the 
course of legislation, may with strict propriety be called 
law-making or legislative public opinion, and is recorded 
either in a statute-book, which contains the laws enacted 
by Parliament, or in the volumes of the reports, which 
contain the laws indirectly but not less truly enacted by 
the Courts'. 54 
There is a measure of tautology in this definition. 
55 If opinion is 
that which is reflected in law it can hardly be an independent variable 
shaping the law. However, if one accepts that he means that opinion exists 
before it is given its shape in law then Dicey at times comes close to 
arguing thatlaw-making opinion is a reflection of'. the, iHterests of the 
ruling class: 
_[Iln 
matters of legislation men are guided in the main by 
their real or apparent interest. So true Is this, that 
from the inspection of the laws of a country it is often, "" 
possible to conjecture, and this without much hesitation, 
what is the class which holds, or has held, predominant 
power at a given time. 156 
Viewed in isolation it almost seems as if Dicey has, here become a 
supporter of a conflict theory of law. However, this view is again 
qualified by his conception of opjnion not as a monolithic whole but as 
, _57 a force containing 'counter-currents and cross-currents . Counter 
currents are remnants of public opinion from a previous era which serve to 
delay the reflection of the dominant opinion in law. A cross-current is 
an opinion 'in a measure independent of, though perhaps not directly 
opposed to, the dominant legislative creed of a particular era'. 
58 These 
cross-currents reflect the 'peculiar position or prepossessions of particular 
classes', 
59 i. e. special interest groups such as the clergy, the army, or the 
professions. At this stage Dicey comes close to adopting a pluralist, 
interactive model. 
Finally, Dicey is also alive to the reciprocal effect that law-makina, 
could have on public opinion. Like Paulus he recoonizesý that the passing of 
15. 
an act even if it were ineffective, could set in motion the development 
of a branch of law. I 
'A principle derives prestige from its mere recognition by 
Parliament, and if a law fails in attaining its object the 
argument lies ready to hand that the failure was due to the 
law not going far enough, i. e. to its not carrying out the 
principle on which it is fo--unded to its full logical consequences. 
The true importance, indeed, of laws lies far less in their 
direct result than in their effect upon the sentiment or 
convictions of the public. 160 
Profound though Dicey's insights are, they do not succeed in providing 
a coherent theory of the link between ideology and law. The reason is that 
he ascribes a different meaning to opinion in each of the three periods he 
deals with. Legislative inertia in the.: firtt period is held to be due to a 
'sentiment of conservatism' 
61 
which passively reflected the interests of the 
ruling order rather than being a dynamic influence. Benthamism, on the other 
hand, Dicey sees as 'a definite body of doctrine directly applied to the 
62 
reform of the law'. Here he equates public opinion with thought and 
claims that it has a 'direct and immense influence upon the development of 
English law'. 63 Collectivism again is 'rather a sentiment than a doctrine'. 
64 
Its influence is therefore much more diffuse than that of Benthamism. 
In his analysis, Dicey tends to concentrate on the profound influence 
of 'thought'. above substantive interests and accordingly pays relatively 
little attention to the relationship of 'thought' to social structure. Because 
he has no conception of the dynamics of social change Dicey is at a loss to 
explain the formation of public opinion. Thus in his conclusion he again 
mystifies 'opinion: 
EE3ach kind of opinion entertained by men at a given era is 
governed by that whole body of beliefs, convictions, sentiments, 
or assumptions, which, for want of a better name, we call the 
spirit of an age., 65 
Some empirical emergence studies discount the significance of public 
opinion entirely. 
66 The argument of this thesis is however, that 
sociological studies of the emergence of law, whilst adopting many of the 
insights suggested by Dicey can deal more precisely with the interrelationship 
among social structure, opinion (ideology) and law. 
There is an important sub-group of empirical studies of the emergence 
and enforcement of specific pieces of legislation which has attempted to 
16. 
deal with the influence of ideology by stressing that new laws are enacted 
not only for their instrumental qualities but because they have symbolic 
meaning to those responsible for them. This distinction between the 
instrumental and symbolic dimensions of legislation has been applied in 
an empirical study by Joseph Gusfield. 
67 In his discussion of the 
American Temperance Movement he emphasized that those responsible for the 
enactment of the laws governing prohibition were a status group, the 
established Protestant, rural section of the middle class. This group 
did not stand to gain any material advantages from the legislation they 
proposed. However, a law prohibiting the use of alcohol would enshrine 
their values in legislation and thus show that they, and not the recent, 
hard-drinking immigrants were in command. Accordingly they pressed for 
such a law even though it was practically unenforceable. Gusfield 
concluded 
'Law can thus be seen as symbolizing the public affirmation 
of social ideals and norms as well as a means of'. direct 
social control. This symbolic dimension i's given in the 
statement, promulgation, or announcement of law unrelated 68 to its function in influencing behavior through enforcement. 
Carson, and subsequently Burman, have developed Gusfield's dichotomous 
model by applying it to other spheres of legislation and pointing out tha-, ý. 
symbolic dimensions are not inherent in the law2lbut emerge as law is 
introduced and enforced in society. Thus Carson in his discussion of early 
69 factory legislation commonly shows how; attempts at legislat-ive 
innovation that were initially supported for instrumental reasons by workers 
as well as some factory owners, gained symbolic overtones which caused the 
two groups to adopt opposing attitudes. In the course-of the legislative 
battle the factory owners eventually managed to have legislation passed which 
did not entail a symbolic threat to them, thus freeing them to pursue their 
instrumental objectives again. Carson's analysis is extremely useful because 
it relates the specific issues surrounding factory legislation to the broader 
ideologies of the nascent manufacturing (middle) and working classes. He 
points out that at the particular historical juncture at which the factory 
legislation he discusses was introduced, class formations and ideologies 
were in a s, tate of flux as the old order had been emasculated by the 
industrial revolution and a new social structure was stil-l. in the process 
70 
of beiýg forme. d, Consequently, he is able to describe. the legislative 
process as both forming and being formed by social pressures. 
17. 
Carson's approach is further advanced by Burman 
71 
who applies the model 
of emergent instrumental and symbolic properties of law to the process of 
law enforcement as well. In his study of imperial law enforcement in 
Southern Africa he found that foreign law could be imposed on a captive 
population and would eventually be accepted by them as the symbolic costs 
were not too high. If, however, they were exorbitant, as in the case of 
Basutoland, where the inhabitants were insulted by an attempt to disarm 
them, the whole colonial legal system might be rejected, even if it had 
short-term instrumental advantages. 
The studies by Carson and Burman demonstrate that empirical work need 
not necessarily proceed from the uncomplicated conceptions of social 
process and social structure adopted by Aubert, Chambliss and Paulus. 
Although they do not deal in detail with the larger theoretical concerns 
of classical sociology, they are, as shall be pointed out below, not 
incompatible with the concerns which motivated Weber and some Marxist 
thinkers to regard the sociological study of law as a key question in the 
understanding of the reproduction of modern society. 
Carson's work can be criticized on the grounds that the analysis of a 
specific piece of legislation is difficult to generalize. 
72 Thus 
MacCormick notes: 
'Carson's fascinating account of the emergence of the 
factory legislation in Britain ... may disconfirm some 
general theory, as it evidently disconfirms the 
"commonsensell view of how the Factories Acts came into 
being. But it does not and cannot of its own force 
establish some new grand theory. It is necessarily 
suggestive and not conclusive., 73 
The same criticism can be applied to all the studies in this section. 
What is required is that they be situated clearly in terms of grand theory. 
In this way the contribution of such studies to the understanding of the 
relationship between agents and structures of power, bureauc ratic institutions, 
the professions and ideology can be made explicit. 
111. The emergence oflaw in sociological theory (grand theory) 
A) Weberian sociology of law 
In the studies discussed so far the question of what law is and at 
what level law should be analysed has been disregarded either by analysing 
18. 
a specific law or by analysing a specific social problem area and examining 
how steps that are 'obviously'law-making, such as the activities of the 
legislature and the courts, were introduced to cope with the problem. In 
Weber's'work, however, the conception of law used is such that it actually 
interpenetrates his discussion of. the social forces which shape law in 
modern capitalist society. This complexity is not at all apparent from 
his formal definition of law: 
'An order will be called law if it is externally guaranteed 
by the probability that Co--ercion (physical or psychological), 
to bring about conformity or avenge violation, will be applied 
by a staff of eople holding themselves specially ready for 
that purpose., 
94 
From this definition of law it appears as if Weber, as a sociologist, 
is interested only in law in forms which are actually or potentially 
empirically observable in all societies. In fact the contrary is the case. 
For Weber law exists not only as a type of order (command), but also as a 
mode of thought. Indeed Weber's sociology of law'is primarily concerned 
with explaining how legal thought emerged in what Weber appears to regard 
as its 'purest' form, formal legal rationality. 
In order to understand this, one mus. t examine Weber's classification 
(ideal types) 75 of various modes of legal thought. The key element in the 
classification is the concept of rationality. 
76 Weber consistently regards 
rationality as an emergent quality of law. He stresses however that a body 
of law can be 'rational' in several different senses depending on which of 
77 
several possible courses legal thinking takes towards rationalization. 
guided by general rules, may be Rational law-making i*. e. law-making 
substantive or formal. Uaw-ýaking is substantively rational in as far as it 
is guided by the principles of an ideological system other than that of law 
itself. 78 Formal rationality, on the other hand, appears to be dependent 
on a logic unique to the law. It can manifest itself in two forms: 
. extrinsic 
formality-when significance is ascribed to symbolic external acts 
observable by the senses, and logical formality. The latter category of 
logical formal rationality is particularly important. In this approach 
'where the legally relevant characteristics of the facts . are 
disclosed through the logical analysis of meaning and 
definitely fixed legal'concepts in the form of highly 
abstract rules are formulated and applied'. 79 
19. 
Weber regards logical formal rationality as the epitome of legal 
(and indeed all) rationality. He realizes that this approach is in sharp 
contrast to law based on substantive rationality. 'However [he argues3 the 
peculiarly professional, legalistic, and abstract approach to law in the 
modern sense is possible only in the measure that the law is formal in 
character. ' 
80 
Emergence studies in the Weberian sociology of law therefore are largely 
equated with the study of the emergence of formal leqal rationality. In 
Weber's words: 
'Our task is now to find out how the various influences which 
have participated in the formation of the law have influenced 
development of its formal qualities. '81 
To understand law-making one-also has to understand the political 
processes which underpinAt. In order to explicate these processes 
Weber constructed a further series, of ideal types. which elucidate 
the exercise of political power. Power, Weber argues, where it is not 
exercised by means of the direct expression of interests in a formally free 
market, has to be expressed as a form-of domination. In modern society, 
and as far as law-making is concerned, the state is the most important form 
of domination as it '(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate 
82 use of physical force within a given territory'. The apparatus of 
domination can take three forms, each of which is*legitimated by a 
corresponding set of beliefs, i. e. by a corresponding ideology. The first 
form, traditional-domination. (which rests on the authority of the 'eternal 
, 83' yesterday and the second, charismatic dominatýon (which rests on the 
personal appeal of the ruler 
84) do not rely on rationality as a mode of 
legitimation to the same extent as the third,. Ieqal domination. Under legal 
domination persons obey the law rather than the persons implementing it. 
Legitimation of legal domination is grounded in a 'belief in the validity 
of legal statute and functional "competence" based on rationally created 
85 
rules'. 
The 'apparatus' that implements the system of legal domination is 
limited by the same legal rules as limit the exercise of power. 
'This organization is continuous; its officials. are subject 
to rules that delimit their authority, institute controls 
over its exercise, separate the private person from the 
performance of official functions, and require that all 
transactions be in writing in order to be valid. ' 86 
20. 
In other words power is exercised through a bureaucracy. 
87 
In each case the existence of the system of domination depends on the 
acceptance of the legitimacy of the system by both the rulers and the ruled. 
Beliefs of this kind are not only philosophical. The success of the 
domination depends largely on the extent to which they are shared by the 
ruled and the rulers. 
88 
Where one mode of domination is paramount, others can continue to exist 
and thus to provide additional legitimation for the authorities. It is 
also important to note that these modes do not form a developmental sequence. 
That is, a charismatic ruler who oversteps the mark can be replaced by a 
traditional ruler, who again can be usurped by someone showing charismatic 
qualities, and so on. This does not apply to legal domination which, 
because of the overwhelming efficiency of bureaucracy (and technology) can 
only be supplanted by a r6gime which retains rational procedures and therefore, 
Weber would argue, a variant form of legal domination. 
89 
Weber regarded the emergence of domination based primarily on legal 
rationality as unique'to modern Western society. 
90 
Since legal rationality is seen as a type of legal thought it is 
clear that, in Weber's model, law is a central element in the conceptualization 
of modern Western society. For Weber rationality found its highest expression 
in bureaucracy on the one hand and in legal formalism on the other. These 
two serve to support each other in modern society. 
91 
The question then arises: how did the convergence of bureaucracy and 
legal rationality come to predominate in modern Western society? In his 
sociology of law, Weber provides a model of how the process of rationalization 
might take place. 
'From a theoretical point of view, the general development 
of law and procedure may be viewed as passing through the 
following stages: first, charismatic legal revelation through 
"law prophets"; second, empirical creation and finding of law 
by legal notables...; third, imposition of law by secular 
or theocratic powers; fourth and finally, systematic elaboration 
of law and professionalized administration of justice by persons 
who have received their legal training in a learned and formally 
logical manner., 92 
21. 
Following Bendix, Weber's four categories can be simplified to three: 
law-making by 'law prophets', by established authority and by legal notables 
(professionals). 93 In this form they fit more closely the way in which 
Weber actually explains the emergence of law. The first two of these three 
correspond directly to modes of domination. All three gradually lead to the 
growth of rationality in law. Thus even charismatic law-making, Weber noted, 
is soon bound up in rigorously formal procedures whi. dh*lead to categories of 
law being distinguished and which provide an element of rationality in the 
formulation of distinctions between legal problems. 
94 
More importantly authoritative legal pronouncements based on traditional 
(patrimonial) domination tend towards consistency as states become more 
dependent on a central organization, e. g. to collect taxes. These organizations 
come-'to be manned by officials who need consistency in order to further their 
careers and thus support the introduction of consistent and therefore rational 
laws. It is important to note that the conditions which Weber sees as 
encouraging the rationalization of law from this source are the same 
95 
conditions as provide for the emergence of bureaucracy in Western Europe. 
The influence of the pronouncements of legal notables is particularly 
interesting in as far as it stresses the importance of a status group in 
the development of the rationalization of law. On the continent the 
important status group was the body of law professors at the universiti-es. 
They were relatively emancipated from direct commercial control and set 
about constructing from a Roman law base a body of law composed of a 
logically consistent and gapless system-of norms which would be applicable 
in all cases. The legal profession found this approach attractive, Weber 
argued, because the 'logical systematization of the law has been the 
consequence of the intrinsic intellectual needs of the legal theorists and 
their disciples'. 96 Such formally rational law was popular in areas where 
the central administration was weak since it could provide a basis for 
agreements. 
In England, however, legal notables as a status group operated 
differently. They were not based at universities but were orjanized into 
guilds. The law practised there was not formally rational but developed 
from case to case. 97 It continued in this form long after continental law 
had become more formally rational. 
22. 
Paradoxically, since formal legal rationality is supposed to Go hand in 
hand with modern capitalist society, England proved to be the first modern' 
industrial society. Weber explained this paradox in two ways. First, lawyers 
organized as guilds were powerful enough to resist change. Second, they were 
closely allied with the owners of fixed property who were their main clients 
and who were the only people who could afford to pay lawyers' fees. The 
result was that justice was denied to those of inadequate means and that 
the law as shaped by the lawyers, acting on behalf of their property-owhing 
clients, was not incompatible with the development of industrialcapitalism. 
98 
Weber's critics99 have found these explanations unsatisfactory and have 
suggested that the deviant example of English law can be explained more 
successfully using a different model. Thus Walton has argued that legal 
change in both systems can be explained in terms of the rise of capitalism: 
'For though both develop strong legal systems and healthy capitalism they 
do so at. different speeds, with a different emphasis in legal thought. ' 
100 
Legal thought of the kind that-Weber analysed, therefore does not seem to be 
a crucial element in this development. However, as shall be argued when 
discussing Marxist theories of law - on a variation of which Walton's approach 
is based - this does not exclude 'law' from playing a key role. 
The cardinal weakness is that Weber's implicit definition of law as 
formal rationality, although broader than his original definition of law,. 
is still too narrow to include the full complexities of law as a social 
phenomenon. Because he focuses on the emergence of formal rationality he 
fails to lay sufficient emphasis on the largely similar forms of law which 
became salient in England and on the continent with the rise of industrial 
capitalism. Kahn-Freundlol has convincingly demonstrated that when 
industrial capitalism has been established differences in legal traditions 
in fact mask far larger similarities in legal form. 
Weber does note that the differing legal categories of different legal 
102 
systems might disguise economic similarities and that 'economic interests 
are among the strongest factors influencing the creation of law 
103 but, 
as a result of his concentration-on formal legal rationality, does not 
apply this insight consistently. Thus he attributes the changes towards 
formal rationality introduced by continental jurists to 'intrinsic 
intellectual needs' and does not seek the primary explanation for the changes 
23. 
in their economic significance as a basis for trade in a politically fragmented 
area. In contrast, for the conduct of English lawyers, who do not develop* 
their law according to what Weber regards as being typically legal, i. e. 
formal legal rationality, Weber immediately finds economic motives. 
The stress on theýdevelopment of formal rationality in law means that 
Weber tends to gloss over the fact that law can also act as an ideology 
legitimating a particular form of domination. Weber is not unaware that 
there are other values beyond the acceptance of rationality in general which 
contribute to the dominance of legal rationality in the modern state. 
However, he does not discuss them in his consideration. of the emergence of 
formal legal rationality, but (as outlined below) under 'natural law' while 
dealing with power struggles in the already constituted modern state. 
In spite of all its weaknesses Weber's sociology of law is important 
in that it situates legal rationality in terms of emergence and reproduction 
of Western social order. Whilst there might'be more to law than legal 
rationality a specific mode of 'rational' thought appears at first glande to 
be a characteristic of both the legal rules laid down to control new technology 
and of the bureaucracy designed to apply them. Expressed differently, 'legal' 
rationality appears to structure both these aspects of the law relating to 
technology. Its influence in this area can therefore be investigated 
empirically and the role which legal professionals play in its introduction 
examined, even if rationality is held not to be the dynamic element in the 
emergence of industrialised society. 
B) Weber on natural law in modern society 
Apart from his general theory of the emergence of legal rationality, 
Weber also considers the significance of natural law philosophies as a 
factor contributing to the legitimation of legal domination. In modern 
times natural law is the most important source ol such values as religious 
revelation and the authoritarian sacredness of tradition have lost their 
significance. Weber defines nat-ural law as follows: 
'Natural law is the sum total of all those norms which are 
valid independently of, and superior to, any positive law 
and which owe their dignity not to arbitrary enactment but, 
on the contrary, provide the very legitimation for the 
binding force of positive law. Natural law has thus been 
the collective term for those norms which owe their 
legitimacy not to their origin from a legitimate lawgiver, 
but to their immanent and teleological qualities. ' 104 
a 
24. 
The content of natural law can vary widely. Thus natural law can 
contain values which justify a revolutionary overthrow of the existing 
order by disclosing existing injustices. On the other hand Weber notes 
that ... natural law of the historically real" has been quite influential 
in opposition to the type of nat ural law which is based upon or produces 
105 
abstract norms'. 
Weber distinguishes between two kinds of natural law - formal and 
substantive. The formal category is, as he points out, misleading, since 
an entirely formal natural law would have no content as it would consist 
wholly of general legal concepts, yet natural law is, on Weber's own 
definition, outside such concepts ! Nevertheless, Weber persists with 
this category. Formal natural law is equated with the contract theory 
of society which arose in the 17th and 18th centuries as a result of the 
Renaissance and 'the idea, particularly indigenous to En gland, that every 
106 
member of the community has certain inherent natural rights'. Formal 
natural law assumed that voluntary rational contracts form the basis of 
the state. It assumed the existence of a system of rights acquired by 
'purposive contracts'. As far as the economic system is concerned, it 
rested 'upon the basis of a community of economic agreement created by 
107 the full development of property... and the freedom to dispose of property'. 
What Weber is in fact describing is an ideology used to justify a 
particular economic system. This ideology is expressed in legal terms. 
It thus shows the ability of law, in the form, of an abstract concept like 
contract, to function both as a regulatory institution and as an ideology. 
However, because he equates legal rationality with law, Weber fails to 
see it in these terms. 
Weber does show some insight into the specific class base of natural 
law as ideology: 
'Freedom of contract and all the propositions regarding as 
legitimate the property derived therefrom obviously belong 
to the natural law of the groups interested in market 
tranýiactions, i. e., those interested in the ultimate 
appropriation of the means of production. ' 108 
Formal natural law, Weber perceived, contained the seeds of its own 
intellectual destruction. From the beginninq it was compelled to come to 
grips with certain existing institutions regarded as 'natural', such as 
25. 
the law of inheritance, which could not be derived from freedom of contract. 
Yet it had to accept them as reasonable. By justifying such institutions, ' 
Weber argued, natural law 'reason' easily slipped into utilitarian thinking. 
109 
This was particularly true in England where 'from the very beginning, the 
English concept of "reasonable"contained by implication the meaning of 
"rational" in the sense of "practically appropriate"'. 
110 This intellectual 
drift continued until the formal qualities of natural law had virtually 
disappeared. A complete transformation took place 'as soon as the legitimacy- 
of an acquired right came to be tied up with the substantive economic rather 
than with the formal modes of its acquisition'. 
ill 
Substantive natural law is defined by Weber in terms of economic rights. 
He regards it as primarily concerned with 'socialist theories of the exclusive 
legitimacy of the acquisition of wealth by one's own labor'. 
112 Such a view 
is directly opposed to formal rational law, because, if carried to its 
logical conclusion, it rejects 
I not only all unearned income acquired through the channels 
of inhe-ritance or'by means of a guaranteed monopoly, but 
also the formal principle of freedom of contract and general 
recognition of. the legitimacy of all rights acquired through 
the instrumentality of contracting'. 11 
Substantive natural law also had its class base. It was, Weber remarked, 
attractive to landless peasants and it also played a part in the ideology of 
the industrial proletariat but was not, in his opinion, of great ideological 
significance. 
114 
In his outline of the rise and fall of natural law as an ideology 
justifyi. ng legal domination in modern capitalist societies, Weber comes close 
to constructing a model of change in ideologies supporting law. Thus he notes 
that at the outset of capitalism formal natural law played a central part in 
the legitimation of legal domination. It was gradually replaced by substantive 
natural law which, in as far as it was influential, (and iMDliCitly this 
depends on a clash between classes) diverted the law from formal rational ity and 
undermined the system of domination. However, substantive natural law did not 
achieve much success because at the very time when it was proclaimed by the 
intellegentsia, as spokesmen for the masses, it was ' already being disintegrated 
by the rapidly growing positivistic and relativistic-evolutionistic skepticism 
of the very same intellectual strata'. 
115 
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The loss of influence by the doctrine of natural law had, according 
to Weber, two paradoxical by-Oroducts. First the eclipse of the 'metajuristic 
implications of the law' led to scepticism towards the dignity of specified 
laws, but in general contributed to the acceptance of the power of authorities 
who claimed dominance on purely formal legal grounds. 
116 
The second was a change in the attitude of lawyers. In an earlier 
period, i. e. during the Enlightenment, they had adopted a revolutionaý. y 
attitude based on their belief in natural (law) rights. However, once the 
"'rule-boundedness" of the social order had been achieved', lawyers accepted 
the law as it stood, viewing the law more as 'regulation' than a source of 
117 
rights. The consequence was that the legal profession had become a 
major conservative force opposed to change on the basis of substantive 
natural law and tending to favour duly constituted authority. 
Weber never explicitly describes the change in the ideology justifying 
law, except in terms of intellectual development. It is particularly 
no ticeable that he underplays the significance of social and economic change 
since he mentions links between various types of natural law and specific. 
social classes. In the sections of his work not dealing directly with law 
Weber does connect the concepts of class with economic foundations. Thus 
Gerth and Mills note that, according to Weber,, ccilass situations are 
determined by the relations of the market; in the last analysis, they 
go back to the differences between the propertied and the non-propertied,,,. 
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In the section of this chapter dealing with the synthesis of various, 
approaches it will be argued that it is possible to combine Weber's insights 
on the rise and fall of natural law with a model of legal emergence which 
makes provision for the shifting class bases of legal ideology as well as 
the direct economic significance of legal forms. In this way a foundation 
can be laid for applying Weber's model of the changing role of natural law 
as an ideol ogy. structuring the development of a particular body of law. 
C) A Marxist theory of law ? 
One might expect, because of the relatively few references that tiarx 
himself makes to law, to find very little in Marxist thought to contribute 
to the understanding of the emergence of law. In fact, this isý not the case 
at all. It will be argued below that the theoretical developm ent of the 
sociology of law within a broadly Marxist tradition can go a long way toward 
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providing a dynamic model of the emergence and reproduction of law in 
industrializing societies, within which the insights of Weber and those 
noted in the empirical studies discussed above, can be subsumed. The 
approach in this section will be to state as briefly and uncontroversially 
as possible the elements of Marx's thought which seem most relevant to the 
study of the emergence 'of law. In three subsequent sections these elements 
will be considered in greater depth in the light of more recent approaches 
to the study of law from within the Marxist tradition. 
119 Unlike Weber, Marx never attempted to define law. Generally Marx 
refers to law as a form of ideology. Law is usually classified with other 
social phenomena such as religion and politics: 
'[A] distinction should always be made between the material 
transformation of the economic conditions of producti. on, which 
can be determined with the precision of natural science, and 
the legal, political, religious, esthetic, philosophic - in 
short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of 
this conflict and fight it out. ' 120 
These ideological forms are situated by Marx in theýsuperstructure 
which he contrasts with the economic foundation (or infrastructure). 
Marx explains the relationship between them in a key passage: 
'In the social production of their life, men enter into definite 
relations that are indispensible and independent of their will, 
relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of 
development of their material productive forces. The sum total 
of these relations of production constitutes the economic 
structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a 
legal and political superstructure and to which correspond 
definite forms of social consciousness. ' 121 
Apart from the foundation/superstructure dichotomy, several other key 
propositions of Marx's theory are revealed by a paraphrase and slight 
amplification of this quotation. For Marx the social productibn of life 
is the starting point for analysis. Men produce goods in or"der to live 
and they produce them in the company of others. Their relationships to 
each other and their relationships to objects are governed by ('correspond 
to') the particular mode of production within which they are operating. Their 
relationships to each other are generally expressed in the form of 
relationships of social class. 
122 
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Different modes of production do not merely exist or are not 'chosen' 
but have a history of their own. New modes of production develop out of 
the inherent contradictions in earlier systems and are constantly transformed 
by changes in the (technical) means of production and in the social relations 
of production - the means of production and the relations of production 
are the twin components of a given mode of production. 
123 - 
At the same time as which a mode of production is evolving the social 
relationships - classes - which it generates are producing ideas and 
institutions. These tend to reflect the views of the economically dominant 
class: 
'The class Which has the means of material production at its 
disposal consequently also controls the means of mental 
production, so that the ideas of those who lack the means of 
mental production are on the whole subject to it. ' 124 
In another passage this general statement is made'specifically applicable 
to law: 
'Mour jurisprudence is but the will of your class made 
into a law for all, a will, whose essential character and 
direction are determined by the economical conditions of 
existence of your class. ' 125 
The ideas of the dominant class are expressed in ideological forms 
which legitimate the position of the dominant class. These ideological 
forms have some internal coherence, but-neither their continuity over 
a period of time, nor changes which occur can be explained purely in 
terms of their internal logic. As Giddens explains: 
'Ideas do not evolve on their own account; they do so as 
elements of the consciousness of men living in society., 
following a definite Praxis. ' 126 
r 
The attraction of Marxist theory as a framework for the study of the 
emergence of law is that it views society as a process in which specific 
social and economic relationships are produced and reproduced. Social 
structure is therefore related historically to social process. The question 
is whether Marxist theory can provide insights into how law (or particular 
bodies of law) is likely to develop. It is not immediately apparent that 
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it can do so within the framework of concepts which have thus far been 
described: for, (objection 1) if Marxist theory as elaborated to include 
an understanding of the role of law in the reproduction of social order 
were to hold that law is completely independent of the economic foundations 
of society it would be unable to explain the emergence of law. Similarly, 
(objection 2) if the economic influence of law were dominant in the shaping 
of economic development at all times, the significance of a sequence of modes 
of production with potentially differing relationships to the superstructural- 
components would disappear and with it the predictive elements of Marxist 
theory. Finally (objection 3), if law were totally irre. levant to Marxist 
theory, it'-would hot be able to generate any theory of legal emergence at 
all. 
It would be possible to attempt to refute these objections by comparing 
various texts in which Marx has touched upon law. However, the answers 
appear more clearly from the work of authors who have addressed themselves 
specifically to the analysis of law within the Marxist tradition. By 
concentrating on their interpretations added insights can be gained. 
D) The social functions of law 
The first two of these objections are boldly tackled by the Austrian, 
Karl Renner, in his book The Institutions of Private Law add their Social 
Functions. 127 He does not consider the third objection as it does not 
appear to have occurred to him that the changing functions of what he calls 
'legal norms', i. e. legal concepts, might not be the stuff of Marxist analysis. 
- The objection concerning the extent to which law is shaped by the mode 
of production is 'overcome' by adopting a jurisprudential stance of extreme 
analytic positivism. 
128 This meai 
such as property and even contract 
A legal concept is conceived of as 
frame'. This frame is only given 
plane of law'. 
129 In other words 
function but not the form of law. 
is that Renner regards 'basic' legal concepts 
as essentially immutable (and unchangeable). 
'an abstract principle.... an empty legal 
social content 'by hard facts below the 
the economic foundation determines the 
As a Marxist analysis Renner's approach to the study of law has both 
strengths and weaknesses. 
- 
Its major strength lies in his. detailed historical 
analysis of how legal concepts can serve to disguise the true nature of an 
30. 
economic reality and thereby contribute to its reproduction. Renner 
introduces his analysis by describing an idealized 
130 
system of simple 
commodity production in which legal concepts such as property directly 
reflect the existing economic order. For Renner the concept of property 
or dominium in its pure and unchanging legal form consists of 'a person's 
all-embracing legal 
. power over a tangible object'. 
131 In the system of 
simple co[nmodity production the owner exercises-untrammelled physical and 
economic control over his property as we. 11, for it consists of the 
contents of his household which he himself uses to produce commoditi es. 
Since the owner is largely surrounded by other owners of similar status, 
his control is absolute, 'as no neighbour is interested in interfering or 
would stand interference'. 
132 
Renner relates simple commodity production to emerging capitalism. 
With the rise of capitalism the economic foundations change as do the 
functions of legal concepts. Property. does not remain in the physical 
possession of the owner. It becomes something administered by managers 
and used by wage-earning workers, until its; only remain'ing function is to 
provide the legal owner with unearned surplus value. In spite of these 
dramatic changes in economic function, its legal form remains unchanged. 
The legal form therefore disguises the change in economic realities. 
133 
This chanae in the function of property under capitalism does not occur 
in isolation from other legal concepts. The concept; of contract, and in 
particular the contract of employment, comes to play an increasingly central 
role in support of property. 
134 Under the system of simple commodity 
production, workers, such as apprentices, had been compelled to remain in 
employment by means of public law. 
135 In capitalism, however, workers 
are theoretically free from compulsi 
, 
on by law and can freely choose to 
enter into contracts of. employment-. In practice these workers are compelled 
by economic necessity to enter into such contracts. The 'abstract principle' 
offreedom to contract therefore really serves as an indirect way of 
controlling labour. At the same time it provides the property owner with 
a direct and absolute power of command over the labourer who has 'freely 
contracted' to give the owner this authority. Law, in the form of the 
concept of the free contract of employment, therefore mystifies the true 
nature of the relationship between the capitalist owner and the employee. 
136 
In the analysis of law relating to technology in this thesis, the question 
whether concepts of property and contract are also used to disguise the 
31. 
nature of the control of new technology will be considered. 
Renner's solution to the problem of the relative autonomy of law, howe ver, 
also has its shortcomings. His assumption that legal forms are themselves 
immutable and therefore not influenced by changing economic circumstances 
(except perhaps at some undetermined stage in the future) 
137 
makes it 
impossible for him to analyse the relationship between legal forms and the 
economic foundations of society. Renner's conception of law was shaped by 
the legal culture within which he worked. To some extent jurisprudential 
approaches, such as legal realism, which do not regard legal concepts as 
unchanging, have undermined the extreme legal positivism of Renner's 
position. Other Marxist writers, such as Pashukanis, have severely 
criticised Renner's solution to the problem of the autonomy of law, stressing 
that the notion of unchanging legal concepts is itself an ideological form. 
138 
The second. objection concerning the reciprocal influence of law on 
economic development, is refuted by Renner with av irtual denial of the 
influence of law. Private law forms would seem to be able to adapt to 
almost any economic circumstance, but cannot fundamentally alter the 
course of: economic development. ' In Renner's words: 
'[Tihe lever which the law uses upon social facts is too short 
to control them. Legal ties are mere threads compared with 
the herculean power of natural life. Yet this Hercules 
stretches his limbs so gradually and imperceptibly, that the 
threads do not suddenly snap in all places. ' 139 
Renner is equally sceptical about the possibility of legislative changes 
in public law changing the economic foundation of society. He labels such 
attempts as 'decretinism' dismissing them contemptuously and attributing 'a 
profound faith which believes legislation capable of performing miracles' to 
'the emotional disposition of the masses after every successful revolution'. 
140 
-Renner's contempt for revolution by legislation does not. mean that he 
ignores the very real intervention of public law in more advanced capitalism, 
nor does he regard this intervention as insignificant. On the contrary, he 
notes a tendency to increasing intrusion of Public law and argues that it is 
to be encouraged, for he sees the limitations placed on private law rights to 
control property as part of an evolutionary process whereby 'Eellements of a new 
order have been developed within the framework of an old society'. 
141 
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In spite of his perceptive observation of the increasing role of public 
law, Renner does not provide a model which can explain whi the state 
intervenes inthis way rather than by changing existing private law. Instead 
he resorts to vague generalizations about the evolutionary certainty Of. 
change as a result of increasing and apparently inevitably beneficent 
intervention. Later Marxist writers, as shall be seen below, do attempt 
to provide a framework for an answer to this question. They are able to do 
so because they recognize that the private law - public law distinction 
(like private law concepts themselves) is not immutable, but that it is 
bound up in the nature of the capitaTist mode of production. Renner 
completely fails'to analYse this distinction. He thus overlooks the point 
that, as his generally sympathetic editor Kahn-Freund notes, 'Et3he "neat" 
separation between public and private law ... served a very definite 
-ideological purpose'. 
142 
E) Law as hegemony; and state power 
Whilst Renner simply assumed that law could be studied from a Marxist 
point of view, modern sociologists of law have been forced to defend the 
relevance of a Marxist approach to law. Objections have come from theorists 
such as PQ Hirst who claim that Marxism, particularly as developed in Marx's 
later works, is a 'science' with its own objects of enquiry. 
143 A point of 
departure which accepts 'the given actuality of crime and law' is, according 
to Hirst, 'therefore a more or less "revisionist" activity in respect of 
Marxism; it must modify and distort Marxism to suit its own pre-Marxist 
purpose 
144 This charge has been strongly denied by M Cain in a recent 
article in which she argues that law is not "'merely" ideological' but 
that it is a central element in the key Marxist concepts of hegemony and 
the state as they manifest themselves. 
145 
The concepts of hegemony and the state as used by Cain, are not derived 
directly from Marx but rather from the writings of the Italian, A Gramsci. 
In his Prison Notebooks Gramsci argued that, for heuristic purposes, 
' 46 
one could distinguish 
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'two major superstructural "levels": the one that can be called 
"civil society", that is the ensemble of organisms commonly 
called "Private", and that of "political society" or "the state". 
These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of 
"hegemony" which the dominant group exercises throughout society 
and on the other hand to that of "direct domination" or cormand 
exercised throughout the State and "juridical" government'. 147 
Gramsci further argued that active intervention at both these levels 
could significantly shape future developments as long as the infrastructural 
possibilities for change existed. For GramsciýMarx's writings which emphasi"se 
the (economic) infrastructure simply indicate 'that a given structure gives 
rise to a field of possibilities which relatively permanent and countervailing 
148 forces seek to utilize in opposite ways'. 
In his own work Gramsci was concerned with understanding these forces in 
order to provide a guide for the utilization of opportunities by the working 
class. Cain has a ttempted to develop the concept of hegemony in relation to 
law so that the possibilities of legal change can. be assessed. 
'Hegemonic control' is, for Cain, the ability to determine common-sense 
understandings in society. It is in this sense that the term 'ideology' is 
often loosely used. She, however, makes a useful distinction between 
ideology and hegemony and uses the term 'ideology' to designate 'developed 
and elaborated systems of thought'. 
149 Ideologies are subject to hegemonic 
control by the common-sense notions that underpin them and are also shaped by 
their further elaboration in terms of their own internal logic. Cain argues 
that it might happen that different groups dominate at the levels of hegemony 
and ideology. She illustrates the point in a way which relates it directly 
to the sociology of law: 
'ELlegal ideology is rooted in bourgeois common sense. Lawyers, 
however, in elaborating conceptions of legal rights grounded in 
these notions, may find themselves in conýlict with certain 
bourgeois fractions. Outcomes of such contradictions will be 
affected by the structure of the legal organization which makes 
such claims to autonomy possible and tenable. It becomes a 
question, then, of organisation and of class and group dependencies 
and alliances. ' 150 
The advantage of this approach is that it provides a framework for 
analysing the variations in common sense and ideology which exist between 
groups-within a social class and which also cut across class boundaries. 
In order to develop this approach Cain draws a distinction between 'hecemonic 
34. 
fractions' and 'hegemonic sectors'. The former exist within one class and 
correspond to (economically based? ) fractions of it. Hegemonic sectors 
however, are 'ideologically constituted' groups and cut across fractional 
and even class boundaries. 
151 Their particular ideology might be a 
resource in a class struggle. In order to study these groups, Cain argues, 
one can use the techniques of non-Marxist sociology. 
152 Hegemonic sectors 
cannot be studied in isolation from social structure, (i. e. merely by 
analysing the evolution of ideas) nor can they be analysed simply in terms 
of social classes determined by the mode of production, since they do not 
correspond to the class divisions of society. 
It is important for Cain's analysis of law that a. conceptual distinction 
be drawn between hegemonic domination and political domination - i. e. 
control of the state. In order to do this the state must be clearly 
conceptualized. Cain adopts a definition of the state as that'which has 
1 153 coercive power and she attacks those who include institutions which 
creaie ýegemony (cf. Althusser's ideological state apparatuses)154 as part 
of the state. This. definition is much narrower than that adopted by most 
other Marxist students of the state, but at the same time, in common with 
many of them, accepts, without analysis a distinction between the 'political' 
and the 'economic'. 
155 
156 Cain, like other Marxist writers such-as Althusser, Poulantzas and Milibandl 
accepts that the state is a separate force which has key coercive functions. 
Althusser and Poulantzas include law in the repressive state apparatus but 
note that it has ideological functions as well. 
157 Similarly Miliband - 
deals at length with institutions outside the state system which serve to 
legitimate it. 158 It is conceivable that he could include at least some 
elements of the legal system such as the professional organizations of 
lawyers in this category. The strength of the particularly narrow emphasis 
which Cain gives to the concept of the state, is that it allows a unique 
place for law which might be subsumed under the more general headings of 
'ideology',. 'state apparatuses' or 'the state' by other approaches. This is 
apparent from Cain's definition of law' 
'Law constrains both hegemonically and coercively. Thus it 
is a point of articulation - though it may be a point of 
contradiction - between hegemonic and political structures. 
Law pronounces what is proper, and backs these pronouncements 
with threats of coercion. In law hegemony and coercion are 
integrally mixed: their unity constitutes the concept. ' 159 
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The stress on the dichotomous character of law can be useful in a 
descriptive model. A similar model has been deployed with great effect by- 
D Hay in his analysis of the importance of the criminal justice system, and 
in particular the death sentence, in preserving, not only the property but 
alsothe domination, of the propertied ruling class in 18th century England. 
160 
Hay demonstrates how the majesty of the law - all its pomp and ceremony - was 
used to provide a platform from which the judges could articulate (in Cain's 
terms) their ideology. This ideology was in general agreement with the common- 
sense of the property-owning, ruling Oass'. The legal ritual. of-the assizes 
sucteeded in extending the, hegemonic control of this common. -sense to a w4der 
audience. At the same time the coercive element of the law remained to back 
up its hegemonic claims. In practice the death sentence was often imposed 
but relatively rarely carried out. This flexibility of the law allowed 
various members of the ruling class - the judges, the local elites, and also 
the king, - to show that they could exercise coercive power by using their 
influence to have sentences commuted. 
If one now returns to the first two potential objections. raised above, 
at the end of the introductory section on Marx and law, one can see that 
the approach to law which Cain adopts will come to conclusions different 
from those of Renner. Cain's situation of the law at the centre of 'both 
hegemonic and political struggle for the working classes' 
161 indicates that 
it is to be regarded as an area which is not shaped directly by the mode of 
production. This does not mean that, like Renner, she regards the law or 
legal concepts as unchangeable. On the contrary, she stipulates no limits 
to legal change but regards law as something to be shaped by the class 
struggle at the hegemonic and--political levels, rather than directly by the 
mode of production. 
On the second objection, concerning the reciprocal influence of law her 
response is also different to Renner's. Her view is that changes in the law 
ca n undoubtedly have economic effects. 
162 She condemns as -'mechanistic' 
Marxist approaches which claim that this is not the case and argues. that, 
whilst the economy might be determined 'in the last instance', this does 
not mean it is necessarily determined at any specific point in time. 
163 
The major strength of Cain's approach is that it liberates the Marxist 
conception of law from the clutches of positivist jurisprudence. Legal 
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forms are not beyond the reach of change - but themselves evolve in the 
course of the reproduction of social order. Moreover, the dichotomous 
definition of law enables one to understand the mystifying qualities of law 
which Renner describes while at the same time comprehending the influence 
of state power. One can speculate that the distinction between public and 
private law which Renner regards as immutable will be held to be of little 
real importance by Cain in her desire for a conception of all law as a 
possible locus for change. Her approach is therefore more flexible than 
Renner's and allows for a broader range of possibilities to be investigated. 
The weakness of this approach is that it is so 'open' that it has 
little value as a predictive theory or explanation of continuing legal 
change. Thus. for example, in Hay's study which brilliantly explores the 
function; of law in 18th century England, one finds no answer to the question 
of why the ruling class chose the means that it did to preserve its authority 
and property. 
164 The description is couched in essentially static terms. 
165 
An allied weakness is that Cain accepts the category of the state without 
an attempt to situate its emergence firmly in the course of the development 
of a particular mode of production. This means that the framework that she, 
as well as Poulantzas and Miliband, adopts, unjustifiably attributes an 
ahistorical validity to the state. 
166 The category of the state is conceived 
as if it were an unchanging given. Holloway and Picciotto argue that this 
leads to two major weaknesses in a position of the kind that Cain adopts: 
'The ... failure of both Miliband and Poulantzas - and much the same can be said of Gramsci - to base their analyses of 
the state in the contradictions of the capital relation 
leads . *.. to two consequences of fundamental importance firstly, they are unable to analyse the development of 
political forms, and secondly they are unable to analyse 
systematically the limitations imposed on state action by 
the relation of the state to the process of accumulation. ' 167 
It is the argument of the next section that a Marxist approach can 
provide a convincing answer to these-weaknesses without lapsing into a 
simplistic economic determinism of the kind which Gramsci and Cain attack. 
F) Law and the 'state derivationists' 
In the previous section law was dealt with directly in terms of Marxist 
concepts such as ideology/hegemony and the state. An alternative approach 
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in which law is seen as directly involved in the reproduction of the capitalist 
mode of production, is to be found in the work of the Russian Marxist Eugene 
Pashukanis 168 and also in the so-called 'state derivation' debate within 
German Marxism 169 in which Pushukanis' approach has been refined and extended. 
The analysis proceeds from an observation of Marx that 'legal relations 
as well as forms of state are to be grasped neither from themselves nor from 
the so-called general development of the human mind, but rather have their 
170 
roots in the material conditions of life... '# In this context the 'material 
conditions of life' mean the modes of production and social conditions under 
which individuals produce and enter into relations with one another. In the 
bulk of their analyses both Pashukanis and the state derivationists 
concentrate on the capitalist mode of production and by following an abstract 
mode of reasoning conclude that both the forms of law and the forms of the. 
state are-central to this mode of production. 
171 
Pushukanis argues that just as political economy begins in barter I aw.. 
begins when the material conditions of life are able to provide for man, " 
who as an 'eaotistic managing subject', is in a position to operate'in a 
'goods-money economy'. Unlike Renner, Pashukanis believes that under a 
system of simple : conTnodity production where each man produces all he needs, 
law will have no role at all. Robinson Crusoe's relationship to goods would 
be completely factual. Only when he wished to trade would he have to 
perceive his goods as property with value. In Pashukanis' words: 
'Both value and the law of property owe their oriain to one 
and the same phenomenon: The circulation of products which have become goods. Property in the juridic sense appeared 
because people were able to exchange goods only after they 
had donned the mask of owner and not because it entered their 
heads to endow each other with this legal quality. 
"Unlimited power over a thing" is merely a reflection of the 
unlimited circulation of goods. ' 172 
The role of outside coercion in the creation of law is very-limited. 
In economic systems where barter played a relatively small role, law was 
not of central importance in the constitution of social and economic 
relationships. 
173 However, as modes of production evolved, the exchance 
relationship became increasingly important and so did law. 'As the wealth 
of capitalist society takes on the form of a vast accumulation of goods, so 
the society itself seems to be an endless chain of juridic-relationships. ' 
174 
38. 
When society has reached this stage law begins to develop twin forms. 
One finds a distinction between private and public law. This distinction 
has been defined by the German Marxists, Blanke, JUrgens and Kastendiek, 
as 
'the separation... between the law (in the narrower sense) 
relating to the reproduction of bourgeois society (a law 
which pivots around private property) and the law relating 
to the structure and jurisdictional competence of public 
rule'. 175 
For Pashukanis (and for Blanke, JUrgens and Kastendiek) private law is 
the basic form of law because it refers directly to the material interests 
of individuals. Public law in its most elementary form, is merely a reflection 
of the needs of private law. In even the simplest form of commodity 
circulation the distinction exists, because, if it is accepted_. that law only 
comes into existence when a dispute is settled, it means that a procedure 
for set 
. tling disputes and a means of enforcing the settlement is required. 
176 
The procedure for settling disputes belongs to the realm of publid law and in 
later societies is controlled directly by the state. Moreover, the 
enforcement of settlements requires the presence of a force outside the 
control of the parties to the dispute. This force too is part of the state. 
The distinction between private law and public law is of crucial importance 
in capitalist societies not only as a form of law but because it provides the 
basis for the distinctions between the 'economic sphere' and the 'political 
sphere'. This is a distinction which is accepted unquestioningly in bourgeois 
views of the nature of society. Private law clearly belongs to the 'economic 
sphere' as it relates directly to commodity circulation. Public law, however, 
immediately takes the form of a political struggle on how rights should be 
interpreted and on how coercive forces should be, icontrolled. Yet private 
and public law are both forms of law and therefore inseparably linked. 
In order to understand the limits and inadequacies of this 
distinction it is necessary to return to the problems inherent in the 
notion of simple commodity circulation. While early forms of barter 
would allow some circulation of commodities it can only exist as a 
fully developed form when labour power circulates as a commodity as 
well. 
177 This only happens under capitalism, i. e. when labourers 
are not employed directly by property owners but rather employed to produce 
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surplus value. The result is that the equality which the law presumes to 
exist between commodity owners, clashes with the real inequality inherent 
in the context of capitalist production. The reason for this discrepancy 
is that all forms of commodities (except labour power) can circulate freely 
without their owners being involved. Labour power, however, is different: 
'The owners of the commodity labour power carry together with 
the commodity themselves as concrete beings onto the market: 
figuratively,. the worker as legal subject remains for ever in 
circulation never entering the factory, never shouted at by a 
fdreman, sitting besuited in his car before the factory gates; 
the worker as concrete being puts on his blue overalls and 
becomes the "factor of p-roduction", a material function within 
the system of capital production, he acquires the form of 
variable capital. ' 178 
Ander a capitalist system the forms of law remain the same as in an 
idealized. system of commodity circulation. A distinction is maintained 
between public and private law. However, because of the nature of the 
capitalist mode of production, legally backed coercion presses differently 
on the capitalist and, the worker. The protection which the law grants to 
the operation of the law of value means that subjects must behave in 
accordance with the demands of the capitalist economic process. In the 
case of capital this means that restrictions on the freedom to deploy capital 
are removed. In the case of workers it means that they must sell their labour 
at the market price. This leads to the prohibition or discouragement of 
'artificial' combinations of workers. 
179 
In the sphere of production the law of private property also serves to 
confi rm the law of value. This means that the capitalist is free to reorganize 
his production process by introducing technological and organizational changes. 
On the other hand this freedom greatly limits the power of the worker as he 
180 has no legal right of access to the means of production. 
Law therefore has a dual effect. As far as commodity-owhing capitalists 
are concerned, law, in its form of public law, ideally speaking, does not 
intervene. It is no more than a neutral third party guaranteeing relations 
between equals in-the process of exchange. On the other hand, as far as 
workers in the productive process are concerned, the extra-economic coercive 
force (which, as has been seen, is a constant concomitant of the force of law) 
40. 
'guarantees not just the possibility of bbying and selling 
but also the compulsion to sell resulting from the division 
of the producers from the conditions of production. It 
guarantees the reign of capital in the private production 
process, i. e. the unrestricted employment of labour power 
for the purpose of producing surplus value. ' 181 
The result of this dual function of the form of law is reflected in the 
form which coercive power takes in capitalist society, i. e. the form of ' 
the state. In simple barter arrangements all that was required to guarantee 
contracts was an extra-economic coercive force. When, however, commodity 
circulation develops to the full, the modern state form necessarily arises as, 
it has further functions to perform than merely guaranteeing contracts. In 
capitalism the state, like the law which it enforces, has dual functions. 
Blanke, JUrgens and Kastendiek put this very clearly: 
'ITIhe "state" (as a concrete structure) constitutes 
, 
in essence 
a general force of coercion which confronts even the individual 
bourgeois (individual competing capital) as a separated, neutral 
instance, but which at the same time and only through this 
separation is, by virtue of its existence as a central force 
guaranteeing the law, a class force. ' 182 
The strength of this abstract analysis of the form of law and the state 
lies in its derivation of the form of law directly from the mode of 
production. As far as the general form of law is concerned it therefore 
refutes the objection that law might be autonomous, (or even relatively 
autonomous to some undefined degree), by denying that the basis of the 
objection, i. e. the distinction between infra-structure and superstructure, is 
relevant to an understanding of the general form of law and the state. In 
the words of Hol 1 oway and Pi cci otto: 
'CA3 materialist theory of the state begins 
what way "the economic base" determines. the 
superstructure" but by asking what it is abi 
production under capitalism that makes them 
economic and political forms. ' 183 
f 
not by asking in 
"political 
)ut the relations of 
assume separate 
The general form of law is such an integral part of the capitalist mode 
of production that it cannot be securely located in the superstructure. In 
EP Thompson's words : "'Law" was deeply imbricated within the very basis 
184 of productive relations, which would have been inoperable without this law. ' 
Instead, the emergence of this general form must be understood as part of the 
emergence of capitalism. Specific bodies of law do have a certain autonomy 
which depends on the actual historical evolution of capitalism. Their autonomy 
Al 
T 
is limited by the general forms of law as these are dir. ectly determined by 
the capitalist mode of production. 
At the level of general form, law is part of the economic foundation 
and therefore cannot be regarded as shaping it. 
185 In as far as specific 
bodies of. law are used successfully to counteract crises in capitalism they 
clearly do have economic impact. In the short term therefore, since new 
modes of intervention are conditioned by their predecessors, law does shape 
its own economic foundations. The relationship of law to the economy cannot" 
be determined in general terms for differing modes of production, since law 
has a specific relationship to the capitalist mode of production. In other 
modes of production, law would probably be of little economic significance,. 
if any. 
186 
This approach demonstrates that law is not an 'epiphenomenal reflection 
187 
of any set of relations of production'. It is an essential element of 
commodity circulation on which the capitalist mode of production is founded. 
On the one hand this approach avoids the economistic conclusion that the 
state and the law simply and directly reflect the economic interests of the 
ruling class. On the other hand it also avoids the a priori acceptance of 
the categories of law and the state. By demonstrating how they were derived, 
it provides a logical framework for an answer to the question posed by 
Pashukanis in his Theory of Law and Marxism: 
'[Wlhy does the 
, 
dominance of a class not continuec-to be that 
which it is - that is to say, the subordination in fact of 
one part of the population to another part? Why does it take 
on the form of official state domination? Or, which is the 
same thing, why is not the mechanism of state constraint 
created as the private mechanism of the dominant class? Why 
is it dissociated from the dominant class - taking the form 
of an impersonal mechanism of public authority isolated from 
society? ' 188 
Critics of the state derivationist approach have suggested that it is 
too deterministic; that by 'logically' deriving the course which the 
development of law and the state will follow, it minimises the significance 
of active capitalism. 
189 It is suggested that such criticism can be 
overcome by historical work which uses the theorization of the derivationists 
merely as an analytical framework and remains sensitive to the significance 
of structure (including emerging social classes) which : impinge upon the 
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development of law. In the synthesis below it is explained how the model 
adopted in this chapter is to be kept open in the historical analysis of the 
law relating to the control of new technology. Prior to this, however, the 
state derivationist approach is elaborated in two ways which are particularly 
relevant to this thesis-: (i) by concentrating on a specific theoretical 
derivation of the state which pays particular attention to the si*gnificance 
of t6chnological innovation and the class struggle; and (ii) by setting out the 
different historical stages of the derivationist approach. Both of these 
'elaborations' will be used asguidelines in the historical part of this thesis. 
(i) The state, technology and social class 
State derivationists stress different aspects of the development of 
law in the course of the emergence of capitalism. 
190 Particularly useful 
for this thesisi'because it considers the importance of new technology (even 
although not directly in the context of law) is the model of the development 
of the state under capitalism put forward by J Hirsch in his essay 'The State 
Apparatus and Social Production'. 
191 Hirsch (who in his derivation stresses 
the class conflict inherent in the capitalist mode of production rather than 
the relations between commodity producers 
192 ) sums up his position as follows: 
'EFIrom the determination of the form of the: ýbourgeois state 
the possibility and the general necessity of its general functions 
can be derived - the possibility in so far as the state as a force 
separated from bourgeois society is functionally in a position to 
guarantee the general and external conditions of reproduction which 
cannot be created by private capitals and to intervene with force 
"against the encroachments as well 'of- the workers as of individual 
capitalists" (En§els, Anti-DUhrinq, p. 382). This possibility implies 
at the same time the impossibility of interfering with the foundations 
of the capitalist reproduction process, namely: private property aM 
the availability of free wage labour. The general necessity of state 
intervention results from the fact that the capital proc: ess of 
reproduction structurally presupposes social functions which cannot 
be fulfilled by individual capitals. ' 193 
Hirsch does not howeverlimit his analysis to a statement of the 
possibility and necessity of state action. There are only broad guidelines' 
to; state action. Inherent in the capitalist mode of production are contradictions 
which threaten to destroy it. Since the state is an intrinsically capitalist 
form which owes its existence to capitalism, and since it is peopled by members 
of the ruling class it will strive to reproduce itself at-all costs. The only 
way in which it can do this is to see that the capitalist mode of production 
on which it is dependent is also reproduced. 
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The interrelated contradictions of capitalism are the tendency of the 
rate of profit to fall and the class struggle. Whilst the former can be 
outlined in abstract terms its occurrence depends largely on the latter and 
therefore on historical circumstances. 
194 In its simplest form the tendency 
of the rate of profit to fall can be understood as a tendency which results 
from the necessity for capital to reproduce itself. Capital is reproduced 
as a result of the accumulation of surplus value. However, competition 
limits the amount of surplus value by lowering the price of goods .' The 
result is that the capitalist has to find other ways of increasing his 
profit. Assuming that wages cannot be lowered, since they have reached their 
social minimum 
195 
, the only way open to capital is the technical transformation 
of the labour process: 
'The technical revolutionization of the process of production 
becomes a necessary instrument in capital-'s conflict with wage 
labour mediated through the expansion and self-assertion of 
individual capitals in competition. ' 196 
The'result of the increased use of sophisticated technology is that more 
expensive machinery and therefore more fixed capital is required to produce 
the same profit. The consequence is that the rate of profit falls. 
197 'The 
tendency of the rate of profit to fall does not however reveal itself as 
simply as outlined. It is not an economic law the validity of which can be 
directly measured. It is merely a tendency of capitalism subject to counter- 
tendencies, Of these counter-tendencies the influence of new technology. 
and the spread of technologically mass-produced goods into new and less 
sophisticated markets are the most important. Technology is a double edged 
factor in the-development of capitalism because on the one hand it causes 
the rate of profit to fall by tying up more constant capital while on the 
other it effectively reduces unit production costs and therefore in*creases 
profits. 
The significance of technology as a counter-tendency is further complicated 
by the fact that technological development, does not procee. d smoothly since the 
quality and effectiveness of new technology can vary. Crises of capitalism 
caused by the erratic operation of counter-tendencies require their conscious 
mobilization. 
'The mobilization of counter-tendencies means in practice the 
reorganization of an historical complex of general social 
conditions of production and relations of exploitation in a 
process which can only proceed in a crisis-ridden manner. ' 198 
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This mobilization does not take place in a vac u um. The 'general social 
conditions of production' refer not only to abstract factors such as the . 
tendency of the rate of profit to fall, they also refer to the conflict between 
capital and labour - the class struggle. Thus for example as a result of 
labour being organized the minimum social wage might be increased causing 
a decrease in profits. The process of mobilization does not start anew at 
every crisis instead 'each cycle or reorganization is moulded by the ever- 
199 intensifying contradictions springing from the previous reorganization'. 
From this analysis the direction which the development of the state, as 
mediated by law, will follow can be broadly predicted. In Hirsch's words: 
'The development towards the modern interventionist state is 
to be understood as the development of a form peculiar to the 
capitalist system within which the contradiction between the 
growing socialization of production and private appropriation 
can temporarily move. Therefore, the investigation of state 
functions must be based on the categorical analysis of the 
historical course of the process of capitalist reproduction 
and accumulation; it must be borne in mind, however, that this 
is'not a question of the logical deduction of abstract laws but 
of the conceptually informed understanding of an historical 
process, in which the objective tendencies determined by-the 
law of value and the capital relation assert themselves through 
the mediation of concrete political movements and processes, 
class struggles and conflicts between individual capitals 
and groups of capitals on a national and on an international 
level. ' 200 
Since the development of technology and the expansion of trade are two 
of the means by which a declining rate of profit can be stemmed, the state, 
it can be predicted, will take action in these areas. If it is accepted that 
the state, acts largely through legal forms it can therefore be predicted that 
the body of ilaW relating to development and control of technology will become 
an area of some importance. At the same time, as a result of the increasing 
dominance of capitalism, the conditions for class struggle take shape and the 
state can be expected to take action to counteract its potentially disruptive 
effects. Public law will increasingly be mobilized in order to protect the 
capitalist system. This will tend to distort the public law - private law 
relationship. HowevEr the state will be limited by basic private law forms. 
201 
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(ii) Stages in the development of forms of state and law 
In their essay 'Capital, Crisis and the State, 
202 Holloway and Picciotto, 
who rely on the analyses by Pashukanis, Blanke, JUrgens and Kastendiek, and 
Hirsch, provide a general model of the changes in the state leading towards 
and developing out of the capitalist mode of production. This model allows 
one to analyse in detail how the capitalist form of the state and its 
related legal forms were brought about and how theycame to take on further 
functions whilst their basic forms were reproduced. The importance of this 
model lies in the fact that it combines logical analysis of legal forms with 
historical analysis of their detailed development. Holloway and Picciotto 
outline three basic periods: 
(a) The generalisation of commodity production: the establishment of 
the preconditions of accumulation203 
The first 'moment' of capitalist production arises from the separation 
of production and consumption. This takes place. with the breakdown of 
feudalism and the founding of the mercantilist state - historically in 15th 
and 16th century Europe. At this stage the state has not reached the form 
most suitable to commodity production and circulation as various privileges 
and monopolies still exist. Nevertheless the nucleus of commodity production 
is established - to some extent by these monopolies themselves. 
(b) The primary contradictions of accumulation and the liberal 
moment of the state 
204 
Once the preconditions for capitalist accumulation are established, the 
principle of equality can be pursued with vigour. By positing an absolute 
distinction between the economic and political spheres an attempt is made 
to remove all restrictions on the circulation and production of commodities - 
the two elements which together constitute capitalist accumulation. However, 
contradictions of the kind described above, between equality in the sphere 
of circulation and inequality in the-sphere of production, both supposedly 
i. n the economic sphere, soon create problems. 
In the liberal moment of the state the law simultaneously intervenes in 
two -different ways to solve these problems. By reforming the legal apparatus 
of the mercantilist period the law is brought more closely into line with the 
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ideal of equivalent exchange. This happens 'as the sphere of circulation 
becomes the sphere of realization of industrial capital rather than the 
sphere of primary accumulation of mercantile capital'. 
205 The law also 
intervenes to rectify inequalities in the sphere of production which 
threaten the capitalist system. Early legislation dealing with such subjects 
as factories and education are examples of legal intervention for this purpose. 
The paradox is that at the same time as the law relating directly to the 
circulation of commodities is formulated in terms of general principles, bodies 
of officials and specific codes, such-zs thos"e described by MacDonagh and 
Paulus, are created to deal with problems of 'social welfare' i. e. to contain 
the immediate contradictions inherent in capitalist accumulation. 
(c) The socialisation of production and the tendency of the rate of 
206 
profit to fall 
From the last part of the 19th century the tendency of the rate of profit 
to fall begins to take effect. This happens because 
' 
capitalism has exhausted 
the easy ways of increasing surplus value e. g. by reducing wages. Various 
authors have suggested that either an economic crisis or a political crisis 
ensues. Holloway and Picciotto reject this-Aistinction and argue that the 
social relations on which capital is based are continually restructured. 
However, the development of capitalism. is uneven; crises therefore result in 
which the continual. -restructuring of capitalist social relations is inadequate 
and state intervention is required. 
The mobilization of counter-tendencies to the falling rate of profit 
therefore increasingly takes place through the state. However, the state is 
subject to constraints, such as the legal forms which capitalism has by now 
developed, and which the state is bound to protect, albeit in modified form, 
if it is to protect its own basis. The distinction between public law and 
private law is one such form. It implies that there is an area in which the 
state cannot intervene. 
207 
The state is also constrained by the fact that it does not effectively 
eliminate competition between capitals. Even within the state apparatus 
they act as 'hostile brothers' 
208 
vying for the favours of the state. 
209 
In more general terms, the state is further constrained by class struggle. 
47. 
This does not begin afresh with each new crisis but is conditioned by the 
circumstances of previous crises. 
The consequences of the constraints on the actions of the state are that, 
'Eals capital is forced, in the struggle for accumulation, to strive to overcome 
the limitations of the state form, it tendentially undermines that 
particularisation of the state which is a precondition of its own existence'. 
210 
It is at this stage that one can expect the distinction between public and 
private law to become increasingly blurred. It is not yet clear. to what 
extent the 'neutrality' of the state can be undermined without the destruction 
of the capitalist mode of production. 
In the substantive part of this thesis this. model of the emergence 
and development of the capitalist state and its related legal forms will 
be further explored. The periodization and the descriptions of the various 
periods will be compared to one facet of capitalist development. If found 
to be generally accurate, the model will be further elaborated. 
IV. Synthesis 
In the introductory section of this chapter it was noted that the 
relationship between agents and structure was a key focus of this thesis. 
Empirical studies of the emergence of law (it was found in Section II) 
have made an important contribution by pointing to the active intervention 
of agents. (both as individuals and as groups) in the construction of 
specific bodies of law. Such studies have, however, not adequately located 
these activities within the structural framework within which social order 
is reproduced. 
At the other extreme, the model of the emergence of law put forward by 
Pashukanis and the state derivationists explains the emergence of law in 
general. (particularly of its form, but also, to a large extent of its content) 
in terms of a 'structural' factor i. e. the emergence and reproduction of the 
211- 
capitalist mode of production. Critics - of this approach have pointed 
out thdt, at least in some of the derivations, the 'logic' of the approach 
is stressed to such an extent that the role of active agents - other than 
the dominant class, which, as a whole, uses law for its own purposes - is 
minimised. 
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It is an hypothesis of this thesis that the 'logical' derivation of 
law can give some guidance for the analysis of a specific body of law but 
that it needs to be 'opened' substantially - by a broader conception of 
structure than a direct 'functional' relationship to the mode of production 
and by a conception of law which investigates the sociologically relevant 
facets of a body of law rather than concentrating exclusively on 'form' or 
'content'. 
The intervention of social classes might be found to disturb the direct 
relationship between law and mode of production. Such classes are held to 
emerge under particular modes of production and act in opposition to the 
existing social order in an attempt to change it. Active intervention might 
lead to significant variations in the patterns of legal development predicted 
by the State Derivationists - including perhaps instances where the working 
class develop interests in specific forms of law which are part of the 
capitalist mode of production. The actual interventions of social classes 
therefore need to be closely studied. 
The meaning of class in social theory and in history 
212 is highly 
controversial. A detailed treatment of it is outside the scope of this 
thesis. For the purpose of analysis it is accepted, broadly following the 
theorization of Giddens213 and the social history of Perkin214, that a 
class division of society is an emergent quality of industrial capitalism. 
The point is elaborated below in the light of historical evidence of 
developments in British society. 
215 
In the empirical study that follows class divisions are treated as only 
one (emergent) feature of social structure. -Interest groups are not ignored 
but considered as active agents and, at the same time, in terms of the class 
structuration of society. Following Cain, interest groups are interpreted 
as being both intra-class (fractions of a class) and inter-class (sectors). 
In both cases the members of the group have in common an ideology in which 
an idea about law or a body of law may play a part. Such ideologies are 
a developed feature of the consciousness (common sense) of the class to which 
members of the group belong or primarily belong. Ideas, in the form of 
'ideology' or 'common sense', are therefore also a structural feature of 
society. Finally institutions - the organs of the state, voluntary 
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associations etc - are seen as providing structural opportunities and 
constraints on the exercise of power by human actors either as individuals, 
or in social groupings. 
This open concept of 'structure' allows the insights gleaned from other 
sociologies of the emergence of law to be incorporated within a primary 
developmental model of law in industrial capitalism. Critical attention 
is paid to factors previously noted as causally linked to the emergence of 
particular laws and their relationship to the larger structural constraints. 
This allows comparison with other empirical studies without necessarily 
accepting their implicit models of society. 
It is important to note that law is not thought of as existing outside 
these structural constraints but is conceptualized as part of them. Using 
different terminology various writers have drawn attention to how specific 
laws can at the same time have analytically separable qualities. One line 
of empirical work has noted that legislation can have both inýtrumental 
and symbolic dimensions. It can be: of significance to the evolution of 
the mode of production (instrumental), be part of an ideological structure 
(symbolic) and, at the same'time, be of social structural significance as 
a point of reference for fractions, sectors and even classes. Nor are 
these qualities given, for law as a mode of reproduction of social order 
is itself a process which emerges and coalesces. 
Several writers, from within very different sociological traditions, have 
noted the ideological importance of law in general. Foremost among them 
is Weber's analysis of the ideological role of natural law. It is paralleled 
by Pashukanis' analysis of the same phenomenon. Thus Pashukanis commefits on 
'the service rendered by the natural law doctrine in laying the foundations 
of the modern bourgeois legal order'. 
216 In their analysis both Pashukanis 
and Weber note the extent to which natural law theories formed the basis of 
bourgeois law at the time when the bourgeoisie were a revolutionary class 
and how, when their revolutionary fervour cooled, it was replaced with, in 
Pashukanis' words, 'a unique medley of historici . sm and juridic positivism'. 
217 
Weber's analysis of rationality also notes what an important 'ideological' 
resource legal rationality is in the legitimatization of power. In this he 
directly parallels Cain's use of the related concepts of ideoloaY, heclemony 
and common sense. Thus W Kaupen has remarked 
50. 
'103ne may find, on becoming more familiar with the new paradiam 
[advanced by Cain following Gramscil, that quite a number of 
observations in "traditional" (bourgeois? ) sociology of law are 
consonant with this orientation. Max Weber's analysis of different 
ways of legitimizing power can be interpreted, for instance, in 
terms of hegemonic control: according to changes in social structure 
and in the respective "common senses" the ruling classes have to 
develop different types and modes of justification for their rule 
the "rule of law" being one specific phenomenon in this variety 
of justifications. ' 218 
Weber's conception of legal rationality extends further, to institutiona 1 
structure - for he argues that it conditions the responses of bureaucracies 
which constitute the state.. This notion has been challenged empirically. 
Gabriel Kolko, in his analysis of the role of bureaucracies in the 
implementation of anti-trust legislation in the USA during the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries, 
219 
points out that bureaucracies set up to enforce 
this law were not neutral, but were consistently biased in favour of the 
capitalists whom they were supposed to police. They were deliberately set 
up in this,. way by the large capitalists themselves. Kolko argues that Weber's 
failure to consider why bureaucracies were set up, leads him to ignore their 
class base and to attribute too much explanat6ry significance to the 
bureaucratic form of government. 
220 The point is well taken but it does 
not follow that the significance of the bureaucratic. form tan beAghored 
The notion of a legally rational bureaucracy is doubly important for, 
as will be seen in the chapter dealing with professionalization, bureaucracy 
can itself be an important constitutive element for professions dependent on 
it. Professions are again crucial elements in modern social structures and 
are actively involved in shaping the relationship between law (or a body of 
law) and society. 
It is in understanding the relationship of active agents to 'structure' 
that the insights gained from the studies of the emergence of specific laws 
discussed above can be synthesized with broader evolutionary. views on law 
in general. Lukes has argued that, in general, 
'social life can only properly be understood as a dialectic of 
power and structure, a web of possibilities for agents, whose 
nature is both active and structured to make choices and 
pursue strategies within given limits, which in consequence 
expand and contract over time. ' 221 
61, 
In this thesis the concept of power is used in this active sense to 
indicate that agents choose to act - to exercise power in the different 
dimensions outlined by Lukes. At the same time the models of capitalist 
development (particularly that of Holloway and Picciotto) are retained 
as guidelines to the possible structural limits to the choice of active 
agents. The actual dialectic must, of course, be worked out in empirical 
research. Accordingly, within the scope of a longitudinal study, constant 
attention will be paid to the dialectic between agent and structure in the 
emergence of law. 
In summary: the model to be explored is one which suggests that law 
is an integrM feature of the capitalist mode of production - or, in other 
terms, that the legal form is central to the reproduction of-social order 
in capitalism. At the same time it allows examination of the forces which 
lead to legal change in terms of a dialectic between power and'structure. 
Finally, it remains open towards law itself, suggesting that a particular body 
of law might be a constitutive part of several facets of social order. 
V. The area of analysis: Law controlling the introduction of new technolag 
The question that remains to be considered is how the proposed model 
can be applied and refined. As has been observed, the strength of the 
model lies in its combination of logical and historical analysis. Further 
development depends on empirical analysis which will refine the categories 
on which the model is based and lead to a more detailed understanding of 
the way that law can'be expected to develop. 
The ideal way to do an empirical study of this kind of theory would 
perhaps be to analyse the emergence of all law which came into being in 
the period leading up to and following from the first simple commodity 
circulation. Clearly this cannot be done in one study, and even if it could 
be done in several, it would still be of doubtful value as it would fail to 
distinguish between areas of the law which were more or less relevant to 
the central problem of the production and reproduction of human society. 
A finer analytic focus is needed to do justice to the full richness of the 
various conceptions which the sociology of law has developed and which can 
be integrated into the suggested framework. 
The selection of an area for analysis is fraught with difficulties. 





'No sociology can totally comprehend a totality, and some 
areas of life must be pushed to the marains before analysis' 
can proceed. It is nevertheless of some importance to 
continually question the costs of obscuring or bracketing 
certain facets of problems. ' 222 
The analysis of the form, law, has shown how dangerous the choice of 
sub-division can be. Thus it has been demonstrated how Renner, by 
accepting legal concepts as his unit of analysis, and by regarding the legal 
distinction between public and private law as immutable, was unab 
' 
le to 
analyse the emergence of these forms themselves. Similarly the narrow focus 
on a specific piece of legislation often does not ask why law should be 
held to be relevant to the particular problem to which the legislation is 
addressed. 
The alternative is to select a specific segment or sphere of social 
life in which law appears to be active and to subject to analysis the 
various ways in which law intervenes in it. MacManus has made this point 
clearly: 
'We must still, however, start outwith legal considerations 
in defining a research area. What has to be chosen is an 
area of activity crucial to the society, defined and limited 
for us by an examination of that society. In doing this we 
are attempting to overcome the potentially misleading effect of 
treating law as a mirror of..:. society, looking rather ýor the 
"Real" society underneath the law's distorted reflection. ' 223 
1 
In the argument presented above on the relationship between law and the 
state the production of commodities is seen as a basic precondition to the 
existence of law. All production entails the application of certain skills 
or techniques but when production becomes of such a kind that it proceeds 
beyond a subsistence economy and produces a surplus of commodities, it 
immediately implies an increase in the sophistication of the technology used. 
Technology can therefore be regarded as arp 'activity crucial to the society' 
which has progressed beyond subsistence level. A preliminary examination of 
British society, to which the substantive section of this thesis-will largely 
be confined, reveals that technological innovation was a: crucial element in 
major economic and social changes. In the analysis below this inter- 
relationship will be spelled out in greater detail. If the model of legal 
development which has been proposed is sound, it ought to be able to 
accommodate an explanation of the various efforts that were (and are) made 
to use law to control, and thereby to stimulate or repress, this crucial 
element in the productive process. 
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Is law as significant an element in the exploitation of new technology 
as theorists suggest it is in other capitalist economic processes? The 
question remains to be answered, for, while it is common cause that 
technology is of enormous significance in changingl modes of production, 
the mediating influence of legal forms in making technology exploitable has 
largely been ignored. Many social theorists tend to regard it as fortuitous 
that technological developments have consequences favourable to the dominant 
economic class. 
Marx often came close to this position. Commentators have been hard 
pressed to deal with some of his more mechanistically determinist 
pronouncements. Thus Marx said: 'The hand-mill gives you society with the 
feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist. ' 
2g4. 
Giddens, an expositor of Marx's thought, points out that this 
proposition is a gross oversimplification which has led to Marx being 
accused of 'technological determinism It is. certainly clear from 
Marx's development of other concepts that the rise of the 'industrial capitalist' 
was influenced by other factors as well. Giddens argues that the reason for 
this confusion-is that Marx, in his discussion of technology, uses the concept 
'relations of production' loosely. Sometimes it refers to what Giddens 
calls 'para-technical relations' i. e. the relationship between men and 
machines in a factory. At other times it includes linkages between 
productive units such as those found in commodity circulation. Giddens 
stresses: 
'The point is that the connection between para-technical 
relations and the broader economic relationships involved 
in any given system of production is a variable one: and 
the character of the second depends less upon the nature 
of the first than upon the ways in which relationships 
are formed by coercion, custom or law. ' 226 
Other writers also notice this weakness in Marx's thought. Thus 
Cain notes that Marx does not explain why the 'unintended consequences 
Eof technological development] so fortuitously and so frequently have 
effects favourable to the dominant economic class . 
227 She hints that law 
might play a significant part in the distribution of the advantages of new 
technology and that these advantages might not be divided equally amongst 
the dominant class. 
228 She does not pursue the point. , 
Marx is not alone in linking technological developrmnt to the evolution 
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of capitalism without explaining how the linkage takes place. Weber also 
notes that the use of technology which is constructed and organized on the. 
basis of rational principles is a basic prerequisite of modern capitalism. 
229 
He argues, as has been seen, that modern capitalism cannot exist without 
legal rationality - but he too fails to explore the link between law and 
technology. 
Of the theorists who have beendiscussed only Renner deals directly with 
the relationship between law and technology. In his analysis of the extended 
functions of property Renner points out that capitalist property incorporates 
inventions in the form of machines. These machines are used to extend the 
domination of property over large numbers of workers who are bound to the 
routines of 'machino-facture'. 
230 They destroy the 'mystery' of the skilled 
artisan and reduce bim to an unskilled worker. 
231 
Renner does not explain quite how this is done. How does the owner 
appropriate new technology? The answer is, of course by gaining legal control 
of it - but that raises another question - why should the owner use the form 
of law to gain control of technology? This leads to general questions about 
the form of law - which, as shall be seen in the case of law relating to 
technology-, assumes fascinating parallels with the (private) law of property 
without actually becoming part of it. Renner does not deal with the general 
form of the law which gives property the extra function it acquires. 
As patent law appears to be thelbody of law most directly connected to 
the legal control of new technology the substantive analysis concentrates 
on its emergence. At the same time the analysis remains open to the 
possibility that other areas of substantive law (the law of industrial 
design, the law of copyright, etc. ) might impinge on the control of new 
technology. Changes in the law both at the level of function and of 
form are considered. 
On the question of the function of patent laws a recent writer, Balz, 
has remarked: 
'The patent laws have remained unaltered in their substance 
and their conceptual form, while the real process of 
invention and innovation has moved constantly way from the 
situation of the patent archetype. The evolution has 
affected both the societal organization of technological 
change and the structure of science and technology as a 
system of thought. The effect is a functional transformation 
of the patent laws that is comparable to though probably still 
more radical than the functional transformation of the 
institution of private property in the "New Industrial State"' 232 
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The validity of this proposition is considered but at the same time the 
'patent archetype' is not accepted as the last word on the form of patdnt 
law. Instead it is analysed as an ideological construct in its own right. 
In this respect patent law is potentially significant. Descriptions of 
its essence are complex, even tortured. This is a prima facie indication 
that even lawyers find it difficult to slot the law dealing with new 
technology into the better known forms of law such as property or contract, 
or to locate'the patent system in the public law/private law distinction. 
The primary focus is on the question of how the law dealing with , 
technology came into being and how it came to be accepted as 'commonsense' 
that technology ought to be controlled by law. As this happened primarily 
during the 'liberal moment' of the state, the bulk of the analysis is 
concentrated on that period. This does not mean that the three-period 
classification suggested by Holloway and Picciotto is abandoned. On the 
contrary, the substantive analysis first focuses briefly on the control of 
technology in the mercantilist period as it sets the background to the 
framework provided by the state for the control of technology in capitalism 
(Chapter 2). 
The liberal period is then dealt with in more detail. Three chapters, 
3,5 and 6 deal with the actual development of the patent system into a 
structure for controlling new technology and making it exploitable by 
capital. Chapter 3_covers the formative years, t 1750 - 1800, in which a 
mercantilist institution was revamped to deal With the needs of early 
industrialism - without a clear basis for it being articulated. Chapter 5 
spells out the moves towards a reformed and established patent system 
culminating in the legi-slation of 1852. Chapter 6 considers the attempts 
to abolish all legal control of technology and the resistance to them 
(1852 - 1873). Apart from the more or less chronological account of the 
construction of a jurisprudence of patents and of the development of the 
patent system, detailed analyses will be made of the incorporation of 
ideas about patents in broad class based 'common senses' (Chapter 4) - 
Also to be considered in this chapter are the more tightly knit ideologies 
of the professional groups which emerged around the actual operation of 
the patent system. 
Acceptance of the most important law relating to the control of 
technology in Britain, the patent system, took place at the beginning of 
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the long depression which lasted approximately from the mid-1870's to 
the end of the 19th century. This roughly coincides with the start of the. 
third period: the socialisation of production. After dealing with the 
events which led to the passing of major legislation (Chapter 7), the 
substantive analysis stops because the 'goal' of acceptance of the legal 
control of technology had been achieved. As thit; took place primarily 
within a national framework, the focus on Britain is justifiable. 
Obviously it did not take place in isolation from developments in other 
countries with similar systems of production. These influences will 
be assessed in the course of the analysis. In the final chapter (Chapter 8) 
mention is also made of the drastic changes recently introduced in patent 
law by Britain's entry into the European Economic Community. It is argued 
that they reflect the operation of law governing technology in a wider 
capitalist sphere. 
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CHAPTER 2- MERCANTILISM AND THE GENESIS OF LEGAL CONTROL OF NEW TECHNOLOGY 
Introduction 
The legal control of new technology in Britain originated as part of a 
proclaimed policy of the state to encourage (albeit selectively) economic 
growth. The idea that an inventor automatically has a legal right of some 
kind to the control of his inventions only arose much later. Since these 
two issues were often confused by lawyers seeking historical justification 
in the common law' for'patents of invention by which inventors exercised 
monopolistic control over their inventions, they have to be carefully 
separated in a consideration of the early relationship between law and 
technology. 
An ideal-typical, synoptic view of the significance of technology 
in the feudal period can serve to set the stage for an understanding of its 
dynamic interaction with legal controls. In the primarily agrarian economy 
of the feudal middle ages the control of technology was not a distinct issue. 
Such technology as existed, remained in the control of workmen whose very 
movements, in the ideal type of this society, were controlled by the feudal 
overlord. There was no encouragement for individuals who might wish to 
introduce new methods of production which could upset the existing order of 
primary self-sufficiency within the manorial community. Two factors operated 
to disturb the theoretically perfect equilibrium of the feudal system. The 
first was the presence of ppecialized craftsmen and merchants who operated 
in the towns outside the framework of the rural hierarchy. The-ýsecond was 
the gradually coalescing, centralized state which provided an alternative 
focus of power to that held by the feudal barons. It is perhaps an over- 
simplification, yet essentially true, that it was a combination of these 
two factors which in post-medieval Britain brought about the policy of 
mercantilism which in turn created the framework for the first attempts at 
legal control of technology. 
. 
The social corollary of these changes was the emergence of a new social 
grouping, the growing merchant class, or, as it became known, the 
bourgeoisie. As Giddens has explained: 'The bourgeoisie, as it were, 
develop within an enclave within the feudal system, but are not an integral 
part of it. ' 
2 This, of course, does not mean that society was restructured 
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overnight into a class based society resting on the capitalist mode of 
production, but it did herald the beginning of the breakdown of the hierarchical 
feudal social order. 
The concept of a policy of mercantilism is, like that of feudalism, an 
ideal type. The meaning of the concept has been open to controversy ever 
since it was first used by Adam Smith to designate state interventionism in 
favour of merchants and against the producer. 
3 In what follows the term 
is not used in its narrow sense of 'the system of economic doctrine and 
legislative policy based on the principle that money alone is wealth' 
4 but 
rather 'the belief that the economic welfare of the state can only be secured 
5 by government regulation of a nationalist character'. 
II.. Early state intervention 
Government regulation clearly depends on a government powerful enough 
to be able to, regulate. In the 14th century effective central government, 
rather than a loose confederation of land barons headed by a king, was 
emerging in Britain for the first time. Britain at that time was economically 
a relatively backward country. 
6 This remained true relative to the rest of 
Europe until at least the middle of the 16th century. 
7 In order for the 
centralized state to flourish there had to be progress beyond subsistence 
or localized commodity production, so that the necessary revenue could be 
provided. Accordingly the state attempted the gradual stimulation of the 
production and circulation of commodities in those sectors of the economy 
where it could act without disturbing powerful vested interests. The 
first clear illustration of this policy is the invitation in 1331 to John 
of Kempe, a weaver from Flanders, to settle in Britain. 
3 In return for 
introducing his skills into Britain and for training apprentices he would' 
receive royal protection. Thai this was not an isolated incident is apparent 
from the wording of the letter which promised similar privileges to other 
weavers who wished to settle in Britain. It was followed. by a statute.. 
extending such privileges to all textile workers and also by further grants 
to individuals who had other technical skills which were needed in Britain. 
9 
An example is the admission of three Bohemian coal miners in 1450 on account 
of their 'meliorem scientiam in Mineriis'. 
10 
The system of grants remained piecemeal and largely ineffectual. It 
was not until the middle of the 16th century that state intervention in the 
form of royal patents of monopoly came to be a significant factor in the 
11 control of newly introduced industrial techniques. In order to understand 
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this change the nature of central government in England must be considered 
in more detail. 
III. Administrative reform 
The central administration of the 14th and 15th centuries had grown 
out of the household of the king and was not capable of implementing the 
routine decisions required in o'rder to follow any consistent government 
policy. In the first half of the 16th century, however, the administrative 
structure began to develop organs of government which were beyond the king's 
immediate supervision though still under his control. During the 1530's, 
in the reign of Henry VIII, the climax of this development was reached in 
what JR Elton has called 'the Tudor revolution in government'. 
12 This 
'revolution' led to the reorganization of the government into national 
departments each responsible to the Crown for its specific sphere. Of 
particular significance to the later development of the law governing 
technology was. the Clerks' Act of 1536.1.3 This Act made provision for a 
systematic process to be followed by the clerks of the offices of the Signet 
and the Privy Seal in the process of attaching these seals to official 
documents. Such seals were required before the decisions of the Privy 
Council or any royal patents could be given effect. In this way the 
implementation of the decisions of the Privy Council came to be cast in a 
formal administrative mould - although the actual decisions on the granting 
of patents were still taken by a body directly responsible to the king. 
When the system of patents came to be used as a means of granting privi'leges 
for the control of new technology these seals remained a requirement and 
continued to be a feature of patent administration until the middle of the 
19th century. 
14 
It-must not be thought that the Tudor revolution in government introduced 
a system which conformed to Weber's ideal type of a modern bureaucracy. 
15 
The officials were appointed to their posts for life and were remunerated by 
the fees that they charged for their work. Offices were virtually the property 
of the incumbents and were often inheritable. The public and private affairs 
of the officials were not clearly separated. On these counts the 'reformed' 
Tudor administration fails to meet the description of a modern bureaucracy. 
On the other hand the purpose of the Clerks' Act was to introduce an 




16 into the administration. In as far as it succeeded it 
showed some of the characteristics of a modern bureaucracy. 
Elton suggests that the adminittrative changes of the 1530's created a 
unique, ndt 4 hybrid, type of government -a type which he calls 'early 
17 
modern'. This type, Elton argues, can easily be separated from a 
medieval (in Weberian terms, traditional or patrimonial) government and a 
18 
modern (in Weberian terms, rational bureaucratic) government. 
Early modern government is of great significance since it provided the 
instruments with which a central government could attempt a far more 
ambitious policy of intervention in the economic life of the nation than 
would have been possible for a medieval government. 
A question which arise 
,s 
is, did this form of bureaucracy -. a type not 
recognized by Weber in his attempts to understand the development of formal 
rationality in bureaucracy and law - play a role in the emergence of legal 
forms? The full answer to this question will only become apparent when 
the continued existence of early modern bureaucracy into the period of 
'rational' capitalist production is considered - for the Clerks' Act of 
1536 remained in force until 1851.19 Part of the answer however, lies 
in the use to which the early modern': -bureaucracy was put in implementing 
a mercantilist policy towards the: control of technology. Asa prelude 
to this answer the technological and economic changes which parallel the 
administrative reforms must be considered. 
IV. Industrial growth and technological innovation 
In broad terms it can be said that, from the 
' 
16th century to the mid- 
17th centuryBr. itain developed from a relatively backward country. to a 
country which, if not industrialized, produced a substantial quantity 
of marketable commodities. 
20 Economic historians have stressed that it 
is impossible to quantify these changes in terms of, for example, an 
21 accurate calculation of gross national product. Nevertheless, it is 
apparýýnt that agricultural production, and specifically the production of 
wool, increased greatly. This led to a growing woollen industry so that 
22 by the early 17th century all exports of unprocessed wool were prohibited. 
The woollen industry was not the only growth point. The period 
following the administrative reforms of the 1530's was also a period of 
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increasing technological innovation and industrial activity. The extent 
of this activity is controversial. RU Nef in a seminal article, speaks. 
of the century after 1540 as a period of technological change to rival 
the industrial revolution of the post 1780 period. 
23 His characterization 
of changes during the century 1540-1640 as an industrial revolution has 
been, vigorously attacked, most notably by DC Coleman. 
24 He argues that 
Nef's examples are atypical and that, whilst there were technical 
innovations in the industries to which Nef refers, large concentrations of 
capital and labour were not typical of these industries. Nevertheless Coleman 
concedes: 'This is not in the least to deny that the development of these 
industries marked a significant variation on domestic production or that they 
represented, taken together, an important phase in the slow growth of early 
industrialization. ' 25 
In his article Nef isolates three kinds of technological development 
which he sees as crucial to the growth of large scale industry in this period: 
(i) The introduction of 'new' industries: 26 The period 1540-1600 saw 
the introduction of the first paper mills, gunpowder mills, cannon foundries, 
sugar refineries, large-scale saltpetreworks and brass and battery works. 27 
The majority of these had been produced before but not on a scale which 
involved the setting up of capital intensive plant. 
(ii) The progress of advanced technical methods in old industries: 
28 
Increased demand created pressure for new techniques particularly in the field 
of mining. Ironmaking became more advanced and assumed 'a new and highly 
29 capitalistic form'. Copper smelting was developed by workers from 
Germany and combined in a sophisticated enterprise with copper mining. 
Goods manufactured from metals, such as wire, sheets and rods, were also 
produced by improved techniques. 
. 
(iii) The discovery and application of new technical methods: 
30 Perhaps 
the most important of these was the use of coal in the smelting of ore. 
Also significant were the adoption'of more elaborate kilns for the production 
of bricks'during the reign of James I and the discovery, at about the same 
time, of new methods of glass-making. 
V. State intervention 
Even if one accepts that Nef overstated his case the technological 
changes he describes are of great significance forýan understanding of the 
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relationship between the state and the control of technology, for, in 
the period following 1540, and particularly after 
in almost all of them. 
31 The mechanism used for 
reformed administration. The most common means o 
i. e. 'letters' from the sovereian issued in terms 
in the Clerks' Act, which gave an individual or a 
1560, the state intervened 
intervention was the newly 
f intervention were patents, 
of the procedure laid down 
group the exclusive right 
to do something of economic significance. The functions of letters patent 
in this initial period can be divided into five categories. 
32 
(A) Patents were used to relax the rigidity of a law controlling a 
particular industry by granting dispensations from it to an individual. 
Such patents also took the forms of a right given to an individual to grant 
dispensation to others from a particular act for a fee. 
33 
(B) Patents were granted entitling an individual to oversee an 
existing industry directly by issuing licences. 34 
(C) Patents were granted allowing one or more persons to take over 
a whole industry and operate it for personal gain. 
35 
(D) Patents were granted to those who began a trade in a hitherto 
untraded commodity or who began trading with a new area. Such patents gave 
them a monopoly in trade in a particular commodity or with a specific area. 
36 
(E) Patents were-granted for a limited period where, in Bacon's words, 
'any man out-of his own Wit, industry or endeavour finds 
out any thing beneficial for the Common-Wealth, or bring 
in any new Invention, which every Subject of this Kingdom 
may use; 'yet in regard of his pains and travel therein, her 
Majesty perhaps is pleased to grant him a Priviledge to use 37 the same only by himself or his Deputies for a certain time'. 
Patents for monopoly have in general attracted a great deal of attention 
from economic and legal historians because they appear to represent a 
38 
systematic government policy. In particular, exhaustive analyses have 
been made of all the patents of the fifth category - patents granted for 
the 'finding out' of any thing connected with new industry. These studies 
have shown that such grants were fairly rare before 1560,39 but that after 
1560 they were extended to include virtually every form of technical 
innovation mentioned by Nef. 
40 
63. 
Under the reformed administration the first patent relating to 
technology was granted to Edward Smyth in 1553.41 It gave Smyth permission 
to introduce into England a number of foreign workmen who were 'mete and 
expert' in the manufacture of glass. These workmen would train local 
apprentices. The patent prohibited, for a period of 20 years, the 
manufacture of 'Normandy glass' or any similar product which could rival 
Smyth's. 42 
Later patents relating'to new techn6logY took much the same form as 
Smýth's patent. 
43 They too dealt with the control of new industry, 
44 
were 
for a limited period 
45 
and obliged the patentee to teach his skill to others46 
and/or to work his patent on an economically significant scale. 
47 
It is understandable that the study of patents in an attempt to determine 
the relationship of the state to new technology will concentrate on those 
ostensibly granted to promote the introduction of new industry. It must not 
however, be thought that in the granting process, patents with the economic 
function of establishing new industries can be isolated from those with other 
functions, nor that an unwavering line of distinction can be drawn between 
the various categories. On the contrary, patents initially dealing with new 
technology could be renewed or repeated so as to serve different functions. 
Consideration of developments in the manufacture of glass illustrates this 
point. 
48 Glass: There is no record of the early 1553 patent being worked. In 
1567 a new patent was granted to Becku and Carter to make window glass. 
49 
The patent contained a provision that the patentees should, as a condition 
of their grant, instruct English artisans. The patentees were incapable 
of doing this as they were not craftsmen themselves but merchants dependent 
on French workmen who soon left their employ. 
50 The patent was not revoked 
but during its term numerous French workmen who were experts in the 
manufacture of glass emigrated to England. They began work and came to 
an informal arrangement with the patentees. By 1589, the year in which the 
patent expired, there were 15 glass manufacturers in England. 
51 This would 
appear to be a clear case where mercantilist intervention had failed to 
introduce a new industry but where the desired result had been achieved by 
informal means. 
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Mercantilist intervention in glass manufacture, however, had not yet 
run its course. In 1574 a patent was granted entitling an Italian craftsman, 
Versalini'(Vprsalyn) to make drinking glasses for 21 years. 
52 It was 
coupled with a prohibition on the importation of foreign glass. The patent 
entitled Versalini to sell glass himself. In 1592 the patent was 
surrendered in favour of Sir Jerome Bowes for a further period - according 
to Price 'in consideration of Sir Jerome Bowes' personal services to the 
crown,. 
53 The patent was renewed and when it expired in 1609 - i. e. some 
five years after the landmark decision of the courts on the nature of patents 
(Darcy v Allin discussed below 
54) 
-a further patent for a type of glass not 
55 included in Bowes' patent was granted to Edward Salter. 
By this time the techniques of glassmaking were well known, yet, 
' 
in 1611, 
another patent was issued to Sir Edward Zouch. This granted him an exclusive 
privilege for the use of (sea) coal in the manufacture of glass. 
56 In 1613 
the Privy Council ruled that Zouch's monopoly was to take precedence over 
those of Bowes and Salter but that they were to be compensated for their lost 
privilege. 
57 
Zouch's patent was strengthened by a partnership with 'two powerful 
, 58 courtiers, the Early of Montgomery and Sir Robert Mansell In 1615 a new 
patent for the use of coal in the manufacture of glass was taken out to 
reflect this partnership. Under the leadership of Mansell a prohibition 
on the use of wood (ostensibly to protect forests) was obtained and the 
use of coal was strongly enforced. The result was that a virtual monopoly 
controlling the whole glass industry was established. 
59 This patent by now 
had nothing to do with new industry or invention but was specifically exýcluded 
from the operation of the Statute of Monopolies which in 1623 sought to curb 
monopolies not related to new industries. 
60 Mansell's monopoly existed 
unhindered until 1642 when it was revoked by Parliament. 
61 The glass 
62 industry based on Mansell's patent continued until after his death in 1653. 
In the glass industry it can therefore be seen that intervention by the 
state was initially intended to encourage new industry (function (v) above), 
but resulted in monopolistic control of the industry (functions (ii) and (iii)). 
The changing functions of patents can also be seen in other industries. 
Thus, to mention briefly a further example, in the mining industry one finds 
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that during the Elizabethan period patents were granted to foreign workmen 
tolýpersuade them to bring their skills into Britain. 
63 The two most 
64 important patents in this sphere, those granted to Hoechstetter and to 
Humfrey and Sch*dtz, 
65 
which between them covered virtually the whole of 
Britain, were soon converted into two chartered companies. These companies 
did very little mining themselves. Instead they functioned as organizations 
which licensed the mining activities of others. In this way they provided 
an opportunity for courtiers (who were directly involved in the companies) 
and for the State to take a percentage of their profits, in the form of 
royalties, without 
' 
becoming directly involved in mining. 
66 Economists 
have speculated that this form of industrial organization was harmful to 
the mining industry as a whole. 
67 
From these examples 
68 it would appear that state intervention by means 
of patents did not show a consistent policy towards new industry. Indeed 
some modern commentators have suggested that in general the policy of the 
monarchy did not favour economic growth. Thus Christopher Hill has written: 
'The myth that Tudor governments supported a "planned 
economy", or W any wish to promote social or economic 
welfare, has long been exploded. Elizabethan economic 
policy, if policy is not too strong a word, should be 
attributed less to "depression economics" or "war finance" 
than to fear of social disorder, especially from the lower 
classes. Governments ... were open to bribtry from pressure 
groups. But there was no considered policy of protecting 
English industry or furthering English trade. ' 69 
The dismissal of all state intervention as random government responses 
to class pressures is, however, too extreme, for in the period 1560-1640, 
an era of technological innovation and economic progress, patents for new 
industries were issued in a significant number of spheres of economic 
importance. Furthermore, even if the courtiers and those in government 
directly involved in patent policy were really as corrupt as. has been 
suggested, this period also led to the formulation of consistent justifications 
for the intervention by the state in. the introduction of new industry and for 
its non-intervention in other spheres, as will be shown. In the creation 
of this hegemony parliament and the courts played key roles. 
Areas of agreement emerged in the course of an overtly political battle 
between parliament and the king over the exercise of state power. Both 
parties were interested in the mercantilist development of the economy without 
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wishing to disrupt the existing-sotial structure. Their struggle was 
concerned with how the mercantilist state should intervene and within 
what framework the intervention should take place. These disputes were 
only to be resolved by the termination of personal rule in the 1640's. 
These disputes must be outlined briefly as they indicate the disagreement 
about the extent of state intervention. At the same time it should be 
borne in mind that a general mercantilist approach towards state intervention 
provided grounds for a 'common-sense' agreement in the specific area of 
control of new technology which,: was far more fundamental than the acrimonious 
struggle might suggest. 
VI.. Parliamentary and legal intervention 
A. Parliament. Patents for monopoly became a contentious issue 
because of the constitutional question about the control of state finances, 
for although the administration had been remoulded in the 1530's so that the 
clerks were paid by means of the fees which they received, the state, of 
course, still needed some source of income. This could be acquired in 
various ways. Parliament could be asked to vote taxes or parliament could 
in some instances be bypassed and income acquired by direct intervention 
in the economy. One form of direct intervention was the granting of patents 
for monopoly and the acceptance of an"un der the table'payment for so doing. 
Alternatively royalties on the patent could be made directly and openly 
payable to the crown. In the short term it would make no difference to the 
state finances if a patent were granted for the introduction of a new 
industry or for any of the other functions which patents could serve. 
To parliament it made a great difference: patents which gave control of 
existing industries to individuals would disturb vested interests; patents 
which-would allow individuals to enforce laws would add to the burden of 
taxation; and to a lesser extent the creation of new industries could disturb 
the existing; social order. . 
Moreover pa rliamentarians who were not royal 
favourites would be excluded from the benefits of the patent system. 
Parliament therefore began to agitate against the patent policy of the crown. 
In 1571 the matter was raised during a debate on the subsidy (budget). 
A member of the House of Commons pointed out that 'the people were galled 
by two means... namely by licences, and the abuse of promoters; for 
which, if remedy were provided, then would the Subsidy be paid willingly; 
which he proved, for that by licences a few only were enriched, and the 
67. 
multitude impoverished'. 
70 The member was, rebuked by the Privy Council 
and a stern message was-sent by the Queen warning the House not to meddle 
with the powers of theCrown. 
71 
The discontent about monopolies seems to have, had some effect, although 
perhaps not the effect desired by parliament. By the 1590's patents had 
become harder to obtain. There had been a reduction in the number of patents 
issued for the control of new technology. Foreigners were particularly hard 
hit by the change in policy. 
72 1. 
The change in policy did not mean that the use and abuse of the patent 
system by the Crown had disappeared. In 1597 the matter was again raised 
unsuccessfully in parliament. The Queen's reply was significant: 
'ITIouching the monopolies her majesty hoped her dutiful 
and loving subjects would not take away her prerogative, 
which is the chiefest flower in her garden ... but that they will rather leave that to her disposition ... [for she3 
promiseth to continue, that they shall all be examined, to 
abide the trial and true touchstone of the law. ' 73 ' 
The point was thus made that the law, rather than the passing needs of 
government policy, contained some stahdard for testing the validity of 
patents. 
In 1601 parliamentary agitation reached a climax and a B-ill was 
introduced entitled: 'An Act for the explanation of the common law in 
certain cases of Letters Patents'. 
74 Once again the role of law was 
underlined. The debate that followed was characterized by ad ivision between 
Members of Parliament who-were also Privy Councillors (and therefore close to 
the-Crown) and the rest. The former who included Francis Bacon75 and Robert 
Ceci, 76 stressed the constitutional position; that it was beyond the powers of 
parli. ament to limit or even to discuss the royal prerogative to issue 
patents. The opposing members concentrated on the practical-hardships 
brought about by patents for monopoly and on specific monopolies such as 
the monopoly for the sale of salt. 
77 A list of patents granted since the 
last parliament was produced. 
78 The debate proceeded for four days. At 
the. end of the debate the Queen informed the Speaker that she wished to 
issue a proclamation on the question of monopolies. 
79 She did so three 
days later. 80 In this proclamation she listed several grants which were 
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to be withdrawn completely. 
81 She followed this with an address to the 
Commons in which she made a general claim to a consistent economic policy:. 
'Since I was queen, yet never did I put my pen to any grant, 
but that upon pretext and semblance made unto me, that it was 
both good and beneficial to the subjects in general, though a 
private profit to some of my ancient servants, who had deserved 
well. ... That my grants should be grievances to my people, and 
oppressions, to be privileged under colour of our. 1patents;. our 
Kingly dignity shall not suffer it. ' 82 
The reign of Queen Elizabeth ended in 1602 just as the economic policy 
based on her prerogative began to be considered by the courts. 
B. The courts., In the period, before 1599 the role of the courts in 
shaping the patent system. was limited. As Fox has explained: 
! IMIatters involving letters patent and grants of monopolies 
and other priyi, leges were rarely, if ever, heard in the 
common law Courts .... Grants of this type were, generally 
speaking, based on an exercise of the royal prerogative, and 
it was not thought fitting or consonant with the royal dignity 
that questions concerning their propriety should be discussed 
and considered in the ordinary courts of common law. ' 83 
It is, of course, well known that not all courts were of equal significance 
in the shaping of English law. 
84 In general conciliar courts tended to be 
mere extensions of the central administration while the courts of common law 
combined a more reasoned, 'ideological', system of thought with their overtly 
repressive functions. 
85 It meant that the common law courts and the common 
lawyers in parliament developed an ideological system as part of their 
conception of law. In it the limitation of the powers of the Crown was 
presented as part of a generally accepted system. When parliamentary 
pressure for the reform of the patent system became severe the Queen was 
compelled to refer the question to the common law courts. This gave them 
an opportunity to develop the law in such a way that the legal system laid 
down the standards for the acceptance of patents. 
The central event in this regard was the famous Case of Monopolies, 
86 Darcy v Allin which was only decided after the Queen's death in 1602. 
There was an important prelude to this case. In 1599 in the case of 
Davenant v Hqrjiijý the so-called Merchant Tailors' case, the question of 
monopolies was raised in the common law courts for the first time. The facts 
of the case indicate how far the medieval system of guilds had decayed by 
69. 
this time. The Merchant Tailors' Company, a typical guild type organization, 
had passed a by-law forcing its members to have at least half their cloth 
finished by other members of the guild. The very existence of such a by- 
law is an indication that the guild had already lost its grip on the trade * 
88 
The strength of the guild was-further undermined by Davenant who ignored the 
by-law and, when reprimanded, challenged its validity. In the ensuing court 
case Lord Coke, Davenant's counsel, argued that the by-law was void because 
it created a monopoly which was not in the public interest. 
89 The implication 
was that the common law had in principle always been opposed to monopolies. 
However, as Letwin has pointed out, Coke could find no authority for this 
statement. 
90 The principle that a monopoly which did not serve the public 
91 
good was void was accepted by Moore, counsel for Hurdis. (It is perhaps 
not withoui significance that, as a Member of Parliament, Moore had expressed 
his opposition to monopolies. 
92) Moore based his client'. s defence on an 
argument that the by-law did not create a monopoly. In its judgement the 
court held that the by-law established a monopoly and therefore was void. 
93 
The outcome of the case reflects a move away from the medieval guild 
system which had provided some of the impetus for mercantilist regulation. 
Guilds were being isolated from other justifiable monopolies. For the 
first time the courts had taken a clear stand on the question of monopolies. 
Criteria still had to be established for deciding which monopolies were 
admissible 'for the public good'. In LaLcy v Allin94 an opportunity to do 
this arose. 
The dispute in qýýc v Alli-n involved an established industry, the 
manufacture and importation of playing cards for which Darcy had been 
granted a patent of monopoly. 
95 In 1601 his monopoly was ignored by Allin. 
Darcy sued him for infringement and. litigation ensued. In his address to 
the court Fuller, counsel for the defendant, contended that monopolies in 
general were invalid. In a famous passage he argued, by way of example, 
that an exception should be made for new industry: 
'Now therefore I will shew you how the Judges have heretofore 
allowed of monopoly patents, which is, that where any man by 
his own charge and industry, or by his own wit or invention 
doth bring any new trade into the realm, or any engine tending 
to the furtherance of a trade that never was used before: and 
that for the good of the realm: that in such cases the King may 
grant to him a monopoly patent for some reasonable time, until 
the subjects may learn the same, in consideration of the good 
that he doth bring by his invention to the commonwealth: 
otherwise not. ' 96 
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In the judgment that followed in 1603 the patent was overturned on the 
grounds of it being a monopoly contrary to the public good but no direct 
reference was made to the exception for new industry. 
97 Nevertheless the 
decision is rightly regarded as of crucial significance in the development 
of patent law for, owing to the vagaries of early law reporting, counsel's 
argument for the defence was reported in full and came to be regarded as 
the finding of the court while the final judgment was virtually ignored. 
98 
In the years that followed 1603 - until the 1640's - the struggle between 
the C"rown and its protdg6s on the one hand, and parliament and the common, law 
courts on the other, continued. However, the law regarding patents for new 
industries had largely been cast into the form it was to maintain until the 
6ch more extensive industrial revolution of the latter half of the 18th 
century. To complete the picture the further struggles surrounding the 
control of monopoly patents and the details of mercantilist law on patents 
need consideration. 
C. Beyond the case of monopolies - Parliament and the common law courts 
in tandem: 
James I who succeeded Elizabeth in 1603 was caught up in a struggle on 
the question of monopolies in the same way as his predecessor. His needs and 
those of his courtiers demanded that patents be freely granted. Parliament, 
in contrast, demanded their regulation. A pattern of disputes soon emerged 
with the king promising ineffectively that patent grants would be curtailed, 
only to have his protestations met by further petitions of grievance from 
parliament. Thus, at the start of his reign in 1603,99 in 1606 
100 
and 
101 again in 1610, -in the last instance in his celebrated Book of Bounty, 
the King announced his intention to limit existing monopolies and not to 
102 grant new ones. -Parliament brought petitions of grievance in 1606, and 
1610103 and spoke bitterly against monopolies in 1614.104 In 1614 too, 
the common law courts had an opportunity to deal with the limits of the 
prerogative to grant patents in the Clothworkers of Ipswich Case. 
105 
The subject of the litigation was again a question relating to the changing 
guild system - it turned on the control of workers in a company of tailors. 
The court held that a royal patent granting'a monopoly to such a company 
was illegal but it took the opportunity to restate its policy on patents 
for new industry in the following way: 
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'But if a man hath brought in a new invention and a new 
trade within the kingdom, in peril of his life, and consumption 
of his estate or stock, etc. or if a man hath made a new 
discovery of any thing, in such cases the Kin'g of his grace 
and favour, in recompense of his costs and travail, may grant 
by.: charter unto him, that he only shall use such a trade or 
trafique for a certain time, because at first the people of 
the kingdom are ignorant, and have not the knowledge or skill 
to use it: but when the patent is expired, the King cannot 
make a new grant thereof: for when the trade is become common, 
and others have been bound apprentices in the same trade, there 
is no reason that such should be forbidden to use it. '. 106 
In Parliament agitation against monopolies in general continued to be 
a major political issue. It reached a climax in 1621 with the investigation 
of the patents of two royal favourites, Sir Giles Mompesson and Sir Francis 
Mitchell, who had been granted patents for the manufacture of gold and silver 
lace. These patents were cancelled and the pat entees punished-for fraudulently 
obtaining them. 
107 A Bill designed to control the granting of patents was 
introduced in that year but it failed to pass the House of Lords. 
108 
Finally, in 1624, largely on the instigation of Coke, parliament enacted 
the so-called Statute of Monopolies'09 which gave expression to its views on 
monopolies of all kinds in statute law. In the first section of this Act 
direct reference was made to James I's Book of Bounty of 1610 which, it 
was claimed, formed the basis of the Act since it too called for the abolition 
of all monopolies. 
110 Section 2 made provision for the validity of all 
monopolies and all such commissions, grants, licenses, charters, letters 
patents, proclamations, inhibitions, restraints, warrants of assistance 
to be determined by the common law. Section 6 created an exception from the 
general-prohibition for new industry. 
'Provided also, that any declaration before mentioned shall not 
extend to any letters patent and grants of privilege for the term 
of fourteen years or under, hereafter to be made, of the sole 
working or making of any manner of new manufactures within this 
realm to the true and first inventor and inventors of such 
manufactures, which others at the time of making such letters 
patents and grants shall not use, so as also they be not contrary 
to the law nor mischievous to the state by raising prices of 
commodities at home, or hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient: 
the said fourteen years to be accounted from the date of the first 
letters patents or grants of such privilege hereafter to be made, 
but that the same shall be of such force as they should be if this 
act had never been made and of none other. ' 
Even the passing of this Act did not bring an end to the disputes about 
monopoliesbetween the'Crown and parliament. In its later clauses (ss 9-14) 
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it made provision for numerous specific exceptions to its general prohibitions. 
In particular chartered companies were able to avoid the limitations which 
the Statute had placed on individuals. 
"' James I's successor, Charles I, 
used these loopholes and persisted in the policy of granting patents. In 
Christopher Hill's words: 'The ambivalence of Tudor economic policy turned 
into incompetent predatoriness under Charles I; and the merchant class 
polarized between the small group of government-privileged monopolists and 
, 112 the mass of rank-and-file traders. 
Parliament continued to respond by protesting vigorously. 
113 The common 
law courts were not called upon to decide on the validity of patent monopolies 
again and the system appears to have been enforced by the (conciliar) 
exchequer courts and by the court of the Star Chamber in particular. In 1641 
personal rule was terminated and the Star Chamber abolished, 
114 thus 
- 115 effectively bringing the enforcement of patents by the executive to an end. 
In the-same year, the Scottish parliament passed a Statute which, in words 
similar to the English Statute of Monopolies of 1624, limited to new industries 
the royal prerogative to grant monopolies. 
116 The effect was to bring the 
law on patents in Scotland into line with that in England. The procedure for 
granting them, however, remained separate. 
117 
VII. Legal content 
The overtly political disputes which surrounded the granting of monopolies 
must not allow one to lose sight of the fact that during this period the 
policy toward patents of monopoly as applied by both the 'government privileged 
monopolists' and in the common law remained within a mercantilist framework 
of calculated state interventionism. The consistently mercantilist nature of 
this approach becomes apparent on analysis of the legal principles which, in 
the 17th century, underpinned s6 of the Statute of Monopolies. Such a 
technique is particularly valuable in this instance as Coke, who was the 
author and instigator of the Statute, held that it was merely declaratory 
of the common law of the period. 
118 
A. Legal status 
The mercantilist nature of the state intervention is most apparent 
in the status ascribed to patents; for even if granted for the introduction 
of new technology they remained privileges not rights. Their granting 
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remained subject to it being established in each case that their operation 
would be to the public good. The idea that patents were in theory and in 
practice grants to be refused on grounds of publ ic policy, was shared by 
administrators and the courts. The administrators' attitude is reflected 
in the late Elizabethan refusal of patents for several new machines 
including Lee's stocking frame. 
119 The argument of public policy was also 
advanced in Darcv v Allin where it was suggested by counsel that the monopoly 
was justified since it limited card, playing - card playing, it was argued, 
120 
was bad for public morals. In this case the argument was rejected on the 
facts, but the principle remained. The mercantilist conception of the role 
of public policy in the granting of patents is perhaps best demonstrated by 
an, example which was used by Coke to illustrate the meaning of the words 
'generally inconvenient' in s 6: He describes, with apparent approval, how a 
patent for a mill designed to shape cloth for hat and cap making was refused 
on the grounds that it would put the eighty men whose labour it saved out of 
work. It was therefore ordered that this process be done by hand. 
121 
B. Subject matter 
Other, more specific words and phrases in the Statute of Monopolies 
can also be understood in terms of the policy of mercantilism. The focus 
was on the introduction of new industries as viable entities rather than as 
in the modern patent system on disclosure through patents of new knowledge 
about units of technology. The term 'new manufactures' in s6 was therefore 
used to inplude whole new industries. Such industries were, in modern 
patent law terms, the 'subject matter' of patent grants. 
There are numerous indications that the introduction of new industries 
had to be practically effected. 
_ 
One such indication is the limitation in s6 
of the Statute of Monopolies of a grant to a maximum 'term of fourteen years' 
- the period, Coke suggested, required to train two groups of apprentices . 
122 
More direct evidence is to be found in Hulme's analysis-of the patents of 
the Elizabethan era, which shows that those patents which related to new 
industry usually had a clause which made the grant subject to the introduction 
of the new industry within a fixed period. 
123 Not all grants had a clause 
making working of the patent compulsory but those that did not were mainly 
those that had functions other than the introduction of new industry. 
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C. PatOnts of addition 
The focus on whole new industries is further demonstrated by the fact 
that the subject matter was held to exclude improvements to existing 
processes - what are now known as patents of addition. There were two 
examples of patents refused because they were only requested for additions. 
In the first, Matthey's patent, a patent for an improvement in the hafts 
of knives was opposed by the London Company of Cutlers and refused on the 
grounds that 'such a light difference or invention should be no cause to 
restrain them'. 
124 The same rule was stated by Coke with reference to 
Bircot's Case: Much a privilege must be substantially and essentially 
newly invented but if the substance was in esse before, and a new addition 
thereunto, though that addition make the former more profitable, yet it is 
not a new manufacture in law. ' 
125 
D. Specification 
Another indication of the general focus on the practical introduction 
of new manufactures rather than on the abstract knowledge of new technology 
can be found in the fact that patentees were not required to specify how 
their new 'inventions' would work. There is a limited number of exceptions 
126 
to this general rule. Sturtevant's patent of 1611 is a famous example. 
127 
In terms of his original patent grant Sturtevant was required to supplement 
his brief initial outline by a more detailed description. He did so in his 
famous Treatise of Metallica. 
128 However, research has indicated that this 
description was not a specification of his invention in the modern sense but 
rather a general advertisement of his skills. 
129 Detailed specifications 
did not become standard practice until the 18th century. 
130 In the - 
mercantilist period the focus remained on the actual introduction of industry. 
Inventor 
The stress on the introduction of new industries is also apparent from 
the meaning of the words 'true and first inventor'in s 6. 'Inventor' did 
not have its modern meaning of the creator of something that was previously 
unknown but included a discoverer and an importer. 
131 In various grants 
it includes the 'bringer in' of technology on which new industries could be 
based. This is particularly true of early Elizabethan patents which were 




Coupled to this early meaning of inventor was a very limited test of the 
novelty of that which was to be patented. It merely had not to be in use in 
Britain: In the words of the statute 'such manufactures, which others at 
the time of making such letters patents and grants shall not use'. 
133 This 
meant that prior publication of the information on which the new manufacture, 
would be based was entirely irrelevant. A patent could only be invalidated 
on grounds of lack of novelty by prior use - and even that use would have to 
be within living memory. 
134 
VIII. Conclusion 
In what has been called the mercantilist period several important 
innovations were made in the sphere of new technology: 
(i) 
, 
Production based on new, improved technology expanded to such an 
extent that commodity production took place on a large scale. 
- (ii) An administrative apparatus was created which enabled the state to 
intervene (for good or ill - effectively or ineffectively) in this process. 
(iii) Once new technology became economically significant (potentially 
valuable) a struggle for its control developed between the administrative 
sector of the mercantilist state (the. king, the court favourites and 
officials) and the legal sector (the I egislature and the common law courts). 
The legal sector, as defined, eventually gained the right to lay down policy 
for intervention by the state. 
(iv) The rules which the legal sector developed to govern this intervention 
remained within the broad mercantilist framework which it shared with the 
administration and executive. Their common-sense understandings were not 
challenged by constitutional struggles. 
(V) Authorization from the state to control a unit of new technology 
remained a privilege to be granted or refused by the state. Technology 
had therefore not yet, even in theory, become a 'commodity'-capable of 
being formed and exchanged in the same way as the goods it was instrumental 
in producirg. Technology had become the subject of legal control. However, 
this 'subject' had not yet been conceived of as a legal right - it had not 
yet been cast into an 'unchanging legal form' of the kind which Renner 
perceived as the essence of all law. 
135 
From these specific conclusions it follows that, as far as technology 
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in the mercantilist period is concerned, one can accept the contention of 
Holloway and Picciotto that 
'the initial moment of the formation of the capitalist 
state is dominated by the spread of commodity relations. 
However, until commodity production becomes fully 
established (when labour power becomes a commodity and 
primary accumulation of capital achieved), social 
relations and state forms are by no means dominated 
by equal exchange, but rather by its opposite: compulsion. 
Thus the mercantile state is structured around trade 
privileges, monopolies and regulations of commerce. ' 136 
It remains to be seen whether, in a subsequent period, the control of 
new technology could be restructured, either in theory or in practice, to 
reflect 'equal exchange' in this economically crucial sphere. It can 
also not be assumed that the debate would always be contained within such 
a narrow framework as the mercantilist consensus. 
The potential for such restructuring was increased by the legal history 
of patents subsequent to the enactment of the Statute of Monopolies. As 
Hulme has summarised it: 
'For a period of over a century the reported cases are 
destitute of any decision of importance in this branch 
of jurisprudence. cLater decisions] ... attest a tendency to rely upon a verbal criticism of the Statute 
of Monopolies rather than upon the earlier practice, of 
which that statute is professedly an exponent. At the 
end of the eighteenth century, therefore, the Common Law 
Judges were left to pick up the threads of the principles 
of law without the aid of recent and reliable precedents. ' 137 
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CHAPTER 3 THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION 
I. Introduction 
From the middle of the 18th century onwards - i. e. after the long period 
of relative dormancy in the sphere of the law relating to the control of 
technological innovation - the courts began to reinterpret the law of patents. 
Before the end of the century they had made substantial changes to the legal_ 
form and content of the law. These changes ýhich will be detailed in this 
chapter) were effected without legislative intervention, without altering 
the bureaucratic structure by which patents were granted and even without 
the widespread public controversy which was to characterise the later history 
of the patent system. In order to understand these changes it is necessary 
to set them in the context of the reproduction of the changing social order 
of which they formed part. This can best be done by making generalizations 
about contemporaneous technological and economic developments and social 
changes. Inevitably there will be over-simplifications in this account. 
As is the case with the industrial developments of the 15th and 16th 
centuries there is a great difference of opinion among economic historians 
about the extent of development from the mid-18th century onwards. Thus 
AE Musson notes in a recent work: 'The older view of the Industrial Revolution 
that it was a. sudden cataclysmic transformation, starting around 1760 
clearly is no longer tenable. 
" Nevertheless, neither actual changes nor 
their significance should be underestimated. DS Landes in his book, 
The Unbound Prometheus, which can perhaps be regarded as the definitive 
study of technological development in Western Europe from the mid-18th_ 
century onwards, describes the changes as follows: 
'In the eighteenth century, a series of inventions transformed 
the manufacture of. cotton in England and gave rise to a new 
mode of production - the factory system. During these years, 
other branches of industry effected comparable advances, and 
all these together, mutually reinforcing one another, made 
possible further gains on an ever-widening front. ... These improvements constitute the Industrial Revolution. ' 2 
These technological innovations were paralleled by increased economic 
activity in the second-half of the 18th century. Although unspectacular 
by modern standards it was in marked contrast with levels of production 
of the period which preceded it. 
3 
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The social background to these changes has also been the subject of much 
enquiry - particularly by scholars seeking the causes of the Industrial 
4 Revolution. In this regard too a few generalizations must suffice: It 
seems that British society of this period was relatively 'open' if compared 
to other European societies: The social historian, H Perkin, has described 
the society which 'spontaneously generated'the Industrial Revolution' as 
5 'an open aristocracy based on property and patronage'. By this he meant 
that although there were enormous disparities of wealth and social status 
they, were not reflected in a few, monolithic social classes but rather in 
a large number of finely graded status rankings within which there was 
considerable mobility. (This use of the concept, class, is controversial; 
for it has often been argued that classes exist in all societies. 
6 In this 
thesis class is not used in the loose sense of 'ruling class' but refers 
to social formations, the emergence of which is mediated by industrial 
capi. talism. 
7) In the 18th century the social classes which were to 
characterize 19th century British society had not yet emerged. 
Significant changes at the level of hegemonic common sense are 
observable if the generally dominant ideas of the mid-18th century are 
compared to those current when the Statute of Monopolies was passed in 1624. 
Most significant was the change in attitude towards state intervention 
designed to stimulate and control the development of the economy. In the 
16th century and early part of the 17th century the desirability, in 
principle, of such intervention was accepted unquestioningly. By the 18th 
century direct state intervention in the internal economy 
8_ 
such as the 
granting of monopolies - had long declined. Although administrative 
apparatuses remained more or less intact, the weakened power of the monarchy 
(central government) did not allow for overall control. As Perkin has 
expressed it: 
'Laissez-faire a hundred years and more before the 
publicati The Wealth of Nations [in 17763 was the 
direct consequence of the breakdown at the Civil War of 
the "Privy Council system" of central control. ' 9 
This change in the actual role of the state was reflected in a large (and 
growing) measure of support - at different levels of the still largely 
'pre-class' social order - for ideas of development and innovation outside 
the framework of state intervention and unfettered by it. 
79. 
II. The ideal of unfettered technological innovation 
It should not be thought that the ideal of unfettered economic and 
technological development was instantaneously or universally accepted in 
the latter half of the 18th century. The ideal emerged gradually and the 
measure of popularity which it did-achieve was dependent on an intellectual 
climate in which 'progress' was held to be desirable and, more specifically, 
on a growing institutional structure which propagated the ideal in the course 
of stimulating technological innovation. 
10 
A major factor in the creation of the ideal was the intervention of 
the philosophers of the enlightenment who, even if sometimes doubtful as to 
human progress in an absolute sense, were quite prepared to prescribe radical 
means of introducing 'temporary' progress. In their writings they defined 
progress as development of new techniques- which, it was assumed, would, of 
their own accord, lead to the satisfactory solution of problems. From this 
it was only a short step to the definition of the problems in terms of the 
technological developments necessary for their solution. Where previously 
technical in 
, 
novations had been a means to progress they became an end - 
progress itself. The question of means became how technical solutions and 
innovations could best be introduced. Thus Hume assumed that the rise of the 
arts and sciences was conducive to progress and laid down as his first 
condition for this to happen: 'ItIhat it is impossible for the Arts and 
Sciences to arise, at first, among any people, unless they enjoy the 
blessing of*a free government'. 
11 The idea of the 'free government' was 
developed in a general way by other philosophers; particularly by Adam 
Smith who, in his influential work, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of 
the Wealth of Nations12 , equated the abolition of monopolies with such- 
li mitation of state interference as was required to set up a society in which 
progress could be made. 
The philosophical desire for innovative technological progress was 
supported by the major developments throughout Europe in what would today 
be known as 'pure' science. Thus in England the Royal Society, founded in 
1648,13 had provided a foundation of knowledge which could be practically. 
applied. Similar institutions had been set up in various European countries. 
14 
The question of the relationship between science and the 'practical' 
technology of industrial development has been hotly debated by historians. 
One school headed by Musson and Robinson, has pointed to the scientific 
i 
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background of several inventors - most notably James Watt who was educated 
in Scotland where he was in contact with eminent scientists like 
Professors Joseph Black and John Robison. Their critics, on the other hand, 
have pointed out that in several fields - notably smelting, brewing and 
certain chemical industries - scientific explanations were only discovered 
years after new processes had been introduced. 
16 Whether scientific 
discoveries led to specific technological innovations is less significant 
than the desire for unfettered enquiry engendered by the natural sciences 
and the methodological framework of empirical experimentation which they 
provided. Even if it cannot be shown that particular inventors were inspired 
by specific scientific information, it is true that many, if not most, 
'practical' inventors came into contact with 'pure' science, for inventors 
were involved in 'learned' societies which included scientists in their 
membership. 
The most influential of these societies was the Society for the 
Encouragement of'Arts and Manufacturers and Commerce which was founded in 
1754 with the aim (as its name indicates) of enc ouraging innovation in 
several fields. 
17 The original membership of the Society of Arts (as it 
came to be called) which included two peers, a teacher, a doctor and a 
18 drawing master, was, in Perkin's phrase, 'a microcosm of English society'. 
Rather than compete with the Royal Society which was, by this time, almost 
exclusively occupied with theoretical scientific problems, the Society of 
Arts attempted to encourage inventions and industrial design by giving 
rewards for solutions to specific practical problems. The link between 
availability of technological knowledge and progress was stressed at every 
opportunity. Thus, for example, W Shipley, the founder of the Society, 
remarked that the publication of information would lead to 'the Employi. ng 
of the Poor, to the Increase of Traýe and to the Riches and Honour of 
19 this Kingdom, by promoting Industry and Emulation'. 
Great stress was laid on useful contributions which would provide the 
maximum scope for innovative progress in industry. Thus even in the fine 
arts section prizes were predominantly awarded to 'art' which could be used 
to decorate the products of industry. This bias is most aptly illustrated 
by the Edinburgh Society for the Encouraging of Arts, Sciences, Manufacture-s, 
and Agriculture in Scotland (established'in 1753 -a body similar to the 
Society of Arts) which decided at one of its first meetings: 
'With-regard to the-application of the fund [for awards3 
the Society resolved that the rewards of*merit in the 
finer arts should be honourary; in the useful [arts] 
generally lucrative. ' 20 
Similar societies came into being in various provincial cities in 
the second half of the 18th century. They were linked not by any formal 
organization but by members belonging to more than one society and by 
acquiring other societies' publications. Thus, to take a single example, 
the relatively obscure Derby Philosophical Society included amongst its 
members Erasmus Darwin, the eminent scientist, and amongst its books the 
publications of the Royal Societies of London and Edinburgh, the Society 
of Arts, the Royal Irish Academy and the larger provincial societies like 
Manchester and Bath as well as some European publications. 
21 
Almost thirty such societies were founded in Britain during this 
period, in most cases by a similar combination of landowners, merchants 
and tradesmen. Some of them, like the remarkable Lunar Society in 
Birmingham, consisted of a small group of eminent men who by their own 
brilliance could attract distinguished speakers, while other, smaller 
societies were dependent on itinerant paid lecturers. 
22 While most 
of them had some cultural pretentions and occasionally debated questions 
of morality, they 'allowed themselves to be diverted therefrom by the' 
universal interest in technical progress'. 
23 This was particularly 
true'of the societies in industrial towns like Manchester where 'the 
great majority of the members were eiiher engaged or interested in the 
extension of Science and Art to manufacturing purposes'. 
24 
The new frame of reference from which problems should be approached 
and the broad social spectrum to which it was addressed, are accurately 
captured in the first edition of the Memoirs of the Manchester Literary 
and Philosophical Society, where a plan to make information more openly 
and readily available (by the founding of a library and a teaching 
institution) is prefaced in the following way: 
'That our manufactures at present depend very much upon 
machines: that the cotton manufacturer in particular is, 
under providence, entirely dependent upon them: and that 
their utmost improvement to the very highest point to which 
it is possible for them to arrive, is, in the present 
circumstances of trade very desirable, for the sake of 
every interest, and of every order of men, dependenfupon 
our manufactures, I will not here attempt to prove. They 
are positions denied by none but the most vulgar where alone 
such weakness is pardonable. Whatever therefore may tend to 
encourage and assist those arts by which mechanism may be improved 
and our manufactures extended is a matter of common utility and importance. The Clergyman, the Physician, the Gentleman are, I had almost said, equally interested with the Tradesman and 
the merchant. ' 25 
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As a social phenomenon the emergence of the various learned societies 
interested in new technology might be regarded (in the terms put forward 
by Cain and discussed in Chapter I above) as the constitution of 'ideolouical 
26 
sector'. The membership of the societies which made up the sector 
consisted of people from various social ranks. Its members shared the 
dominant 'common-sense' view which deprecated state intervention in 
the economic sphere while still accepting unquestioningly the primary 
duty of the state to protect property. At the same time they had a 
specific ideological commitment to technological innovation which they 
wished to make part of the common sense of society as a whole. As a 
positive force consciously shaping common sense this sector could be expected 
to play a significant part in determining the relationship between the state 
and new technology. 
Within the sector two ideas dominated in the consideration-of how 
inventors should be rewarded. The first was that knowledge should be made 
public. It was for this reason that the Society of Arts made known its 
disapproval of patents, for it regarded patents as inhibiting the spread 
of technological ideas. Its Rules and Orders of 1765 laid down 
I 
'No person shall be admitted a candidate for any premium 
offered by the Society who has obtained a patent for an 
exclusive right'of making or performing anything for 
which such a premium is offered. ' 27 
The second idea was that inventors had a right to material reward 
for their contributions to technological knowledge. For this purpose 
various learned societies offered rewards and prizes. However, these 
rewards were not the only inducements available to inventors, for there 
existed a parallel system of direct rewards by the state: i. e. grants made 
by parliament in response to petitions from inventors. Initially these 
rewards had been a form of direct (mercantilist) state intervention designed 
to encourage, on an ad hoc basis, industry in a particular field. Often 
they did not require complete publicity for the invention introduced. 
This is not surprising because parliament had occasionally made such awards 
long before the ideal of unfettered technological innovation had gained 
widespread acceptance. In 1732, for example, Sir Thomas Lombe was awarded 
114,000 for having introduced a silk industry based on Italian machines, on 
condition, not that he made the design of his machines generally available, 
28 but that copies of them were deposited in the Tower of London. 
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In the latter half of the 18th century parliamentary rewards, like 
private rewards, were granted on condition that the information was made 
public. Thus in 1779, for example, James Berkehout and Thomas Clerk 
petitioned parliament and said that they had discovered a new form of red 
dye. The petition was referred to a parliamentary committee which heard 
evidence and accepted letters of recommendation from various chemists and 
also, significantly, from an enthusiastic Manchester Committee of Trade, 
who were getting the knowledge without putting up the money themselves. 
The recommendation was favourable and as a result the petitioners were 
awarded E5000 (a far larger sum than the premiums offered by any of the 
societies) 'upon a proper Discovery to be made by them for the Use of 
29 the. Public of their Method of Dying Scarlet and Crimson-'. 
Rewards by the state and rewards by interested individuals were not 
two separate, exclusive ways, of encouraging innovation. Thus individual 
inventors wouTd approach a group or even interested individuals and offer 
to make an invention public; or again the state rather than a society, 
would offer an award for the solution of a specific technical problem such 
as the calculation of longitude. 
30 Perhaps the. best example of this 
interrelation is in the case of Samuel Crompton who offered to publish 
his invention, the 'mule', if a public subscription were raised. The 
subscription, however, produced very little (ilOO) and, when it was realized 
that he would not be rewarded adequately and that the Society of Arts would 
not support him, he petitioned parliament for a reward, and with the support 
of the same Manchester Merchants who had offered him a reward in the first 
place, he was finally given a grant of 15000 in 1812.31 
The fact that the sector was not opposed to rewards by the state (i. e 
to all state intervention in the sphere of new technology) gi. ves a clue to 
its attitude to patents. If patents were monopolies they were, as the 
Society of Arts had shown, an unacceptable form of state intervention. If, 
however, they protected the right of inventors to a material reward and if 
they did (eventually) increase the stock of publicly available technological 
knowledge'they might not be regarded as beyond the pale. This essentially 
ambiguous attitude of a hegernonic sector closely involved in shaping the 
ideal of unfettered technological innovation was to play a crucial role 
in shaping the law of patents. 
_84. 
III. Patent grants 
During the latter half of the 18th century, therefore, the ideal 
of innovatory progress by means of technological innovation had come to be 
strongly entrenched across a wide spectrum of British society. An 
institutional framework had sprung up to-encourage this Ueal. It 
provided the know-how with which new inventions could be facilitated and, 
within its loose framework, lent social prestige and, in some cases, granted. - 
monetary rewards to those who helped fulfil the ideal. Furthermore, the 
ideal was usually articulated in such a way as to suggest that it could best 
be fulfilled by allowing for the free exchange of knowledge and limiting 
or indeed abolishing the constraints of organized intervention in the economy. 
Against this background it seems anomalous that the number of patents 
granted increased significantly and steadily after 1760 - after. having been 
relatively stable in the preceding century (since 1659). 
32 
Number of patents granted 
1660-9 31 1730-9 56 
1670-9 51 1740-9 82 
1680-9 53 1750-9 92 
1690-9 102 1760-9 205 
1700-9 22 '1770-9 294 
1710-9 38 1780-9 477 
1720-9 89. 1790-9 647 
These statistics have long held a fascination for economic historians. 
Attempts have been made to use them as an index of inventive activity or 
even of technological change - thus suggesting that this change can be - 
related to other quantifiable indicators of economic growth. 
33 Serious 
objections can, however, be raised against the validity of using patent 
statistics in this way. First, it must be doubted whether technical . 
inventiveness can be quantified, for there is no assurance that all, or even 
most of, the significant inventions in a particular period were patented at 
all. ' In fact it has often been argued that improved techniques were the 
result of innumerable small and mostly unpatented improvements. 
34 
Second, there is no reason to suppose that patents can be qualitatively 
compared, for among patents there are obviously inventions that are mere 
flights of fantasy on the part of inventors. There are also a large and 
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varying nuinber of inventions which are simply of little or no commercial 
importance. The quality of patents is influenced both by the scientific 
knowledge available to allow a judgment on whether they are practicable or 
not, and also by the requirements of patentability laid down by the law. 
Even if allowance could be made for these factors, the bare statistics 
could not reveal whether a larger number of patents would have more 
influence on manufacturing techniques than a smaller number. 
A more probable immediate reason for the popularity of patents as a 
mode of controlling units of new technology was that patents were of great 
(or potentially great) economic value to some entrepreneur/caDitalists. 
Evidence of this can be found in the careers of the two major 18th century 
patentees, Richard Arkwright and James Watt - the latter in partnership 
with Matthew Boulton. Arkwright, by shrewd manipulation of licence agreements 
for the use of his patent, managed to earn large sums. His practice was to 
licence his competi. tors to use his machines. * These licences limited the amount 
of cotton they could produce using the machines. -Additional licence fees 35 
would have to be paid for 'overspinning Although Arkwright's patent 
was eventually overturned by the courts his income from it was not reduced, 
for as Chambre J (in an early decision, Hare. v Taylor, 
36 
which alluded to 
Arkwright's patent) explained 
'His [Arkwright's] patent was not overturned till near the 
time when it would have expired; very large sums had been 
paid for patent machinery, of which sums the main part was 
for the privilege of using the patent right; but no money 
which had so been paid was ever received back. ' 
Direct evidence of how lucrative a patent could be is available in-the 
instance of Watt's steam engine patent (which was extended for 25 years by an 
Act of Parliament in 1775 
37). Watt and his partner, Boulton, also extended 
the scope of their patent by ancillary contracts since they too did not sell 
their patent rights directly but charged a royalty based on a percentage 
of the cost of the coal saved by new machines which they supplied or by old 
machines which they converted to work according to their patented 'methods'. 
38 
in 1799, in an effort to have their patent extended further, Boulton and Watt 
made detailed calculations of the savings their patented machines had 
effected: They estimated what they ought to have been paid on the basis of a 
royalty of one third of the savings brought about by this patent and what 
they had in fact earned. They concluded: 
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'By a correct statement made in the Year 1793, it appears 
that Boulton and Watt's Engines compared with Common ones 
doing the same Work, effected Savings in One Year of 
138,605 reckoning Coals at 42/- per Wey; Boulton and Watt's 
third part of which amounted to il2,868 but in fact they only 
received E5,133: 7: 0. 
And though the price of Coals has been stated at only 42/- 
per Wey (that being the price settled between the Adventurers 
and Boulton and Watt) their real cost was 63/- per Wey and the 
Amount consequently 157,907. Boulton and Watt's third part 
of which should have been il9,302 instead of 15,133: 7: 0. ' 39 
On their own figures therefore, which would probably have been conservative 
since they were arguing that they had not been sufficiently rewarded, Boulton 
and Watt had made more than 15,000. out of their patent in a single year - an 
enormous sum for the 18th century. 
Patents were also of economic significance in the 18th century because 
they provided channels for investment. The economic historian, P Mathias, 
has noted with reference to the patent system of this period: 
'IT3he side of the patent law system which is too often ignored 
lies in its effects upon the inducement to invest rather than 
the inducement to invent. It created incentives for persons to 
back an inventor with risk capital in the riskiest of all 
ventures by offering them monopoly returns in the case of success. 
Often backers took their rewards in licences to operate a patent 
themselves without fee. ' 40 
Finally, indirect evidence of the economic significance of patents is 
offered by the cost of obtaining them: A solicitor's bill regarded as 
typical in 1808 totalled il25: 14: 9 for a patent in England. 
41 It included 
no fewer than forty separate items. Yet a further fee was necessary if- 
the patent were to be extended to the colonies. Separate administrations 
required that most of the items be duplicated if the patents were to be 
extended to Scotland and Ireland. 
42 The fact that patentees were prepared 
to risk such large sums in obtaining the relatively uncertain protection 
that 18th century patents offered, is prima facie proof of their perceived 
potentia. 1 value. 
IV. Patent law 
The economic success of individual early inventor-entrepeneurs cannot 
be regarded as a sufficient explanation for the revitalization of the patent 
system. Early (Elizabethan) monopolists had also made money out of 
monopolies without this contributing to their preservation.. The explanation 
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for the continued survival of the patent system can, it is submitted, 
rather be found in its ability to change in such a way that it was not 
incompatible with the dominant common sense. 
Change was facilitated by the long period of dormancy, from more or 
less 1650-1750, during which hardly any decisions in patent cases were 
reported. 
43 This enabled the courts to interpret the law afresh. In 
1785 Wm Weston, one of Boulton and Watt's attorneys, noted that 'from 
whatever cause it has arisen, it may with truth be said that the books 
are silent on the subject and furnish no clue to go by, in agitating the 
Question "What is the Law of Patents? " 
44 
. As late as 1795 Eyre CJ in 
Boulton and Watt v Bull 
45 
could still say: 'Patent rights are no where, 
that I can find, accurately discussed in our bo oks. ' 
The power of the courts to shape patent law was further facilitated by 
a procedural change made in 1753. As a result of a complex dispute about 
who should try the validity of the patent of a certain James, the Privy 
Council effectively divested itself of all jurisdiction in the validity of 
patents and left all such decisions to the courts of common law. 
46 It is 
probable that this led to increased flexibility for the courts (unlike 
the Privy Council) were institutionally separated from the unreformed 
bureaucracy which processed patent grants and which could be expected to 
demand adherence to established interpretations. 
In the latter half of the 18th century the courts took advantage of- 
the opportunity provided by the dormancy of the old system and by the 
procedural reforms to remould patent law. In a series of decisions, many 
of thefii arising from matters involving Arkwright and Watt themselves, the 
courts, while preserving the formal requirements of s6 of the Statute of 
Monopolies, reshaped patent law. Their modifications are best illustrated 
by comparing the legal position which emerged towards the end of the 18th 
century with that (described above) which existed shortly after the passing 
of the Statute of Monopolies. (A warning must be noted: owing to the vag-aries 
of 18th century law reporting - the first collection of patent cases appearing 
only in 181647 - changes might not have seemed quite as clearcut to 
contemporaries as they appear to be if reported decisions are analysed. ) 
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Legal status 
The most basic change effected by the courts in the 18th century was 
that they, in practice, recognized that in certain, defined circumstances 
a person had a right to a patent. While the wording of the actual grant 
continued to speak of a privilege granted by the Crown, thý-courts accepted 
that inventors had rights which could be embodied in a patent and enforced 
through it. The mercantilist idea that the state could choose to intervene 
by granting or refusing a patent in specific instances on general grounds 
of public policy was effectively overturned. This sentiment was clearly- 
expressed in 1785 by Lord Loughborough in Arkwright v Nightingale: 
48 
'We must never decide patent rights upon any idea of public 
benefit; a cause between two individuals cannot be determined 
upon consequential reasons, that it would be beneficial to the 
Public that one should prevail. The law has established the 
right of patents for new inventions; that law is extremely 
wise and just. ' 
The courts in'the 18th century did not define precisely what they 
meant by the 'right of patents' (nor did the legislature). In other 
countries where, under the influence of the enlightenment, a clearer break 
was made with past forms, there was less ambiguity: Thus the preamble 
to the patent law passed in 1791 by the French Constitutional. Assembly 
stated boldly, 
'that every novel 
can become useful 
who conceived it, 
the rights of man 
invention were no 
idea whose realization or development 
to society belongs primarily to him 
and that it would be a violation of 
in their very essence if an industrial 49 t regarded as the property of its creator'. 
A similar stance towards the rights of inventors was adopted in the 
United States of America on the basis of an interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment to the Constitution which gives Congress the power to 'promote 
the Progress of Science and the useful Arts' by giving to inventors the 
50 'exclusive Right' to their 'Discoveries. 
The move of the courts in Britain towards de facto recognition of a 
right to a patent was nevertheless enough to ensure a more liberal 
interpretation of patents in favour of the holder of the patent right - 
the patentee. 
51 It was also an indication that the focus in the control 
of technology was moving from public law (intervention by the state) to 
89. 
private law (rights of individuals). This point was noted in the 
contemporary jurisprudence: As early as 1762 Adam Smith remarked in his 
Lectures on Jurisprudence: 'cT]he property which one has in ... a machine 
he has invented, which continues by patent in this country for 14 years, 
is actually a real right'. ' 
52 
1 
The 'right' of a patentee, whether it be in the juridic form of property 
right or the product of a contract53 between the patentee and thý state, was 
granted because the patentee as an individual had 'earned' some reward 
because of the contribution which he had made to new technology and thus to 
progress: As Ashurst J argued in support of Watt's (somewhat dubious) 
patent in 1799: 
'Every new invention is of imp*ortance to the wealth and 
convenience of the public; and when they are enjoying 
the fruits of a useful discovery, it would be hard on 
the inventor to deprive him of his 'reward. ' 54 
B. Subject matter 
In the mercantilist period the words 'new manufýcture' in the Statute 
of Monopolies had been interpreted to mean 'new industry' and patents had 
been deemed to be valid only if they would serve to secure the introduction 
of such industries. In the 18th century the term was reinterpreted to refer 
to new technology, for it was believed that such technology would 
automatically lead to the introduction of new industries. The modern 
concept of 'subject matter' (which means that which can be patented) has 
its legal roots in an interpretation of the term 'new manufacture' in 
Boulton and Watt v Bul, 
55 in which it was held that an 'abstract scientific 
principle could not be patented. but only inventions which resulted in an 
article which was industrial and vendible. In his judgment, delivered in 
1795, Heath J held that 'ES3uch manufactures are reducible to two classes. 
The first class includes machinery, the second substances (such as medicines) 
56 formed by chemical and other processes... '. Further glosses on this 
definition by the courts followed the same line of reasoning (and remained 
the basis of the definition of subject matter until the definition was 
codified in 197757 ). 
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C. Patents of addition 
A further change followed from the changed nature of inventions for 
which patents were sought. In 1776 Lord Mansfield, in the case Morris v 
Branson 58, changed the rule laid down in the Elizabethan judgment in 
. 59 Bircot's case that a new addition to-an existing product or process was 
not patentable. Lord Mansfield's judgment (if there was one) has not 
survived but merely that he had suggested to a juryman that, if the objection 
that the patent were a mere addition were upheld, 'that objection would go 
to repeal almost every patent that was ever granted' and that, as a result, 
the patentee was granted 1500 damages by the jury. From this somewhat 
oblique reference the principle seems to have crept into the law: Morris v 
Branson was quoted with approval in 1795 by Buller J in Boulton & Watt v Bull 
60 
61 
and the principle confirmed in 1799 by Grose J in Hornblower v, Boulton & Watt. 
The fact that patents of addition were allowed underlines the shift in the 
perceived function of the patent system from the encouragement of whole new 
industries to the encouragement of new techniques. Patents of addition have 
62 
remained part of modern patent law. 
0. Specification 
A crucial change to patent law came about gradually with the introduction 
of a compulsory specification. as a condition for the granting of a patent. 
In other words, a patentee would have to lodge a detailed description of the 
operation of the patent enabling others to make the patented article or 
substance when the patent had expired. The Statute of Monopolies made no 
provision for such a condition. As has been seen above, early patents 
concentrated on the introduction of new industries the, workings of which 
could hardly be described in anything less than a treatise. However, the 
general search for technical solutions to specific problems meant that the 
subjects for which patents were required became more narrowly circumscribed 
and accurate definitions of the patent more important. In the first half 
of the 18th century inventions had become more technical. It became common 
practice to grant patents only on condition that the inventor specified his 
invention precisely. By the middle of the 18th century it was part of the 
procedure of the patent' grant to demand a detailed description. 
63 In 1778, 
64 in the case of Liardet v Johnson, Lord Mansfield reconsidered the function 
of the specification. Since the claim of introducing a specific new industry 
by means of the patent had been abandoned he held that the specification now 
had to embody the function of the patent. In his words: 
91. 
'The ... point is whether the specification 
is such as 
instructs others to make it. For the condition of giving 
encouragement is this: that you must specify upon record 
your invention in such a way as shall teach an artist, 
when your term is out, to make it - and to make it as well as 
youby your directions: for then at the end of the term, the 
public have the benefit of it. 65 
This new function of the specification, and indeed of the patent, can 
easily be reconciled with the general approach to technical information which_ 
has been outlined but did notAmmediately settle the function of the 
s pe ci fi cati on. 
In 1781 Arkwright's famouý patent for his water-frame was rejected by 
the courts in the case of Arkwrigh v Morduant , 
66 'on the ground that the 
patent was void, from obscure and incomplete specification of the invention'. 
However, the finding did not deter Arkwright, for in 1782 he petitioned 
parliament asking that his patent be declared valid saying that the vagueness 
of his specification was intentional since, 
'It3o prevent his inventions getting abroad to foreigners, 
Mr. Arkwright purposely omitted to give so full-. and 
particular a description of his inventions, in the 
specification of his last patent, as he would otherwise 
have done, believing, from the concluding clause in the 
patent, that he need not so fully describe'. 67 
p 
The argument which Arkwright put forward might have succeeded in the 
mercantilist period when patents formed part of a policy designed to 
encourage and protect domestic industry. By the 1780's, however, the courts 
had declared that this was not the object of the patent system; but rather 
that patents were granted as an inducement to make public new technology. 
Arkwright seems to have been little inhibited by his own admission 
and in February 1785 brought a successful action against one Nightingale 
for infringement of his patent. 
68 In this action he led the evidence of 
various 'experts' and successfully proved the sufficiency of his specification. 
However, his-opponents reacted strongly and in June 1785 his patent was finally 
69 defeated. In this final case Arkwright's petition was used as evidence 
against him and the Judge stated the law on specifications unequivocally: 
92. 
'A patentee must disclose his secret in his specification, 
so that others may be taught the art by it, to do the thing 
for which the patent is granted; it must teach what the art 
is, and put the public in possession of the secret, in as 
ample and beneficial a way as the patentee himself uses it. '70 
The specification has remained an essential part of patent law. 
Indeed modern patent bureaucracies concentrate on processing and testing 
the adequacy of specifications. 
71 
Inventor 
It has been noted above that, at the time the Statute of Monopolies was 
passed, the word, inventor, had a far wider meaning than that current in 
ordinary speech today and included, the assembler of the ideas of others 
and 'the bringer in' or discoverer. By the end of the 18th century this 
definition appears to have been largely rejected in common usage. Thus 
in Rv Arkwright72 Arkwright's invention was attacked inter alia on the 
grounds that he had not-invented the patented machine himself - although 
he had undoubtedly assembled and improved the various parts that made up 
the machine and in so doing had been instrumental in promoting a new 
industry. 
This rule that the invention had to be the idea of the inventor was 
limited in one. way. The rule laid down in the early (1697) case of 
Egeberry v Stephens73 that the term inventor also included the 
. first 
importer of patentable ideas, was followed - albeit for pragmatic reasons. 
In Boulton and Watt v Bull 
74 Eyre CJ held: 
'That case EEdgeberry v Stephens] establishes, that the first 
introducer of an invention practised beyond the sea, shall 
be deemed the first inventor; and it is there said the act is 
intended to encourage new devices useful to the kingdom and 
whether acquired by travel or study, it is the same thing. ' 
He continued to say that 'this construction is now universally accepted 
in our courts', and argued: 
'Whether this construction be logically correct is not 
material; but it is of greatest importance for the 
improvement of the trade of the realm that all possible 
encouragement should be given to the introduction of 
discoveries useful to man from every region of the globe... '. 
93. 
This exception remained part of English law but has increasingly 
been recognized as an anomaly. 
75 It does not form part of the EEC patent 
introduced in 1977. 
F. Novelty 
The importance of the patent as a means of conveying information led 
to the re-examination of the degree of novelty required in a patent. While 
previously an invention had been regarded as 'new' if it had not. been used 
within the realm within the memory of man the focus in the 18th century was 
on new knowledge rather than industry. This meant that prior publication 
became a relevant factor. In the case of Liardet v Johnson 
76 the defence 
listed a whole battery of previous publications which described the patent. 
Although these succeeded in convincing the editor of the Monthly RevieW77 
(when published in pamphlet form the, following year) that the invention was 
not new, they were less successful in convincing the jury - perhaps because 
Lord Mansfield in his summing up stressed that what was required was not 
absolute novelty but that the invention was not in the knowledge of the trade 
at the time when the letters patent were granted. 
78 
The result was that the courts, while moving some way towards the ideal 
of open information suggested by the new role of the specification, were 
still bound by the Statute of Monopolies to the extent that it limited the 
search for prior publication to the trade, within the realm, thus still 
thinking in terms of patents designed to introduce new trades. Nevertheless, 
a trend towards emphasizing novelty had been set. Since the 18th century 
standards of novelty have been raised even further - most recently by the 
Patents Act 1977.79 The trend towards-strict requirements of novelty - is 
also part of the focus on new technology. 
V. The exercise of power in the period of transition 
Perhaps the most strikinb feature"of the increased use of patents as 
a mode of controlling new technology in the latter half of the 18th century 
(and of the changes in patent law during this period) is the relative ease 
with which it was accomplished. However, it should not be thought that, 
because the changed patent system was so easily accepted, there was no 
opposition to it. Opposition came from those, at both ends of the social 
spectrum, who were opposed to all innovational change. At one end, that 
94. 
of'the established worker threatened by new techniques, the opposition 
is illustrated by the 'cotten spinners and others' who in 1780 petitioned 
parliament against 'an Evil of Great Magnitude ... the Introduction of Patent 
Machines and Engines of Various Descriptions, 
80 
and who, before that, in 
1779 and 1767, had attempted to hold up innovational change directly by 
smashing the offending machinery. 
81 At the other end of the spectrum, 
an analysis of the debates of the House of Lords shows a general suspicion 
of innovation expressed in a principled opposition to rewards for innovations-, 
whether the rewards were made in the form of patent grants or cash. 
82 
Both these groups appealed to the traditional notion of a patent only 
being granted for socially desirable change since otherwise it would be 
'mere monopoly' and therefore despicable. Thus the cotton spinners in their 
petition to parliament did not deny that the patent. machines were more 
efficient that they were, but stressed the unemployment that machines caused 
and the lower quality of machine produced goods which would have a negative 
effect on British trade. In other words they were arguing along the lines 
which' the courts were decisively to reject in 1785 in Rv Arkwright 
83 
, that 
the consequ. ences-of the patent and its effect on the public should be taken 
into consideration when determining the validity of a patent. 
In their reliance on the traditional criticism of patents as monopolies 
'traditionalists' were joined by certain established factory owners. Although 
in general terms factory owners formed part of the hegemonic sector which 
supported progress based on technological innovation, they were opposed to 
patents for innovations which would upset the pattern of their operations. 
For example, a body of manufacturers in Manchester in 1781 organized a 
, 84 committee to protect its interests. This committee was initially set up 
to combat Arkwright's attempt to sue them for the infringement of his patent. 
It proceeded, however, to oppose patents in general and to devise alternative 
methods of encouraging and rewarding inventors. 
85 
In the light of all this opposition against the patent system it is 
clear that the protection both of individual patents and of the system in 
general required an exercise of power. It is submitted that the structure 
of British society in which a fairly wide range of persons had access to 
the ruling (aristocratic) elite provided the framework within which such 
power could be exercised. 
95. . 
A. Power and individual patents 
The relative uncertainty 
the control of new technolog., 
exercise power directly - in 
dimensional f6n-n -in order to 
of the principle governing the law relating to 
y allowed patentees and their associates to 
Lukes'terms outlined above, 
86 in a one- 
ensure that specific decisions were made in 
their favour. The events surrounding Watt and Arkwright's patents provide 
several illustrations of the exercise of power of this kind. The best 
documented example is the extension in 1775 of the fourteen year period 
of Watt's patent for another 25 years. 
87 In his article, 'Matthew 
Boulton and. the A-rt of Parli. amentary Lobbying', E Robinson has shown that 
the extension depended on the shrewd and calculated persuasion. of members 
of parliament by Watt, and particularly by Boulton, who had numerous 
contacts in the ruling elite. 
88 
In the legal defence of their patents patentees were also able to call 
on supporters of innovational progress. Prominent members of the Lunar 
Society testified on behalf of Arkwright in trials involving hi. s patent. 
89 
Watt too was able to draw on the leading scientists of the day to: testify 
on the validity of his patent: Sir William Herschel, the astronomer, 
JA De Luc, the Swiss chemist, Samuel More, the Secretary of the Society 
of Arts and Professor Robison of Edinburgh all gave evidence. 
90 A great 
deal of their evi dence was about Watt's character rather than his work. 
Much of the evidence was legally irrelevant yet crucial to the success of 
the case. As, Farey, an early 19th century patent expert, explained: 
'According to the ordinary practice of the Courts of law 
in other cases, Mr Watt's patent ought to have been annulled' 
for theinsufficiency of the specification, which is a series 
of definitions of principles of action without any description 
of the means of carrying them into effect. And it is certain 
that if the specification had not been supported by scientific 
artists, who stated that it was sufficient in their opinion, 
and if the merit of Mr Watt's engine had not been so universally 
allowed ... his 
ýight could not have been established as a mere 
question of law.... ' 91 
There is evidence that Boulton and Watt regarded efforts at exercising 
power to protect their patents as highly important. In a letter to Watt 
after Arkwright's patent had been defeated, Boulton intimated as much: 
96. 
'If he CArkwright] had been a more civilized being and 
had understood mankind better he would now have enjoyed 
his patent. Hence let us learn wisdom by other men's 
ills. ' 92 
Finally, E Robinson has unearthed evidence which suggests that at the 
time of the trials involving Watt's project, Boulton and Watt took advantage 
of the relative. openess of the social structure to become personally 
acquainted with and to influence the judges in these trials. 
93 1*f their 
actions were a decisive factor in the decisions of these judges it would be 
the clearest of all examples of a direct exercise of power by individual 
patentees during this period. 
B. Power and the patent system 
In the preservation and evolution of the patent system as a whole power 
was exercised more indirectly. Changes could only be effected which did not 
threaten the aristocratic elite's sources of power in property and patronage. 
The system could be adequately defended(and even changed)in as far as it 
succeeded in discounting the inherent 'weakness', that patents are in a sense 
, monopolistic py9vileges granted by the central government, and in stressing 
that they are (property) rights. This point was cleverly made by 
Wm Kenrick, a contemporary pamphleteer. Kenrick, a strong supporter of the 
patent system, argued that the distinction which some lawyers drew between 
incorporeal rights (of which patents were the most important example) and 
corporeal rights, serve no purpose. For, he contended, 'there are incorporeal 
rights as readily ascertainable by law and as justly entitled to the 
protection of it as others which arq 
, 
corporeal'. 
94 In 1775 in a remarkable 
passage (which foreshadowed some of the more radical arguments of the 19th 
century) he explained that incorporeal property, such as patent rights, 
complemented the early property owning order: 
'Every man that Providence sends into the world has a 
natural right to live in it; and if to live in it, to the 
means of subsistence. In the present state of society, 
however, the man who is born to no estate, real or personal, 
finds the means of subsistence already engrossed by prior 
occuýants; he is therefore of necessity reduced to the 
creation of new means of livelihood; a right to all corporeal 
property being already secured to others he must have recourse 
for subsistence to the incorporeal property he is endowed 
with by Nature in the use of his personal talents; he must 
live by his wits or his. labour. ' 95 
97. 
The conceptualizations of patent 'rights' which, as has been seen above, 
were developed embryonically by the courts towards the end of the 18th 
century served to support Kenrick's line of reasoning. 
The patent system was also legitimated in the eyes of the aristocratic 
elite by presenting it as part of a natural order. It has been noted how in 
this period a hegemonic sector played a crucial role in gaining acceptance 
for unfettered innovational progress as part of the natural order. 
Protagonists of the patent system suggested that patents were the 'natural' 
instrument for achieving such progress. Thus a contributor to the 
Gentleman's Magazine of 1785 claimed a central 'place for patents in a perfect 
society -a society which followed 'the dictates of both reason and gratitude 
iby rewarding its inventors]... for they are held to have contributed to 
civilize human nature, to improve the morals, polish the manners, relieve the 
96 
wants and increase the happiness of the species'. Similarly, Adam Smith 
conceived of a 'natural order' in which the patent system operated as a 
relatively unproblematic exception to the rule of minimum state interference 
in the economy. 
97 
As far as the preservation of the system as a whole was concerned, here 
were clearly structural forces which operated in conjunction with patentees 
to legitimate it. Changes in the law can also be explained in terms of 
indirect pressures to increase the legitimacy of the system. Changes in the 
procedures for granting patents, however, were subject to different forces. 
It is not unreasonable to assume that a cheap, simplified method of granting 
patents which did away with the formalities of the early modern bureaucracy 
would have been in the interest of patentees. Such a step would, however, 
have threatened the aristocracy'ý traditional authority to exercise power 
in the central administration by means of patronage. 
In the 18th century the issue of general administrative reform was 
raised by Watt, ' the most articulate spokesman of the patentees. 
98 It does 
not seem as if such reforms were considered seriously by, the authorities 
in this period. This is an indication that power was exercised in what 
Lukes has called a two-dimensional form - i. e. by keeping the matter off the 
agenda. The fact that, in contrast to the 19th century, the issue was so 
rarely raised, points to an even more indirect exercise of power, the 
exercise of power by the effective exclusion of the insight that a problem 
existed - in Lukes' terms, the three-dimensional view of power. In as far 
98.1 
as class ideals had not yet emerged, the hegemonic dominance of the 'open' 
aristocracy ensured that reforms would not be considered. This most 
subtle form of power could therefore be exercised as a consequence of the 
(largely) pre-class 18th century social structure. 
VI.. Summary and conclusion 
A., Patents remained important in the control, of new technology in 
the 18th century but both their function and form changed. In function 
there was a shift of emphasis from control of new industries to direct 
control of units of new technology. The legal form of patents changed 
from a privilege granted in public law by the-state to a de facto private 
right of a novel kind but analogous to a property right. The change in 99 
function can be understood in terms of Renner's analysis outlined above 
as analogous to the changes in function undergone by other branches of the 
law in different modes of production. The change in legal form is, however, 
a factor outside the model which Renner put forward, since he did not 
consider the possibility of a legal 'structure' (such as the patent system 
with its formalities) remaining intact while the underlying legal form 
changed. The significance of this change is further considered in the 
concluding chapter. 
B. If the period described in this chapter, the start of the Industrial 
Revolution, is equated with the beginning of what Holloway and Picciotto 
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call the 'liberal moment of the state' . it is noteworthy that control of 
new technology was, to some extent, liberated from the grasp of the state. 
The termination of the power of the state to decide relatively freely whether 
or not to grant a patent in a specific instance created the basis for a 
'market' in which units of technology defined as a matter of course in terms 
of general legal rules, could be treated as commodities. The existence of 
the 'market', however, depended on the involvement of the state (acting 
through a cumbersome and expensive bureaucracy) in defining the commodity. 
The contradiction between an ideology which denied the significance of 
state intervention and a system of control of new technology which depenýed 
on such state intervention, was not an issue in the 18th century. 
C. If the changes in the patent system are conceived in Weberian terms, 
additional features require comment. The movement towards a concept of 
patent rights can be equated with the general development of law in the 
99.. 
direction of logical, formal rationality which Weber regarded as 
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characteristic of law in modern industrial societies . Patent 
'Mghts' 
are abstract legal concepts. As Weberian theory predicted, legal notables 
(lawyers acting, in this instance, through the courts) had played a part 
in introducing these concepts. In terms of Weberian theory one could 
expect them to continue to develop the logical implications of the legal 
forms that had been adopted. However, in the administrative apparatus 
which granted the patents, equivalent or parallel development towards 
logical formalism had not, as Weber might have expected, taken pl ace. The 
complex 'early modern bureaucracy' continued to follow extrinsically formal 
procedures in the application of seals and the processing of patent applications 
by various offices which served no apparent 'rational' purpose except that of 
providing sinecures for the office holders. 
D. This disjunction between the development of the 'legal' elements of 
the patent system and the virtual stagnation of the bureaucratic elements 
has been explained in terms of the structural features of 18th century 
society. It has been shown that the dominant (aristocratic) elite allowed 
(and participated in) the direct exercise of power in the defence of 
individual patents and the simultaneous protection and adaptation of the 
patent system. It has also been suggested that the same elite, through 
the largely indirect exercise of powerexcluded the, patent administration 
from the ambit of change. This explanation for the particular changes 
could not have been deduced from a general model of the emergence of law 
but required examination of actual structures. 
E. The ideological sector which, by propagating a new attitude towards 
technological innovation, had served as a catalyst for change, remained within 
the structural and hegemonic constraints of pre-class society. The sector 
included men of differing social rankings (landed gentry, manufacturers and 
workmen etc. ) which, in the 19th century, were to form the basis of a division 
of society into different social classes. In the 18th century this division, 
with its competing class ideologies seeking hegemonic domination, had not yet 
developed. Nor had a large body of patentees or oF professionals dealing 
exclusively with new technology - i. e. interest groups/fractions situated 
within a class structure and providing ideological support for the patent 
system - come into existence. Although, to a large extent, the legal form 
of the patent system was firmly established during the latter half of the 
18th century, the social structure in which the efficiency and eventually 
the legitimacy of the system as a whole would be questioned, had only begun 
to emerge. 
100. 
CHAPTER 4- SOCIAL CHANGE AND NEW IDEALS 
Introduction 
In the 19th century the effects of the Industrial Revolution of the 
18th century increasingly began to be felt not only on further industrial 
development and a concomitant, continued demand for new technology but 
also on the social structure of society as a whole. In this chapter the 
impact of these changes on views on how new technology should ideally be 
controlled will be explored and the positions of influence of three 
emerging social groupings discussed. In subsequent chapters a more 
chronological account of the creation of the modern patent system will be 
resumed against the background of these developments. In order to focus 
specifically on new technology some very broad assumptions about social 
developments must be made. 
The major change in the social structure of early 19th century Britain 
1 
was a movement towards a society divided along the lines of social class. 
A synoptic view would suggest that the conditions for the emergence of class 
consciousness were formed by the productive relations introduced by the 
industrial revolution - i. e., most importantly, through the factory system 
but also through increased urbanization which loosened the 'traditional' 
bonds between employers and employees and which, at the same time, brought 
employees (workers) from different enterprises closer together. Under these 
conditions. workers became conscious of their shared interests of their 
2 
relationship as a class. At about the same time an awareness of class 
interests opposed to those of both the aristocratic elite and the working 
class began to emerge among industrial employers - the entrepreneur/capitalists 
who were to make up the core of what became known as the middle class. 
Finally, the aristocratic elite too became aware of its class interests. 
In broad terms therefore it could be said that British society was developing 
towards a three-tier stru. cture of upper (aristocratic), middle and working 
classes. 
Emerging social classes were not the only 'new elements' in the social 
structure of 19th century Britain. Within the middle class occupational 
groups were organising themselves into professions with their own areas of 
expertise and their own ideologies. 
3 Early pre-industrial 'professionals' 
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such as doctors and lawyers were also reorganizing. These changes were, 
it has been suggested by MS Larson in her work, The Rise of Professionalism4 
'an accessory development' of the great transformation wrought by the 
Industrial Revolution. This transformation she has noted, led to the 
replacement of a relationship of patronage with one in which a 'market' 
could be created for professional services. In order to take advantage of 
this potential market a 'collective effort' on the part of an occupational 
group was required. 
5 
Class consciousness and the related, more specific, ideals of the 
emerging professions implied a move away from the unquestioning acceptance 
of the existing social order. In other words, the hegemonic dominance of 
the old elite came to be challenged by the newly emergent social classes 
with their own 'common-sense'- view of how society ought to be organized. 
This challenge inevitably led to a measure of class conflict. 
These structural changes were to have a significant impact on the 
further development of the law relating to the control of new technology, 
for members of the various classes shared notions about technological 
progress and about how the technical knowledge required for it should be 
produced and controlled. In the sections that follow the content of the 
ideology put forward as common sense in the sphere of the production and 
control of new technology by 'ideologies' of the middle and working classes 
will be examined for indications of developments which one would expect to 
be supported by the particular class. At the same time the dissemination 
of their ideas will be studied in order to ascertain, as clearly as possible, 
to what extent their ideas became hegemonically dominant. The ideas of the 
old aristocracy (the emerging upper class) will not be examined separately 
but their residual power will be borne in mind and considered when actual 
changes in the system of control of new technology are discussed in the 
following chapter. In a further section of the present chapter the social 
basis and ideological assumptions of the professional group most cl , osely 
connected with the control of new technology will be considered in detail 
for, although they were, to a large extent, merely a fraction of the emerging 
middle class they were in a uniquely powerful position to shape developments 
in this sphere. 
II. The classical economistsand the middle class 
By the time the newly emergent social classes came to formulate the 
assertive ideologies which would justify models of society in which they, 
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rather than the old aristocracy, would play central parts, various ideals 
other than those of a natural order based on patronage and property were 
already beginning to surface. Amongst these were some of the ideas of 
early economists and particularly of Adam Smith. In the 19th century 
Smith's ideas remained influential, particularly in the heterogenous 
intellectual school known as the classical economists. - 
This school is of great importance, for in the first half of the 
century the theories of the classical economists came to dominate economic 
thought and eventually became the basis for almost all debates on economic 
matters. In particular the emergent middle class claimed to adopt the 
tenets of classical, or as it was sometimes known, 'political economy', 
as descriptive of its ideal of how society ought to be composed. 
The significance of classical economy lies both in its content and in 
the extent of its dissemination - among members of the nascent middle 
class and among other classes over which the middle class wished to extend 
its hegemonic domination. In order to explain the. potential of classical 
economy, both to reveal the interestsof the middle class and to justify the 
protection of these interests in the sphere of new technology, the content 
of the ideas of the classical economists must first be analysed. Once this 
has been done one can consider how these ideas were spread. 
A. Content 
In general most of the classical economists shared the ideal of 
unfettered technological progress which had emerged in the 18th century. 
Technological knowledge, it was believed, following Adam Smith, would 
grow in a society in which a division of labour existed and in which the 
role of the state was limited to the creation of conditions in which the 
'invisible bond' of the free market economy could ensure development and 
progress. 
(i) Adam Smith: In the Wealth of Nations Smith explained how 
the division of labour led to the production of knowledge: 
'A great part of. the machines made use of in those 
manufactures in which labour is most subdivided, were 
originally the inventions of common workmen, who, being 
each of them employed in some very simple operation, 
naturally turned their thoughts towards finding out 
easier and readier methods of performing it. ' 7 
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A close reading of Smith's writings on the creation of new technology 
shows, however, that he did not regard all technological innovation as 
equally important. In his Lectures8 , where he dealt with the problem at 
greater length, he distinguished between the worker whose mind was focused 
by the problem with which he had to deal and the 'philosopher' who was 
capable of something as profound as the invention of the steam engine since 
he had a broader overview of the problems involved. 
9 It thus appears that 
Smith recognised a hi. erarchy of inventions in which the more 'abstract' 
inventions are superior although they too ultimately depend on the division 
of labour and the skills of artisans for their implementation 
N Rosenberg has summarised Smith's position on this point as follows: 
'In short, the "capacity" to invent cannot be assessed or 
measured in absolute terms; the concept is meaningful only 
in relation to the complexity of the'existing technology 
and the degree of creative imagination required in order for 
new "breakthroughs" to occur. Presumably, then, even if the 
aler * 
tness and intellectual capacity of the common labourer 
remained constant, or increased somewhat, it would be inadequate 
to perform the increasingly complicated intellectual feats 
required of an inventor in a technically progressive society. ' 10 
The implication of this was that, as society advanced, only the 
'philosopher', i. e. the man with a wide education, would be able to make 
'real' inventions, while the labourer would be limited to the 'mere' 
improvements that followed 'inevitably' from the division of labour. As 
far as important inventions were concerned, therefore, it did not matter 
that, in Smith's view, the division of labour with its increased 
specialization also led to a numbing of the workers' intelligence since, as 
long as the division left a class of broadly educated 'philosophers', they 
would be able to take care of the opportunities for invention offered by 
the division of labour. Such a 'natural order' of society was ideal for 
the production of knowledge and could be reinforced in several ways. 
For those directly involved in the productive process Smith advocated 
only a limited 'practical' education which on the one hand ameliorated the 
inevitable hardships of the division of labour and on the other improved the 
'dexterity' of the workers. The expense involved could easily be justified 
in terms of. an increase of wealth: 
'The improved dexterity of the workmen may be considered 
in the same light as a machine or instrument of trade - 
which facilitates and abridges labour, and which though it 
costs a certain expense, repays that expense with a profit. ' 11 
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Education for workers should be organized by the state - though as far 
as possible be financed by thos e receiving the education - since it would 
help to preserve a stable social order. For the same reasons of social 
stability and heightened skills the efforts of the workers and therefore 
the fruits of the division of labour might be further stimulated by small 
rewards for practical improvements. In Smith's words: 
'Premiums given by the publick to artists and manufacturers 
who excel in their particular occupations, are not liable 
to the same objections as bounties. By encouraging 
extraordinary dexterity and ingenuity, they serve to keep 
up the emulation of workmen actually employed in these 
occupations, and are not considerable enough to turn 
towards any one of them a greater share of the capital of 
the country than that what would go to it of its own accord. 
Their tendency is not to overturn the natural balance of 
employments, but to render the work which is done in each as 
perfect and compleat as possible. ' 12 
In contrast Smith suggested a far broader education for those at the 
top (in effect members of the upper and middle classes) who, largely free 
from the ravages of the division of labour, were able to cope with more 
profound problems. For the production of their qualitatively different 
knowledge they required a broader, though still 'useful', education so 
that they could consolidate the inventive opportunities offered by the 
division of labour. Furthermore, they should be allowed to exploit 
knowledge in the marketplace by being granted temporary monopolies through 
the existing patent system. 
13 
Of central ideological importance to, the middle class was Smith's 
distinction between trifling improvements and real inventions which were 
to be rewarded in different ways. It provided a basis for an argument 
to exclude lesser inventions from the legal apparatus of the patent system 
while supporting patents for major inventions. Thus a distinction could 
be drawn between the new technology produced by working men and the new 
technology produced by 'true' inventors. 
In dealing with the problems of the inventive process Smith was in fact 
formulating the notion. of an interventionist state which belied later 
vulgarizations of his work which suggested that he supported a completely 
laissez-faire approach. 
14 State intervention was suggested in two different 
but complementary ways: first by encouraging the social conditions most 
favourable for the production of knowledge; and second, direct intervention 
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into the market itself by means of grants of patent monopolies. The latter 
role of the state was to be reformulated and more clearly justified by later 
classical economists. 
(ii) Jeremy Bentham: Of the later writers who considered the 
production and control of new-technology the most detailed treatment is 
found in the work of Jeremy Bentham, the influential social philosopher and 
15 
economist. 
In many ways Bentham's work was similar to Smith's. He too saw new 
technology emerging from the division of labour. 
16 He too perceived the 
need for specialised 'useful' education - '... for the extension of the 
new system of instruction to the higher branches of learning, for the use 
of the middli-ng and higher ranks in life,. 
17 He too saw the utility 
of rewards for smaller inventions in contrast to patents for larger 
inventions. 18 In these respects Bentham offered the same ideological 
support for middle class ideals as did Smith. 
The development in Bentham's work lay in his far more detailed treatment 
of the'patent system. In his Manual of Political Economy, Bentham argued 
, that an 
invention. or discovery involved a great deal of time, money and 
effort and also included an element of risk. Since the invention could 
only be used for the general increase of knowledge and wealth if there 
were a person willing to exploit it, it must, for a period, be reserved for 
the exclusive use of a particular person. 
'But EBentham arguedi such exclusion can no' otherwise be put upon 
any body but by the hand of law: and hence the necessity and the 
use of the interposition of law to secure to an inventor the benefit 
of his invention. ' 19 
Bentham had no difficulty in immediately equating this law with the existing 
English patent system 
20, 
and indeed argued strongly in favour of the patent 
system: 
'A patent considered as a recompense for the encrease 
given to the general stock of wealth by an invention, as a 
recompense for industry and genius and ingenuity, is proportionate 
and essentially just. ' 21 
Itisi mportant to note that he di d not j usti fy patents as 'natural 
property rights but rather on the utilitarian grounds of their efficacy. 
106. 
Indeed, unlike many later supporters of the patent system, Bentham was 
quite prepared to admit that legally a patent was a 'grant of a monopoly' 
22 
but argued that its effect was different; for while other monopolies caused 
some products not to be produced, patents for invention had the opposite 
result of encouraging the manufacture of products which had been newly 
23 invented. 
. 
The utilitarian basis of Bentham's support for the patent system is 
also apparent in the later work-The Rationale of Reward, where he"argued 
that state intervention through the patent system should be as cheap and 
efficient as possible. On this basis he held that the way the existing 
patent system was administered was unfair to the inventor as it was too 
expensive and suggested extensive reforms-to the administration. 
24 
In spite of his utilitarian approach Bentham did not abandon entirely 
the idea that a patent might be a form of property. He argued that all men 
should realise that the patent system encouraged the increase of wealth 
'and that in so essential a point, that the security given to property-cannot 
be held to be compleat without it,. 
25 In a lengthy footnote to this 
statement Bentham explained that all property was defined by the protection 
of the state granted to it and existed because of it. 
26 He therefore based 
his view of 'property' on the utilitarian objectives of the state and not 
on an inalienable natural right. 
. 
(ii-i) Other classical economists: There is no evidence of 
classical economists who differed radically from the views * 
on the control of 
new technology advanced by Bentham. Some, like David Ricardo and the. 
Rev Malthus, gave relatively little attention to the subject. Two classical 
economists who did write on the control of new technology were JR McCulloch 
and John Stuart Mill. McCulloch wrote extensively in support of patents as 
an encouragement to ingenuity. He too was highly critical of the existing 
patent administration. In a leading article in The Scotsman he wrote : 
'If any thing can be called a man's exclusive property, 
it is surely that which owes its birth entirely to combinations 
formed in his own mind, and which, but for his ingenuity, woul'd 
not have existed. Yet in Britain, which owes so much to 
mechanical improvement, this species of property is feebly 
protected, and a heavy fine is levied in the shape of fees 
upon those who make a diligent use of the inventive powers 
which nature has given them. ' 27 
In this passage, alone amongst the classical economists, McCulloch 
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came close to adopting the notion of a patent as a natural property right 
to which each inventor is entitled as a human being, rather than merely 
as property conferred by the law for the utilitarian purpose'X)f encouraging 
the production and utilization of new technology. Yet, in his case, unlike 
that of critics of the political economists who based a serious argument 
on the notion of natural rights, the suggestion of an unlimited entitlement 
is simply a matter of style.. In his later discussion of patents he entirely 
ignored the rhetoric.. of property of any kind and argued that limited patent. - 
'privileges. ' should be granted to encourage invention. For further discussion 
he merely referred his readers to the standard legal texts of the time. 
28 
1 
JS Mill too supported the patent system without introducing any new 
perspectives. 
29 In his early writings on patents he did not use any 
argument connected with property. He largely repeated Bentham's arguments 
on why patents specifically should be used to reward ingenuity He adopted 
the rhetoric of the free market economy by suggesting that the reward depended 
on the invention proving to have economic value and that, in any event, only 
the users of the commodity created were paying for the increased price caused 
by the patent monopoly. He added that the patent law had the further 
advantage above a system of government rewards that 'it leaves nothing to 
one's discretion'. 
30 This conception of the soundness of patent law as an 
impartial arbiter because it 'automatically' granted patents to inventions 
which met the formal legal requirements -a notion implicitly common to all 
the political economists - was, as will be seen, strongly challenged by 
those with a competing perspective on the 'natural order' of society. 
Ov) Content - summary and-conclusion: The classical economists, 
model of the control of new technology preserved through education the 
production of significant new technology to the middle and upper classes. 
They did not favour an entirely laissez-faire approacý by the state to the 
production and control of new technology and specifically supported the 
patent system as a legal framework for the control of 'important' new 
technology. There was some ambiguity in their writings about whether 
such a system existed for utilitarian reasons or whether it formed a 
necessary part of the 'natural order' of. society and was based on a 
'natural property right'. The concept of property, however, was perceived 
as sufficiently flexible for it to be used with reference to patents even 
where the utilitarian aspects of the patent system were stressed. 
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B. Dissemination 
The ideas of the classical economists on the production and control 
of new technology were widely disseminated, both by themselves and by 
their popularisers. 
31 The classical economists' speeches and writings 
were the most important carriers of the full range of their ideas. 
Although they have been described 
'scientific community, 
32 these te 
for the classical economists were 
Thus, for example, both Ricardo and 
members of parliament. 
33 
as an 'intellectual school' or a 
rms should not be understood too narrowly, 
all actively involved in public life. 
John Stuart Mill were, at different times, 
Their most significant contributions, however, were made in the numerous 
articles which they wrote for the various poli. tical reviews in which the public 
debates of the 19th century were conducted and through which the ideals of 
the emergent middle class were articulated. Particularly important was the 
Edinburgh Review (established 1802) which had the largest circulation of all 
political reviews. 
34 
Almost all the important 19th century classical economists were 
contributors. It had a 'Whig slant to its politics' 
35 
and adopted an 
almost evangelical approach towards the virtues of political economy. 
Thus in 1833 it proclaimed: 
'Political Economy, we rejoice to think, has apparently 
nearly waited its appointed time. The mysteries and the 
abstractions have retired for a while into the inner 
sanctuary; whilst, amongst the ministers of the outer 
courts, and throughout even the surrounding multitude, 
there are symptoms of movement which bespeak the arrival 
of the missionary era. The moral enthusiasm... will satisfy 
all who are to be satisfied that the science is not (what 
it has been childishly termed) a cold-hearted science; and 
that its gospel is one which must be preached to all classes, 
more especially to the poor. ' 36 
Other journals such as the more 'radical' Westminster Review, founded 
by Bentham in 1824, also served to spread the doctrine of political economy * 
37 
Even the Tory Quarterly Review founded in 1809 to oppose the Edinburgh Review, 
carried numerous articles on economic matters couched in the terminology of 
the classical economists. 
38 Many outsiders, who were not economists 
themselves, subscribed to some of the important ideological positions held 
by the classical economists. Some of the leading publicists of their ideas 
were associates who specialised in subjects which overlapped with the central 
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concerns of the classical economists. One such associate was Charles Babbage, 
professor of Mathematics at Cambridge, who belonged to some of the associations, 
such as the Statistical Society and the Royal Society, through which the 
classical economists kept in contact with one another. 
39 
Babbage's encyclopedic study, On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures, 
was particularly important in the dissemination of the views of the classical 
economists on the subject of technological innovation. 
40 It sold 3000 CODies. 
in its 
- 
firsi two months in 1832 and quickly went through. four editions. 
41. 
Babbage was so widely read that later classical economists, notably John 
Stuart Mill, could simply assume that readers were familiar with the factual 
data which he had assembled. 
42 
The content of Babbage's economic theory was similar to that of the 
classical economists. Babbage stated that his object was to explain 
'ItIhe accumulation of skill and science which had been directed to diminish 
the difficulty of producing manufactured goods'. 
43 He accepted the basic 
premise that knowledge was prdduced by the division of labour. Large sections 
of his book consist of practical examples of how the division of labour had 
facilitated specific technological advances. Babbage combined his examples 
with detailed proposals for changes which would both encourage rapid future 
technological innovation and reduce social tension. 
In the sphere of the protection of units of newly created knowledge, 
Babbage did not attempt to untangle the complexities of the classical 
economists' position. He accepted uncritically the necessity of some form 
of monopolist privilege for inventors. 
44 Nevertheless he criticised t he 
existing institutional arrangements-of the patent system as harshly as the 
classical economists themselves had done. He did not, however, attempt to 
suggest solutions to the problems presented by the particular imperfections 
of the patent system. Although he thought that 'scientific knowledge' 
should be advanced by other means, above and beyond patents, he did not 
consider which classes of knowledge should be protected by the patent 
system. 
No .t all writers who achieved renown by spreading the ideas of the 
classical economists maintained their careful scholarly methods and 
style. The most important populariser of the work of the classical 
economists was probably the novelist, Harriet Martineau. Her technique 
was to transplanttheir theories from the semi-academic context into the 
II0. 
speech of characters in her novelettes. Moreover, each novelette served 
as a fable which illustrated one or more economic truths. Her sales were' 
enormous - at 10,000 copies a month during the 1830's far outstripping the 
sales of serious economic writers. 
45 The Edinburgh Review testified to her 
influence: 
"We have heard more political economy during the last 
three months than was ever before heard out of the Political 
Economy Club. It has flowed smoothly, too, from off the 
tongues of people so very unlikely to trouble themselves 
with such investigations, that her own fictitious personages, 
whether they be retired sergeants, or village sextons, who 
speak as professors of the science, can now no longer 
appear to us a romance. ' 46 
In her role as a propagator of the values of the middle class, Miss 
Martineau laid great stress on the values and virtues of invention and 
warned against the smashing of machinery. 
47 
. 
Although it was not a main 
theme, she did consider the protection of new inventions in one of her 
novelettes, A Tale of the Tyne. 
48 Since the central message of this 
work is the danger of state intervention in the economy, the author had 
to make it clear that-she regarded the patent system as an exception to the 
general rule that 'all interference of government with the direction and 
49 the rewards of industry is a violation of its duty towards its subjects'. 
Martineau, following the classical economists, regardL-d the patent system 
as a justifiable exception to the general rule. She did not embark upon a 
sophisticated argument about the nature of patent rights to justify this 
position. One of her characters, Walter, is asked whether he thinks ill of 
patents. He replies: 
'There is all the difference in the world between a patent 
to sell what lies before everybody's industry, and a patent 
to sell what a man has invented by his own ingenuity, and 
perfected at his own trouble and expense. If a patent could 
secure to a man the sale of his own article till he has 
reaped the reward society owes him, I should, think very highly 
of a patent: and it is only because it is so difficult to 
secure this that I have any doubts about my father's trip to 
London. But it is a hard thing to manage... ! 50 
In fact Martineau was quite prepared to criticise existing institutions. 
Later in the novel Walter's father reports from London: 
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'Of my invention, it is not good to speak at this time and 
in this manner. Much care has been laid upon my respecting 
it; it being told me by some who know, that not one patent 
in a thousand is good for any thing, owing to the difficulty 
of making it out, and the easiness of invading it. As there 
is also no security whatever between the time of asking for my 
patent and its being sealed, you will discern the reason of my 
not now enlarging on the particulars which you are doubtless 
craving to know. ' 51 
The story does not explain whether his patent ultimately was financially 
successful, but contains a final criticism of thd patent system. Walter's 
father remains pessimistic about his prospects as a result of his (justifiable) 
'expectation that his patent would be invaded, and that he should cease to 
gain by his invention, even if he were not involved in law proceedings to 
defend it'. 52 Like Babbage, Martineau did not suggest specific improvements 
in her criticisms of the patent system. 
I The wide publicity given by Babbage and Martineau to the basic views of 
the classical economists on new technology - i. e. -thAt a reformed patent 
system was a satisfactory means of controlling new technology - must be 
seen against the dearth of contrary views in the works read primarily by the 
middle class and in publications (such as those of the Society for the 
Diffusion of Useful Knowledge 
53 ) produced by the middle class for working 
class consumption. Taken together they indicate that the views of the 
classical economists were widely adopted by the middle class. They are 
also evidence that the ideas of the classical economists had succeeded 
in achieving a measure of hegemonic dominance in this sphere. That this 
dominance was not total is apparent if the views of the emerging working 
class on the subject of new technology are considered. 
III. The workinq class alternative 
Although the theories of the classical economists were widely 
disseminated during the first half of the 19th century, they were by no 
means universally accepted. Indeed they were strongly associated with the 
entrepeneurial employers by industrial workers who were groping towards an 
alternative ideology which would justify their own emerging class 
consciousness. One such 'alternative' framework which dealt specifically 
with the economic importance of knowledge was provided by Thomas Hodgskin, 
who, in the 1820's, identified closely with the emergent working class54 
and deliberately tried to articulate a 'popular' ideology. 
55 Hodgskin and 
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his collaborator JC Robertson were actively involved in an 'ideological 
conflict' on behalf of the working class. 
56 In the course of this struggle 
they attempted to bring their ideal social order into existence. It is 
submitted that an analysis of Hod6sVin'sideas will show what possibilities 
they presented for providing the working class with a conception of its 
interests in the control of technology. (A warning must, however, be added. 
In its early stages the working class ideal was much more fragmented than 
that of the entrepeneurial middle class. Moreover, Hodgskin's work was not- 
part of an intellectual tradition as closely articulated as classical 
economy. Accordingly an analysis of Hodgskin's ideas and of their dissemination. 
concentrates on only one strand in the emergence of working class ideology. 
As shall become apparent, however, it is the strand which is related most 
directly to attempts by the working class to set up an organizational 
structure to deal with the creation and control of new technology. For 
this reason it has been elected to focus on Hodgskin's ideas rather than, 
for example, the concurrent emergence of Owenite socialism. 
57 ) 
Hodgskin's theories, as developed between 1825 and 1829, shared and 
even extended the classical economist's conception of the importance of 
useful knowledge. Indeed in his book Popular Political EconomY58 the 
central theme is that knowledge is an important separate category amongst 
the factors governing the production of wealth. 
Hodgskin argued that the classical economists, including Adam Smith, 
had linked the creation of knowledge too closely to the division of labour 
in society. Since the conception of improved methods preceded their 
introduction, knowledge should rather be seen as preceding the division 
of labour. 
59 Furthermore, the spur to the increase in knowledge was 
to be found not in the division of labourwhich was merely a consequence 
of the production of knowledgd, but in the growth of population. 
60 
Notwithstanding his assertion of faith in the inevitability of increasing 
prosperity engendered by the growth of population, Hod9skin considered the 
division of labour to be an important, beneficial and even 'natural' 
consequence of the increase of knowledge. In this context he quoted both 
Adam Smith and JR McCulloch with approval to show that the division of labour 
increased opportunities for invention and facilitated the production of goods 
and thus the creation of wealth. 
61 However, Hodgskin warned, this analysis 
should not be misunderstood: 
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'It is however indispensable to remark, that all the benefits 
of this practice naturally centre in the labourer; belong to 
him, and contribi to his ease or add to his opulence. It 
increases his skill, by allowing his attention to be 
uninterruptedly fixed on a single operation; it saves 
, 
his 
time, by making no change of tools or of employment necessary; 
and it facilitates his invention of those machines that are 
adapted to the singTe-and simple operations, which, in 
consequence of division of labour, constitute the whole task 
of each individual.... CA]s all the advantages derived from 
division of labour naturally centre in, and naturally belong 
to the labourers, if they ar deprived of them, and in, the 
progresý'-ofsociety those only are enriched by their improved 
skill who never labour, - this must arise from unjust appropriation 
from usurpation and plunder in the party enriched and from 
consenting submission in the party impoverished. ' 62 
The basis of this definite assertion of who should benefit 'naturally' 
from the increased wealth which is the fruit of the division of labour -a 
conception of what is 'natural' which, as wil 1 gradually become apparent, 
differed markedly from that of the classical economists - lay in Hodgskin's 
conception, developed in his first book Labour Defended against the Claims 
of C. apital 
63 
of how wealth was created. 
In almost identical terms to Bentham, Hodgskin held that the increase - 
of wealth was, no matter what circumstances might encourage or retard it, 
directly the result of labour, both physical and mental. But Hodgskin took 
this argument much further: He consistently held that physical and mental 
labour were merely mutations of the same activity. Wealth, he continue d, 
was the product of labour - its sole producer - and of nothing else. 
Since labour in its various guises formed the sole basis of wealth. 
(capital), Hodgskin argued that a system in which wealth in the form of 
profits went to those who did not labour, could not be justified. The 
controllers of capital, he conceded, provide some services (i. e. labour) 
by means of their superior technical and organizational knowledge; but, 
instead of only being fairly rewarded for this labour, they -claimed huge 
profits through the manipulation of capital. 
64 
This inequity, he noted, was particularly rife in the way in which 
inventors were rewarded for their labour. In a passage remarkable for its 
debunking of the heroes of early technological advance Hodgskin commented 
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'No labourer would, I am sure, be disposed to deny EinventorS3 
their reward. But no subject of complaint is more general or 
more just than that the inventor of any machine does not reap 
the benefit of it. Of all the immense number of persons who 
have acquired large fortunes by the modern improvements in 
steam engines and cotton mills, Mr Watt and Mr Arkwright are 
the only two, I believe, who have been distinguished for their 
inventions. They also acquired wealth less as inventors than as 
capitalists. Mr Watt found a capitalist who appreciated his 
genius, and Mr Arkwright saved and borrowed the means of profiting 
by his own inventions. Thousands of capitalists have been 
enriched by inventions and discoveries of which they were not 
the authors, and capital, by robbing the inventor of his just 
reward, is guilty of stifling genius. ' 65 
Unlike Smith, or even Bentham, Hodgskin saw no reason for society to be 
structured in such a way as to allow for a 'capitalist' (middle) class free 
from the rigours of the division of labour. He denied that it represented 
a 'natural order' or that, as Smith had indicated, a qualitatively different 
type of knowledge (which ought to be encouraged and rewarded in a different 
way) was produced by this class. On the contrary, Hodgskin argued that the 
excessive rewards of capitalists for their limited- services could be eliminated 
by the education of workers in the skills and knowledge held by capitalists 
and by explaining to them how capital distorted 'the PRINCIPLES on which 
66 societies are formed and governed'. 
Hodgskin himself was involved in early attempts to educate on these 
lines. With JC Robertson he was the founding editor of the Mechanics' 
Magazine which aimed to bring knowledge of technology and economics to the 
working class. Furthermore in 1823, they were involved in the foundation 
of the London Mechanics' Institution and in the ensuing struggle to keep 
it under the control of the workers themselves. 
67 
The progress of this struggle has been examined in detail by several 
historians. 68 Its significance in the history of the emergence*of working 
class consciousness derives largely from the importance which Hodgskin 
attributed in his lectures to the provision of an ideological basis for the 
consciousness of the workers who initially attended them. In the early 1820's 
a number of similar mechanics' institutes had been created throughout Britain 
in order to provide technical education for artisans. 
69 Initially these 
institutions were founded primarily by the artisans who had themselves 
realised the importance of new technical and organizational skills. Soon, 
however, the institutes attracted the interest of various prominent middle 
-1 
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class radicals who wished to use them to spread middle class ideals amongst 
the working class. 
From the prospectus which Hodgskin and Robertson had personally 
drafted for the fledgling London Mechanics'Institutiontheir bias in favour 
of control by the workers is apparent: 'The education of a free people, 
like their property, will always be directed most beneficially for them 
when it is in their own hands' 
70 
, they wrote. Moreover, there was no 
intention of limiting the education of the workers to mere practical 
training designed to improve their skills - training of the kind that 
Adam Smith had suggested - for they continued-: 
'The principle object of it [the Mechanics' Institution3 Will 
be, to make them Ethe mechaniCS3 acquainted with those acts 
of chemistry, mechanical philosophy, and the science of the 
creation and distribution of wealth, which, at this period of 
society, it is essential for them to know. ' 71 
Shortly after the founding of the London Mechanics' Institution a 
power struggle ensued in which the ideals of Robertson and Hodgskin were 
eventually rejected. The London Mechanics' Institution came under effective 
control of George Birkbeck who was a close friend and ally of Lord Brougham, 
a leading middle class radical. 
72 The pattern of takeovers by the middle 
class was repeated throughout Britain. By the early 1830's the first phase 
of. the movement had passed and the institutes were firmly under middle class 
control. 
Robertson resigned as secretary of the London Mechanics' Institution in 
1824 but remained editor of the Mechanics' Macazine. 
73 In this position 
he was able to maintain contact with artisans in mechanics' institutes 
throughout Britain. The Mechanics' Magazine became a harsh critic of the 
London Mechanics' Institution. Attempts were made to influence the composition 
of its membership and its teaching by means of direct, often vicious attacks 
74 
on its leaders and their policy. The correspondence columns of the journal 
became a forum for artisans who wished to remain in control of the institutes, 
in order to influence what was taught at their lectures. Thus for example in 
1827 a correspondent, a 'mechanic from Rotherhithe', had complained that 
'owing to the late distress amongst us many [mbchaniCS3 were obliged to 
discontinue their subscriptions, and since that the Institution has got into 
the hands of persons of a higher class'. 
75 This had led to the contents of 
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the lectures becoming too 'literary' and not suited to the interests of the 
artisans. Artisans were leaving the institution with the result that it 
was in danger of changing into a literary club. The editor encouraged 
an extensive correspondence76 and warned of the dangers of allowing outsiders 
77 to control t. he knowledge which the working class acquired. 
The Mechanics' Magazine did not only concentrate on mechanics' 
institutions but continued to plead the cause of the working class generally. 
In particular it warned against the potential influence of the Society of 
the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge. It argued that if the SDUK gained a 
monopoly of readers interested in technological matters it would become 
almost impossible to refute the 'one-sided' ideology which it introduced 
amongst its 'factual' material. 
78 
For a while the. mechanics' institutes remained open to Hodgskin. In 
1825 he gave a course of lectures entitled 'Popular Political Economy'. 
The lectures were later published in the Mechanics' Magazine and in book form. 
79 
In his last important book The Natural and Artificial Right of Property 
80 Contrasted he developed his earlier themes in such a way as to make his 
differences with middle class ideals even more explicit. This led to the 
final severance of his ties with Birkbeck and Brougham. 
Hodgskin's central argument was that if it were accepted that labour, 
both physical and mental, created wealth, then it should also be accepted 
that property was naturally created by labour and that government was merely 
established for the protection of the 'antecedently' existing right of 
property. Since property was created by all men, through all forms of labour 
in all societies, it was a natural right of man to own property in the same 
way as he was naturally entitled to the control of his own body which either 
directly or indirectly produced it. Indeed the ownership of property was 
understood naturally and 'instinctively' by all men - even by children - 
prior to the creation of law. 
81 
Bentham had regarded the law as creating and determining property rights, 
and had, therefore, Hodgskin argued, entirely misunderstood the basis of 
their creation. Although it was true that a 'simple man' might 'appeal to 
the law as a last, but still ruinous, resource to compel those who infringed 
his right to make him a compensation' this did not determine his conception 
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of property. The 'ingenuity' of 'literary men', wrote Hodgskin, 'could 
scarcely persuade the smith, or the carpenter, that his right to own the 
horse-shoe or the gate, he makes, has been conferred on him by the statutes 
and the judges'. 
82 Hodgskin summarised his position : 
'Without the intervention of any law, contract, or agreement 
between individuals, as to what shall belong to each, Nature 
produces in each the idea of individuality, which she extends 
to ownership, by bestowing on each individual, and exclusively, 
whatever he produces. ' 83 
In a footnote to this 'truth' Hodgskin argued that even where the 
division of labour had made production more complex workmen naturally settled 
the question of their shares in the property produced among themselves. This 
could be done without 'legal enactment'; Hodgskin, however, did not consider 
exactly how it would take place. Such a conception left no place for law 
at all. Hodgskin was very suspicious of the. whole legal system. He 
considered the law to be nothing but 'a great scheme of rules intended to 
preserve the power of government, secure the wealth of the landowner, the 
priest and the capitalist, but never to secure his produce to the labourer'. 
84 
If the law were not an accurate reflection of natural property rights, 
could it be reformed, and how indeed could society be changed so that labour 
could be justly rewarded? These related problems form a central dilemma in 
Hodgskin's work. He seemed very much inclined to give an almost anarchic 
aýswer to the question of law reform and in 'the foreword to the 1832 edition 
of his last book wrote that he had 'gradually satisfied himself that all law- 
85 
making ... is arrant humbug'. 
The. dilemma of those who accepted Hodgskin's analysis 
of labour rather than capital for economic growth and who 
as a product of labour, remained: What, in practical term 
the 'thousands of capitalists' who had 'robbeo' inventors 
Within the mechanics' movement this question was answered 
which attempted to take positive action in the light of a 
existing laws controlling the Utilization of knowledge. 
of the importance 
regarded all knowledge 
s, could be done about 
of their just reward ? 
in two ways, both of 
critique of the 
First, it was argued that the exploitation of knowledge should be 
attempted by the inventors themselves without recourse to the 'privileges' 
offered by the law through the patent system. For this reason the Mechanics' 
Magazine editorially supported the founding of a 'Society for the Encouragement 
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of Inventions. In its prospectus the iniquities of the patent law were 
cited to justify the existence of the society as an alternative means of 
exploiting knowledge. 
87 The plight of the 'poor' inventor was emotively 
described: 
'Is an inventor humble and poor, who is there to advise 
and befriend him? He has no access to men of science - 
no patrons among men of wealth; he cannot himself defray 
the heavy expense of securing by patent the property of his 
invention, nor even in many cases, the cost of those - 
preliminary experiments necessary to determine its real 
value. He seeks among strangers for pecuniary aid, perhaps 
too for scientific advice, and either falls in the hands of 
persons who plunder and then forsake him, or, from a natural 
reluctance to give his entire confidence to a stranger, makes 
such an imperfect revelation of his plans, that nobody can be 
induced to patronise. ' 88 
Given the state of the law and the plight of the inventor the object 
of the society was to eliminate the role of 'strangers' (i. e. capitalists) 
by getting mechanics, 'who are likely to contribute most to the society', 
89 
to invest small amounts of their own capital so that inventions could be 
developed and commercially exploited. The proposals to call for capital 
from mechanics, even if this were to be done 'by instalments, so moderate 
in amount, and on such long notices that even men of humble means may find 
1 90 it an eligible medium for the investment of savings , was not the same 
as calling for the elimination of the role of capital in the exploitation 
of knowledge. Nevertheless, it was an attempt to allow workers to exploit 
the knowledge which they themselves had created. 
Second, the ideological position of a natural right to property in the 
products of all labour was used as a basis for a thoroughgoing criticism 
of the existing laws for the pro tection of intellectual property. Thus, in 
an*, -eloquent passage, JC Robertson, replying to a lawyer's defence of the 
existing patent system, appealed not only, as Bentham had done, against the 
inefficiency of the patent administration which was hampering the working of 
the system, but also for the modification of the substantive rules which '. 
formed the basis of the system. This he did by contrasting the position under 
the existing system with the natural rights to which each labourer was j ustly 
entitled. In Robertson's own words : 
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'Mr D [the lawyer] takes his chief stand on royal prerogative! 
We are disposed to take much higher ground. We hold that there 
is a right in every man to the fruits of his own ingenuity and 
labour, which is superior to all prerogative. We know of no 
solid foundation for prerogative but the'. better protection of 
private rights; and to whatever extent it may accidentally 
subsist beyond that, the sooner it is clipped the better. Nay, 
so absolute and indefeasible do we consider the property of 
every man in his own thoughts and inventions, that we must 
confess we could never discover on what principle of justice it 
has been determined, that an author or inventor is merely entitled 
to the fruits of his industry for certain limited periods, while 
all other men are allowed not only to possess the fruits of theirs 
during life, but to hand them down to their heirs to the end of 
time. Is it because the productions of man's immortal mind are 
as nothing, compared with such scrapings of the dust of the earth, 
as any kindred though sentient clod may call his own? Or is it 
rather because the empire of brute force, which regards as nothing 
whatever it cannot grasp and handle, and place under lock ardkey, 
has not yet entirely lost itssway amongst us? May we not hope that 
a time will yet arrive, when mind shall assume its proper station in 
the estimation of men, and when to cultivate its powers will be found 
as certain a source of permanent gain, as either ploughing the earth 
or digging into its bowels? ' 91 
In this call for the law to protect the full natural property rights of 
the inventor in his intellectual labours, there is also a strong stress on the 
differences between the creators of knowledge and the exploiters of knowledge 
not obtained by their own labour - between mechanic and manufacturer. Thus 
in the same passage Robertson continued : 
'We must necessarily hold in. but little respect, any plan 
for their relief, which does not-at least propose that the 
greatest protection which has been given any individuals 
of the class, [men of ideas] shall be extended to the whole. ' 
He concluded by asking that members of all Mechanics' Institutions 
throughout the cibuntry should support a campaign for the reform of the 
patent laws. 
The fact that rights were denied to some (and also the importance of 
group solidarity) was perceived by a correspondent who wrote, in the first 
of a series of letters on patent law published in the 
, 
Mechanics Magazine, 
that the only advantage of a patent to an inventor was 'to be able to 
affix the title of patent to his invention ... whilst the profits of his 
ingenuity serve to enrich larger capitalists'. The correspondent concluded 
'that it is the interest of the poor mechanic only, that must be-sacrificed 
for the public advantage' and asked rhetorically: 
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Will the mechanic suffer calmly the curtailment of his rights, 
that the legal profession may be enriched at his expense? He 
is one of a body of men rising daily into increased importance, 
and should his view of the subject accord with mine, let him 
openly demand that this barrier to the full enjoyment of his 
rights, as a British subject, be removed. Let him petition the 
legislature to this effect, let the members of the different 
mechanics' institutions coalesce, let the voice of the 
manufacturing population be heard; and before the assembled 
commons, let the question of such importance to the artizan, 
who has raised the manufactures of the united kingdom to 
their present lofty pre-eminence, be discussed. ' 92 
In summary,: it can be submitted that the ideas of Hodgskin and his 
collaborator JC Robertson formed the basis for a coherent-working class ideal 
which recognized the economic importance of technological knowledge, but 
combined it with an ideal of social-. order totally different from that held by 
the classical economists. As a prescriptive ideology, however, their views 
contained one central flaw. For, while condemning all fonTs of enacted law 
as 'unnatural' and accepting that the increasing division of labour was making 
economic relationships more complex, it did not expound systematically an 
alternative 'non-legal' framework within which these increasingly complex 
relationships could be developed. For this reason the debate on how 
knowledge should in fact be exploited was conducted in terms of the creation 
of new or modified organizations, operating within the framework of the 
existing market economy. As a result, in their practical proposals, members of 
the working classwere confronted by the same problems that the classical 
economists had faced: namely how could knowledge be exploited without direct 
intervention by the state? 
Nevertheless, their criticisms of the basis of the existing patent system 
were more thorough than those of the classical economists. For, since they 
were concerned both with the class bias of the legal system as a whole and 
with the structure within which knowledge was economically exploited, they 
were prepared to analyse the principles on which the patent system was based, 
rather than merely to suggest reforms which would make the existing system 
more efficient. The result was that their ideas could present a direct 
challenge to the methods of controlling new technology which were embodied in 
the existing patent system. Their ideas were qualitatively different from 
the reforms suggested by Bentham and his followers. Furthermore their ideas 
provided a potential ideological basis for soli. darity and action for those 
who perceived that, even if Benthamic refoýms should succeed, they would 
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still be exploited by capitalists and less than adequately rewarded for 
their skills. 
The relative success of the projection of the middle class ideal of 
what the natural social order should be, hampered implementation of a working 
class view of the way in which new technology ought to be deployed from the 
start. The loss of control over the mechanics' institutes meant that 
organizations specifically designed to enable the working class to create 
and control new technology disappeared. Although the institutes continued 
to draw working class members throughout the 19th century, the focus of 
attention becamo 'harmless' social and cultural activities. The more active 
members of the working class devoted themselves to other causes - socialism, 
co-operation and trade unionism. 
93 None of these however, led specifically 
to participation in the defence of working class interests in new technology. 
The result was that although artisans could still articulate their interests 
in new technology in terms of uniquely working class ideology, they had no 
basis for collective action in this field. Individual inventors were forced 
to act through the offices of 'friendly outsiders'. Such outsiders would need 
to have ties with the existing system through which new technology was 
controlled. They would therefore be operating from a different economic and 
social position to that of the artisan-inventor. In the following section the 
position of such 'friendly outsiders' - the patent experts - is explored. 
IV. Patent experts 
A. The background of rising professionalism 
I Patent experts emerged as an occupational group with professional status 
during the first half of the 19th century. Social historians have commented 
on the increase in the numbers and influence of self-styled 'professional' 
men during this period. Thus for example, Perkin found: 
'The Industrial Revolution ... which emancipated the entrepreneur 
and the wage-earner, also emancipated the professional man. With 
urbanization and the rise of living standards, doctors, lawyers, 
writers, and even the clergy (including dissenting ministers) 
found an enlarged demand for their services, which reduced their 
dependence on the few rich and increased that on the many 
comfortable clients of their own social standing. The transition 
enabled them to acquire a greater measure of self-respect, and to 
demand corresponding respect from society. "Respectability" was 
the conscious aim of the "gentlemen practitioners".... ' 94 
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For the purpose of acquiring respectability professional organizations 
were set up or revitalized. This happened both in the more established 
occupations such as law and medicine, as well as in newly emerging 
occupations. Among the latter, civil engineers (1818), architects (1837), 
and mechanical engineers (1847) all established new occupational associations 
which, like the associationsof the older occupations, strove through the 
apparatus of annual meetings and journals to establish their own respectability 
and to articulate explicitly the claims of their group to the 'professional. - 
ideal'. 95 
The use of the concept 'respectability' as a common core of the ideology 
of the 'gentlemen practitioners' highlights the fact that spokesmen for these 
various occupational groups were moving towards defining the services 
offered by a particular occupation as of central importance to society as a 
whole. In some respects this ideology overlapped with that of other groups. 
In particular they tended to share with members of the (entrepeneurial) 
middle class strongly-held beliefs in the inevitability of progress and the 
need for general efficiency. However, 'gentlemen practitioners' were set 
apart from early entrepeneurs by their 'professional ideal' - the ideal that, 
as members of an occupational group providing a service, they were entitled 
to define their clients' needs. The ideal went even further: It held 
that their prestige was not a reflection of that of their patrons or clients 
but of their autonomy as a group of th eoretically equal and free agents 
delineating their fields of activity (ostensibly) in terms of'universally 
held 'common-sense' values such as 'sanctity of life', 'justice' or 
'progress'. 
Students of the professions in general have warned that descriptions which 
professions offered (and still offer) of themselves and of their ideals 
should not be accepted at face value as true descriptions of how they function, 
or as explanations of particular needs of professional practice. 
96 Writers 
such as Johnson and Larson have noted that the professional-ideal, as it 
emerged in the 19th century, should not be regarded as having universal 
validity. Instead it should be understood as allied to a form of occupational 
organization which typically emerged in this period of industrializing 
'Western' societies. 
97 This change in occupational organization - i. e. 
professionalization, has been defined by Larson as 'the process by which 
producers of special services sought to constitute and control a market for 
98 their expertise'. 
123. 
Control of a market by 'professionals' means that they are able to 
exercise a measure of power in the field in which their skills are marketed. 
Johnson has suggested the potentiality for the degree of autonomy which a 
profession requires in order to exercise power rests on the 'esoteric 
character of the knowledge applied by the specialist' 
99 
- i. e. it is based 
on the extent to which the knowledge which he applies is not understood by 
the client. The actual power of an occupational group 'to impose on all 
consumers-its own definitions of the content of production and its ends' 
depends, according to Johnson, on whether its own resources of power are 
articulated with other, wider bases of social power. 
100 In what follows 
the emergence of the occupational group, patent agents, will be discussed; 
their aspirations to professional status similar to that of other 19th 
century professions noted; and their sources of power in an esoteric body of 
knowledge and in links with other, relatively powerful social groupings 
considered. 
B. The occupation of patent agency 
The system of issuing patents - apart from patents for inventions, 
patents were issued for appointments to service commissions and other posts, 
and charters to royal companies - was from Tudor times a complex bureaucracy 
and no doubt from early times agents could be found who would, for a fee, 
smooth ou t the bureaucratic obstructions to obtaining a patent (i. e. a royal 
grant of any kind) for their principals. Some of these agents were also 
clerks at the Patent Office, appointed for life, and this enabled them to 
expedite the business of their principal. s. 
If one defines the occupation of a patent agent as the development,., 
delineation and protection of units of technology, for the purpose of commercial 
exploitation on behalf of a client there is evidence from about 1820 onwards of 
a small but cross-referring group of 'professional gentlemen' spending a major 
portion of their working lives employed in these interconnected tasks. 
Evidence about their activities can be gleaned from various Committees of 
Inquiry, 101 of which the evidence of the 1848 Committee on the Signet Office 
and the Privy Seal contains the most information since half of the witnesses 
regarded themselves as patent agents. Of these, four (Robertson, Newton, 
Carpmael and Poole) claimed to have been patent agents for twenty years or 
more. 
102 
Not surprisingly there was some uncertainty as to the boundaries of the 
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occupational group. This seems to have gone hand in hand with the loose 
definition of the occupation itselfi Perhaps the most comprehensive 
definition was given to the 1848 Committee by Wm Carpmael who claimed 
to have been a patent agent for 27 years: 
'A patent agent, strictly so called, would be the party 
to whom an inventor would come to take out his patent; 
and if he be well informed upon the subject of manufactures, 
he will be consulted to know whether the invention is new; 
and if he be practically informed upon most manufactures, 
he will be consulted also as to whether it is probable'that 
the proposed invention will be useful; and the last head of 
his professional duty is that of preparing a specification 
on which the whole validity of the patent depends. ' 
He was questioned further: 
IQ: Is it not also part of his business to pass patents? 
A: Yes, he passes them through the public offices. 
Q: Then it appears to be necessarý that a patent agent should 
possess considerable scientific knowledge, and should also 
be acquainted with the practice of obtaining patents? 
A: Yes, and also he ought to be well acquainted with all the 
decisions of law which govern patents, otherwise he cannot 
shape his specifications to the requirements of the law. ' 103 
A clear occupational corBhad emerged by the 1840's. In 1848 FW Campin 
could testify: 'Those who we call patent agents amongst ourselves are in 
number about 10 individuals. ' 
104 He added that about 20 persons were listed 
as. patent agents in the London Directory. For the earlier part of the 
century the picture is less clear. Thus until 1829 the only name in the 
London Directory which is classified as patent agent is that of Thomas Gill 
who advertised himself as such in his magazine Technical Repository. 
Nevertheless, Robertson, Newton, Carpmael and Poole all regarded themselves, 
at least in retrospect, as having acted as patent agents from approximately 
1820 onwards. In this they'were joined by others, notably John Farey who in 
his evidence to the 1829 Committee of Inquiry into the Patent System outlined 
105 his activities in terms almost identical to those of Carpmael in 1848. 
By the early 1820's (which, as will become apparent, coincided with the 
start of the movement to reform the patent system), a group of men were 
engaged in the activities which later came to form the occupation of patent 
agency. By 1850 this occupation had come to be regarded as an established 
1professional' occupation in the:. minds of its practitioners. The extent 
of this 'professional' self image and adoption of the 'professional ideal' 
is clearly illustrated by an exchange of views between William Spence, 
125.1 
natent agent, and two manufacturer/inventors in 1851. Spence had been r- 
accused of insulting the public by 'accusing them of ignorance'. In a 
letter to Aris's Birmingham Gazette he replied: 
'I propose to deal\with this point seriously. I do 
advisedly regard "the public" as ignorant of my particular 
craft, which men of experience acknowledge to be a difficult 
one. I do this in common with every man of any trade or 
profession requiring skill and learning, who has taken the 
pains to acquire a knowledge of his business so as to enable 
him to practise it. And how can a man be competent to. advise 
others in difficult cases, unless he have confidence in his 
own mature judgment as against public opinion? 
This remark applies especially in Patent cases, wherein the 
office of the Patent Agent is to protect his client from the 
questioning of the validity of his Patent. Every practising 
Patent Agent knows how often he has to assert the rightful 
claims of his client against all kinds of opposition; and how 
could he do this if he did not feel confidence in his own 
judgment upon such claims? And-; of course if we believe one 
thing to be right, we believe the opposite to be wrong. I 
must, therefore, retain my unwillingness to regard public 
opinion as of any force to influence me so far as it clashes 
with my own deliberate convictions on the subject of Patents, 
upon which my exclusive professional study has been bestowed. ' 106 
C. Structural roots and ideological influences 
Given the broad range of activities that patent agents were called upon 
to perform in their unifying occupational concern with the control of 
technology it is not surprising to find that patent agents were rooted in 
three other occupational fields. They were (i) direct involvement with 
general technology, (ii) the legal system and (iii) the state bureaucracy. 
Patent agents advertised their roots in other occupations as contributing 
to their professional skills. Thus, for example, a pamphlet, issued in 
1851, claimed: 
'The advantages Messrs W. & J. H. Johnson offer in achieving 
the above objects, igener6l'patent agenCy3 consists in the 
combination in their Firm, of a CIVIL ENGINEER and a SOLICITOR; 
the possession of their own offices in London and Edinburgh, 
where all English and Scotch Patents are passed and the 
Specifications enrolled and the Sole Proprietorship of a first 
class Scientific Periodical, "The Practical Mechanics' Journal"' 107 
In order to understand how the various occupations contributed to the 
ability of patent agents to define and control their own occupational 
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activity and thus to influence changes in the way in which technology 
was defined and controlled, it is necessary to analyse how patent agents 
related to these occupations and combined some of their elements. In 
each case the importance of the background occupation not only in terms 
of its direct relationship to the social and economic structure (i. e. 
its relative power and importance), but also as a resource for the creation 
of an esoteric body of knowledge must be considered. 
(i) General technology: Patent agents were linked through their 
occupation to the creation and exploitation of technology; for, in the 
terms in which their occupation has been defined, technology formed the raw 
material of their activities. Technological knowledge did not per se 
provide an esoteric knowledge base for the emergent occupational group since 
patent agents shared their technological knowledge with their clients - at 
least initially, when their clients were personally the inventors of the units 
of technology to be polished, defended and eventually patented. To some 
extent the knowledge base they shared with their clients made them vulnerable 
to the power of their entrepeneur clients who themselves had ability to make 
decisions on technological matters without the professional assistance of 
patent agents. Other connections within the world of general technology, 
however, reduced their exposure to the clients' definitions of the relationship 
to technology as a source of esoteric knowledge. 
The earliest of these links were those which existed between patent 
agents and people whom one might term technological experts. The roots of 
this co-operation had been put down in the 18th century with the use of expert 
witnesses in patent trials where the academic prestige of scientists was 
used to impress juries. Although 'practical' inventors strongly objected 
to this practice, it was continued in the 19th century and the links 
strengthened by the involvement of academic experts in the work of patent 
agency other than the collection and presentation of evidence at patent 
trials. Thus, for example, Moses Poole whose patent agency was largely 
limited to conducting formalities, testified in 1829 that clients who 
ý. ad required specifications to be drafted on their behalf had been referred 
to him by Professor Millington, the professor of mechanical engineering at 
the Royal Institution. 108 Millington, on his own testimony to the 1829 
Committee of Inquiry, was even more closely involved in the patent system 
than Poole had suggested. Not only was he employed to draft specifications 
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but he also occasionally dealt directly with the bureaucracy in the role 
of agent in the narrow sense. Furthermore he was employed in the laborious 
task of attempting to extract information from the unreformed patent 
bureaucracy in order to be able to advise his clients as, to the previous 
inventions in a*specific field. 
109 
Another academic who played a part in the. activities of patent agency 
was Professor Bennet Woodcroft who later became a pioneering administrator 
of the reformed patent system. Woodcroft, like Millington, was involved in 
attempts to glean information from the patent rolls of the unreformed 
system. In 1851 he gave detailed evidence as to the inherent obstructions 
in this system, so demonstrating a thorough knowledge of its operation. 
110 
The importance of the incorporation of such academics as a peripheral 
part of the occupational group was twofold. On the one hand they brought 
with them technical knowledge of such a calibre that they overshadowed the 
technical skill of the practical inventor. Thus they lent the authority of 
their own expertise, which was to some extent esoteric because of-their 
academic status and approach, to the patent agents who consulted them. On 
the other hand the system itself was legitimised by their close personal 
involvement in its operation. Even when they were critical of parts of the 
system, they showed, both by their continued involvement and by their 
pronouncements, that they considered the patent system to have a useful 
function. 
Apart from their links with individual experts, patent agents were also 
linked to various organizations involved in the creation and exploitation 
of new technology. Central amongst these was the Institution of Civil 
Engineers which was founded in 1818 with the explicit purpose of lending 
professional status to an emergent occupation. 
"' 
The identification of patent agents with engineers was both personal 
and institutional. At a personal level the growing status of the engineer 
clearly held some attraction for patent agents and initially the occupations 
were often combined. Thus an individual such as Farey who, in the 1820's, not 
only performed most of the functions of a patent agent but also supplied the 
1829 Committee of Inquiry with comprehensive summaries of the existing legal 
sources of patent law, still regarded himself as an engineer. 
112 It was in 
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his capacity as engineer that he wrote a handbook on the steam engine which 
contained detailed criticisms of the patent system. 
113 
At institutional level early patent agents were also closely involved 
in engineering. Several patent agents were members of the Institution 
which provided them with a forum for their views. The extent of the 
involvement of patent agents in the activities of the Institution of Civil - 
Engineers is best illustrated by a meeting in 1851 at which AV Newton (son, 
partner and eventual successor of the early patent agent William Newton), 
a full-time patent agent and member of the Institution, gave a paper under 
the title 'An enquiry into the nature of Patent Law Protection with a view 
to the better appreciation and security of the Inventors' Rights'. 
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Discussion of this paper which was basically a cautiousJustification of the 
system, combined with suggestions for limited improvements, extended over 
three successive meetings and was published in extenso in the Minutes of 
the Institution. Amongst the participants in* the debates were engineers 
and manufacturers as well as specialist patent agents and lawyers. Although 
there was some criticism of the paper-on specific issues the debate was 
conducted bntirely within theý. basic parameters laid down by Newton and his 
fellow 'specialists'. 
Institutional links with formal associations operating in the field of 
general technology were important to the emerging occupation of patent agents 
in two ways. First, they associated individual patent agents with the most 
prestigious associations actively involved in encouraging scientific and 
technological innovations of all kinds and propagating the ideal of progress 
through such innovation. This enabled these patent agents to claim expertise 
in matters relating to technology and to use the ideal of progress as part of 
the justification of their primary occupational activity, even though (as in 
the case of the Society of Arts of which the early patent agent T Gill was a 
member) the association might officially disapprove of the way their occupation 
was conducted or even of the existence of the occupational activity itsel f. 
Second, and. more specifically, the almost symbiotic relationship with the 
engineering occupation enabled the patent agents to absorb the professional 
ideal of a specific occupational group and also to deploy some of its power, 
prestige and esoteric knowledge of the implementation of technology in their 
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relationships with their entrepeneur clients. Thus they could, to some 
extent, minimize the power of their clients even in matters relating 
directly to technological problems. 
The power and influence of patent agents in the field of general 
technology were further increased by their active involvement in the 
propagation of the actual, relatively simple technology (particularly 
mechanical techniques) on which l9th century industry was based. This was 
done by editing, or at least contributing to, journals which published 
information about new inventions. Most important of these journals were 
the Repertory of Arts, (Gill's)Technical Repository, the London Journal of 
Arts-and the Mechanics_Magazine. 115 By the mid-1820's the editors of all 
these magazines were involved in patent agency and this continued throughout 
the rest of the first half of the century and beyond. Later examples of such 
journals edited by patent agents were 'the Practical Mechanic's Journal 
(1848-1852? ) and the Patent Journal and Inventors' Magazine (1846-1851 ).. 
116 
Both were relatively short-lived and neither appears to have been very 
i nf I uenti al . 
There is no evidence to suggest that any of these journals were produced 
under, or even influenced by, the patronage of the clients of the patent 
agents. All the journals were edited according to roughly the same formula. 
The bulk of the 'news' which they carried was extracted from the patent rolls 
held in the various offices of the unreformed patent bureaucracywhere it 
was for all practical purposes inaccessible to outsiders. This news was 
supplemented by information on foreign inventions and occasionally by 
original articles. However, the journals did not, and probably could not, 
offer all the available information on a particular subject. Instead the 
various editors advertised their own larger pools of information which, at a 
small fee, would be available to their readers - readers being regarded as 
potential clients. Coupled with this invitation were often direct 
advertisements suggesting to the reader that the editor and. his associates 
would be the ideal advisers on all problems related to the exploitation of 
technology. 117 
The field of expertise of the editor was indicated by the way in which 
technologi-cal news was covered. There was a marked practical bias and new 
scientific principles were projected in terms of their usefulness to 
manufacturing industry. Moreover, since the journals did not contain only 
technical items there was scope for the demonstration of an explicit editorial 
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commitment to ideals of progress. Thus, for example, the editor of the 
Mechanics' Magazine refused to publish a letter on the 'Effects of Machinery' 
although he admitted it to have been 'cleverly written': 
'The invention of man must have entire scope, or it may 
as well have none at all. To establish by Act of Parliament 
a limit beyond which invention shall not pass (which is what 
Mr R. recommends) would be to ordain a general march back to 
barbarism. We feel convinced that Mr R's proposition would 118 lead to no good result, and must therefore decline its insertion.. - 
In addition the potential influence of the editor was increased by the 
fact that some journals, particularly the London Journal of Arts and the 
Mechanics' Magazine, devoted a great deal of space to letters, articles and 
editorial comment which analysed the working of the patent system and suggested 
detailed changes to it and also to other bodies of law concerned with the 
119 
control of technology. 
The editorship of the various journals therefore enabled patent agents 
to set themselves up as experts who had esoteric knowledge of both practical 
technological problems and of the 'true' requirements for technological 
progress. It was in their capacity as editors of journals that patent 
agents were recognised by the general legal profession as having a unique 
area of expertise. Thus, for example, in his important early text book on 
patent law, the barrister, Riýhard Godson, referred his readers to the 
editors of the Repertory_of Arts (new series) and Gill's Technical Repository 
for advice on technological matters. 
120 It is this connection which must 
next be considered. 
(ii) The legal system : Patent agents specialised in the law 
relating to new technology and did not, as far as can be ascertained, act 
as general legal practitioners. Oq the other hand, it appears from the 
evidence before the 1829 and 1848 Committees of Inquiry 
121 that solicitors 
occasionally acted as patent agents in the narrow sense and applied to 
the various offices through which patents had to be passed on behalf of 
their clients. The roots of such occasional 'Trofessional' involvement 
by lawyers in the control of technology go back further than those of 
engineers, for, in the 18th century, lawyers had taken part in the struggle 
surrounding the patent system. Yet their expertise had been their general 
legal skill and not their exclusive knowledge of a detailed and specific 
body of law concerned with the control of technology. 
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The 19th century saw lawyers participating more actively in the 
increasingly lucrative occupation of the control of technolo 
, 
gy. Some began to 
specialise in this field although remaining formally within the organizational 
structure of the legal profession. Crucial to this process were the activities 
of a small group of men who, although regarding themselves primarily as 
barristers, shared several facets of the activities of patent agents and who 
became'part of the network of experts to whom entrepeneur clients were referred. 
Particularly in the period before the occupation of patent agency had become- 
exclusively defined by a formal 'professional' structure (i. e. the period 
which included the first half of the 19th century and beyond, until the 
foundation of the Institute of Patent Agents in 1882) they can, in terms of 
their primary occupational activities, be regarded as belonging to the same 
occupational group. 
There is indeed clear evidence that the occupational basis of patent 
agency was shared both in fact and in ideal. - Thus for example, Benjamin 
Rotch, barrister and member of parliament, was employed, from the 1820's 
onwards, as a consultant on the drafting of highly technical specifications. 
122 
At the same time he was directly involved in the movement to reform, or 
rather to modify, the patent system. His roots in general technology are 
apparent from the fact that he was a founder-member of the mechanical 
engineering section of the British Association. 
123 
Similarly, the barrister and authority on patent law from the 1840', s 
onwards, Thomas Webster, who took a leading part in the modification and 
consolidation of the patent system, had a firm grounding in general 
technology. From 1837 to 1841 he had been secretary of the Institution of 
Ci-vil Engineers and was also a member- of the important 'umbrel7a' 
organizations interested in encouraging progress through technological 
innovation - such as the Royal Society, the Society of Arts and the British 
Association. 124 
Although these personal links between the legal profession and patent 
agency must not be 'disregarded, the most important connection between them 
was provided by the joint construction of a body of knowledge which 
encapsulated the activity of definition and control of technology in legal 
form and which created a shared Universe of discourse between lawyers and 
patent agents. 
132. 
The initial steps towards the creation of this body of knowlege 
consisted merely of the collection and notation of past decisions of the 
courts and the description of legal procedures followed previously in 
matters connected to the law relating to patents for invention. These 
collections were not all made by members of the legal profession. The 
compilers of the first four collections, Davies (1816), Farey (1829), 
Carpmael (1843) and Webster (1844) described their occupations as Clerk 
of the Patent Rolls (i. e. civil servant), engineer, patent agent and barrister 
respectively. 
125 Nevertheless, they all followed approximately'the same 
procedure. 
The collection of case reports had direct consequences for the status 
of patent law, for, by providing accessible precedent, it created a resource 
within which differences of opinion could be defined and settled. Moreover, 
the doctrine of precedent meant that changes in the law effected in the 18th 
century were now given the added sanction of being firmly incorporated into 
the body of law as a whole. These changes were thus reinforced by a 
historical line of decisions which the ideology surrounding legal precedent 
in general justified as being an 'inevitable' unfolding of jurisprudential 
logic. 
Further contributions to the distillation of legal principles as the 
basis for, an esoteric body of knowledge was made by the production of legal 
texts on the subject of patent law by both patent agents and lawyers. Their 
efforts were soon given public recognition:, In 1846 the president of the 
Institution of Civil Engineers spoke thankfully of the conditions which had 
'given rise to an important class of professional gentlemen 
styled Patent Agents, who devote themselves exclusively to 
the study of inventions and the peculiar laws relating to them, 
in order to secure to inventors their just rights and prevent 
them from being infringed upon by others. Amongst these 
gentlemen we may mention the names of Robertson, Newton, and 
others, to whom inventors are much indebted for the skill and 
attention with which their interests are guarded, as also to 
Godson, Holroyd, Hindmarch, Rotch, Webster, Farey, Carpmael and 
others, who have devoted themselves to the study of the Patent 
Laws, and have written ably upon them. ' 126 
All the people mentioned in this passage wrote extensively on the subject of 
patents. Thus Godson (1823), Holroyd (1830), Carpmael (1832), Webster (1841), 
133. 
and Hindmarch (1846) were the authors of the most important early textbooks 
on the patent system. 
127 If one adds to this list the earliest works dealing 
exclusively with the patent system, those of Collier (1803) and Hinds (1808), 
the picture of a large body of newly systematized knowledge is confirmed. 
128 
Legal writings of patent experts not only built up an esoteric body of 
knowledge, they also provided ideological justifications for the patent system. 
Thus they stressed the historical continuity of the system arguing that the 
patent system was the product of the Statute of Monopolies and that it ought 
to be accepted as a common-sense part of the British tradition of liberty 
and ought hot to be regarded as unjustified intervention by the state. The 
early textbooks of Collier and Godson both propounded this argument at some 
length and they were followed by later authors. 
129 
In legal texts the concept of a patent as a form of property was used, 
as it had been by the classical economists, as a justification for the patent 
system as a whole. For example, in the opening sentence of his Practical 
Treatise on the Law of Patents for Inventions. Godson wrote: 
'Each individual, by the natural riýhts of mankind, is 
entitled to exercise an uncontrouled power over every 
kind of property of which he is legally in possession; 
whether obtained by purchase, or produced by labour. ' 130 
Later writers such as Carpmael, Webster and Hindmarch, whose important 
textbools appeared in the 1840's, used the same justifications as had 
Collier and Godson but integrated their arguments more carefully so that the 
body of knowledge available to patent experts became more coherent. In 
pýrticular,. they were more careful in their use of the concept, 'property', 
claiming, at least where patents were concerned, to define property in the 
utilitarian manner, i. e. to be what the legal system regards as such rather 
than an abstract right to which the public would always be entitled. 
Hindmarch's textbook offers a good illustration of how this subtle distinction 
was made without, to the eye of the casual reader, abandoning the rhetoric of 
property. Hindmarch introduced his book in the following way: 
'The right of property in moveable chattels was recognised 
in the earliest periods, and is founded on the law of nature. 
But it was very different with respect to the sole right to 
use an invention, which had its origin in an advanced state 
of society, and not until after improvements in the arts had 
made considerable progress. ' 131 
134. 
Thus Hindmarch too seemed to place the patent system within the spheres 
of natural rights and historical progress. Nevertheless he went on to 
dismiss the 'natural rights' argument that 'according to the principles of 
132. universal equity, an inventor has an exclusive property in his invention'. 
This 'property', he suggested, disappeared as soon as the inventor made his 
invention known. After this point the rights of the inventor depended on 
the consent of the community. However, the consent of the community was a 
fiction, for it was simply assumed that the community had consented to the 
granting of a privilege by the state for everything that was new and useful 
to the public - the inventor having no rights to what was not both new and 
useful. 
133 Hindmarch concluded: 
'Accordingly inventors are never entitled as of right 
to letters patent, granting them the sole use of their 
inventions, but they must obtain them from the Crown by 
petition, and as a matter of grace and favour, and letters 
patent always express tFat the grant is so mide. ' 134 
The more sophisticated approath to concepts of right and property did 
not, in practice, mean that the validity of patent grants was determined 
by the consent of the community or by the grace and favour of the monarch. 
Hindmarch and his contemporaries regarded the decisions as to what was new 
and useful as quasi-legal questions to be determined by the patent experts. 
This was probably the most important development in knowledge 
surrounding the patent system in the first half of the 19th century. The 
earlier textbooks such as those of Collier and Hands had been divided into 
separate sections containing justifications for the system, lengthy quotations 
from previous cases and descriptions of the bureaucracy. In the later 
textbooks, Godson's to some extent, and those of Carpmael and Hindmarch in 
particular, justifications and case material became integrated into a 
unified body of knowledge. Whether something was new, useful and within 
the scope of the patent system became dependent on the definitions of the 
legal categories of utility, novelty and subject matter. These categories 
were developed by the analysis and organization of case material until they 
had lost their common-sense: meaning. They became the cornerstones of the 
esoteric body of knowledge held by patent experts. 
The development of patent law into a virtual legal sub-discipline had 
the important consequence that patent agents came to regard their esoteric 
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body of knowledge as a source of potential solutions to all possible 
conflicts over the control of technology. The 18th century distrust of 
the adequacy of patent law lingered on into the 1820'sq 
135 but was eventually 
dispelled, at least in tfie eyes of patent agents, by its increasing 
sophistication. Thus in 1847 the patent agent, William Spence, could write 
in his work Patentable Invention and Scientific Evidence: 
'I do undoubtedly entertain a strong conviction of the 
p4ramount importance of treating patent reform as 4 
question relating to change of practice rather than of 
essential law, believing the settled points to involve 
a body of legal doctrine amply sufficient for adaptation 
by intelligent minds to the cases likely to arise. ' 136 
Finally, the links which this body of knowledge provided with the 
legal structure should be considered from the point of view of its 
potential of increased influence for patent agents. Not only would 
patent agents absorb the professional ideal from the legal profession 
but they would gain prestige by being involved in an occupational activity 
similar to that of lawyers. Furthermore they too would be supported by the 
ideological justifications applicable to the legal system as a whole. 
Turk has noted the importance of this process in general terms. 
'Those definitions of the real, the true, and the, worthy 
given legal expression or approval are thereby given the 
support of what is not only the most prestigious of cultural 
structures, but also that structure most directly supported 
by the apparatus of political control. ' 137 
The uses to which the ideological resources offered by the legal 
elements in the knowledge base of patent agents were put, will be outlined 
in subsequent chapters. Before that the structure within which patent 
agents could use their 1ýgal knowledge and their reiationship to the 
bureaucracy which, in their occupational activities, directly linked them 
to the 'apparatus of political control' must be considered. - 
(iii) The unreformed bureaucracy: Patent agency originally 
referred to the piloting of patents through the numerous offices of state 
necessary for obtaining official sanction for the sole use of units of 
technology which the patents purported to describe. Throughout the first 
half of the 19th century these offices continued in largely the same form 
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as in the 18th century and therefore retained their importance. Dealing 
with bureaucracy remained one facet of the 'new' patent agency. 
The nature of the relationship of patent agents to the bureaucracy is 
of interest because the unreformed 'early modern' bureaucracy was, to some 
extent, a source of power. The labyrinth of its offices mystified outsiders 
and the ability to extract patent grants, and even technical information, 
from it could be regarded as a form of esoteric knowledge. This might have 
meant that the bureaucracy had the power to mediate in the relationship 
between the patent agents and their clients in such a way that it would be 
the bureaucracy rather than the patent agents which held the real power 
of providing access to the sanctions which would enable the clients of 
the patent agents to control and exploit 'their' units of technology. 
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Patent agents would then not have been able to fulfil the professional 
ideal of themselves defining their relationship to their cl ients. In fact 
such a juxtaposition was prevented by two factors: first, by the intimate 
personal links between agents and the unreformed. bureaucracy; and second, 
by the limitations on the bureaucratic power imposed by the legal-traditional 
nature of the-bureaucracy. 
Links of the former kind are typified by the career of Moses Poole, 
perhaps the most important transitional figure between the two types of 
agency. In 1817 Poole was appointed, in succession to his father, James Poole, 
to the office of Clerk of Inventions. at the Patent Office. His appointment 
was made 'for life, or while he executed the duties of his office properly'. 
139 
In fact Poole held the office which entailed primarily the mechanical copying 
of patents for a few hours a day (and for whi-ch-he was entitled to hire an 
assistant) until the Patent Law Amendment Act was passed in 1852.140 
This type of office was not remarkable since many offices in the early 
19th century government were filled by similar officials performing similar 
tasks after having been appointed for life, by patronage and often on an 
hereditary basis. 141 Nor was it remarkable that Poole provided other 
services than those stri. ctly laid down in his capacity as a government 
official; for the estimatet of the costs of patents show that it was 
openly accepted that 'gratuities' had to be paid to various officials and 
their minions in order to expedite the process. 
142 Where Poole did differ 
from other holders of sinecures was in the scope of his involvement in 
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unofficial activities. Like his father he acted as an agent passing patents 
through the various other offices for the standard fee of M: 10s. (plus 
143 il: ls. for stationery and expenses). In his evidence to the 1829 
Committee he described his role as limited entirely to this 'routine' 
activity and denied that his position in the bureaucracy was of any 
assistance. 
144 However, on closer examination it is apparent that he 
. did in fact 'look over' specifications on behalf of his clients. 
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Furthermore it is clear from his casebook that not only did he check 
specifications but also acted as a 'clearing-house' for clients who had 
problems with regard to the control of technology in general. Thus he 
arranged for advice on legal problems to be obtained from barristers. Clients 
were referred to 'experts' who could draft specifications. He also passed 
foreign patents in his own name while acting as agent. 
Poole's practice flourished. Farey testified in 1829 that Poole passed 
more patents than anyone else. Furthermore, -Farey continued, 'he EPoole3 
obtains patents more expeditiously than some othe. rs, and I believe at 
something less expense'. 
146 By 1837 Poole himself estimated that he was, 
concerned as agent, in the narrow sense, for between one-half and two-thirds 
of the whole of the patents for inventions which were issued annually. 
147 
Assuming that he was still being paid the standard fee of M: 10s. per 
patent to which he had testified in 1829, his income in 1836 from this source 
alone would have been at least E1554, or more than 670 per cent of his 
-official salary. 
148 In 1837 Poole went into partnership with Wm Carpmael, 
'engineer and patent agent'. 
149 This meant that the necessity for 'outside' 
consultants was minimised and that the partners could perform all the 
activities associated with modernýjpatent agency. - 
The secure position held by Poole (and others appointed permanently in 
the unreformed bureaucracy) is illustrated by an incident which took place 
in 1839. In that year an attempt was made by a newly appointed Clerk of 
Patents to have Poole removed from his sinecure. Poole appealed to the 
Attorney- Genera I who had originally appointed him. They wrote on his 
behalf to the then Attorney-General, Sir Frederick Pollock. Eventually 
Pollock confirmed Poole's appointment. He stressed that, although the 
number of patents for invention had increased to such an extent that there 
was Ian apparent objection' to Poole'sacting as patent agent, he was 
nevertheless 'desirous of treating with the--utmost deference every 
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arrangement made by my predecessors in Office and of interfering as little 
as possible with the benefits enjoyed in the office in consequence of any 
150 
appointment of former Law Officers... '. 
It is important to bear in mind that the process to which a patent 
specification was subjected before a patent was granted, was not a naked 
exercise in lucrative bureaucratic hairsplitting - although such hair- 
splitting abounded. The bureaucrats provided a legal rationalefor their 
activities: In Weberian terms, they justified their occupational activities 
on the basis of their intrinsic legal formality. Thus the bureaucrat 
witnesses to the 1848 Committee of Inquiry into the Offices of the Signet 
and Privy Seal attempted to justify the entire sequence of their formal 
activities in terms of legal/constitutional forms which had to be preserved. 
151 
The unreformed bureaucracy had, in general terms, been defended by the legal 
profession., Thus in 1830 the Law Magazine had described an attack on the 
various sinecures of the patent bureaucracy as 'atrocious and Benthamic' 
and had considered it to be a danger to the constitution. 
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Apart from these general links which resulted from the legal nature of 
the formalities of the process of granting patents, the structure of the 
bureaucracy allowed patent agents to be involved in quasi-judicial hearings 
which enabled them to protect the interests of their clients in a particular 
class of technology over a period of time. By means of what was known as 
the caveat system a notice, called a caveat, could be entered at the office 
of the A. ttorney-General and the Soiicitor-General. The caveat asked that 
before they recommended that a patent be granted foý a particular type or 
class of invention the petitioner be warned of its existence so that he could 
decide whether to oppose the grant. Caveats were usually entered in the 
names of patent agents so as to keep secret the identities of their clients 
whose inventions in the same field might not yet have been patented. 
153 (In 
practice, if no caveat were entered, the Attorney-Qeneral automatically 
endorsed the application for the patent. ) 
In the event of the caveat procedure being followed the role of the 
patent agent was crucial since the Attorney-General decided the case 
without the assistance of scientifically trained assessors. Moreover, he 
did not consider the validity of the patent as a whole but merely heard 
the evidence of the would-be patentee and contrasted this with the evidence 
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presented by the opposing party, through his patent agent, as to the 
existence of an equivalent invention under the same title. 
The caveat system was important because it involved patent agents 
directly in the only significant decision made by the bureaucracy - namely 
the decision whether to grant a patent or not. The bureaucracy was in 
fact only stimulated to make this decision by the intervention of the holder 
of a caveat. Since this was usually a patent agent it meant that a patent 
.. 
agent had to watch over the technology of his client over an extended period, 
rather than only being involved during the process of granting a patent or 
defending it in the courts. 
Decisions were made in the caveat system on what FW Campin, an early 
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patent agent, called 'mixed questions of law and science'. It meant that 
the bureaucracy provided a framework within which the patent agents could 
deploy their esoteric body of knowledge, which combined precisely these two 
elements, for the purpose of gaining the powerful sanctions of the state on 
behalf of their clients. It can be concluded that the esoteric knowledge 
of the patent agents rather than the activities of bureaucrats decided 
whether the technology of their clients would be protected by the sanctions 
of the state. At the same time it must be noted that by the middle of the 
19th century patent agents had built up a relationship with the bureaucracy 
through which they had direct personal contact and influence with people 
such as the Attorney and Solicitor-General who had the power to shape 
directly legislation relating to the control of new technology. 
V. Conclusion 
The first half of the 19th century saw the emergence of social classes 
in Briti. sh society. Included in the consciousness of these classes were 
notions about the relationship of the state to the control of new technology. 
-In particular the growth of a relatively influential middle. class with its 
own distinctive 'common sense' led to a departure from what Dicey called 
'Old Toryism or Legislative Quiescence ,. 
155 However, at least in the sphere 
of control of new technology, the change in 'public opinion' was not towards 
'individualism' as Dicey had suggested. Indeed, this chapter has shown that 
the ideologues of the emergent middle class (the classical economists) were 
prepared to allow for a measure of (reformed) state intervention. It was the 
working class alternative that viewed intervention by the state in the control 
of new technology with the greatest hostility. 
140. 
This chapter has also indicated that the potential ability to shape the 
future development of the way in which technology was controlled was not 
equally distributed. In particular, the analysis of the emergence of the 
occupation of patent agency has demonstrated how various structural roots 
and ideological influences combined to give the occupation the strategic 
social position and the occupational unity which would enable it to influence 
the way in which its occupational role was to be fulfilled. Patent agents 
combined the general ideals of professionalism and respectability with 
specific ideals of expertise held by the various occupational groups to 
which patent agency was closely linked. This combination gives some 
indication of the goals to which patent agents would aspire and of the 
means -a unified body of esoteric knowledge and links with other professions 
available to them in the first half of the 19th century. In the next chapter 
a chronological description will be given of how patent aqents deployed the 
means at their disposal to shape, within the constraints of the changing social 
structure, the manner in which new technology was controlled in such a way that 
their occupation was safeguarded and the scope for the exercise of-their 
'professional' skills increased. 
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CHAPTER 5- THE REFORM OF THE PATENT SYSTEM (1820-1852) 
I. First stirrings 
The first 19th century stirrings of a movement toreform the patent 
system coincided almost exactly with the period, at the beginning of the 
18201: s, which the social historian, H Perkin, has denoted as the time of the 
'birth of class' in English society - i. e. the period in which, in his 
words, 'the vertical antagonisms and horizontal solidarities of class come 
for the first time, clearly, unýistakably, and irrevocably, to supplant 
the vertical connections and horizontal rivalries of dependency and 
interest'. This is not to suggest that the early requests to parliament 
for the reform of the patent system were the product of the desire to extend 
the hegemonic dominance of the emerging classes by destroying the influence 
of the old order in the administration of patents. A more immediate reason was 
2 that the growing number of patentees were dissatisfied with the protection 
offered by their patents. 
The initial challenge, in the form of petitions to parliament, came 
directly from the users of the patent system. They did not ask for cheap 
patents for they did not wish to increase the number of people who owned 
patents. Instead they asked that the rights which they already had, or were 
about to acquire,, should be more effectively defended. The various 
improvements suggested were aimed directly at securing their investments 
rather than at providing solutions congruent with a theoretical conception 
of the importance of technological innovation in the ideology of the emergent 
middle class. This instrumental orientation is apparent from the content of 
their specific pr6posals. 
3 
One of the proposals was-that, as Arkwright and others had unsuccessfully 
suggested in the 18th century, specifications of the content. of the patent 
ought to be kept secret. Petitioners in 1820 complained that specifications 
were being copied by their competitors, some of whom were foreigners.. Leave 
was sought to bring a Bill 'to prývent the too great facility of procuring 
copies of the specifications enrolled by the grantees of letters patents'. 
The Bill proved abortive. 
4 It also provided the. occasion for an important 
statement of principle. Joseph Hume, the middle class radical, attacked the 
proposal on the grounds that: 
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'the motion was contrary to all sound and liberal views 
of commercial policy, and that instead of concealing the 
specifications of patents every possible facility ought 
to be given to render them public. The legislature ought 
never to lend itself to any measure which was calculated 
to prevent the diffusion of knowledge. ' 5 
Here was a clear statement of the importance of technological innovation 
which was couched in far broader terms than the protection of individual 
patentees. Nevertheless, the issue was not discussed at a general level and. - 
the standards for the specification remained obscure. Such obscurity still 
enabled substantive patent law to be all things to all men. 
In 1826 a similar request for secrecy was made in a petition presented 
by Lord Palmerston. 6 By this time more than forty years had elapsed since 
Arkwright's patent had been defeated on grounds of the insufficiency of its 
specification. The judgment in the case had been reprinted in the early 
legal textbooks. Nevertheless the law was so little known by 'outsiders' 
that the Attorney-General, in the course of a general apology for the patent 
system, could still claim that 
'in patents there was a protection for several Years, during 
which they Epatentees] were not called upon to give such a 
particular description of their invention as would allow 
other persons to avail themselves of it for the purposes of 
imitation'. 7 
Other improvements which were suggested did not elicit such sophistry. 
There was no opposition from the government to a proposal to change the 
standard clause in the patent grant which prohibited. the joining of more 
than four partners in the exploitation of a patent. 
8 This was an issue 
which directly affected the use of patents as a basis for investment but 
did not influence the administrative process. No legislative changes at all 
were made as a direct result of the bills and petitions presented between 
1820 and 1826. 
The importance of these early attempts to modify the patent system 
lies not in the content of the almost apologetic suggestions for improvements 
in the system but in the contention that the system of traditional privileges 
might not be fulfilling its function as it should. The result of these 
limited, instrumentally motivated steps taken by the petitioners was that 
the whole problem of the control of technology by the patent system came 
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to be reassessed. This meant that the idea that the unreformed 'traditional' 
administration had an essential part to play, came to be challenged. Men 
began to realise that the way in which technology was controlled might not 
be in their interests. Once this question had been raised the way was 
opened for men to reappraise their interests in the control of new technology 
in the light of the ideological frameworks within which they operated. The 
unchallenged power of the old aristrocracy and the administration which was 
the product of its patronage had been questioned. 
II. The redefinition of protest 
Until the mid 1820's the old order of the unreformed administration 
and their patrons in government had been powerful enough to ignore petitioners 
and the limited public protest. If not ignored, protesters had been fobbed 
off with platitudes or parliamentary time had simply not been made available 
for detailed consideration of the problem. The role of the patent system 
had not yet been raised to the status of a mass issue. 
From 1826 onwards the press tried to interest the public in the issue 
of patent reform. Although the general press 
9 
commented on the parliamentary 
debates of that year, it was from the specialised journals dealing with 
technology that the sharpest reactions were forthcoming. 
At about this time independent patent agents began to emerge as a 
separate occupational group capable, as has been seen in. the previous chapter, 
of exerting power in their determination of. the development of the patent 
system. Patent agents did not, however, simply work out the logical 
implications of a particular ideological framework for thefuture of the 
patent system. Three intervening processes prevented this.. First, patent 
agents as an emerging occupational group had, for reasons which have bo .en outlined, 
their own interests in structuring their occupation according to the ideals 
of professionalism. In the second place the ideological frameworks adopted, 
would differ according to what the ideals of their clients were and to how 
closely the patent agents identified with these ideals. Third, the scope 
of the patent agents' action was limited by the residual power of the old 
elite. Even though challenged the common-sense ideology which justified 
the old social order did not immediately lose its hegemonic dominance 
(legitimacy) at all levels of society. Members of the old elite still 
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protected and defended the unreformed patent system. The existing patent 
system provided the milieu in which the patent agents worked. Some such 
system was necessary to enable patent agents to operate at all. These 
circum stances all conspired to inhibit rejection of the old system and to 
force patent agents to compromise in their proposals for change. 
Three examples will illustrate how patent agents in interaction with 
those who made up their occupational world, articulated their own ideas 
on how the patent system should be reformed. 
A. Perhaps the clearest illustration of how the ideology of a particular 
class could be interpreted in order to obtain reforms congruent with the 
objectives of the patent agents as an emerging profession can': be found in 
the way that JC Robertson, editor of the Mechanics' Magazine, dealt with 
attempts by his readers to articulate a specifically working class view,; on 
the control of technology. In the section on. the working class ideology, 
it was noted how Robertson had become a spokesman for the emergent working 
class. At the same time as he was. editing the Mec hanics' Magatine and 
defending the rights of the working class in the London Mechanics' 
Institution he had also set up practice as a patent agent and solicited 
business through his journal. 10 
The insight which Robertson in his capacity as patent agent gained into 
the forces controlling and protecting the existing patent system was first 
shown in the timing of the Mechanics' Magazine's campaign to reform the 
system. Given its expressed concern for the right of the working class to 
control technology one might have expected Mechanics' Magazine to pinpoint 
the shortcomi-ngs of the patent system in its early issues. Yet, only in 
1827, four years after its foundation and some time after the issue had been 
raised in parliament, did it publish theý-first of the large number of letters 
which it had received on the subject of. patent rights from its artisan readers. 
The delay was explained by the editor. He had for some time, 'from a private 
knowledge of circumstances' known of moves towards reform and had accordingly 
deliberately held'back in his efforts to exert pressure. 
11 Only when private 
influence had failed was he prepared to turn the problem into a public issue 
definable in terms of class interests. 
Robertson then began a vigorous campaign to reform the patent system by 
publishing in successive editions a series of letters on patent rights. His 
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choice of letters reflected both his identification with the working Class 
and his limited goals for reform. The former element is illustrated by the 
letter which he selected to open the campaign. It cast the debate in terms 
of the artisan seeking to 'reap the fruits of his labours' but being exploited 
12 by the 'larger capitalists'. Robertson's editorial contributions also spoke 
in general terms of substantive natural rights in the product of labour. 
13 
The limits which Robertson placed on the debate only became apparent 
as more letters were published. He allowed sharp attacks on the administrati-on 
to pass unremarked, yet he was quick to defend the rationale of the substantive 
law. 14 He argued that the-legality of a patent quite correctly depended on 
the specification being clear and public 'since material concealment vitiates 
the grant, ' and was not prepared to consider attacks on the patent system 
15 
which proceeded,. -from the argument that specifications ought to be concealed. 
Robertson made'. his acceptance of patents as defined and protected by the 
existing positive law quite clear 
'The fault which intelligent men find with our Patent Laws, 
is, not that they do not furnish protection enough ... but that it costs such an enormous sum to procure that 
protection; and to this point alone we would have the 
petitioners against these laws address themselves ... in the first instance at least. ' 16 
Even at this early date (1827) Robertson was Prepared to accept the 
essential validity of the esoteric knowledge base of his nascent profession. 
At the core of this esoteric knowledge was the ability to define units of 
technology. Since definition was accomplished by a legally defined 
description, i. e. the specification, and since the specification was protected 
by law, legal knowledge was a key part of Robertson's professional expertise. 
He remained committed to a specifically legal element in the patent system. 
The result was that the rhetoric of working class ideology served only to add 
gloss to the essentially limited goal of providing a cheaper and more 
efficient way of using the legal system to create exploitable units of 
technology. 
I 
Robertson's approach to the question of patent reform did not mean that 
he personally rejected the cause of the working class. Instead it indicates 
that on the question of patent rights the ideological framework within which 
he worked as a professional restricted his vision and shaped his tactics for 
change. As in other fields, he distrusted the proselytizing of middle class 
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reformers such as Brougham and Birkbeck on the subject of patent rights. 
For this reason he was less than enthusiastic about a meeting held under 
Birkbeck's chairmanship in June 1827 to discuss the 'Emancipation of 
Mechanical Genius'. 17 When, as he predicted, it failed to produce any 
moves towards reform of the patent system he produced his own petition, 
which he asked artisans everywhere to support. 
18 Although clad in the 
rhetoric of natural rights this petition basically limited its claims to 
removal of spurious offices and fees so that the patentee could be placed 
in the same position as the holder of copyright. It contained no substantive 
claim which could not also have been justified by the arguments of a middle 
class reformer bent on efficient government. Robertson's achievement was 
to equate limited patent reform with the working class ideal. This meant 
that the middle class reformers and the working class shared the same 
objective. Nevertheless the difference in rhetoric meant that failure of 
the middle class to achieve the reformist goals could still be interpreted 
as a denial of working class rights. 
B. Other early patent agents merely adopted and adapted the ideological 
positions of their more middle class readers and clients. An illustration 
of this approach can be found in the support given by the patent agent 
editor of the London Journal of Arts, Wm Newton, to a series of articles 
contributed from 1828 onwards to the journal by a correspondent who signed 
himself 'Vindicator'. 
'Vindicator' argued, along similar lines to Hodgskin, that an inventor 
had an inalienable natural property right in the product of his mental 
labour. Unlike Hodgskin, however, he did not relate his claims to a 
doctrine of substantive natural law which would support the claims of the 
working class to all products of labour. Instead he harked back to the 
18th century radical tradition (of which Kenrick had beEnpart)19 and 
specifically to the idea of a social contract that was the formal basis of 
the inalienable property rights of individuals. 
In 1829, in reply to timid suggestions in parliament that patent reform 
should not make patents too cheap or too easy to obtain, 'Vindicator' 
argued: 
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'Mhe position maintained in this doctrine, of the inexpediency 
of facilitating the taking out of Patents for inventions, 
directly involves the principle of non-protection to the actual 
property of the subject, and the exclusion, so far as the 
principle operates, of every man from the fundamental compact 
of society. Absolute and entire protection to property, without 
reference to the plus et minus of its amount, forms one of the 
principal claims which every member of a community has upon it, 
or rather upon those who are pleased to undertake its direction 
and state. This principle is fundamental and inherent to the 
constitution of every society. -The social compact would be 
virtually destroyed were it not, for the universality of the 
extent of the protection it offers to all property. ' 20 
Piecemeal reforms would serve no purpose, for as 'Vindicator' explained, 
'absurdities care] interwoven with and integral to the PRINCIPLE of issuing 
patents'. 
21 What was required ideally was a system which'assured rights, 
even to valueless inventions, on demand. Unlike Hodgskin and some of the 
correspondents of the Mechanics' Magazine, 'Vindicator' did not deny the 
efficacy of the law to safeguard such units of new technology. Instead he 
argued that patents should be protected by the full rigour of the criminal 
law. 22 
In the ideological base provided by the classical economists for the 
emergent 19th century middle class the place of innovation had not always 
been analysed in terms of inalienable individual ri. ghts. Nevertheless, 
'rights and property', 'technological innovation' and efficient government 
were all concepts of symbolic importance to the middle class. They were 
all concepts which, in slightly different context. - the middle class used 
when asserting its own independence. They therefore had to be taken seriously 
by anyone who wanted middle class support. 
What Weber has called formal natural law arguments (see the discussion 
in Chapter I above), from the tradition that 'Vindicator' epitomised, were 
of ambiguous value to patent agents in their attempts to influence change 
in the patent system. On the one hand they could not reject 'Vindicator's' 
eloquent plea for a formally just patent system, his denunciation of the 
excesses of the existing patronage-based administration or his claims on 
behalf of inventors. On the other hand, if his prescriptions could be put 
into effect and if the system could be simplified to such an extent that 
it could easily be patrolled by the existing apparatus of criminal law, 
there would be no legal or bureaucratic framework within which patent agents 
could exercise their unique combination of occupational skills. 
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In practice this dilemma was not insoluble; for, as Weber pointed 3ut 
in his discussion of natural law as an ideology, a completely formal natural 
law could not exist since 'such a natural law would consist of general legal 
concepts devoid of any content'. 
23 Although the ideal of formal natural 
law contained high standards these were lowered when practical problems, 
inherent in existing systems appeared. Weber explained how this process 
took place: 
'In purely formal natural law, the reasonable is that which is 
derivable from the eternal order of nature and logic, both 
being readily blended with one another. But from the very 
beginning, the English concept of "reasonable" contained by 
implication the meaning of "rational" in the sense of "practically 
appropriate". ' 24 
According to Rheinstein, Weber had in mind the gradual 'shift from natural 
law thinking to utilitarianism, as expressed by Bentham, John Stuart Mill 
and Spencer', when he wrote this passage. 
25 
. It was precisely this 
utilitarianism which patent agents chose to stress in the middle class 
ideology of their clients. They published natural property right arguments 
and did not attempt to refute them. Instead they simply ignored the 
implications of a blanket condemnation of the existing patent system, and 
concentrated on changes which could 'reasonably' be made to the existing 
system in order-to improve their clients' (and their own) positions. 
Although Newton did not ever directly contradict 'Vindicator' and granted 
wide publicity to his ideas through his journal, his own approach was 
cautiously utilitarian. Thus while he supported the introduction of 
scientifically trained experts into the patent administration he did not 
believe that such a change need entail the replacement of the whole system. 
A patent, Newton argued, should still be granted by the King. Costs should 
only be reduced by removing stamp duties so that 'officers could be left in 
possession of their fees'. 
26 Newton could only justify such a hybrid 
mixture of changes by claiming, rather vaguely, that specific changes were 
'reasonable'. 
The manipulative success of Newton and his colleagues lay in their 
ability'to suggest that changes which they proposed and which would in fact 
increase the scope for expertise, were not totally unlike the proposals of 
people like 'Vindicator'. In the early period of the reform movement their 
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lack of response to the challenge of abstract, 'ideological' questions 
assisted in accomplishing this. 
C. Finally some patent agents had such close and lucrative links with the 
unreformed patent administration that it was' very difficult for them to 
criticise the existing system, even where reforms might lead to them 
becoming more independent. Thus, for example, Moses Poole when asked to 
state his views replied: 
'I have no particular views; I do not see any defect in the 
present law; perhaps the specifications might be made more 
sure. ' 27 
However, when their clients began to realise that they might be able to 
secure their interests more successfully under an improved system even the 
most conservative patent agents had to make some attempt to appear concerned. 
The views of the conservative group of patent-agents, in particular of Poole 
and his later partner Carpmael, were expressed by the Repertou of Patent 
Inventions. The technological information in this journal consisted almost 
entirely of reprinted specifications of patents. This gave it a semi-official 
character. Unlike its competitors its only critical reference to the patent 
system in'the period before 1829 was a. report of the abortive meeting held 
under Birkbeck's chairmanship in 1827 to discuss the 'Emancipation of 
Mechanical Genius. ' 28 In general though, this group had little initial 
impa ct on the reform movement except where their rebuttal of its arguments- 
lent publicity to its existence. 
III. Legislative Reform - the first phase 
A. The 1829 Select Committee 
In April 1829 Parliament, in response to 'public' pressure29 took its 
first positive step towards general reform and appointed a Committee of 
Enquiry into the patent system. 
30 This appointment was a si . gn that the 
power of the old aristocracy to administer the patent system. in the 
traditional way was being threatened. It does not however indicate a 
capitulation on the part of the old elite but can rather be interpreted as 
an attempt to reaffirm its control of the increasingly lucrative patent system. 
The arguments used in the debate which led to the committee being set up, 
support such an interpretation. They were phrased in such a way as to limit 
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the scope of the debate about the patent system and also to legitimate the 
existing system as far as possible-. Thus TB Lennard, who introduced the 
motion, outlined the long historical pedigree of the law of patents and 
stressed that he had no intention of infringing on the principle on which 
the law had traditionally been based nor of challenging the prerogative of 
the King to grant them. He-made no mention of any kind of rights of 
inventors whatsoever but simply argued that the patent system had 
traditionally been intended to reward inventors and to stimulate industry 
and ingenuity. He supported these goals and merely wished 'to make the law 
I efficient for these purposes'. 
31 
Lennard also attempted to defend the existing administration and to 
protect the income of the officials it employed: 
'He should not say anything in regard to the expense of 
taking out a patent; he had heard it spoken of as a 
grievance, but he was not prepared to say that the law required 
any alteration in that respect. It was his own opinion at 
present, and he knew it was the opinion of many persons who 
had great experience in that part of our laws, that it was 
not desirable to facilitate over-much the obtaining of patents 
by any reduction of expense. ' 32 
Most speakers shared his cautious approach. 
33 They included the Home 
Secretary, Robert Peel. In his speech, Peel revealed that the old elite 
which benefited directly from the inefficient andexpensive patent system 
was not without allies. Not all entrepreneurs wished to see a cheap and 
efficient patent system. Like Adam Smith, he was prepared to distinguish 
between major inventions which deserved to be protected by patents and 
those lesser improvements which were beneath protection. He is reported 
as saying: 
'He entertained some doubt, however, whether any great advantage 
would be derived from diminishing the expense of taking out 
patents; as, if there were too great a facility in the taking them 
out, a patent might be asked for any inconsiderable and unimportant 
invention. Manufacturers in such towns as Birmingham and Manchester, 
who had large establishments, might be made liable to vexatious 
actions brought against them by persons taking out patents for some 
improvement, which they, unconscious of the existence of such 
patents, might already have brought into practical operation. The 
subject was one which should be proceeded in with great caution 
and circumspection. ' 34 
Later in 1829 the report of the Committee of Enquiry was published. 
35 
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Evidence had been submitted by a large number of disparate individuals 
including manufacturers, engineers, patrons of the arts and patent agents. 
Almost all argued that the substantive law was uncertain, and that the 
existing administration was not functioning properly. Most wished to 
preserve some sort of barrier to keep out trifling inventions and to 
eliminate imposters. The criteria for achieving this were left vague 
and no one was prepared to suggest outright that the existing administration 
be totally abolished. The result was that the Committee made no specific 
recommendations. It simply presented the evidence submitted to it in lieu 
of a report. 
36 
The Committee was not reappointed. 
The old elite might have seen the appointment of a committee of enqUiry 
as an ideal tactic to lessen the pressure for reform. Yet paradoxi, cally the 
inconclusive report provided the material for-raising reform of the patent 
system into a national issue. Its publication provided the occasion for a. 
discussion of the issue in the general press. In October 1829 The Times 
began a series of articles which were based on the evidence given before the 
Committee. 37 These articles were highly critical of the existing patent 
system and suggested that reform was 'a subject that eminently affects the 
interest of the public as well as individuals [because of] its connection 
38 
with science and with the operations of the mind'. 
The evidence given before the Committee was read by the popularisers 
of the classical economists' ideas on the importance of new technology. It 
was noted by the political reviews in the context of encouraging innovation. 
Thus, for example, the Westminster Revievi analysed the evidence of the 1829 
Committee in detail. It stressed practical problems and unnecessary expense 
and concluded that 'ample room remains here for rooting out abuses flagrant, 
39 
absurd, and intolerable'. 
Similarly even the Tory Quarterly Review used the evidence to show that 
the old order, by failing to patronise the sciences adequately, was neglecting 
its 'duty' to advance the new technology needed by industry. In an article, 
entitled 'Decline of Science in England', presumably written by the eminent 
40 
scientist Daniel Brewster, it attacked the patent system as fiercely as any 
radical critic, describing it as 
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'a system of vicious and fraudulent legislation, which, while 
it creates a factitious privilege of little value, deprives 
its possessor of hii natural right to the fruit of his genius, 
and which places the most exalted officers of the state in the 
position of a legalized banditti, ESiC3 who stab. the inventor through 
the folds of an act of parliament, and rifle him in the presence 
of the Lord Chief Justice of England. 41 
Nor was it taken in by Peel's argument that patents ought not to be too 
easy to acquire: 
'Sir Robert Peel stated, in the House of Commons, that if patents 
were made too cheap, the manufacturers of Manchester and 
Birmingham would be put to great inconvenience. Without noticing 
the novelty of the principle of taxing inventors for the convenience 
of the manufacturers of these towns, we may ask if the manufacturers 
here referred to are the pirates who lie in wait for the poor man's 
inventions, or the respectable tradesmen who would scorn to touch 
the property oftheir neighbour? The former do not deserve our 
sympathy, and the latter do not require it. ' 42 
The solution suggested was a renewed role for the old order. It did 
not wish to reform the patent system but rather wanted a revitalised system 
of patronage administered by scientific boards. What was required was 'an 
association of our nobility, clergy, gentry, and philosophers which would 
rescue the science of England, the principle of her arts iwhich was] 
43 
struggling for existence, the meek and unarmed victim of political strife'. 
The possibility that patent law reform might become a viable political 
issue was increased by the extensive coverage which the evidence before the 
Committee was given in the technological journals. Major proportions of the 
evidence were serialised verbatim during the following three years by all 
those journals. 44 During this period correspondents were encouraged to 
comment on the proposals that appeared. Many of these letters made scathing 
comments about members of the old aristocracy who had urged that reform be 
approached cautiously whilst they themselves drew huge incomes from the 
office of the old administration. A satirist described the proceedings in 
parliament: 
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'One senator in our chapel has "no intention of encroaching 
on the prerogative; " another says, "the subject is full of 
difficulties, and should be approached with cautiom" a third, 
who actually derives an income of about L2000 per annum, from 
the "mere motions of the thing, " finds it'an unfortunate, 
erroneous, but very 5eneral opinion, that the thing may be made 
to work better with less oil; and a fourth, who was lately one 
of the priests of the temple, deriving an annual aid from the 
aforesaid "mere motions, " to the amount of above 13000 - with 
a kind of star-light gaze at a reinstatement to his resigned. office 
cannot assent that any thing but the "thing" itseTf shall 
operate our protection, notwithstanding the unfortunateý erroneous, 
but very general misgivings as to the utility and expense of those 
operations. ' 45 
By 1833 the stage was set for anyone who wished to exploit the issue . 
of control of new technology through the patent system. In particular, patent 
experts could attempt to show that they had the power to shape new legislation 
to the benefit of their clients. 
B. Godson's Bill 
. The first person to attempt to do this was Richard Godson MP, barrister 
and patent expert by dint of his textbook on patent law. 
46 In the House 
of Commons on 19 February 1833 he introduced the first general Bill to 
reform the patent system. 
47 He had laid the foundation for his Bill by 
publishing a special supplement to his textbook in which he outlined what 
he considered to be the major defects o. f the patent system. 
48 In his 
speech introducing his Bill he promised to improve the inventor's position. 
This would be effected principally by eliminating more formalities and by 
allowing specifications of the content of patents to be amended under 
certain conditions. Godson's speech met with cautious approval; much as had 
the proposal to set up a Committee of Enquiry in 1829.49 
Patent experts were, however, universally hostile and used the occasion 
to undermine their own individual claims to a unique expertise in representing 
the interests of inventors. On 13th February The Tim6s had sketched out 
Godson's aims and given his Bill a cautious welcome. Two days later Newton 
and Berry wrote to the Times in their capacity as patent agents and strongly 
condemned Godson's tactics. It would serve no purpose, they argued, to 
attack 'the vested rights of many persons and the ancient prerogatives of 
the Crown'. 50 The average'inventor dealt with the various offices through 
his agent and was not put to the inconvenience of dealing with them personally. 
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What the inventor desired was a reduction of the 'exorbitant fees and stamps'. 
Godson, they hinted, was not a true representative of the interests of 
patentees. They, on the other hand felt qualified to speak as they were 
'tolerably well acquainted with the defects of the existing laws and also 
with the opinions of patentees in general in different parts of the kingdom'. 
51 
Robertson in the Mechanics' Magazine was even more indignant and attacked 
the B-111 for being 'drawn up in an excessively careless and slovenly manner'. 
He contended that it should have been called 'a Bill to unsettle and perplex 
the Laws respecting Letters Patent for Inventions, to secure to rich men 
exclusively the property of their Inventions, and finally to throw open the 
whole arts and manufactures of the country to a grasping and ruinous system 
of monopoly; ' and published a clause by clause exposd of its shortcomings. 
'Mr Godson, ' he concluded, 'has evidently undertaken a task for which he is 
unequal; and perhaps the sooner he abandons it the better. '52 Not content 
with this personal attack Robertson also attempted to appeal to members of 
parliament directly and sent them copies of his detailed criticisms of 
Godson's Bill so that, in his words 'the poor inventor might find an advocate, 
53 
and the true interests of the country an enlightened asserter'. 
Newton, editor of the London Journal of Arts, also tried to set himself 
up as an alternative to Godson, as a champion of the interests of patentees. 
He suggested that his readers should not attempt to influence Godson by 
writing directly to him. Instead they should call public meetings in their 
own localities. 
54 Shortly after this appeal Newton published his own 
55 draft of the form he thought Godson's Bill should take . It did not differ 
substantially from Godson's Bill except that it made provision for the . 
introduction of expert patent commissio'ners. In general it maintained Godson's 
56 legalistic bias . 
Meetings to discuss Godson's Bill were duly called by the 'manufacturing 
interests' in Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, Glasgow, Sheffield and Nottinghan57 L 
At these meetings resolutions were passed which laid down guiding principles 
for the reform of the patent system. Thus, for example, the meeting in 
Birmingham 
'resolved unanimously - That every new idea, whereof the manifestation 
or development may become useful to society, belongs exclusively to 
him who conceives it, and that it is highly advantageous to the 
useful arts and manufactures to encourage industry by securing the 
property of inventions to their authors ... at a moderate expense. ' 58 
155. 
Newton was present at some of these meetings and had no difficulty 
convincing those present that their ideal (utilitarian) notion of property 
would be adequately defended by a modification of the patent system. At 
Birmingham and Leeds his expertise persuaded them that his redrafting of 
Godson's Bill precisely reflected their ideals. They also nominated him 
to represent their interests to the legislator. 
59 
More tradiohali-st patent agents also contributed negative criticism. 
William Carpmael wrote a pamphlet which pointed out that some of Godson's 
proposals were unworkable. 
60 Carpmael's views were echoed in the 
Repertory of Patent Inventions 
* 
which blamed the 'clamour, raised against 
the patent laws' on ignorance 'existing in most classes of society' about 
the perfectly clear, but difficult to find, decisions, which courts had 
given on all disputed questions. 
61 
In the face of all this agitation Godson's Bill was referred to a 
Select Committee of the House of Commons. 
62 Whilst the Bill was being 
considered 'a highly respectable and numerous meeting of patentees and other 
scientific gentlemen' was held in London. 
63 Among the participants were 
many people who had been influential in spreading middle class ideals of the 
importance of technology. Or Birkbeck of the London Mechanics' Institution 
was chairman. Other participants were Babbage and Tolpis, secretary of the 
London Mechanics' Institution, and also patent experts such as Newton and 
Rosser, a solicitor with a large patent practice. Their general approach 
reflected their pragmatic orientation to existing institutions and their 
attempts to carry the middle class ideal to others. 
The wealth of the country, they remarked, had 'principally resulted from 
the unrivalled skill, energy and enterprise of the productive classes' - 
i. e. members of their own class. The patent system still provided the best 
way of securing this wealth. It was, they argued i. n a clear attempt to 
extend the hegemonic dominance of their views, 'for the common interests of 
all classes, that the profits arising from-improvements in the arts, and 
manufactures, should be secured to their authors for certain limited periods'. 
64 
Once these general resolutions had been passed a working committee was set up 
which drafted a set of detailed proposals which were more elaborate than those 
in Godson's Bill. They included the whole range of reforms suggested by the 
pragmatic middle class reformers. They suggested'inter alia the creation of 
an independent body of scientifically trained experts to examine specifications 
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in order to ensure the sufficiency of the descriptions offered. Fees 
should be drastically reduced. The administration should be rationalised 
so that documents could be consulted more easily and so that officials could 
not practise privately as patent agents. A copy of the 28 proposals and a 
list of 34 separate comments on Godson's Bill were all sent to the Select 
Committee which was considering Godson's Bill. 
65 
Given all this pressure and criticism from within the 'reformist' ranks 
it is not surprising that the old aristocracy which stood to lose. some of its 
income and powers of patronage if Godson's Bill were passed, was able to. 
defend its privileges in parliament. The defeat of Godson's Bill came in two 
stages. In order to attempt to salvage some of the reforms the Select 
Committee bowed to traditionalist pressure and reported that the Bill should 
be divided into two separate Bills. 
66 The Bill which contained the 
'substantive' reforms should be considered but procedural reforms which would 
entail reducing the number of traditional offices should be regulated to a 
second Bill which should be postponed indefinitely. 
67 This approach was 
followed. The substantive measures were passed in the House of Commons but 
allowed to lapse in the House of Lords. 
68 When questioned in the House of 
Lords, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Brougham, announced that he personally would 
submit a new and improved Bill in the following sessi on. 
69 
The defeat was hailed as a triumph in the London Journal of Arts70 
while Robertson extravagantly claimed in the Mechanics' Magazine that he 
alone in the press had secured the Bill's defeat. 
71 Although patent agents 
with reformist ideals had played a large part in the defeat of Godson's 
Bill they did not pause to analyse what had happened as 'more positi , ve'ý.: 
reform seemed about to follow. The immediate result of the outcry surrounding 
Godson's Bill was to raise public awareness of the necessity for patent reform 
to the extent that a leading politician would consider it worth his while to 
intervene. Nevertheless the diversity of opinions among patent experts showed 
that they were not yet united in an effort to fulfill a professional ideal. 
C. Lord Brougham's Act 
Initially Lord Brougham's intervention seemed to stand a good-chance 
of fundamentally reforming the patent system. Certainly Newton in the London 
Journal of Arts seemed genuinely hopeful that Brougham might succeed where 
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the 'mutilated fragment' of Godson's Bill had failed and offered to supply 
72 him with all the relevant information on patent reform. 
In the event Brougham's Bill of 1835 was even-more limited in scope than 
Godson's initial Bill. Brougham's speech contained no fundamental statement 
of principle and merely defended the existing patent system on the grounds 
that it balanced conflicting interests more effectively than a hypothetical 
new patent system. The content of the Bill reflected the shallowness of 
its conception. It made no attempt to reduce fees or to eliminate any of 
the offices through which a patent application had to pass before it was 
granted. The only changes of any consequence which it introduced were 
procedures for correcting errors in the original specification and a 
simplified process for applying for an extension of the normal period of the 
grant. It also made provision for triple damage to be awarded if a patent 
were unsuccessfully challenged in the courts after it had been upheld in a 
previous trial. 
73 
Opposition to Lord Brougham's Bill came from the same 'experts' who had 
attacked Gcdson's Bill for not going far enough. Thus the London Journal of 
Arts compared Lord Brougham's Bill unfavourably to the earlier Bill which had 
at least. attempted some substantial improvements. 
74 Its prolific correspondent, 
'Vindicator, ' launched a comprehensive attack which accused Lord Brougham of 
not even attempting to deal with the 'exorbitant fees demanded, paid to and 
received by certain automatons who represent certain antiquated bags and 
things, whose vested interests are deemed sacred'. 
75 'Vindicator' concluded 
by condemning Lord Brougham in broad ideological terms for acting against 
the interest of the inventor whose cause he pretended to adopt. 
'[Ain amendment of technical legal anomalies, and the consequent 
better security of patent property, however valuable in itself, 
is inefficient for the mass of inventors; it is only legislating 
for those who purchase the poor man's invention, instead of 
enabling the poor man himself to secure his intellectual property 
and place it in the public market; it is legislating for the 
capitalist, against the man of genius and inventiVe talent - for 
the rich, against the intellectual'. mechanic... - forýupholdingý, of_: 
useless formalities and expensive antiquated forms, against the 
-plain principles of sound policy, of public good, and of individual 
inherent rights in matters of property: in short, such legislation 
is equally inimical to our commercial prosperity as a nation, and 
to our unfettered progress in the road of scientific improvement, 
which only requires for its full development plain and just laws, 
simple and unexpensive forms of protection. Lord Brougham's Bill 
is the production of the mere lawyer, not the comprehensive essay 
of the philosophic legislator and determined reformer. ' 76 
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Robertson in the Mechanics' Magazine used similar language to condemn 
the Bill as a whole. 
F7 
At the same time he specifically attacked parts 
of the Bill which he thought might infringe on the sphere in which his 
, 
occupational expertise was exercised. He described the provision allowing 
amendment of specifications as an attempt to deal with 'imaginary' grievances. 
A patent agent who was a true expert did not require such a provision. He 
suggested disparagingly that, it had probably been inserted for the benefit of 
incompetent rivals. 
Patent law reform had been raised to a national political issue by Lord 
Brougham's involvement and his opponents were quick to exploit the opportunity 
of pointing out that his efforts at reform were unacceptable to the poor 
inventor whom he was supposedly trying to encourage. Thus The Times reprinted 
large sections of the critical comments which Robertson made in the Mechanics' 
Magazine. It repeated libellous allegations of mysterious plots: 
'CW3e could throw such a light on the private history of this Act, 
as would make more than two or three very busy bodies run for 
concealment to any hole or corner that offered -a foul chimney 
with a ragged and sooty innocent for companion - not excepted. 
But 'tis,. perhaps, as well; the Act isits own best commentary; 
there wants no private history to convince every intelligent and 
reflecting mind that the persons who framed it (the real, not the 
ostensible framers we mean) could have neither at heart the good 
of inventors nor the good of the public. ' 78 
In spite of all this opposition and abuse Brougham's Bill progressed 
through parliament. Notwithstanding a lukewarm reception in the House of 
Commons where it was described as a 'miserable, bungling piece of legislation, 
7 
it passed into law substantially unamended. 
80 
The passage of Brougham's Act was the climax of the first phase of 
legislative reform. It was the first general piece of legislation governing 
new technology to emerge after the Industrial Revolution. Its flimsy content 
represented a triumph for the old order which had managed to preserve intact 
its position of control. The extent of its triumph is apparent from the 
arguments advanced in defence of the Act. A correspondent in The Times 
wrote that the Act had achieved all that could be hoped for and concluded: 
'His Lordship Brougham has shown great forebearance, in common 
with some individuals, whose names would be worth mentiohing in 
refraining from persisting in the advocacy of certain measures 
(the cost of patents for instance) which would have endangered 
the passing of any act at all. ' 81. 
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Further evidence of the Act's inefficiency was the effusive support it 
received from the traditionalist Repertory_of Patent Inventions: 
'We congratulate our readers on the passing of this measure, 
strengthening as it does the possessors of patent property.... 
[Wie trust we shall, in future, hear no more of insecurity of 
patent law. We have no doubt that a clamor will be made by 
certain interested parties in order to get the question of 
patent law reopened; but who will these parties be? - not the 
patentee or would-be patentee - not the ingenious inventor, 
but those who, having no invention themselves, wish to pirate 
the talent of others: - those who, under the sheep's clothing, 
pretend to be the friend of the poor man, but are only desirous 
of having an unsettled and agitated state of law, that they may 
avail themselves of the ingenuity of others. We therefore say 
to all patentees, and would-be patentees, beware of. those who 
would again open the question. ' 82 
D. Conclusion of the first phase 
After 1835 further desultory efforts were made at general reform but they 
were easily defeated. In 1836,1837 and 1838 reform Bills were introduced 
in the House of Commons. 
83 None of them reached the stage of a second 
reading. Only in 1837 was there a brief debate. In it the*Attorney-General 
openly showed that he had little stomach for reform. He declared that, 
except for some minor administrative problems, 'the machinery which was now 
, 84 in existence would be pretty effectual . In 1839 Lord Brougham again 
successfully introduced a Bill but it was a mere technical amendment of his 
1835 Act. 85 For a decade the issue of patent reform dropped out of national 
politics and was virtually ignored by the general press. 
This did not mean that dissatisfaction with the way new technology was 
controlled disappeared entirely. An undercurrent of discontent remained 
throughout the late 1830's and early 1840's and the down-trodden inventor 
continued to be mentioned occdsionally in radical publications. 
86 The modd 
was perhaps best summarised by a correspondent in the Mechanics' Magazine, 
who claimed: 
'The almost annual attempts at amending the patent laws are 
only so many trials to make the theory of privilege, and its 
consequent practice, fit the universal feeling of right; but 
the crooked billet offers no fare that will fit. ' 87 
k 
The end of the first phase of patent reform demonstrated the extent 
of the power which the old aristocracy still held in various parts of the 
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social structure. At the ideological level their hegemonic dominance had 
been eroded and they were unable, as in the 18th century, to exercise what 
Lukes calls three dimensional power by limiting the perception of the 
problems caused by the inefficient patent administration. In this regard 
the middle class ideal and to a lesser extent, the workina class ideal, 
articulated by and through patent experts, provided alternative views of 
the reality of patent administration whi. ch clashed directly with these 
of the old order. 
The old order was not, however, without allies. It might even have 
managed to increase support for the existing system by relaxing the 
restriction on the number of partners who could have a share in a patent. 
The change strengthened the alliance with large manufacturers which Peel 
had hinted at, for it made it easier for wealthy capitalists to exploit 
patents without making them cheaper to obtain or defend. 
The parliamentary battle also demonstrated the continuing hold of the 
old order on the institutions*of the state. The fact that Brougham had 
been persuaded to withhold any attacks on their position is evidence of 
their power of a two dimensional kind - i. e. the power to exclude the 
discussion of certain issues. Indeed his Act had the effect of legitimating 
the traditional patent system for it now bore the stamp of a system 
reformed by someone who had taken a keen interest in the lot of the poor 
artisan turned inventor. After Brougham's Act had been in operation for 
a while the Repertory of Patent Inventions noted how successfully the patent 
system was functioning: 
'We again congratulate patentees on the passing of this measure, 
and we again repeat to all patentees, and would-be patentees, 
beware of those who would again open the question, we consider 
it now settled - and well settled. ' 88 
The victory of the old order was, for the time being, complete. 
The role of the patent agents in the first phase of reform had been 
limited. As has been demonstrated, they did. play an important part in 
generating the reform movement, but their efforts to control and-direct 
it to their advantage failed. The old order was able to exploit the divisions 
in their ranks. Nevertheless, their participation laid the foundation for 
similar action at a later period when they and their middle class allies 
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would be in a more powerful. position. Already they had largely succeeded 
in making the debate about the patent system a debate about legal and 
administrative reform. In so doing they ensured the continued existence 
of their future as a 'professional' occupational group. 
IV. Industrial design and new: ýtechnology (An interlude in the movement 
to reform the patent system) 
Until the late 1830's the patent system was thought to embody the only . - 
legal knowledge directly applicable to the control of units of new technology. 
This perception was shared by both the defenders of the system and its critics. 
However, when obstacles to patent-law reform proved insurmountable, the focus 
of reformist interest temporarily shifted to the possibility of controlling 
units of new technology by means of the law of copyright in design. 
The intellectual roots of the new approach were in the common law 
protection of literary copyright. From the beginning of the Industrial 
Revolution, copyright, as another form of state prot ection for the products 
of intellectual labour, had rhetorically been compared to patents. 
89 The 
inference had always been that they should be equally protected. The initial 
interest in copyright in industrial design, which emerged in the 1830's, owed 
littl. e however, to any upwelling of ideological support for either a 
substantive or a formal natural law notion of a right to the products of 
(intellectual) labour. Instead the driving force was the pragmatic. fear 
of foreign competition. 
In 1835 and 1836 a Committee of Enquiry examined the state of arts and 
manufactures in Britain. 
90 In particular, it was concerned with the lack 
of artistic quality in British products when compared to French products. 
The original focus was primarily on patterns for fabrics. (The copyright in 
such patterns was protected without any form of registration, for a short 
period, as a result of legislation which had been passed in the late 18th 
century. 
91), In the course of the evidence before the Committee the problem 
of protecting designs of all kinds was raised. Some witnesses even discussed 
the lack of protection for 'inventi. ons'. 
92 In this discussion the terms 
'invention' and 'inventor' were used loosely and referred to a much wider 
range of innovation than had previously been governed by any part of the 
legal system. 
In its Report the Committee recommended that the scope of copyright in 
design be widened to include protection of designs in manufactures other 
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than fabrics. 93 It did not explain exactly how this should be accomplished 
but did suggest that some system of registration be set up to record all new 
designs. In this roundabout way the possibility was therefore raised that a 
separate and entirely new bureaucracy could be created to protect some types 




which it presented for a change in the 
mode of legal-bureaucratic control of new technology' weýe not lost'on those who 
were-trying to change the patent systems. --In--1838 the Mechanics' Maqazine noted: 
'Mr MacKinnon, in evident despair, at the apathy evinced by the 
legislature upon the subject of an amended patent law, has for 
the present abandoned even the attempt to force the subject upon 
the consideration of parliament. In order, however, that one 
injured and unprotected class of inventors may not hang as a 
millstone about the neck of another, he has thrown aside the 
fourteen years patent question, and is now struggling for a 
twelve month copyright for pattern designers. In so doing he 
is following the suggestions of the Commons Committee on the 
Arts and Principles of Design.... ' 94 
M. acKinnon's 'Patterns and Inventions Bill' was soon defeated; 
95 but it 
was just one of the Bills which related the reform of copyright in fabric 
patterns to the control of new technology. In 1839, Poullett Thompson MP, 
a member of the 1835-6 Committee, successfully introduced two new Bills 
in Parliament. The first of these merely extended the scope of the 18th 
century provisions relating to fabrics. The second Bill went much further. 
97 
It made provision for protection, for periods of from twelve months to three 
years-to be granted in the copyright of designs of manufactured articles, 
excluding fabrics. Protection could only be achieved by registration by the 
'proprietor'. Designs could be freely bought and sold. The rights of 
proprietors were protected by a single simple procedure which allowed them 
to sue by summary proceedings before two justices of the peace. Compensatory 
fines of between 15 and 130 could be levied. In such a trial a certificate 
of registration would be prima facie proof of the registration and originality 
of the design. 
98 
This Bill passed into law with surprising ease. It elicited no 
opposition from those with vested interests in the patent system; even 
though it clearly referred to the control of innovation. In his introductory 
speech Thompson had made it clear that one of his objects was to establish 
a form of protection: 
163. 
'for those inventions which were only wanted for a very short 
time, and the inventors of which could not afford to go to the 
expense of obtaining patents in the ordinary way. [He continuedi 
that one of the reasons why all previous attempts to secure 
protection for the articles in question had failed was that the 
promoters of them had endeavoured to extend the provisions of the 
patent laws to those articles which were not by their nature 
capable of achieving the protection they afforded. ' 99 
At the time of its conception the Registry of Designs presented a 
stark contrast to the unreformed patent system. For unlike the early modern. - 
bureaucracy of the patent system it displayed all the characteristics which 
100 Weber has attributed to modern bureaucracy under legal domination. Thus 
the 1839 Act laid down that officials were to be employed on a full-time 
basis and at a fixed salary. The loyalty of the officials was to be 
undivided. The Act specifically prohibited, on pain of dismissal, the 
registrar or any person employed by him from demanding or receiving any 
gratuity or reward, whether in money or otherwise, except the salary or 
remuneration authorised by the Commissioners of the Treasury. 
101 Furthermore 
the system contained no formalities not directly and rationally related to 
its primary task of registering designs. Registration took place promptly 
and cheaply. In contrast, the patent system still contained numerous and 
obscure traditional formalities and required extra fees in order to expedite 
its process of registration. 
The contrast between the two types of administration was also apparent 
in their influence on legislation. The direct influence of the actual 
administrators of the unreformed patent system was limited. They were 
dependent on their patrons and adopted defensive ideological positions. 
They defended their sinecures primarily in terms of a traditional entitlement 
to office. On the other hand the new bureaucrats could positively influence 
changes in the registration of designs because their position allowed them to 
stress impersonal objectives - what Weber has termed 'reasons of State. ' 
102 
Since the reasons they advanced for changes related directly to the professed 
objective, in this instance the Designs Act, their motives would not be 
questioned. The fact that they were extending the scope of their own 
activities, i. e. their power as bureaucrats, at the same time, might pass 
unnoticed. 
The first sign of such positive influence was apparent in the final form 
of the Copyright of Designs Act, 18 
' 
42.103 In its original form this Act had 
been introduced only in order to have fabric patterns included in the system 
164. 
of registration. 
104 The initial Bill generated a great deal of protest and 
parliamentary debate but discussions remained limited to questions relating 
directly to the art of textile printing. 
105 In 1842 however, the leader of 
the campaign, Emerson Tennant MP, announced that he had been requested by 
the government to introduce a Bill which would consolidate all the legislation 
relating to copyright in designs. 
106 Such a Bill would allow the Registrar 
to reorganize the registration of designs according to new and supposedly 
rational categories. This Bill was taken over by the government and became 
law in 1842. The number of designs registered increased dramatically after 
1842.107 
More direct was the influence of the new bureaucracy on the 1843 Designs 
Act. Although the 1842 Act extended the scope of the law of copyright in 
designs, it had laid down specifically that registration referred only to 
108 the 'ornamenting' of articles. The interpretation of the term 'ornamenting' 
does not appear to have been considered by the courts, but it could have 
eliminated the registration of many inventions which had been registered 
under the vague provisions of the 1839 Act. In 1843 a further Copyright of 
Designs Act slipped through Parliament without any debate. 
109 It specified 
that designs of articles of utility could be registered as a separate 
category. Once again the scope of the activities of the Registrar of Designs 
increased. The Mechanics' Magazine attributed the Act dire ctly to the 
(beneficent) activities of a creative bureaucrat: 
'Me feel bound to state that we never met with a gentleman in 
an official situation who exhibited more anxiety than Mr Long 
Ethe Registrar of Designs] to perform his duty well, or in more 
strict accordance with the spirit of the Acts from which he 
derives his authority. It T-s not unknown, besides, that so far 
from being in the least unfriendly to the greatest possible 
extension of the privilege of registration, it was in no small 
degree owing to Mr Long's representations and exertions that 
the last Act, extending it to articles of utility as well as 
to articles of*ornament, was passed. ' 110 
The development of the system of protecting copyright in design by 
registration provided patent agents with an opportunity to extend the 
scope of their professional activities. The opportunity was not ignored 
although the controversial area of fabric patterns seems to have been 
avoided. Thus the London Journal of Arts followed its first notice of 
the 1839 Act with an advertisement which stated: 
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'Any further information on the subject of the 
Designs in different branches of the Arts, may 
Messrs Newton and Berry's Offices for Patents, 
instructions for registering such designs will 
the fees and charges upon the transaction of wl 
on an average may be stated at 14.4s. ' 111 
Registration of 
be obtained at 
... where be received, 
iich business, 
The proprietor of the Mechanics' Magazine published similar advertisements. 
112 
Even the traditionalist Repertory of Patent Inventions serialised a work by 
the patent agent, William Carpmael, on the registration of designs. 
Paradoxically, it is doubtful whether, in spite of its obvious 
administrative advantages, the system of registration of designs substantially 
increased either the economic value or the extent of the legal protection 
accorded to new inventions. The fact that, with the exception of the 
peripheral field of fabric patterns, the Acts passed into law without major 
opposition from large manufacturers or from those with vested interests in 
the administration of the unreformed patent system is significant. It 
indicates that they did not see theipselves being disadvantaged by the system 
of registration. Instead, the introduction of a cheap but limi-ted alternative 
to the patent system represented the legislative culmination of the two-tier 
conception of innovation which, since the time of Adam Smith, had distinguished 
between innovation which was the material product of the division of labour 
and more important inventions which should be adequately rewarded and 
protected. Such an argument is supported by the limited period of protection 
offered and by the small maximum penalties. 
Even patent agents who made use of the. Designs' Acts differed concerning 
their value. On the one hand Robertson in the Mechanics' Magazine hailed 
their introduction enthusiastically: 
'We look upon it as a real boon conferred on the Genius and 
Industry of the people - as their Act of emancipation from 
much, if not the whole, of t7h-atenormous load of oppre§sion,, 
which our wretched and monstrously expensive system of patent 
law has for ages imposed upon them. ' 113 
The London Journal of Arts was far more sceptical and suggestej, in 1847, 
that the extension'of the Designs! Acts to articles of utility had been 
disastrous, particularly since they clashed with patents in such a way that 
the registration of a design could undermine the validity of a patent without 
offering alternative protection. It quoted examples of actual instances to 
support its contentions. 
114 
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The legal interpretation of the words 'shape or configuration' which the 
1848 Act used to describe what could be*registered, remained obscure - although 
it was generally accepted that all chemical inventions were excluded. Rather 
surprisingly there was very little litigation about copyright in designs. To 
some extent this impression might be false because most litigation must have 
taken place before lay justices of the peace who did not give written 
judgments. 115 Supporters of the system claimed that the relative lack of 
litigation demonstrated 
'a sort of conventional morM respect for 
among inventors; and that, although the ri 
valid in law, they are held so in morals, 
pi, racy of them takes plate, and that none 
which it has been prophesised would a-tt-en, 
rights has been the result'. 116 
them [registered designs] 
? gistrations are not 
and that little, if any, 
of that enormous litigation 
J the recognTtion of small 
A more likely explanation was advanced by Newton in the London Journal of Arts. 
He observed sarcastically that 'the known illegality of a registration is 
surely not a very strong motive for a registree to test the validity of his 
117 
claims in a court of law'. Only in 1851 did the courts give reasoned 
judgments on the scope of the 1843 Act. In the case of Rogers v Driver 
118 
it was held that the design of a new type of brick which was hollow on the 
inside would be protected by registration. The fact that it might also have 
been patentable did not influence the result. In contrast in the Queen v 
Bessel, 119 decided during the same year, it was found that a new hinge could 
not be the subject of registration although it would be patentable. The 
reason was that although the principle was new, the actual shape of the parts 
was not. In ensuing years the courts continued to limit the scope of the 
definition of a design which could be registered. 
120 
If the economic and legal effects of the Designs'Acts were uncertain, its 
symbolic importance was undoubted. Its existence lent support to the 
argument that a whole class of hitherto unprotected new inventions should 
be protected in some way. Its bureaucracy was an example to be contrasted 
with the existing patent administration. These factors will be considered 
in the context of their interaction with the renewed call for patent reform. 
V. Legislative reform - the second phase 
A. The role of the entrepreneurial middle class 
In the late 1840's the debate about the reform of the patent system was 
revived. 
121 Social and economic conditions had evolved sin 
. 
ce the first phase 
167. 
of reforms in the 1830's. A relative increase in the power of the 
entrepreneuridl middle cla ss had taken-place from the beginning of the 
extended period of prosperity which was to last from about 1848 until the 
early 1870's. 122 
(i) The Great Exhibition and the Society of Arts. The increasing 
self-confidencP of the middle class was expressed through the Great 
Exhibition of 1851 organized by the revitalised Society of Arts and supported 
by public meetings throughout the country as a celebration of the. growing 
importance of new technology. Commenting in his book, The Exposition of 1851 
or Views on the Industry, the Science and the Governance of Britain, Babbage 
attributed the positive developments in technology and in society as a whole 
to the middle class and explained: 
'With the increasing wealth of the country, and with the greater 
application of observation, of reasoning, and of science to its 
many arts and manufactures, a vast increase had been produced 123 in the numbers, the power and the. influence of the middle classes. 
In contrast to the hardworking middle class, Babbage observed that the 
old elite were involved in party politics which existed only for the 
ag. grandizement of a few families. The dawn of the Exhibition was the time, 
he suggested, for the middle class to stand up for its rights and to 
implement the 'economical reform' which would eliminate the powers of 
patronage. 124 
The Exhibition was also seen by its organizers as an opportunity to 
extend to the working class the hegemon y of middle class ideas of how technology 
should be produced. One of the organizers explai, ned that members of the 
working class should be encouraged to visit the exhibition since 
'prejudices, incorrigible by argument, will then melt away 
before facts, indisputable because seen and handled by 
themselves .... In due time, many of them will think more 
and drink less, as a result of these repeated and lengthened 
visits to the Exhibition. ' 125 
Not only would working people learn a lesson in technology but they 
would also comprehend the realities of the'natural ordeý of society. From 
the exhibition they would learn that 
168. 
'CtIhe reciprocal dependance of capital and labour is so 
absolute and inseparable, ... that were it possible for the objects crowded under our eyes in the Exhibition, to be 
resolved into their elements, so as to shew the exact 
portion contributed by each, probably the division would 
be more nearly equal, than either has supposed. ' 126 
The Great Exhibition also served to focus attention specifically 
on the control of new technology. Practical considerations linked the 
issue of patent reform to the organization of the Exhibition, for the 
question arose whether the articles exhibited would be protected in any 
way. In 1850 and 1851 Acts were passed for the specific purpose of providing 
such protection 
ý27 They provided respectively that designs and patentable 
inventions, if registered, could be exhibited publicly for the period of the 
Exhibition without prej udice to later applications for protection. As 
explained below, these Acts directly influenced some of the provisions of 
the major reforming legislation of this phase, the 1852 Patent Law 
Amendment Act. 
The widespread enthusiasm for technological innovation also contributed 
to the creation of the conditions within which the issue of patent reform 
became topical. Thus. E J Hughes, a Mancester patent agent, explained in his 
rather self-aggrandizing account of the reform movement in Manchester: 
'I had been convinced of the necessity of alteration for many 
years, but found it impossible to meet with anyone willing 
to join me in the trouble and expense of agitating the subject 
until the Great Exhibition project was fairly launched. ' 128 
Hughes claimed that as a result of these new conditions he was able to 
convene a meeting in November 1850. The movement had then snowballed. A 
memorial was drawn*up in Manchester and further meetings were held in 
Blackburn, Bradford and Halifax. 
129 There is additional evidence that 
the Patent Committee of Birmingham was inspired by the events leading up 
130 to the Great Exhibition. 
Other committees for patent reform - according to Webster there were 
eleven such committees by 1852 
131 
_ also sprang up in the few years, 
1849-1851. 
Within the Society of Arts, the body directly involved with the Great 
Exhibition, increased momentum was also given to the campaign to reform the 
169. 
patent system. ' 
The Society of Artssince its revitalization in the 1840's,. 
(when after itslong period ofdecline it had increased its membership primarily 
by drawing on newly prosperous members of the middle class 
132 ) had changed 
its approach towards the control of new technology. It had abandoned its 
traditional opposition to patents which dated from the 18th century. 
133 
In 1850 the aggressive new president of the Society, Henry Cole, explained 
the new approach: 
'The time is gone by when it was desirable to hold out small 
rewards for little inventions, because there are now so many 
other and better modes in which all inventions of real practical 
value, are published and rewarded. There are other enquiries, 
which though of the greatest importance, bring no profit or 
reward to those who carry them out, the benefit which they yield 
being shared by the whole community. The exposure of unfair 
monopolies, and the collection of authentic facts and evidence 
showing the evil effects of legal or commercial edicts upon 
manufacturers or trade are services of this sort. ' 134 
In September 1850 (by which time the organization of the. Great Exhibition 
was well under way) the Council of the Society of Arts, at Cole's instigation, - 
appointed a special committee to 'promote the legislative recognition of the 
rights of inventors'. 
135 By this time Cole had already begun work on a 
treatise on the reform of the patent system. Cole sent a proof of it to the 
author, Charles Dickens. Dickens was impressed. He replied to Cole: 
I 'I shall be happy to "join the Union" and I am now at work 
on a paper for "Household Words", which I hope may help 
the question in a taking manner. ' 136 
Accordingly, Dickens joined the committee which, it must be noted, failed 
to include any patent agents or barristers. 
137 
On October 19th 1850 Dickens published a fable entitled 'A poor man's 
tale of a patent'- 
138 The story closely followed Cole's description of the 
'35 stages' through which a patent had'to pass before it was granted. It 
was cast in the form of a dialogue between a Chartist and a working inventor. 
The Chartist tries to convince the working man of the inequity of the various 
offices through which a patent application had to pass. The working man is 
unconvinced and sets out to apply in person for a patent for his * 
invention. 
As a result of his experiences he changes his mind and comes to the conclusion 
that: 
170. 
'if the laws of this country were honest as they ought to be, 
you would have come to London - registered an exact description 
and drawing of your invention - paid half-a-crown or so for 
doing it - and therein and thereby have got your patent. 
*** Further. In William Butcher's [the Chartist3 delivering, "that the whole gang of Hanapers and Chaff-Waxes must be done 
away with, and that England has been chaffed and waxed 
sufficient. " I agree. ' 139 
The moral of the fable was pointed. It was of great propaganda value 
and frequently quoted. 
14Q It hinted by its reference to Chartism at 
working class dissatisfaction which needed to be allayed by reform. 
In December 1850 the first report of the Society of Art's Committee on 
the Legislative Recognition of the Rights of Inventors was published. 
141 
As its name suggests it claimed that inventors were entitled to rights rather 
than privileges from the Crown. These rights the Report claimed, were 
natural ri ghts: 
'To assert that a man is not entitled to reap any advantage from 
his labour and skill, developed in every way not inconsistent 
with the good of the commonwealth, would be to advocate an 
anarchy that would sap the foundations-of the rights of all 
property whatever. ' 142 
After a detailed indictment of the shortcomings of the existing system, 
the Report argued that 
'it is hopeless to effect amendments of the present system 
of obtaining Patents .... Whilst the whole superstructure rests 
upon the fallacy that inventive rights are boons to be granted 
or withheld, and not rights of intellectual labour, it is idle 
to attempt to amend the details of the system. ' 143 
The Report noted that the Exhibition of 1851 had rendered the discussion 
of the question inevitable. It argued that the registration of designs 
had been successful and suggested that a similar system of registration 
be instituted for inventions. The existing system was to be abolished 
completely. 
144 
(ii) Administrative reform. If part of the reason for middle 
class interest in patent reform lay in a renewed realization of the 
importance of technological innovation, a complementary part was to be 
found in the continuing movement for administrative reform in general. 
From i848 onwards Financial and Administrative Reform Associations were set 
171. 
up all over Britain. 
145 They denied any link with political parties but set 
themselves simple goals congruent with middle class ideals. 
'Ist To use all lawful and constitutional means of inducing 
the most rigid economy in the expenditure of the 
Government, consistent with due efficiency in the several 
departments in the public service. 
2nd To advocate the adoption of a simple and equitable system 
of direct taxation, fairly levied upon property and income 
in lieu of the present unequal, complicated and expensively- 
collected duties upon commodities. ' 146 
These goals could easily be combined with middle class concern over the 
means of controlling new technology. The slogan which claimed that the 
unreformed patent system represented a 'tax on knowledge' provided just such 
a link. A pamphlet issued in 1849 by the Liverpool Financial Reform 
Association contained both proposals for the protection and encouragement 
of inventions and a plea for a relief from tax. These were combined with a 
stinging attack on the patronage of the old order: 
'There does not appear therefore to be sufficient reason for 
laying a special tax upon this industrious class [inventors] 
merely because they are desirous of reaping some personal 
advantage from their own labours; and still less rational 
does it seem that this tax should be paid before they are 
enabled to apply their discoveries to the public service; 
more especially as a large portion of the sum is not made 
available for any public purpose whatever. The system at 
present pursued in granting patents is founded solely upon 
precedent of immemorial usage, and as the custom of the 
country has hitherto been to create sinecure offices wherever 
it was possible, so that the Government of the day might thrust 
their relatives and friends therein, the department which 
undertakes the conservation of the inventor's rights has 
received a fair share of these burdens. ' 147 
Organized middle class pressure outside the civil service was not the 
only dynamic force for administrative reform. The reform of the civil 
service as a whole was an uneven process and as some parts were transformed, 
increased pressure was brought to bear on 'traditional' sectors of the 
administration. 
148 In the sphere of patent law reform the most influential 
step proved to be the appointment by the Treasury in 1848 of a little 
heralded committee to enquire into 'the circumstances connected With the 
offices of the clerks of the Signet and the Lord Privy Seal'149, i. e. the 
offices through which patents had to be passed since the time of Henry VIII. 
150 
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The finding of this Committee that the Signet Office be abolished and the 
role of the Privy Seal be curtailed substantially in order to increase 
efficiency in the grantipg of patents - was, as outlined below, to be a 
significant factor in thisphase of reform. 
(iii) The early abolitionists. Given the general rise to power 
of the middle class by 1850 and the specific involvement of the entrepreneurial 
middle class in the issues of control of new technology and administrative 
reform one might have expected that the reformed patent system would, after 
1852, reflect universally accepted middle class ideals. Paradoxically the 
change that took place in 1852 cannot be described in this way, for, at the 
very height of middle class influence, middle class ideology ceased to 
embrace one coherent vision of how new technology ought to be controlled and 
exploited. Parties who agreed on the importance of technological innovation 
and of administrative reform, and who combined to bring the issue of patent 
law reform to a head, suddenly found that the solutions which they proposed, 
arrived at diametrically opposite conclusions. In short- the successful 
struggle for patent reform coincided with the start of a battle between the 
defenders of an 'efficient' patent system and those who wished for its total 
abolition. 
A key factor in the split between members of the entrepreneurial middle 
class who favoured abolition and their opponents from a similar background who 
favoured retention of the system, wasithe ideological ambiguity about how 
technology should be exploited in the ideal social order. The fact that the 
classical economists had all suggested state intervention as a method of, 
ensuring that technology be made exploitable in the market place did not 
mean that they had consciously 'solved' the problem of how technology 
could be. exploited in a free market economy. It simply showed that the 
classical economists shared, in this sphere, an implicit notion of the 
function of the state. 
In the 1840's an increasingly confident fraction of 
, 
the entrepreneurial 
middle class began to challenge the classical economists' sophisticated 
and often ambiguous notions of where the state ideally should intervene. 
Encouraged by the political victory of the abolition of the Corn'Laws in the 
name of the doctrine of free trade they began to attempt to apply the idea 
of deliberate non-intervention by the state (laissez-faire) to a wide range 
of social and cultural issues. In the Journal, The Economist (established 
173. 
1843) they found a champion for whom the concept of laissez-faire was the 
touchstone of all government policy. 
151 
On 28 December -1850 The Economist published the first of a series of 
articles on the patent system. Like other publications aimed at a middle 
class'audience it claimed that it too was considering the question because 
of the manifest inefficiency of the existing system and because of the issues 
raised by the forthcoming Exhibition. 
152 In particular it directed itself 
to the claims of the Society of Arts that inventors had a natural-property 
right in inventions. The Economist', s entry into the debate on this issue 
was in accordance with the general approach it adopted, for, as Gordon has 
pointed out, it adopted a natural law view of property rather than the 
'artificial rights theory identified with the names of Bentham and Brougham'. 
153 
In contrast to the supporters of any system of state intervention based 
on property rights in inventions (be they property rights of a 'natural' or 
'artificial' kind), it flatly rejected the notion that property rights could 
be extended to include ideas or inventions. It did not deny that property 
was connected with labour but argued that it only existed as a combination of 
labour and materials. 'All conceptions of the mind', The Economist continued, 
are not the result of labo. ur or thought but are spontaneous. ' Inventors ought 
to give up all ideas they inherited from others before they claim a monopoly. 
'That is impossible, and the impossibility shows that their minds 
and their inventions are, in fact, parts of the great mental whole 
of society, and that they have no right of property in their 
inventions, except that they can keep them to themselves if they 
please, and own all the material objects in which they may realise 
their mental conceptions. ' 154 
The state should therefore not intervene on grounds of natural law principle. 
It should also not intervene, The Economist argued, for utilitarian reasons. 
Few people, it contended, really conceal inventions and given the fact that 
inventions were derived from a stock of common knowledge, other inventors 
were sure to arrive at the same conclusions. In a further editorial in 1851, 
The Economist argued explicitly that in the sphere of knowledge as in the 
sphere of material wealth, progress would take place by means of natural 
evolution., It concluded: 
'The progress of knowledge, and the progress of invention and 
discovery, like the progress of population and the progress of 
society, have their ordained and settled course, which cannot be 
hastened, though perhaps it may be retarded, by Patent Laws. ' 155 
I 
174. 
The views of The Economist on state protection for the rights of inventors 
were therefore totally opposed to those voiced by the Society of Arts, 
although they proceeded from surprisingly similar ideological positions. For, 
as has been seen, both arguments favoured natural property rights and cheap 
and efficient government. At this phase of the reform movements the 
abolitionist argument represented only an 'intellectual' alternative to the 
problem of how new technology should be controlled within the parameters of 
middle class ideology. These ideas were adopted by individual witnesses to 
the Select Committee on the Patent Law Amendment Bill but there was as yet no 
sign of a concerted campaign or organiz -ed association attempting to convert 
the middle class as a whole to the ideal of freedom to use all technological 
knowledge without restraint. 
B. Patent experts 
(i) Patent experts and their relationship to the middle class. 
Increased. middle class involvement in the control of new technology challenged 
patent experts to justify the continued existence of their profession. At 
the same time it provided an opportunity for them to expand-the power of 
their profession. 
Patent experts were able to neutralize the threat to their professional 
existence implied in some of the proposals for change by becoming actively 
involved in the reform movement and guiding it in a direction which would 
not be harmful to them. Thus Campin, Hughes, Robertson and Webster all served 
on various new bodies set up to campaign for reform. 
156 With the exception 
of the Committee of the Society of Arts no evidence has been found of any 
group actively involved in the reform movement which failed to include a 
patent agent or a patent barrister among its members. One can only speculate 
about the precise degree of their influence on these committees but indications 
are that it was substantial. Thus, for instance, the National Patent Law 
Amendment Association wrote in its prospectus that it considered that 
government support for its proposals for reform could best be obtained if it 
followed the plans of the government Committee of Enquiry into the Signet and 
Privy Seal Offices in the modified form, 
'for which they [the associationi are chiefly indebted to 
the suggestions published in the Mining Journal and Chronicle 
by Mr Campin Ethe patent agent] whose familiarity wiFh- -the 
law and practice relating to the patents and efforts for their 
amendment are favourablY known to that portion of the public 
acquainted with the history of Patent Law Reform'. 57 
175. 
Patent reform was also expounded within 
knowledge of patent experts. Almost all the 
published works on substantive patent law p 
the period 1850 to 1852. They included the 
on the subjects such as Godson, Webster and 
figures such as Drewry, Lund and Turner. 
159 
the framework of the body of 
barristers who had previously 
ublished proposal. s for reform in 
authors of the best known textbooks 
Hindmarch 158 and also little known 
- Wi th the notabl e excepti on of Wi 11 i am Carpmael who as Moses Pool e' s 
partner, remained strongly committed to the old order, there is no evidence 
of any patent expert being totally opposed to reform. 
160 This does not mean 
that they agreed on precisely what shape a reformed patent system-should take, 
161 
but it does indicate a common thread in the ideas of the patent experts. That 
they were opposed to the abolitionists goes almost without saying., for a total 
abolition of all forms of state intervention in the control of new tec hnology 
would have destroyed their occupational raison d'dtre. It is perhaps more 
surprising to find hostility from patent experts-towards the proposals of the 
Society of Arts which, after all, were strongly in favour of the retention of a 
system of state intervention in the control of inventions. 
162 
The different primary justifications for the defence of some system of state 
intervention was a factor in this hostility. It must immediately be stressed 
that these alternative justifications did not mean that there was a total 
separation between the ideology of patent experts and their clients. For, 
as has been explained, there were large areas of shared common sense between 
the ideals of the professional middle class and the ideals of their 
entrepreneurial associates. Patent experts had profited by the general, 
increase in the power and influence of the middle class as a whole which 
had taken place since the 1830's. They also. accppted middle class notions 
of the importance of technology and of administrative efficacy. Yet during 
the same period, the patent experts' commitment to the professional ideal 
of power to define and control their area of occupational expertise had 
increased. As a result they saw themselves as having a unique insight 
into how inventions ought to be practically and efficiently protected. 
They therefore rejected the concept of natural property rights which attempted 
to shape the law according to abstract notions rather than by adhering to the 
existing system which, their professional experience had led them to believe, 
could be reformed. 
176. 
To some extent therefore the utilitarian conceptions held by the patent 
experts were opposed to natural rights arguments - not only those of the 
abolitionists but also those of the Society of Arts. This was illustrated 
by the attacks on the proposals of the Society of Arts. Thus the Mechanics' 
Magazine completely rejected the ideas of 'innate rights' and wrote that the 
'm6re obvious' objections to the Society of Arts' proposals were: 
'First. ! (It is without precedent or example in the jurisprudence 
of this or any other country in the,: civilized world. 
Second. It rests on no evidence whatever of probable utility. ' 163 
Ideological differences between patent experts, whose ideas were dominated 
by ideals of utility, and entrepreneur/inventors who favoured natural property 
rights, should not be seen as the crucial factor in shaping the Patent Law 
Amendment Act of 1.852. Even on the specific isýue of justifying the patent 
system the parties were not in a state of total ideological opposition. As in 
earlier (and indeed later) periods concepts of property in inventions were 
used loosely and rhetorically, without defining whether the property was 'natural 
or 'utilitarian'. The concepts of 'property' and 'efficiency' continued to be 
used by patent experts, as if they had the same meaning as in the ideology of 
the entrepreneurs. The result was that patent experts continued to campaign 
within the ideological and social parameters of the middle class as a whole. 
The degree of this overlap is demonstrated by the fact that patent experts 
projected themselves as supporters of the idea of cheap and efficient 
government put forward by the Administrative Reform Associations. Patent 
experts argued that it was the Society of Arts that favoured unnecessary' 
expenditure. Thus Robertson in the Mechanics' Magazine, pointed out that 
the new post of Registrar of Inventions, suggested by the Committee, would 
create an 'intended-to-be-handsomely-paid-office', whilst the new procedure 
which the registrar would set up, would, 'for anything the Committee know or 
can tell', be just as bad or worse than the existing procedure. 
164 In a 
reply to a letter defending the Society of Arts' proposals, Robertson repeated 
his charges: 
'We have dared to impute a spirit of jobbery to them! Yes; and 
this most advisedly. The Great Exhibition is acknowledged by 
all men to be a job - capitally managed and eminently popular, but still a most literal job. The Society's scheme for the 
overthrow (not the reform) of the Patent Laws arose out of that 
job, ... and has also been made a job of in its way. ' 
I 
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Robertson concluded by describing the proposal as 
'ending in a set of resolutions good for nothing, but smacking 
most significantly throughout of posts and appointments. ' 165 
(ii) Patent experts and the process of reform. In order to counter 
the potent ial threat presented by a new bureaucracy in which they might not 
have clearly defined roles, patent experts, even though generally committed 
to reform, had to preserve some parts of the old system. In particular, 
they had to protect the legal base of their professional skills in defining 
units of technology, from the challenge of a new set of definitions which 
new bureaucrats might create. For this reason, the place of the courts in 
the system had to be substantially preserved, as they applied the same 
intellectual tools to the process of definition as did the patent experts. 
If changes in the administration meant that some decisions on the substantive 
validity of patents were made by officials, these officials should apply the 
same criteria as the courts. Only if this were the case could the patent 
experts assume that their skills would be needed in a reformed system of 
defining inventions. An analysis of the various events which preceded the 
1852 Act shows how successfully patent experts were able to create a 
framework of debate of their choice. In this framework the possibilities 
for reform were limited in such a way that the final product preserved and 
even extended the conditions under which they could fulfil their professional 
ideal. 
(a) Their first and most important suc6ess was in their influence on the 1848 
Treasury Committee on the Signet and Privy'Seal Offices. As noted above, 
' 
this 
Committee accepted the proposals of patent experts for the reform of the 
existing bureaucracy. It rejected the evidence of the witnesses who were 
administrators of the unreformed system and who had argued that the various 
steps were necessary for reasons of constitutional ritual. The rejection of 
their evidence was an important blow to the system of patronage, for it meant 
that a more 'progressi. ve' section of the civil service (the Treasury Committee) 
had added its voice to the condemnation of the unreformed administration. Since 
it came from within it was particularly important, for it contributed to the 
final breakdown of the power of the old order to present the traditional 
administration as an essential and 'constitutional' part of the state. 
Of direct consequence for future change was the ability of the experts 
to persuade the Committee that their utilitarian objectives could best be 
4 
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achieved by doing away with many of the traditional, ritual forms of the 
process of granti 
- 
ng patents, yet, at the same time, preserving the functions 
of the Attorney-General and Solicitor-General in the system. As was 
explained in the discussion of the caveat procedure above, the decisions 
of the Attorney-Ganeral and Solicitor-General represented the only 
instance in the process of granting patents where decisions-were made on 
largely substantive rather than formal legal grounds. The Attorney General 
and Solicitor-General were legally trained and the decision that their role 
in the system ought to be maintained, meant that the Committee accepted the 
evidence of patent experts who had suggested that a legal element should be 
kept in the system. 
166 This bias in favour of the body of legal knowledge 
was directly reflected in the findings of the Committee for it reported that 
the inquiry, before the Attorney- or Solicitor-General on questions of priority 
would appear, for the most part, to involve considerations of a legal rather 
than a scientific nature. 
167 The Report went on to argue that assessors 
exclusively trained in technology need only occasionally be introduced into 
the process, and then at a subordinate level to the legally trained. 
The domination of the findings of this Committee by patent experts was 
complete. Not only was the evidence of the traditional administrators 
rejected, but (with the exception of Bennet Woodcroft) there was no evidence 
from entrepreneurs or inventors who were primarily interested in the exploitation 
of their own inventions. Therefore, the only version of the possibilities for 
reform came from the patent experts. Their strategic professional position 
had led to them initially being accepted by the Committee as the only witnesses 
with the necessary expertise. Patent experts were thus able to ensure that 
their version of how the patent system ought to be changed, formed the basis 
of later debates throughout the second phase of legislative reform. 
(b) Early in 1851 a Select Committee of the House of. Lords was set up to 
consider how the provisions of the Designs Amendment Act 1850, passed to 
protect exhibits at the Great EXhibition, could be extended to patentable 
inventions which were also to be exhibited there. 
168 Although the Committee 
was set up with specific reference to the Great Exhibition it excluded the 
organizers of that event. The majority of witnesses were patent experts, the 
only exceptions being Bennett Woodcroft and a civil engineer, Charles May. 
Patent law and patent law reform were, as before the 1848 Committee, discussed 
in the most general terms. Webster explained that: 
k 
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'after hearing evidence on the probable operation of registration 
of inventions generally, according to the system for the 
registration of designs [the Lords changed their proposals] so as 
to keep distinct from each other the two methods of acquiring and 
protecting property in designs and inventions'. 169 
The Bill which embodied the new proposals, passed into law as the Protection 
of Inventions Act 1851.170 In offering protection for ifnventions shown 
at the 1851 Exhibition the Act introduced several procedural innovations. It 
showed how flexible patent experts could be in their proposals for reform, if 
their occupational basis was not being threatened. Most iTportantly it 
introduced a system of provisional specifications. 
17 1 This meant. that if an 
inventor gained a certificate that he had adequately described an invention 
in broad outline, he would be entitled to a limited protection which allowed 
him to exhibit or publish his invention for a period of-six months without 
losing his right to a full patent in the process. Although the granting of 
the certificate required an administrative decision similar to the registration 
of designs, the possibility of the creation of a threatening bureaucracy was 
limited by placing the decision in the hands of the Attorney-Gbneral. He was 
however, allowed to rely on scientific advisers. 
172 
Provisional protection was granted from the'day of application, thus for 
the first time eliminating the possibility of leaks which had-always been 
present under the unreformed patent system which dated the patent from the 
day the process of granting had been completed. This afforded a precedent 
for the principle that the legal right should date from the day of the 
application in the case of all patent grants. 
The provisi6nal protection granted by the Protection of Inventions Act 
proved popular and in slightly less than six months from its passing until 
the end of the Exhibition, application for provisional protection was made 
in 691 cases and granted in 614 cases. 
173 This compares to a total of 455 
patents granted throughout the whole of 1851.174 
Not surprisingly the Protection of Inventions Adt. proýdd'to be influential. 
Much attention was paid to it in evidence to the 1851 Select Committee of the 
175 House of Lords on the Patent Law Amendment Bill 
(c) This third and final parliamentary Committee of Inquiry of the second phase 
of the reform movement heard much move evidence and was more widely publicised 
than its two predecessors. The witnesses were not dominated by patent experts 
180. 
in terms of numbers. Indeed, their evidence reflected a wide range of opinions. 
The 33 witnesses included at least seven who expressed doubt as to whether any 
system of monopoly protection for inventions should exist at all. 
176 The 
remaining witnpsses favoured the retention of a system of rewarding inventors 
by limited monopolies, but their opinions varied: from those of Henry Cole 
who, representing the Society of Arts, asked for an inventor to be automatically 
entitled to patents in using a cheap and simple system of registration; to 
those of William Carpmael who was prepared to defend the intricacies and costs 
of the unreformed system. 
177 With the exception of Carpmael, all the witnesses, 
suggested some form of change: with the manufacturers, engineers and inventors 
generally favouring more radical change than the patent experts. 
The 1851 Committee of Enquiry heard many complaints of shortcomings and 
diverse suggestions for solutions. However, the course of action it should 
follow had been largely determined by its brief and judicia lly by the Committees 
which had preceded it. For although lengthy evidence was heard on all aspects 
of the system of protecting inventions, the actual task of the Committee was 
to discuss two reform Bills which had been introduced by Lord Brougham, as 
a private member, and Lord Granville, on behalf of the government. 
178 
The Bill submitted by the government was based, to a large extent, on 
the proposals of the earlier two Committees of Enquiry. It provided for the 
abolition of the offices filled by patronage. but for the retention of the 
role of the Attorney-General and Solicitor-General as suggested by the report 
of the 1848 Committee. It also made provision for a system of provisional 
registration as suggested by the example of the 1851 Protection of Inventions 
Act. Most of the provisions of the government Bill, including clauses dealing 
with these key issues, were retained in the consolidated Bill, produced by the 
1851 Committee on the Patent Law Amendment Bill. 
By this time patent experts had the ability to influence the government 
of the day directly. The extent of this influence was apparent from the 
speech which Lord Granville delivered when he introduced the consolidated 
Bill in the House of Lords. After outlining the Bill's provisions, he . 
admitted that he personally favoured the abolition of patents and quoted the 
evidence of six witnessqs who suppbrted his arguments. Neverthele'ss , he felt 
that public opinion demanded reform of the system rather than its abolition. 
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Lord Granville was thus bowing to what he saw as the general influence 
of reformist opinion. He was not, however, accepting the proposals of those 
who wanted radical reform, for earlier in his speech he had categorically 
rejected the validity of evidence based on the notion of 'absolute innate 
179 
rights of property in ideas'. Instead he accepted the findings of the 
Committee and therefore by implication, the more limited reform proposals of 
the patent experts. Direct evidence of influence by patent experts is to be 
found in the conclusion of Lord Granville's speech in which. he thanked 
Webster, the leading patent expert of the day, -whom he described as 
'a barrister in great practice, who attended [the] meetings 
[of the Committee] constantly, and aided them by his valuable 
suggestions'. 180 
Parliamentary manoeuvres 
Notwithstanding the expertise of Webster's draughtsmanship, the passage- 
into law of the consolidated Bill produced by the 1851 Committee was relatively 
stormy. In the House of Commons the Bill was discussed in. great detail and 
abolitionists such as JL Ricardo made a determined effort to delay the Bill 
by attacking each clause from the philosophic basis that patents as a whole 
181 
ought to be abolished. These tactics succeeded in delaying the Bill 
beyond the 1851 session, for on the last day of that session it was returned 
to the House of Lords from the House of Commons, and they refused to pass it 
on the grounds that they did not have adequate time to consider the amendments 
of the House of Commons. 
182 In 1852 the Bill, substantially unchanged, was 
reintroduced by a new government. 
183 Like its predecessor it was strenuously 
opposed in the House of Commons when it was debated in Committee. 
184 
The extended opposition to the Bills is open to divergent interpretations. 
Some contemporaries, such as Hughes, have suggested that the delays were the 
result of attempts to defend the old system of patronage. 
185 There is little 
support for this suggestion in the arguments used in the debates, though the 
tactics of delay were similar to those which had been used in the 1830's. 
More influential seems to have been the intervention by groups (fractions 
of entrepreneurial capital) whose special interests were threatened by specific 
amendments to the existing patent system. One issue which involved special 
interests was whether British patents should continue to be extended to the 
182. 
Colonies. The consolidated Bill introduced in the House of Lords in 1851 
had proposed to drop the Colonies from British patents so that British 
sugar refiners in the West Indies could compete with planters in. Cuba or 
Brazil. 186 This aroused great opposition from refiners in Britain - some 
of whom, such as Farrie and Macfie had testified to the 1851 Committee that 
they favoured the total abolition of patents. On this issue, however, they 
campaigned not for the abolition but for the retention of the status quo 
of patents in both Britain and the Colonies in order, so they argued, to 
enable British refiners to compete with those in the West Indies. 
187 
In the long debate on this clause in the House of Commons their cause was 
championed by the abolitionists who, in this case, were able to exploit a 
specific issue in order to increase their limited influence. 
188 They 
succeeded in defeating the clause in 1851 and thus delayed and restricted 
the government's proposed reforms. In 1852, however, a clause removing 




Only with one issue did the abolitionist -s achieve any notable success. 
Webster had proposed that a board of scientifically. trained examiners be 
set up, 
' 
under the supervision of the Attorney- and S-olicitor-General, to make 
preliminary examinations of provisional specifications. The introduction of 
such examiners was supported by the House of Lords in 1851 and 1852. In 1851 
it had been overwhelmingly accepted after some debate in Committee in the 
House of Commons. 
190 In 1852, however, the clause was struck out-by the - 
House of Commons and clauses referring the provisional specifical. -ions directly 
to the law officers were substituted. No opposition was offered to this 
change by the reformers, because, as Webster explained, 
'the imminent danger which impended of the Bill being again 
defeated by want of time rendered it inexpedient that anything 
should be done which might occasion delay'. 191 
Those who favoured unfettered natural rights to property-in invention 
also tried to shape the law. Thus it was proposed that patent infringements 
be made a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment for not more than 
twelve months with hard labour. 
192 The proposed amendment was dismissed 
out 9f hand by the Chancellor of the Exchequer who 'trusted that the house 
would not sanction for a moment a proposition which would inflict upon any 
ingenious person who might violate the law by any manufacture, a punishment 
of so savage and almost as sanguinary a character... '. 
193 Nevertheless, it 
183. 
indicates a certain militancy on the part of supporters of the rights of 
inventors who were opposed to the compromise proposals of the patent 
experts. 
With the exception of the limitation on the administrative efficiency 
of the new system by the exclusion of examiners, the power of the remnants 
of the old order, the grpups with special interests and the 'philosophically 
convinced' abolitionists, was too limited to exert any major influence. The 
second phase of the reform movement culminated in the passing of the Patent 
Law Amendment Act 1852 194 which embodied most of the provisions of the 
consolidated Bill drafted by Webster in 1851. 
D. Reforms of the second phase 
The most obvious immediate change introduced by the 1852 Act was that the 
necessity for a patent of invention to pass through the various offices of 
patronage was eliminated. As a result the actual issuing of letters patent 
could be cheaply and quickly performed by administrators who had no discretionar 
power. 
Reforms which affected patent grants were all brought about by 'procedural' 
changes. The substantial legal definitions of what could be the subject of a 
patent and the tests of novelty and utility evolved by the courts were left 
unchanged. There were seven major innovations: 
Patents were granted, as in the case of designs or provisional 
specifications registered for the General Exhibition, from the 
day of application. 
195 
One patent granted in London was valid throughout Britain but not 
in the Colonies. 196 
(iii) Costs were made more moderate. and provision was made for increasing 
peri . odical payments. 
197 
(iv) All restrictions on partnersh . ip agreements were lifted. 
198 
(v) Only one invention could be included in a patent. 
199 
(vi) Patent applications had to be accompanied by a provisional or by a 
complete specification. If the description in the provisional 
specification met the standards laid down in the Act a certificate 
was granted by the Patent Commissioners which entitled the patentee 
to limited protection, similar to that provided by the Protection 
of Inventions Act, to exhibit or use the patented article himself. A 
184. 
complete specification had to be-provided before the end of this 
period in order to make the protection permanent. 
200 
(vii) Opposition hearings were reorgani ed. A written statement of 
complaint was required. The law officer did not, as under the old 
caveat procedure, merely weigh the opposing claims but attempted 
instead to decide who the first inventor was. This meant that an 
applicatiqn for a patent could no longer be defeated by a party who 
had fraudulently learnt the secret of the applicant's invention. 
201 
The last three reforms required the administration to decide on whether 
a patent com plied with the requirements of the law. A separate, new 
bureaucracy was not set up to make these decisions. They were to be made 
by the Commissioners of Patents under whose control the patent system had 
been placed. The Commissioners were, for all practical purposes, the Lord 
Chancellor, the Master of the Rolls, and the Attorney-General and Solicitor- 
General of England. 
202 They only had powers to delegate routine administrative 
matters to a centralised Patent Office. This meant that all decisions 
involving an exercise of discretion within the administration were to be made 
by four of the busiest and most important politicians directly involved in the 
legal system. Their assumption of key roles in the administration of the 
patent system meant a continuation of the bias toward dependence on accumulated 
legal knowledge in decision-making but also that thorough investigations into 
whether specifications met legal requirements were practically i! npossible. 
The result was that, although the administration of patents was extensively 
'rationalised' by the virtual elimination of the early modern bureaucracy, 
the new administration did not, even if the criteria which it applied were 
'formally rational', structure the making of decisions in the most efficient 
possible way. 
Some other administrative innovations, although not controversial at 
their inception, were to be of importance. The arrangements for consulting 
specifications were streamlined and Bennett Woodcroft, a former professor 
of mechanical engineering was appointed to the post of Superintendent of 
Specifications. He was required to publish all incoming specifications 
and also to collect and reprint all previous specifications. 
203 The 
possibility was thus opened for an accessible store of technological knowledge 
to be set up within the patent bureaucracy itself. This information created 
the potential for the making of rational 'scientific' decisions within the 
confines of the patent administration. Another change was that provision 
185. 
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was made for the commissioners to publish annual reports. Here too the 
foundation was laid for the regular production of information about the 
patent bureaucracy which could be used to modify and to extend its activities. 
VI. Reform - summary and conclusions 
As the result of the reforms which culminated in 1852 the administration 
of patents became (in the Weberian sense) a 'formally rational' bureaucracy. 
205 
The legal content of patents, although reformed in case law and by textbooks,. 
remained substantially unchanged in the form in which it had been cast at the 
end of the 18th century. In the conclusion to Chapter 3 (above) it was 
argued that the change in patent law, which allowed units of new technology 
to be treated as commodities as a result of the intervention by the state, had, 
because'of structural constraints on changelnot been complemented by an 
administrative structure which allowed this intervention to be effected 
cheaply and efficiently. In the 19th century these structural conditions 
changed and reform of what was a mercantilist 'early modern' institution took 
place. The state was now able to delineate units of new technology more 
swiftly and more cheaply than in the past. 
In terms of 'grand theory' these changes can be understood in Holloway 
and Picciotto's terms, as the liberal state maximising the efficiency of the 
intervention 'necessary' to ensure the operation of laissez-faire capitalism 
in the sphere of new technology. 
206 T, hey can also be understood, in Weberian 
terms, as the extension'to patent administration of the formally rational 
bureaucracy typical of modern Western societies. 
207 Efficiency and rationality 
were increaW in this period but the social processes which led to thý change 
were more 'complex than overarching theoretical constructs would. suggest. Grand 
theory would not. be able-, tp account directly for the grad-ual d'e-velopment of the 
,: complex reform mqvpment nor for the specific changes which did not, in all 
'instances, maximise efficiency. 
It has been argued in this chapter (and in the preceding chapter) that 
the possibility of reform was created by the gradual eclipse of the old order, 
particularly by the rise of the entrepreneurial middle class. The relative 
hegemonic dominance of this class created (in Dicey's terms) a 'climate of 
public opinion' conducive to reform of the patent system. 
208 The specific 
reforms of the system of legal intervention in the control of new technology 
were not the direct product of public opinion - which as has been seen, was 
not entirely unambiguous on this subject. It depended instead on the exercise 
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of power, both directly and indirectly, within the changed social and 
ideological framework by the patent experts, who, because of their strategic 
social position (outlined in Chapter 4 above) were able to channel and 
control the movement towards reform. 
For the patent experts the reforms of 1852 were a triumph. They meant 
that they had been emancipated from the disadvantages of working within, 
and being dependent upon, a system where officials who were the creatures 
of patronage, demanded gratuities and granted favours. The preservation 
of a strong legal element ensured that the profestional skill of patent 
experts would remain important in the delineation and defence of units of 
new technology. 
Patent experts even contrived to profit by the amendments which they 
had been forced to concede in the course of the passage of the 1852 Act. Thus 
Webster, writing shortly after its passage, could shift all blame for future 
shortcomings on to the obstructive abolitionists. Commenting on the decision 
not to appoint permanent scientifically trained examiners he remarked: 
'If inventors, relying on the certifices which have been 
given should be grievously disappointed in the result, it 
must not be laid to the new system but to those who 
deprived that system of this great safeguard and of the 
means of correcting evils and of relinquishing duties which 
the experience of all law officers had led them to wish to 
entrust to other persons. ' 209 
- The reforms of 1852 were not a 'final solution' to the problem of the 
control of new technology. They were contrary to the objectives of the 
fractions of the middle class who had supported the 'radical' solutions of 
unfettered property rights in new technology on the one hand and the total 
abolition of such rights on the other. The reforms of 1852 did however, 
entrench the patent system as the form of state intervention in the control 
of new technology. For this reason they were to be valuable to patent experts 
in the: defence of the patent system in the ensuing two decades. 
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CHAPTER 6- THE DEFENCE OF, THE PATENT SYSTEM 1853-1872 
I. Introduction 
During the two decades following the Great Exhibition and the amendment 
of the Patent Laws the general economic and social conditions which had 
contributed to these developments continued. The overall performance of the 
British economy was good: the period 1850 to 1873 has often been referred to-- 
as the 'Great Victorian Boom'. However, the economic historian, RA Church, 
in his book of the same title suggests that to speak of a 'boom' is an over- 
simplification and that, while the 'rate of economic growth achieved its 
nineteenth-century maximum', the period as a whole was not significantly 
different from what preceded it. 
I 
New technology continued to be developed throughout the 1850's and 1860's. 
Technological expertise became an increasingly important factor in industrial 
productiOn. 
2 Foreign competition was-increasing but Britain was still hol . ding 
its own in the industrial sphere and industrialists remained confident of 
continuing to do so. In the words of AE Musson: 
'Britain's predominance had been well maintained in the third 
quarter of the nineteenth century, an era of "Victorian 
prosperity", and there was further rapid growth in the iron and 
steel, textiles, coal and shipbuilding industries, in which 
Britain 
, continued 
to produce as much as, or more than, the whole 
of the rest of the world. Railway building at home and overseas 
continued to provide a stimulus to iron and engineering, at the 
same time reducing transport costs and widening markets. 
Business optimism was also inspired by rising prices, following 
the gold discoveries in California and Australia, while commercial 
expansion was encouraged by the final adoption of Free Trade. -For 
a time it seemed that the Cobdenite vision of international 
economic liberalism would be fulfilled, following the Anglo-French 
commercial treaty of 1860 and other trade agreements, lowering 
tariff barriers. Britain had become the "workshop of the world", 
her exports massively increasing, and progress seemed unbounded: 
between 1850 and 1873 total United Kingdom domestic exports rose 
from E71.4 million to E255.2 million (current values). ' (3) 
At the level of accepted common sense what Perkin termed the 'entrepreneurial 
ideal' remained hegemonically dominant. 
4 This ideal or 'common 
, 
sense' contained 
notions in favour of free trade and encompassed a broad distaste for 'large' and 
'inefficient' government. In a very general way it reflected the ascendancy of 
an entrepreneurial middle class which had managed to establish a measure of 
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hegemonic dominance over both the old aristrocacy and over large sections of 
the working class. 
The specific application of the ideal was not always clear. In a previous 
chapter the tensions in the work of the classical economists, the ideologues 
of this dominant class, were considered. The classical economists had been 
unable to decide whether they supported a natural or an artificial harmony of 
interests. For them this question had been somewhat abstract and 'intellectual' 
but, as time went on, the dominant class became divided on the role of the state 
in specific social and economic areas. All agreed that if there were to be 
state-intervention in a particular area it ought to be efficient,. but this did 
not answer the question about whether there should be intervention at all. 
After 1850 the debate became more directly linked to practical issues of 
the shaping of specific legal and administrative organs. There was a growing 
identification of different fractions in the dominant class with specific 
positions in the debate. Thus, on the one hand increasingly confident 
entrepreneurs came to demand that the entrepreneurial ideal be carried to 
its 'logical conclusion' of total free trade and a. laissez-faire government 
which intervened as seldom as possible in the sphere of social welfare and 
not at all in the economic sphere. 
5 On the other hand, the period also saw 
the rise of increasingly well established 'professionals' both within the 
civil service and outside. it. Although, in general, they closely identified 
with the entrepreneurial ideal, these professionals claimed that they had 
specific skills which had to be applied in order to maintain a-rational 
ordered society. This is not to suggest that on any particular issue a 
dichotomy would necessarily be found. For example, entrepreneurs in different 
fields - different fractions of entrepreneurial capital - might have different 
interests. Some might therefore back state intervention on an issue while 
others would attempt to prevent it. The important point, however, is that the 
dominant common sense was not given the same interpretation by all its 
supporters. 
The limited reforms to the patent system brought about by the Act of 1852 
'had been a victory for those who demanded 'rational' intervention by the state 
in order to preserve an ordered society. It had led to simplified, cheaper 
procedures which in turn brought about a sharp increase in the number of 
patents . granted. 
6 It had also led to the bureaucracy of the Patent Office 
becoming directly involved in the expansion of technological knowledge by way 
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of the systematic publication of patent specifications and their distribution 
to public libraries. 
7 Previously this function had only been sporadically 
fulfilled by private entrepreneurs. 
8 After 1852 it was officially done by 
the state - and widely praised. 
9 
In spite of these 'advances' which rationalised the operation of the 
patent system, the system as a whole was not accepted as a common-sense, 
necessary part of the state apparatus. The reason for this failure of the 
post-1852 patent system to gain universal acceptance must be sought in the 
rise of an abolitionist movement. It attempted to turn the increasingly 
confident espousals of the entrepreneurial ideal into a specific ideology 
which would unite support for the total abolition of the system of patents as 
the primary form of state intervention in the control of new technology. It 
was against this movement that the patent system was to be defended. And it 
was in the course of this defence that the patent system was to be presented 
in such a way that the change in its status from that of an instrument of 
policy to that of the common-sense mode of dealing with new technology would 
finally be confirmed. 
II. The Abolitionist movement and its. ideology 
In the struggle surrounding the reform of the patent system which 
climaxed in the 1852 legislation, abolition had been presented primarily 
as an 'intellectual' alternative to the existing system. After 1852 the 
abolitionist movement grew into a major campaign which sought to redefine 
common-sense attitudes to the relationship between law and the state on the 
one hand and technology on the other. 
An analysis of the utterances of those who supported the abolition of 
patents shows that there are certain themes which consistently reappear. 
In order to draw out the links between these themes which make up the specific 
ideology of the abolitionists and the general common sense of the period 
detailed analysis is required. 
A. Free Trade: The abolitionists stressed their commitment to a laissez- 
faire policy of free trade in its most extreme form. An absence of all 
state-imposed restraints was presented as the basis from which to proceed 
to consider the question. Thus Professor Rogers introduced his address in 
favour of the abolition of patents to the Royal Statistical Society in 1863 
by arguing that though a limitation on individual freedom might be necessary, 
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it should be distinctly and continuously proved to be desirable: 
10 It ought, 
he contended, to be tested against 'that principle of freedom. which underlies 
all economic reasonings, and is the basis of all material prosperity'. 
11 In 
an editorial in August 1864 The Times adopted a similar stance: 
'It is, in fact, a departure from the ordinary principle of 
non-interference in trade, to volunteer to create an exclusive 
right; and the burden of showing that this exception to the 
general rule is expedient rests upon the upholders of Patents. ' 12 
B. Property: Since the abolitionists on their own account were opposed 
to one type of 'exclusive right' they found it necessary to affirm their 
unquestioning acceptance of another exclusive right which was universally 
accepted, the right to property. The way in which they did this was to affirm 
their support for, or faith in, property but to argue that patents were 'not 
really' forms of property at all. Thus Rogers in the same address, claimed 
that he could not 'discern a single characteristic in mechanical inventions 
which constitutes a claim to the distinctive features of property ,. 
13 
This argument, however, was difficult for the abolitionists to sustain 
for two reasons: (i) The ambiguity of the concept of property and (ii) the 
counter example of copyright. 
(i) The argument which denies that a patent is a form of property depends 
on a very narrow definition of property Which limits it to corporeal objects. 
Such a definition might have been acceptable to contemporary continental 
jurisprudence following a form of 
' 
begriffsjurisprudenz based on Roman law, 
but it did not even then fit the broader definition of property in English 
law. The more sophisticated abolitionists realised this. Their solution 
therefore was to appeal to the common sense conception of property which 
differed from the legal concept. In September 1865_The Times dealt with 
this conundrum: 
'Mhe right of exclusive property in a discovery differs from 
all other property, with the single exception of Copyright, in 
being purely and entirely the creature of the law. Other species 
of property receive the sanction of the law, but this is created 
by it. If a man appropriates to*himself a material object, he 
makes it his own, whether he live in a civilized or a barbarous 
society, and when the law does come into operation it simply steps 
in and defends his possession of that which he has already. But 
in the case of Patent Rights and Copyrights the law, instead of 
defending what a man has, gives him that which he has not; it does 
not, in fact, sanction a pre-existing dominion, but creates a new 
privilege. ' 14 
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Similarly Rogers wrote: 
'The law may give'him [the inventor] a property, as the law 
may allow any other privilege which invades the liberty of 
other men; but his right has'a factitious but not a natural 
origin. ' 15 
(ii) Copyright raised further problems. In the popular sense this was 
regarded as a form of property - as an extension of the concept of property 
to include something incorporeal. Very few of those in favour of. the aboliti on 
of patents dared to support the abolition of copyright - though it appears 
that a few thought that its abolition followed logically. 
16 The. solution 
most often adopted was to claim that copyright was qualitatively different 
because, although not corporeal, a literary work was unique and could easily 
be identified. An alternative solution was to deny that there could be a 
natural property right to copyright but to claim that since the effect of 
such a right was different it was a justifiable exception. Thus The Times 
wrote: 
'[Tihe author can no more claim protection as of right than 
the inventor can; there is no such-thing as copyright at 
common law; but it is evident that many arguments may be 
advanced in favour of the expediency of copyright in literature 
which are inapplicable to Patent Rights in arts. ' 17 
The point could of course be made more bluntly in a way which ignored 
the fact that copyright represented any exception to the definition of 
property advanced by the abolitionists: Thus, in an address to the National 
Association for the Promotion of Social Science in 1870, Sir William Armstrong 
held: 
'As to the alleged analogy between copyright and patent right, 
there is none whatever in regard to obstructive effect. Copyright 
involves no monopoly of ideas, but patent right ddes.. The field 
of authorship is not narrowed by copyright but the field of 
invention is, and to a most serious extent, by patent rights. ' 18 
The problem with these pragmatic arguments was that they underlined the 
argument, so popular in Continental Europe at the time, 
19 that patents could 
not, by their nature, be the subject of property. If patents were regarded 
as a form of property and the abolitionists attacked them they could be 
represented as opponents of property in general. This point was not lost 
on the supporters of the patent system who accused Rogers and other 
abolitionists of socialism. 
20 
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C. Contract: The abolitionists also stressed their loyalty to the 
popularly accepted principle of freedom of contract. They argued that the 
transaction whereby the state decided to grant an exclusive privilege to 
someone 'should be in the nature of a bargain"21 but that, in practice, it 
was not a 'true' contract, for the inventor only entered into such a 
bargain when it suited him. The state however, 'automatically' granted a 
patent when requested to do so. This, they argued, was contrary to the 
principle of parties entering freely and voluntarily into a contract. 
D. Evolutionary progress: Abolitionists also appealed to the common- 
sense belief in progress and a faith in evolutionary development of technology. 
Thus a Mr Winkworth, speaking at a meeting of the Society of Arts in 1854, 
claimed: 
'We might rest assured that the man of real genius was a 
true patriot, and would not hide his talents under a bushel. 
If the patent laws were abolished to-morrow, there would be 
more useful inventions than ever, for talent being no longer 
bound by the fetters of monopoly, and breathing a freer 
atmosphere, would find its true position and exhibit itself 
in forms to astonish, delight, and improve the world. ' 22 
E'.. .. Administration: A further plank in the abolitionists' platform 
was the weakness of the patent system as a bureaucracy. Within the accepted 
common sense-of the. 1850's, condemnation of inefficient administration was 
important. The existing patent system which had recently been reformed was 
demonstrably still weak-and inefficient. The weakness of the partially 
reformed administration was exacerbated by the large increase in applications 
which followed the 1852 reforms and the concomitant reduction in fees. 
23 
As early as 1854 an opponent of the patent system remarked that 'he trusted 
that the time was not far distant when the whole system would be crushed under 
24 its own weight'. 
(i) In spite of reforms (outlined in the previous chapter) the 
post-1852 administration retained some of the characteristics of an early 
modern bureaucracy. 
25 The reforms of 1852 had swept away many of the offices 
of patronage, but not all. In particular, a Mr Edmunds, originally appointed 
to the unreformed Patent Office as a result of the patronage of Lord Brougham, 
had been appointed as clerk to the new Patent Commissioners. Edmunds continued 
to follow the practices of the past. He did not keep a separate account of the 
large sums of public money which passed through his hands. In fact he did not do 
any of the work related to patents himself but instead he employed a subordinate 
to collect the fees on his behalf. The subordinate was not paid a salary but 
managed to scrape an income from discounts of 11 per cent on the stamps bought 
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at the Stamp Office, from small gratuities from patent agents and from profits 
on the sale ofboxes into which letters patent were put-26 
Edmunds' 'traditional' approach perhaps inevitably brought him into 
conflict with the 'new men' appointed as a result of the reforms of 1852. 
In particular he clashed with Bennet Woodcroft, the former professor of 
mechanical engineering whose dynamic reorganization of the Specifications 
OMce epitomized the professional approach of the technologically trained 
bureaucrats in the Patent Office. In 1862 the clash between the two styles 
of administration became public as a result of accusations of corruption. 
It eventually culminated in the dismissal of Edmunds -a victory for the more 
'rational' bureaucratic form. The lengthy squabble, however, undermined 
confidence in the administration of patents as a whole. 
27 
(ii) A second weakness of the patent system as reformed in 1852 
lay in the work done by the Commissioners of Patents - the Lord Chancellor, 
the Attorney-General, the Solicitor-General and the Master of the Rolls. In 
practice they did not operate-efficiently. With the exception of the Master 
of the Rolls the persons filling these offices changed with each government. 
The Commissioners were supposed to supervi se the operation of patent office 
bureaucracy or appoint extra commissioners to assist them in doing so, but 
they failed to appoint extra commissioners and did not themselves supervise 
the operation of the system systematically. As Lord Romilly who was Master 
of the Rolls from 1851 to 1873, testified in 1871: 
'ENIothing can be worse than such a Commission; it does no 
good at all. It is very difficult to get the members of 
it together. The Lord Chancellor, with the Master Of the. 
Rolls and the two officersof the Crown are the only persons 
who attend it; it is difficult to get a meeting, because they 
have so much to do elsewhere, and then matters are not 
satisfactorily disposed of, and are almost entirely confined 
to duties that have nothing to do with the granting of patents. '28 
A more serious weakness in the finding of the Commissioners lay in the 
examination of patent applications and the accompanying (provisional) 
specifications, which in terms of the 1852 Act had to be done by one of the 
Commissioners. 29 Their duty was to examine whether the application was, on 
the face of it, in accordance with the law, but the evidence is that they 
did not*do this. 
30 Indeed, a Mr Henson, the thief clerk of the Attorney- 
General who testified in 1871 that he dealt with patent. -matters on behalf 
of the Attorney-General, could not give the legal definition of what was 
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patentable. 
31 Henson admitted, under cross examination from Macfie, the 
abolitionist, that he allowed applications 'if, in my judgment, the 
specification fairly describes the invention or something I deem an 
invention' but, he added, 'where there is the smallest pretence for a 
32 patent the doubt is resolved in favour of the patentee . 
The failure of the Commissioners of Patents to provide a proper 
examination was compounded by the fact that they derived a large income 
from their 'services'. Applicants paid 12,2s to have their applications 
examined by one of the Commissioners. The extent to which these fees were 
regarded as the spoils of office is apparent from the evidence of-Aston to 
the 1871 Select Committee on Letters Patent: 
'I do not think that the law officers themselves look upon 
the fees which they derive from the patent funds as being, 
in fact, the remuneration for the duties which they discharge 
in connection with the Patent Office. It is understood that 
those fees provide a means of remunerating them for the duties 
which they discharge as the law officers-of the Crown. I am 
quite clear that they should be looked upon in that light, - 
because the compensations received by the officers for Ireland 
and Scotland are paid for no duties at all; for we find that 
a sum of 3,5001. per annum on the average is paid to them and 
their clerks for doing nothing in connection at least with 
patents. ' 33 
Critics of the system were not slow to attack the role of the Patent 
C Commissioners. As early as 1855 the Manchester Examiner and Times commented 
on the report of the Commissioners of Patents for 1854 which had noted that 
'no alteration was made within the year 1854 in the allowance of fees to be 
paid to the law officers and their clerks'. It said: 
'As two of the commissioners (the Attorney-and Solicitor- 
General) are themselves the recipients of those fees, we 
need not wonder that they let well alone. Sir Alexander 
Cockburn has received 12,860, being at the rate of 12.2s. on 
each of 1,362 certificates of specifications, M for fiats 
on reference, E1,019 for signing 971 warrants, - being a total addition to the Attorney-General's income from this 
source of no less than E3,921. His clerk has netted 1345 
from the same source. Sir Richard Beth'O, the Solicitor- 
General, has received altogether 13,896. His clerk has 
received the same as the Attorney-General's. The compensations 
for the year show some nice pickings for doing nothing. ' 34 
Similarly The Times in the course of an abolitionist leading article 
argued: 
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'Surely nothing can be more ridiculous than to make an 
Attorney or Solicitor-General, who is loaded with professional 
and Parliamentary business, the judge as to whether some claim 
to scientific invention is valid, and whether it fulfils all 
the conditions which should entitle it to be made a monopoly 
in one person. No single man, if he had the content of all the 
Encyclopaedias in his head, could do one half of the work. Of 
course, it becomes a sinecure source of fees to the law officers. ' 35 
(iii) Aspects of the patent system, other than the role of the 
Attorney-General, provided grist to the abolitionist mill. Over and above 
the fees paid to the Commissioners of Patents, the other fees paid by patentees 
produced an income far in excess of that required to run the Patent Office. 
In the period 1 October 1852 to 31 December 1870 there was a surplus in every 
year except 1854. By the end of 1870 the surplus amounted to 1866,830 or 47.8 
per cent of total receipts. 
36 Not surprisingly critics of the patent system 
argued that the fees represented an unjustifiable 'tax' on invention. 
37 
(iv) A final weakness of the patent system, as it existed after 1852, 
was the costly and uncertain court procedure which had to be followed to 
enforce a patent. The basic form was an action for damages. This action was 
heard by a special civil jury. It had to decide complicated technical issues: 
whether, for example, the plaintiff's invention was new or whether the defendant's 
process was substantially different from that patented by the plaintiff. 
38 
The Times used this weakness as a further plank in its abolitionist platform 
and argued: 
'If anything can be more ridiculous than the original jurisdiction 
of these overworked lawyers [the Commissioners of Patents], it must 
be the reappearance of the same matter in due time before a British 
judge and a jury. They know no more about the subject befor 
,e 
them 
than they do about the procession of the equinoxes; and it comes to 
this, that the most adroit counsel, who present the subject in the 
point of view most likely to hit their conviction, wins the verdict. 
They strive to do what is right for they are honest men, but the law 
puts them in a false position. ' 39 
F. The position of the worker: The opponents of the patent system were, 
generally speaking, sensitive to the criticism that their proposals might 
serve to support a particular group or class. Occasionally they harmed their 
own cause. Thus the passionately anti-patent journal. The Economist concluded 
in 1869: 
'ET3he more that invention falls into the hands of great 
capitalists, the more likely it is to strengthen the 
manufacturing of a country which is already most powerful. ' 40 
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On the whole, though, the opponents of the patent system were more 
circumspect. They stressed that not only the entrepreneurial (capitalist) 
middle class would benefit from their proposals but so also the working class 
as a whole. Some argued that the position of the worker would be materially 
strengthened by the abolition of patents. A-more common argument was that 
the prosperity of the capitalist and the worker depended on the same factors. 
As it was expressed by The Echo in 1869: 
'The advantage of a few clever operatives should be no argument 
in favour of a law detrimental to industrial enterprize in 
general, and so to the mass of the workmen themselves. ' 41 
G. Supporters of patents: The abolitionists could hardly deny that there 
were some people who did profit from the existing patent system. In one of 
its earliest abolitionist leading articles The Times wrote: 
'E13t Cthe patent system] is seen at once to be a disgraceful 
abuse, by which no one profits but the lawyers and a few 
. speculating 
tradesmen. ' 42 
This theme of a small group often recurred. Thus Professor Rogers 
explained that he had been motivated to address the British Association in 
1861 because he 
'thought that a number of resolutions in favour of patents had 
been carried in an objectionable manner at a meeting of the 
Mechanical Section of that Society, that is, before parties 
who are prima facie interested in the maintenance, and even the 
extension, of the present system'. 43 
Patent lawyers were singled out for attack. One correspondent wrote 
to the Journal of the Society of Arts: 
'1173here is only one body of men who derive any certain and 
permanent benefit from these laws - the patent lawyers; for 
making out of patents and the disputes arising therefrom 
are a most fruitful and certain source of revenue. ' 44 
What can be deduced from the arguments adopted by the abolitionists 
in their campaign? The first five themes are sufficiert evidence to show 
that they whole-heartedly accepted the dominant common sense of their time 
and sought to use it to legitimise their drive for the abolition of the 
patent system. In other words, to paraphrase Cain, the ideology of the 
abolitionists was rooted in bourgeois common sense. 
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The last two themes are of interest for a slightly different reason, 
for they show that the abolitionists did not want their ideology linked to 
sectional interests. They therefore stressed that they represented the 
broad interests of society - including those of the-working class. Moreover 
they tried to brand their opponents as representatives of particular fractions 
('speculating tradesmen' and patent experts) who were motivated by self- 
interest and who, because of their position, were unable to articulate the 
interests of society as a whole. To translate the matter once more into 
Cain's terminology: Through their apparently 'open' ideology and through 
their attempted co-option of woking class support they tried to constitute 
an ideological sector which would enable the campaign for abolition to be 
conducted on cross-class lines. The abolitionists were operating against 
the backdrop of the existing patent system and, most importantly, in opposition 
to those. with vested interests in it.. Their version of how legal control of 
new technology should be exercised had to be neutralized by the abolitionists 
so that they could then substitute their own ideas. 
III. The Abolitionist campaign 
In the two decades after 1852 abolitionists addressed all the important 
organizations which were connected with the shaping of national policy 
towards the development and control of new technology. These include the 
British Association, 45 the (Royal) Statistical Society, 46 the National 
Association for the Promotion of Social Sciences 
47 
and some Chambers of 
48 Commerce. They also spoke at meetings of organizations generally hostile 
to their cause such as the Society of Arts49 and the Inventors'Institute. 
50 
In this, campaign they received some support from the press of which the 
consistently pro-abolitionist stance adopted by The Times was perhaps the 
most important. 
The campaign for abolition was relatively insignificant in the 1850's 
but became more important in the early 1860's. At about the time of the 
'Edmunds affair' the government was persuaded to appoint a Commission of 
. Inquiry into the patent system as a whole. 
51 The period during which the 
Commission sat coincided with an intensive effort on the part of the 
abolitionists to make the patent system the subject of public opprobrium. 
Abolitionists also gave evidence before the. Commission and stressed both 
practical shortcomings and the theoretical inadequacy of the patent system. 
52 
The Report of the Commission which was made public in 1865 was a partial 
victory for the abolitionists. 
53 It made some recommendations for reform 
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which it argued would remove some abuses but concluded: 
'While, in the judgment of the Commissioners, the changes 
above suggested will do something to mitigate the 
inconveniences now generally complained of by the public 
as incident to the working of the Patent Law, it is their 
opinion that these inconveniences cannot be wholly removed. 
They are in their belief inherent in the nature of a Patent 
Law, and must be considered as the price which the public 
consents to pay for-the existence of such a law. ' 54 
The Times, in a leading article on 10 February 1865, found that this 
paragraph in the report justified the abolition of the patent system. 
It rejected what it perceived to be 'faltering steps to abolition' and remarked 
that 
'lilt is only remarkable that public opinion has so long 
hesitated in accepting a dilemma which is seen to be 
inevitable when the theory of patent law is reduced to its 
simplest form. ' 55 
There are also signs that by the 1860's the attitude of the courts towards 
the interpretation of patent 'rights' was being influenced by a critical, 
anti-monopolist stance. 
Foremost amongst the decisions which limited the rights of patentees 
56 
was Feather v The Queen The background to the case was that during the 
Crimean war the British government became involved in the manufacture of 
equipment for its defence force. Some of the articles which it wished to 
manufacture were patented. At the instigati. on of Sir Roundell Palmer, 
57 
the Solicitor-General and a fervent abolitionist, the state argued that 
it was not bound by these patents in the same way as a priv6te citizen. This 
view was upheld by the court. Cockburn CJ justified the decision by 
arguing, on narrowly legalistic grounds, that a patent was really a prerogative 
of the Crown and that the Crown was not bound by its own prerogatives. 
58 
In order to arrive at this conclusion he had specifically to dismiss the theory 
advanced by counsel for Feather that a patent was 'a species of contract' 
according to which 
'ca3 bargain ts made between [the patentee] and the Crown 
that in consideration of his divulging the secret the 
inventor shall have the sole benefit of the invention 
during a limited time'. 59 
The decision meant that a line of authority going back to the 18th century 
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was severed; that one of the strong ideological justifications for patents 
was overturned by the courts; and that patentees were not able to bargain 
from a position of strength when dealing with the state itself in the control 
of units of technology. 
The abolitionists exploited the decision for their own ideological 
purposes. In 1869 The Economist commented on the decision in Feather's case: 
'A few years ago the manufacturing departments of Government 
found themselves so hampered by Patents that they resolved 
to try whether they were bound-ornot, the result being a 
legal opinion that they were not bound. But Government. is 
only a great manufacturer, its work in some departments being 
less than in many private businesses. Is there any reason why 
Government should be released, and individuals bound to 
patentees? As to the supposition that invention will cease, the 
mere interest of the Government in paying for anything worth 
having is found a sufficient stimulus to invention in the things 
which it requires; and so it is assumed will be the interest of 
competing manufacturers. ' 60 
SOpporters of the patent system were outraged by this decision. The 
pro-patent Scientific Review remarked bitterly that the decision in Feather v 
The Queen was 'the most extraordinary decision ever arrived at in a court of 
justice on the subject of patented inventions'. 
61 The effect of the decision, 
The Scientific Review continued, was that 
'it was, for the first time, laid down... that robbery is 
justifiable, if committed by that government to which, in 
whatever form, mankind consent to be subject, only that 
property may be protected'. 62 
The courts continued. to limit patent rights, as far as possible. In 
1867 it was held in Daw v EleY 
63 that a court was bound to hold a patent 
invalid if the foreign (in this case French) patent on which it was based 
64 
was declared invalid. 
After this decision (and the decision in Harwood v Great Northern 
Railway Co 65 that a 'fish plate' to join rails was not new) supporters of the 
patent system began to feel threatened by the approach of the courts. A 
despairing correspondent wrote to The Scientific Review in February 1867: 
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'EI3t appears to me that our opponents though defeated in their 
attempts to influence Parliament in favour of the abolition of 
Patent Property, have transferred their basis of operations to 
our Courts of Law, and with remarkable success; for by a few 
legal victories obtained in rapid succession - such as those in 
Feather v The Queen, Harwood v the Great Northern and Daw v Eley 
they have actually invalidated more than one-half of the patents 
which were supposed to exist. Only a few days since, I was 
credibly informed that in one of the great"patent cases now in 
course of litigation nearly a hundred'persons were banded 
together for the purpose of ruining the patentee. ... ' 66 
The campaign for the abolition of the patent system was spearheaddd 
by RA Macfie who had opposed the 1851 and 1852 Bills in his capacity as 
Liverpool sugar refiner. From the 1860's onwards he addressed many meetings 
and published several books and pamphlets. 
67 He also appears to have 
corresponded wiih numerous persons who, in various European countries, were 
conducting campaigns and uqing similar arguments to the British in order 
to have their municipal patent systems abolished. 
68 
Macfie in his speeches was therefore able to argue that patents were 
being attacked in several European countries. In his book published in 1869 
he could quote a speech in which Bismarck expressed his opposition to patents 
to the 'North German Parliament', extracts from speeches to French and 
Belgian societies dedicated to the abolition of patents and, perhaps most 
impressively, from the debates of the parliament of the Netherlands which 
actually decided to abolish patents in that country in 1869.69 By 1869 
therefore the anti-patent movement in Britain could claim that it was part of 
a rising international tide of opposition to patents in the name of free trade. 
Eighteen-sixty -nine was also a highwater mark for the British abolitionist 
movement. In that year Macfie, who had been elected Member of Parliament for 
Leith, proposed a resolution in the House of Commons which stated: 
'That in the opinion of this House the time has arrived when 
the interests of trade and commerce, and the progress of the 
arts and sciences in this country, would be promoted by the 
abolition of Patents for Inventions. ' 70 
Macfie's motion was seconded by Sir Roundell Palmer. 
71 Palmer's 
arguments were given additional weight by the fact that he had been 
Solicitor-General and therefore could describe the shortcomings of the 
administration of the patent system from firsthand knowledge. Important 
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additional support for the abolitionist cause was provided by Lord Stanley, 
the Chairman of the 1862 Commission. 
72 Stanley stated that he had been 
'converted' and, if forced to vote on the motion, would support it. 
In the event the motion was withdrawn after vague promises of reform 
from the government, 
73 but, it had provided Valuable publicity for the 
abolitionist cause. The Times commented exultantly in a leader on 29 May 
1869, the day after the debate in parliament: 
'113f we may judge from the discussion upon the subject in the 
House of Commons last night, the day is at hand when this branch 
of our legislation will be wiped out of the statute-book. ' 74 
A week later The Economist wrote: 'It is probable enough that the Patent-Laws 
will be abolished ere long...., 
75 Even newspapers and journals that supported 
the retention of the patent system admitted that the abolitionist movement had 
progressed. 
76 
Up to this stage (mid-1869) the abolitionists had addressed themselves 
almost exclusively to a middle class audience and had concentrated on 
organizations which had some link with the introduction of new technology. 
Within the dominant class they gained support from different fractions: This 
is illustrated by the following sentence in. The Times' description of the 1869 
debate: 
'Two of the foremost representatives of law and of statesmanship 
[Sir Roundell Palmer and Lord Stanley respectively] thus enforced 
the reform demanded by Mr. Macfie as a spokesman for manufacturers. '77 
Flushed by the success of the motion in the House of Commons the 
abolitionists tried to extend their class base. Accordingly on 24 July 1869 
a 'conference of working men' was. held in London 'under the auspices of Sir 
Roundell Palmer, M. P., Mr Macfie, M. P., and a few other opponents of Patent 
Property, to consider the desirability of abolishing the Patent Laws' . 
78 
At the meeting Palmer and Macfie argued that the patent system should be 
abolished and sought to have a resolution adopted stating that patent laws 
were 'a hindrance to genius, science, and progress. and. the progregs of the 
. 
79 
whole civilized world, in however simple a form they may appear' . 
From the point of view of the abolitionists the meeting proved to be a 
disaster. Abolitionist speakers were persistently heckled. They failed even 
to get their resolution introduced, for the speaker into whose --hand the 
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resolution was put 'very unexpectedly'Po refused to introduce it and propos 
. 
ed 
instead that the patent system be supported. The amended resolution, 
'It3hat the meeting having heard the statements for and against 
protection for inventions by the existing patent laws, is of 
opinion that protection is absolutely necessary as a right, by 
which inventors may be-secured a true legitimate right in their 
inventions' (81) 
was carried with acclamation. Macfie concluded that the meeting had been 
82 83 
rigged . There is some indirect evidence to support this contention but 
it was widely rejected. 
84 Proponents of the patent system were able to claim, 
and claimed, that the failure of the meeting showed working class-support for 
85 the Patent system. 
IV. The supporters of the patent system 
The two decades after 1852 were difficult for the supporters of the 
patent system. They were supporting a system which ostensibly contained 
elements of monopolistic practice, state intervenionism and 'large government', 
all of which stood condemned by the Zeitgeist. Moreover, throughout this 
period, they had to cope with a dominant common sense (publid opinion) which 
was becoming increasingly sensitized to the idea that the patent system might 
be an anomolous survival of past practice. 
As shall become apparent, the supporters of the patent system operated 
within the same common-sense framework as their opponents. The major difference, 
however, lay in their ability to organize in order to withstand the onslaughts 
of the abolitionists. When circumstances changed they were able to redeploy 
the arguments which they had been using all along so that these arguments 
became the unquestioningly accepted common sense on the form which law 
governing technology should take. In the section that follows this ideological 
appeal will first be analysed. The following section will deal with how they 
organized to combat the abolitionist threat. 
In the previous chapter it is argued that until 1852 the major differences 
of opinion about the patent system lay between the old order who wished to 
retain the patent system unchanged and the reformers. In the post-1852 period 
the division ceased to be of prime importance for two reasons: 
(a) the partial eclipse of the old order by the abolition of the major offices 
of patronage in the administration of patents; (b) the necessity to face the 
common abolitionist enemy. The result was that claims to justify all specific 
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aspects of the patent system in the light of-historical precedent disappeared. 
Instead the retention of the system in general-was supported on the grounds that 
historically a patent system had served Britain well even although the present 
system might need some adjustment. The reformist or traditionalist approach 
of a particular speaker would determine which of these elements he emphasised 
most when he supported the patent system. A contradiction between them was 
consistently denied. 
86 
The historical argument was used by the supporters of the patent system 
alone. It was not available to the abolitionists. The other arguments 
adopted by the supporters of the'. system in this period can best be understood 
if classified in the same way as the arguments of the abolitionists. In this 
way it can be seen how they overlap and where they differ. 
A. Free. trade: The supporters of the patent system claimed to Support 
free trade as much'as did its opponents. They dismissed the abolitionists, 
in the words of The Standard, as 'the supporters of free trade in other people's 
87 ingenuity'. 
In its first leading article The Scientific Review, the journal of the pro- 
patent Inventors' Institute, described as 'most fallacious' the argument that 
a patent was a form of monopoly. It argued that a patent was not a monopoly 
as it entitled someone to control something 'new' rather than to control 
existing processes. It concluded: 
I 'In a certain sense, and to a certain extent, all property 
is a monopoly, and patent right is so in just that measure. 
Whatever a man has created, either by his head-work or his 
handiwork, that he has an indefensible right to sell, in the 
best market he can find, to the highest bidder he can get. ' 88. 
The argument therefore was that a patent system was required in order 
to create units of technology which could be 'traded'. This point was made 
in an editorial by the Daily News: 
'1173he Patent Laws, so far from being in opposition to the 
principle of free trade in inventions, promote and guard 
that freedom by creating the hope of securing the profits 
accruing from the invention. The abolition of the law. which 
enables the inventor to drive a fair bargain with the capitalist, 
means giving legal sanction to piracy in inventions. ' 89 
B. Property: Arguments that patents were property rights analogous 
to copyright -a ýimilar and accepted property right - are found throughout 
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the writings of the supporters of the patent system. Defence of property 
was clearly an unassailable value in the dominant common sense. Supporters 
of the patent system wished to be seen to be defending property. An analysis 
shows that the supporters of the patent system used the concept, property, 
in different ways. Most crudely patent rights were directly equated with 
property. In the words of the Pall Mall Gazette: 
'103f all the forms of property the one most clearly traceable 
to human endeavour, and the one most distinctly devolving on 
the person who has used ýhat endeavour, is property in invention'. 90 
Similarly, speakers at meetings of the Inventors' Institute or at working 
men's organizations tended to equate their products of mental labour with 
property. An exampl. e of this is a speech by a Mr Patterson (of the Working 
Men's Club and Institution Union) who remarked that if an inventor 'had a 
brain property, or, in other words, if he invented a new article of manufacture, 
he ought not to have to pay any tax to have it protected'. 
91 
Legal writers were however, more circumspect in their use of the concept, 
property. Thus the sub-committee on Patent Law of the Society for Promoting 
the Amendment of the Law opined that the question regarding the natural right 
I of the author of an invention had long ago been 'settled in the negative ,. 
92 
However,. this did not prevent them from regarding patents as a form of property 
- they merely held that the property right of an inventor 'is the creature 
of municipal law'. 
93 They could therefore use the loaded term, property, 
without having to defend it in a formal jurisprudential argument - or, in 
Weberian terms, by using formal legal rationality ('Municipal law' could be 
justified in terms of substantive rationality: i. e. on the basis of its utility). 
A similar approach was adopted by the patent barrister, Thomas Webster 
who, in an address to the Society of Arts declined to defend an abstract, 
'natural property right' to a patent but who nevertheless argued that 'the 
recognition and protection to property in intellectual labour, while it is 
but an act of natural justice to the individual is the best and wisest policy 
for the State'. 94 
The result of this ambiguity surrounding the term, property, was that 
the supporters of the patent system could continue to use it without having 
to deal with the full implications of regarding all knowledge as property - 
for, of course, only certain types of (scientific) knowledge came within the 
ambit of the patent system. 
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C. Contract: The opponents of the patent system stressed that the 
'agreement' whereby the state gave a patent in exchange for the publication 
of information was not freely entered into since the state 'automatically' 
granted pa. tents. The supporters of the system denied thi. s and held that 
the agreement was in essence a contract and therefore ought to be upheld, 
since in -common sense, the sanctity of contracts, was taken for granted. 
'The Patent laws' [wrote The Scientific Review] amount 
to a fair barpin between the State, acting also for posterity, 
and the individual, by which, on certain condi 
, 
tions, that which 
was the property of one becomes the property of all. ' 95 
Even after the decision in Feather v The Queen 
96 in which, as has been 
seen, the idea of a patent being legally a contract was rejected, the notion 
lingered on in the ideology of the supporters of the system. In 1869 it was 
clearly stated by a correspondent to The Standard who signed himself 
'A Barrister'. He said: 
'The grant of a patent is really nothing more than this. 
A contract between the Crown (on behalf of the public) and 
the inventor that the inventor shall have the sole right to 
use his invention for fourteen years, on condition (that is 
the contract) that he shall tell the public clearly (by his 
specification) how to use it; and that, at the end of fourteen 
years, the public shall be put in possession of the reversion. 
This is a pure contract, and nothing more. I am, of course, 
well aware that the patent itself is expressed to be granted by 
the mere grace of the Crown. But that is nothing more than a 
relic of the language used in letters patent before the era 
of manufacturing invention; when the subjects of grants by 
letters patent were always land, honours, or other advantages, 
which were strictly in the gift of the Crown, and de facto 
given by the mere grace of the Sovereign. ' But ever since, at 
least, the beginning of the last century, patents have been, 
as they are at this day, a mere bargain between the public and 
the inventor, and not a gift, boon, or reward, in any sense 
whatever. ' 97 
D. Evolutionary progres :. Supporters of the system stressed that patents 
had contributed mateHally to economic progress. They referred to early 
patentees such as Watt and Arkwright and flatly denied that their and other 
inventions could have been made without the existence of the patent system. 
Thus, for example (and there are many examples), Webster, in an address to the 
Society of Arts, asserted: 
206. 
'[03ur manufacturing superiority can only be maintained by 
continued progress, and such progress can only be ensured 
by giving property in the inventions which are to contribute 
thereto. ' 98 
Since the relationship of patents to inventive activity was (and is) 
unknown this assertion could only be met by a counter assertion. The value 
of this debating point would ultimately depend on perceptions of the 
underlying reality. 
E. Administration: The supporters of the patent system shared the 
abolitionists' view that the administration of the system was not perfect. The 
supporters differed amongst themselves about what reforms ought to be implemented, 
In general those who stressed abstract legal rights wanted the most sweeping 
reforms. An example of this attitude can be found in a speech of Sir David 
Brewster to the Royal Society of Edinburgh. He said: 
'If these views of Patent rights Cas the Magna Charta of the 
commonwealth of inventors'] be just, and if, as movable property, 
they are as sacred as copyrights, there can be no just reason why 
they should not be granted equally cheap, given to every applicant, 
and enjoyed during at least the life of the patentee. ' 99 
F. The position of the worker: The supporters of the patent system 
persistently presented themselves as the champions of the working inventor. 
For example, in 1869, a patent agent MA Soul wrote a book entitled, Reform 
of the Patent Law; a working man's question. In it he stated: 
'The question of a cheap protection for inventions is essentially 
a working man's question, and the law should be so amended that 
working men should be able with their own limited means, unassisted 
by others, to obtain Letters Patent. The conduct of Patent suits 
should also be so simplified, and rendered inexpensive, as to 
render the poor Inventor, practically, the legal equal of the rich 
capitalist. ' 100 
On the same occasion, however, the relationship between the worker and 
patent law was described in a way which suggests that supporters of the 
system were more concerned about the effects that a blatantly inequitable 
patent system would have on inter-class relations. Thus FW Campin (a 
former patent agent turned barrister) reported in a somewhat patronising way 
that working men's industrial exhibitions were 'socially regenerative, - 
'if men are engaged in preparing objects for exhibition, they cannot visit 
the public house while they are doing so'. 
101 This 'social gain', he 
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contended, was however, in danger of being lost because of the practical 
shortcomings of the patent system which discouraged artisan-inventors. 
G. Opponents of patents: The supporters of the patent system tried 
to discredit the abolitionists by suggesting that the abolitionists were 
merely looking after their own selfish interests. 'Large capitalists' 
were persistently seen as bogeymen who would defraud the inventor if given 
the chance. A correspondent of The Weekly Times writing shortly after Macfie'. s 
motion had been debated in parliament, gave a good example of this line of 
thought: 
'Mr Macfie spoke simply like a capitalist, taking a purely 
selfish and -narrow view of a great and very difficult question. 
Nothing that he sai .d is worth notice. He reminds us of what we 
all know - that a great many greedy manufacturers would like to 
make money out of other people's brains without giving them 
anything in return. ' 
He continued: 
'There are few patents that I would accept as a gift if bound 
to protect them from attack. A dishonest capit * alist can make a fortune by stealing the inventions of men notrich enough to 
oppose him, and I believe that this species of marauding is not 
at all uncommon amongst great firms. Our rogues and thieves are 
not confined to the poor and needy. Many of our greatest rascals 
are the richest, and our system of law is that of distributing 
unequal justice, which is injustice - letting those who can pay 
most, cheat most, if they please. ' 102 
An important figure who vehemently attacked the opponents of patents 
was John Stuart Mill. As has been seen above, in his more theoretical 
pronouncements, Mill, along with the classical economists, suoported the patent 
system as a justifiable (and relatively uncontroversial) exception to their 
general laissez-faire approach. In the fifth, 1862, edition of his book 
Principles of Political Economy, however, Mill became directly involved in the 
controversy. 
'I have seen with real alarm several recent attempts, in quarters 
carrying some authority, t6 impugn the principle of patents 
altogether; attempts which, if practically successful, would 
enthrone free stealing under the prostituted name of free trade, 
and make the men of brains, still more than at present, * the needy 
retainers and dependants of the men of money-bags. ' 103 
Mill's words were widely quoted by supporters of the patent system who 
appealed to his authority on the basis of Mill's standing as a political 
208. 
economist. Occasionally they linked Mill to other classical economists, 
notably Adam Smith, thus claiming the support of the most important prophet 
of the common sense they espoused. 
104 
Analysis of the arguments advanced by the supporters of the present 
system shows that in their appeal to the dominant common sense they used 
the same concepts as did the abolitionists. This is borne out by the first 
five themes considered above. The last two themes are also comparable. Like 
the abolitionists the supporters of the system aimed to show that their opponents 
were an unrepresentative, self-interested fraction, while they spoke for society 
as a whole. The supporters also wished to recruit working class support to 
show that they were a hegemonic sector with adherents in all classes of society, 
and also perhaps to show members of the middle class that working class support 
could be gained for existing laws as long as they were 'just and fair'. 
V. The organization of support for the patent system 
In the passage of the 1852 Patent Act the patent agents and other experts 
in patent law had played their roles both through the medium of organizations 
which campaigned for reforms and as advisers to the legislature. Since the 
passage of the 1852 Act led to a sharp increase in the number of patents 
passed, it brought about a growth in work and therefore in the numbers of 
patent agents and barristers who specialized in patent matters. The 'strategic 
social position' which patent agents had achieved before 1852, was maintained 
and strengthened. Patent experts continued to support their claims to a 
unique area of expertise by publishing scholarly texts on patent law and 
related fields such as the law of industrial designs. In these books they 
included arguments in support of the system and combined them with discreet 
proposals for reform. 
105 
To some extent the organizational structures through which patent experts 
could manipulate 'informed' opinion on patents were maintained as well. The 
United Inventors' Association (which was linked to the British Association) 
and the National Patent Law Amendment and Inventors Patent Right Association 
produced fresh prospectuses in 1856 and 1858 respectively. 
106 Both included 
influential patent experts in their membership, both claimed responsibility 
for the improvements brought about by the 1852 Act, and both claimed that 
further reforms were needed and suggested that they could bring them about. 
Their reformist position is encapsulated in the following extract from the 
United Inventors' Association's prospectus: 
b 
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'EA31though the spirit of some of those recommendations [which 
the United Inventors' Association had made in 18523 has been but 
imperfectly carried out by the Commissioners of Patents, the 
foundation exist [sic] on which to raise the superstructure of 
a rational Patent system. ' 107 
The reforms suggested by these bodies assumed the continued existence 
of the patent system and aimed at further reducing costs and simplifying 
procedure. A similar position was adopted by the Manchester Patent Law 
Reform Association . Under the guidance of the civil engineer., Sir William 
Fairbairn, and the patent agent, EJ Hughes, they continued to act as they 
had before 1852. During the late 1850's the Association held numerous 
public meetings at which specific reforms were proposed. 
108 
The 1850's also saw patent experts play a dominant role in the British 
Association and, to a lesser extent, the Society of Arts. While abolitionists 
made occasional speeches to these bodies the reformists managed to dominate 
the committees directly involved with Patent Law. This was particularly true 
of the British Association which set up a committee to. examine the patent laws 
in 1854.109 The committee reported annually from 1858-tO 1861-and under the 
guidance of Fairbairn (chairman of the Manchester Patent Law Reform Association) 
and Webster (the leading patent barrister) adopted a position which accepted 
unquestioningly the continued existence of the patent system and proposed 
detailed reforms. 
110 The Society of Arts too in 1857, under the name of 
its vice-chairman, Sir Joseph Paxton MP, produced detailed reform proposals 
proceeding from the same basis. 
"' The activities of patent experts in these 
bodies were occasionally the subject of suspicion: Thus The Mining Journal 
of 14 February 1859 claimed that the system could be left as it was and that 
patent agents were supporting reforms in order to advertise their services. 
It concluded: 
'[Iinventors would do well to receive our observations as a 
caution against being deluded by pretended friends. None more 
than ourselves desire the prosperity of the inventors and the 
encouragement of genius, but we are convinced that the steps 
now being taken by the Patent Law Reform Association are not 
likely to secure either. ' 112 
Such comments were however, very rare within the circle of supporters 
of the patent system. 
In summary it can be said that the first decade after 1852 was characterized 
by a certain amount of organization by the supporters of the patent system. 
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Their arguments were however the continuation of those which had brought 
about the reform of the system and were not specifically geared to its 
defence. 
The Inventor's Institute : In the 1860's, as the onslaught on the patent 
system gained momentum, the supporters of the system, while persevering with 
their reformist approach, had to extend their organization. They did so 
by setting up the Inventors' Institute in 1862.113 It is necessary to 
consider the development of this body in some detail as it appears to have 
played a major part in co-ordinating the activities of the supporters of the 
patent system. It was also dominated by patent experts but at the same time 
it managed to widen the basis of support for the patent system. The Inventors' 
Institute grew rapidly. Its second Annual Report (1864) spoke of 63 new 
members joining in the two months before the report appeared. 
114 By May 
1865, when it was planning its third anniversary dinner, the Institute claimed 
to have 500 members and a council which 'included many of the highest social 
rank and deserved scientific reputation, combined for the common object of 
intellectual progress'. 
115 By 1867 the Inventors' Institute was collecting 
money so that it could apply for a Royal Charter. 
116 
From its inception the policy of the Inventor's Institute was to combine 
the dissemination of 'practical' scientific information with a strong element 
of Patent Law reform. Thus the second annual report shows that several of 
the fortnightly meetings during the previous year were devoted to the subject 
of amendment of the patent law. 
117 The I, nstitute also made recommendations 
to the Commission of Inquiry appointed to inquire into the Working of the Law 
relating to Letters Patent for Inventions headed by Lord Stanley. 
118 
In 1865 The Scientific Review was founded to act as mouthpiece of the 
Inventors' Institute. (It continued publication until 1883 when most of 
the changes which the Institute supported were incorporated in law. ) In its 
opening editorial The Scientific Review spelt out its position: As mouthpiece 
of the Inventors' Institute it intended to go beyond the range of existing 
scientific journals and 'to address itself to a wider sphere, embracing the 
universal pursuits of inventors Eand] to represent their interests and uphold 
the privileges upon which their existence as a class depends. ' 
119 
Foremost amongst these privileges were patents. The editorial promised: 
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'When... it is asserted that the Patent Law ought to be 
abolished, as working the despair of inventors, and repressing 
the improvement of manufactures, we shall insist, on the 
contrary, that the privileges accorded to inventors are based 
on sound principles, and that, wisely regulated, a Patent Law 
is a stimulus to the development of national wealth, and a 
fruitful source of progress in the improvement of our 
manufactures. ' 120 
The journal proved as good as its promises. In the ensuing decade 
hardly a single number appeared without some defence of the patent system. 
These were contained in editorials which rebutted the arguments of individual 
opponents of the system and in lengthy verbatim reports of speeches by 
patent experts defending the system. In no issue of the journal was it 
even suggested that there might be a conflict of interests between patent 
experts (agents and barristers) and inventors. On the contrary, patent 
experts played a key role in the development of the Institute. The first 
secretary of the Institute was a barrister called R Marsden Latham. He 
was succeede'd on his death in 1873 
121 by FW Campin who had been an influential 
patent agent before 1852, had testified to the 1851 Commission, had written a 
textbook on patent law, and had become a barrister in 1864.122 Numerous 
patent agents served on the Council of the Institute at various times, and 
represented the Institute on deputations to persuade the government to accept 
its views. 
123 Moreover, the Inventors' Institute provided a forum where 
patent agents could be put into contact with prospective clients. This link 
was formalized in 1868 when 4 body called the Inventors' Patentright 
Association Limited was set up under the auspices of the Inventors' Institute 
124 to act as patent agents and commercial advisers for members of the Institute. 
The Association was directed by R Marsden Latham, R Richardson (civil engineer 
and vice-president of the Institute ) and J Imray and FW Campin (both patent 
agents). 
The Institute played a key role in lobbying for the government and in 
organizing the dissemination of information favourable to the retention of 
the patent system. There is a great deal of evidence to support this 
proposition: 
(a) In March 1866 the Scientific Review announced: 
'R Marsden Latham, Esq, Secretary to the Inventors' Institute 
has terminated his connection with the "General Patent Company" 
in order that he may apply his time and attention in promoting 
the reform of the Patent Laws and in forwarding the interests 
of the Inventors' Institute generally. ' 125 
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Latham thus became the first full-time campaigner in the struggle 
suerounding patent laws. 
(b) In April 1866 the Institute agreed to a draft Bill which could be 
introduced in parliament. 
126 This was the first of many legislative 
proposals put to parliament. 
(c) The Institute made determined efforts to cultivate leading members of 
various working class movements and to persuade them to support the 
retention of patent rights. 
In March 1868 a meeting 'attended by a large number of members of the 
Institute, and by the representatives of numerous industrial associations 
among the working classes', was held to discuss reform of the Patent system. 
127 
Following this, in June 1868 the Inventors' Institute sent members of its 
council to put its case to the government and to lay before it a petition 
and a proposed patent bill drafted by the Inventors' Institute. The 
members of the council were according to the Scientific Review accompanied 
by the representatives of a number of working men's industrial associations. 
128 
In November 1868, at the inaugural meeting of the 1868-69 year of the 
Inventors' Institute, those representing industrial associations were invited 
to address the meeting after the main speakers had spoken in favour of the 
system. Mr Savage (of the Workmen's Technical Education Committee) and 
Mr Patterson (of the Working Men's Club and Institute Union) availed themselves 
of the opportunity and, perhaps not surprisingly, indicated that working men 
supported the patent system. They also expressed a desire to co-operate with 
the Inventors' Institute. Savage is reported as saying: 
'When during the last session the working men's delegates had 
had several discussions with the Council of the Inventor's 
Institute, they soon formed the opinion that the Institute 
could do first that which the working men required ... by improving the Patent Laws, and affording more protection to 
the inventor. ' 129 
The result of all this organization was that the Inventors' Institute 
was strongly pl. aced to counter the abolitionists. For unlike the unorganized 
abolitionist movement it was able to mobilize support at strategic moments. 
The Inventors'Institute reacted strongly to Macfie's abolitionist proposals 
made in parliament on 28th May 1869.130 
In conjunction with its allies of the 'Working Men's Organizations' it 
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lobbied members of parliament on the questions. Afterwards it claimed that 
the withdrawal of Macfie's resolution 'mainly resulted' from its actions 
and contended 'no other plan of action than this lobbying process could have 
been relied upon to produce the same effect. ' 
131 
on 1 June 1869 The Scientific ReView replied to Macfie's resolution on 
behalf of the Inventors' Institute. It appealed, 'Et3o the brainworkers of 
England ... for support in resisting the attempt now commencing in the House 
of Commons to deprive them of all prospect of 'reward for their labours'. 
It attacked Macfie as 'the ringleader of those who expect Inventors, without 
fee or reward from them to work for their benefit; ' And, it continued: 
'He (Macfie) is also one of the ablest exponents of a theory, fallacious in 
its assumptions, savouring of the wildest socialism and the most despicable 
selfishness, a theory which if put in practive, would bring ruin and 
destruction upon all our industries'. 
132 
Finally, in a single. majestic sentence which contains virtually every 
theme in the ideological framework put forward by the supporters of the 
patent system, The Scientific Review exhorted its readers: 
'Now, if ever, is the time for a-11 who have at*heart the 
interests of invention, of science, of industrial progress'. 
and who desire to maintain for this country that proud 
position which it has acquired among the nations as the 
initiator of the steam engine,, the railway, and the electric 
telegraph, to join, as one man, not only in converting this 
audacious attack into a triumphant vindication of popular right 
and justice, but to stand forth as the liberators of the inventive 
genius of England from its final shackles, by obtaining for the 
pooeest inventor a property in the fruits of his labour as simple 
and perfect as that-which the law already confers on books or works 
of art. ' 133 
The hyperbole of The Scientific Review paid dividends. On 24 June a 
'large' meeting of members and friends of the Inventors, ' Institute was held. 
134 
Several resolutions in favour of patent laws were adopted including one which 
stated that 'working men are especially interested in supporting the present. 
law'. 135 
The cultivation of working men was particularly advantageous when Macfie 
and Palmer on behal'f of the abolitionists made their bid for working class 
support at their conference of working men held in London on 24 July 1869.136 
The report of the meeting in The Scientific Review indicates, perhaps 
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unintentionally, how the Inventors' Institute seized control of the proceedings: 
It says: 
'Mr R Marsden Latham, of the Inventors' Institute, together 
with a deputation from the Delegates Invention-right 
Committee, a body composed of delegates from the Working Men's 
Technical Education Committee, the Workmen's International 
Exhibition Committee; the Foremen Engineers'Association; the 
Workin g Men's Club and Institute Union; the Public Museums 
and Free Libraries Association, and other Working Men's 
Organisations, attended to watch proceedings, and if necessary 
to take part in the debate. ' 137 
What this paragraph means is that the secretary of the Inventors' Institute 
(Latham) gathered round him a large group representing the same organizations 
which a year previously had supported a deputation of the Inventors' 
Institute to the government. This interpretation is reinforced by a letter 
from Macfie to the Dail News which alludes to Latham's role and says that 
'at the vote-taking a considerable proportion EOf the audience3 was composed 
of sympathisers with the Inventors' Association, [Institute? 3 who came in late'. 
1" 
Finally, the influence of the Institute is also illustrated in that the two major 
speakers on behalf of the working class against the abolition of patents were 
Patterson and Savage - the men who shortly before had addressed the Inventors' 
Institute. 139 The defeat of the abolitionists at this meeting was used as 
propaganda by the supporters of the patent system. They claimed that it 
showed working class support for the system. 
140 
VI. Reformers and abolitionists 1870-1872 
By 1870 the two sides in the struggle for the control of the patent 
system were clearly drawn. The abolitionists with Macfie as 'moral 
entrepreneur' had succeeded in pressing their claims and bringing to the 
attention of a wide public the links of their specific position with the 
141 dominant 'common-sense' ideals of their day. They lacked any organizational 
structure but they had influential support in government circles. They could 
claim that the abolition of patents was a 'natural' step in a trend which was 
sweeping Europe. 
142 
The supporters of the patent system on the other hand were well organized 
around a core of patent professionals. They had been able to propagate 
their ideas more successfully so that they could present themselves as an 
ideological sector with support in various social classes. 
In parliament the abolitionist thrust initiated by Macfie continued after 
1869. In 1870 Macfie proposed that a select committee be set up but he was 
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defeated by delaying tactics. 
143 By 1871 the issue had lost some of its 
novelty. The Standard of 10 March 1871 wrote somewhat plaintively: 
'A Patent Law debate is among the inevitable Parliamentary 
annuals. Like our female friend, the Deceased Wife's Sister, 
it is sure to be heard of, either at the beginning of the 
session, before members have warmed to their work, or towards 
its close, when they are pretty well fagged out, and are above 
all things anxious for a quiet life and a fresh breeze. ' 144 
Nevertheless, in 1871, determined efforts were made to break the deadlock. 
On 7 March 1871 the appointment of a Select Committee to inquire into the law, 
practice and effects of grants of Letters Patent was proposed in the House of 
Commons by B Samuelson and seconded by Macfie. 
145 The proposal was accepted 
and the Select Committee was chosen. 
146 Although the setting up of the 
Committee served to block the reformist (patent law) Bill which had been 
tabled in parliament, this did not mean that unanimity had been reached 
on the patent issue. 
147 On the contrary, the Committee represented an 
agreement to differ, for in the speeches proposing the establishment of the 
Committee Samuelson argued that it would be able to produce the reforms 
required to revitalise the system 
148 
while Macfie was confident that the 
Committee would recommend the abolition of the system as a whole. 
149 The 
Committee reported only its evidence at the end of the 1871 sessionl50 but 
this evidence was accepted by a similar Committee which was reappointed in 
1872151 and produced a report later the same year. 
152 
It is worth examining the different approaches of the abolitionists 
and the supporters of the patent system during this crucial period. The 
abolitionists Oncentrated on shaping public opinion. Perhaps the most 
important 'set piece' in their campaign was a major address by the well 
known inventor, Sir William Armstrong, to the National Association for the 
Promotion of Social Science in 1870.153 In this extensively reported 
speech Armstrong rehearsed virtually all the arguments which had been advanced 
against patents: the importance of free trade, the dangers of monopolies, 
that patents were not property, that patents were not analogous to copyright; 
and that the system did not effectively reward inventors. Armstrong concluded 
with a sweeping statement of the laissez-faire view of government: 
'I deprecate all interference with liberty of action, 
except in restraint of offences; and I maintain that the 
greatest good to the greatest number will only be attained 
by leaving the social world as much as possible to the 
governance of natural laws. ' 154 
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Apart from Armstrong's speech and a similar speech by Macfie to the 
155 (hostile) Inventors' Institute, the abolitionist cause was not presented 
systematically to the public during this period. Instead, the abolitionists 
relied on the evidence of various expert witnesses. Thus before the 1871 
Select Committee Sir Roundell Palmer, Sir William Armstrong, Lord Romilly 
and Mr Macfie all argued that the patent system ought to be abolished. 
156 
They were substantially supported by WR Grove QC and E Schneider who both 
argued that the existing system was so poor that, if something better could 
not be substituted which drastically restricted its scope (and they were 
pessimistic about whether this could be done), the whole system ought to be 
157' 
abolished. These witnesses undoubtedly carried a lot of weight. On 
the other hand, similar witnesses were produced before the 1871 Committee 
to support the retention of a reformed patent system. 
158 - 
The supporters of the system adopted a more systematic approach. After 
1870 they organized in various ways. They continued their activities in 
institutions such as the British Association, 
159 the Society of Arts 
160 
and 
161 the Manchester Patent Law Reform Committee, using them as forums from which 
pleas for the preservation of a (reformed) patent system could be made. 
The Inventors' Institute went further than this. It mounted a concerted 
campaign to place evidence favourable to its cause before the Committees by 
sending 'official' representatives to testify on its behalf and by exhorting 
its members to testify. 
162 The increase in the number of pro-patent witnesses 
to the 1872 Committee r. eflects the success of their efforts. 
163 
The activities of the Inventors's Institute extended beyond public 
speeches and testimony by its members. It also actively lobbied the Select 
Committees. Thus The Scientific Review of July 1871 reported that a subcommittee 
of the Institute, 'the Parliamentary Committee on the Patent Laws... continued 
to attend and watch the proceedings of the Committee [of Enquiryj'164- That 
the attendance of members of the Institute was not quite passive is apparent 
from a leading article in the same journal, two months later, entitled 
165 'Obstruction of Patent-Law Reform in the Lobby of the House of Commons . 
This article protested against a new ruling which excluded lobbyists from the 
corridors of the House of Parliament. Members of the Institute were asked to 
'operate upon their representatives in their several electoral districts in 
order that this objectionable and absurd obstruction be forthwith removed', 
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for, warned the leader 'ctihe advancement of Patent Law Reform cannot fail to 
166 be seriously affected by this absurd regulation'. 
Patent experts, and particularly patent agents, continued to play a 
key role both within the Inventors' Institute and outside it: (A) The 
official witness of the Inventors" Institute, J Imray, was a patent agent and 
author of a textbook on Patent Law. 
167 (B) The links of the Inventor's 
Institute with workmen's organizations were largely maintained by the patent 
experts with whom 'artisan-inventors' pres6mably had to deal in order to obtain 
patents. Thus during 1871 at a meeting of the Labour Representation League, 
presided over by RM Latham (barrister, patent agent and secretary of the 
Inventors's Institute) well-known patent experts such as T Webster and J Imray 
were welcomed as participants. 
168 A motion proposed by G Potter (an 'artisan' 
member of the Inventors' Institute) and seconded by F Campin (patent agent, 
barrister and member of the Council of the Inventors' Institute) was introduced. 
This motion is worth quoting in full for it shows how various themes articulated 
by the supporters of the patent system were linked to the interests of the 
working class. It read: 
'That the existence of a legal property in invention is a 
measure of justice to inventors, especially advantageous 
to working men, and of benefit to industrial progress, and 
it is very desirable that the Patent Laws should be reformed 
so as to render such laws more available for the above ends. ' 169 
(C) Patent agents for the first time founded an exclusive professional 
body of their own. In July 1871 a meeting of 'London Patent Agents' was 
held. 170 A series of resolutions was adopted which affirmed 'the natural 
rights of-inventors' and proposed substantial changes to the patent system. 
The proposed changes were that patents be granted cheaply, for a period of 
21 (instead of 14) years, and with the minimum of bureaucratic intervention. 
171 
With these resolutions the London patent agents committed themselves to a 
position favoured by the most extreme supporters of inventors' rights. 
On the 8th May 1872 the Select Committee on the Patent Laws presented 
its report. 
172 As a whole the report was. a deci. sive triumph for the 
supporters of the patent system. In the words of The Times the report was 
173 'decidedly adverse to what has been called Free Trade in Inventions' . 
The report's first two paragraphs defended the utility of the patent system. 
It found, 'after a careful consideration of the evidence on the respective 
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branches of the enquiry given by eminent lawyers, patent agents, inventors, 
and manufacturers of this and other countries': 
'l. That the privilege conferred by letters patent promotes 
the progress of manufactures, by causing many important 
inventions to be introduced and developed more rapidly than 
would otherwise be the case. 
2. That the same privilege leads to the introduction and 
publication of numerous improvements, each of a minor- 
character, but the sum of which contributes greatly to the 
progress of industry. ' 174 
(Although these paragraphs spoke of 'privilege' a later paragraph 
176 
spoke of 'property created by the patent law'. The stress throughout 
was on the utility of the patent system in encouraging invention - as opposed 
to a system of state rewards. ) 
The publication of the report was the decisive event in the retention of 
the patent system in some form. The Standard wrote: 
'The select committee upon the principle and practice of 
the patent laws have inflicted a cruel disappointment on 
those who rashly anticipated that inquiry would involve 
abolition, almost as a foregone, and certainly as an 
inevitable conclusion. ... The committee distinctly and 
expressly recognize the fact that the influence of patent 
privileges has been largely beneficial. ' 176 
Even The Times which a few years earlier had predicted the swift demise of 
the patent system was forced to concede shortly after the publication of the 
Report in 1872 that 'though it [English Patent Law] has been assailed by 
very powerful opponents, popular opinion is certainly not ripe for its total 
abolition. ' 
177 
With the realization, reluctant of course in the abolitionist quarter, 
that some form of patent system would be maintained, the question now was: 
how should the existing system be reformed? The 1872 Committee made specific 
proposals. The most important regarding the ambit of a patent was found in 
resolution 6 which-provided that a patent should only be granted if (a) the 
application described the nature of an invention and its 'particular points of 
novelty' and (b) 'upon the report of a competent authority' that the invention 
was 'new' and was a 'manufacture within the meaning of the law'. 
178 The effect 
of this resolution (and proposals about specifications contained in resolution 7) 
was that the Committee foresaw that a state bureaucracy in the form of the 
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'competent authority' would continue'to, and indeed would increasingly, 
play a key role in the granting of patents. 
179 In subsequent resolutions 
the Committee held that the existing Patent Commissioners could not perform 
this function and recommended that they be 'reinforced by the appointment of 
competent persons of legal, scientific, and technical experience',, whose time 
is not occupied with other engagements to such an extent as to prevent their 
giving full attention to such administration. 
180 They also recommended that 
courts trying patent crimes be similarly assisted. 
181 
Finally the Committee made two other proposals which proved to be 
important in the history of patent law. (a) They recommended that all patents 
have a 'working c1ause' i. e. that they should be subject to the condition that 
manufacture should be carried out within the United Kingdom. 
182 (b) In its 
final resolution the Committee recommended'that there should be an assimilation 
in the law and practice in regard to inventions amongst the various civilised 
countries of the'world', 
183 but it did not spell out how this ought to be done. 
The publication of the Report meant that the focus in the disputes about 
patent rights shifted away from an out-and-out battle between abolitionists 
and supporters of the system. Instead, it took the form of guerilla warfare 
with the abolitionists favouring a system where patents were as few and of as 
short a duration as possible and with the inventors (or at least their 
spokesmen) demanding patents as of righ t, which in practical terms meant 
patents granted on application without any form of examination. It was as 
a solution to this dispute that a 'bureaucratic' patent system eventually 
emerged. That it was still to take more than a decade is evidence of the 
intensity of the struggle. 
Evidence of the differences which still existed can be found in the 
divergent reactions to the Report. The Times (still pro-abolitionist) concluded 
its reluctant acceptance of the Report by saying: 
'We must be secured against frivolous Patents, and 
fraudulent Patents, and obstructive Patents, and Patents 
which are never brought to maturity after stifling the 
ingenuity of rival inventofs, and Patents which are 
notoriously invalid, but which it would be too expensive 
to challenge in a Court of Law. This can only be done by 
strengthening the Patent Office, investing it with a large 
discretionary power, and facilitating the summary adjudication 
of Patent causes; and the scheme advocated by the Committee for 
the attainment of these objects deserves favourable consideration. '184 
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In contrast to this attitude the supporters of the rights of inventors 
were hostile to the report even though it confirmed that the patent system 
would continue to exist. First reaction came from the Labour Representation 
League. At a meeting chaired by RM Latham (the secretary of the Inventors' 
Institute) on the 17th May 1872, 'Emiuch dissatisfaction was expressed with the 
report and the fact that members of the working classes had not been called to 
give evidence before the committee'. 
185 A resolution hostile to the Report 
was unanimously supported. It stated: 
'That the recommendations of the select committee of the House 
of Commons on the Patent Laws are by no means likely to benefit 
the most numerous class of inventors, namely, the artisans; and 
if carried into effect, would render the obtaining of a patent 
more difficult, cumbersome, and expensive than at present. 
Moreover, the committee's recommendations do not provide what 
the generality of inventors stand mainly in need of, namely, 
an assimilation, as far as practicable, of the laws affecting 
invention-right to those of copyright, and especially increased 
facilities for the obtaining by inventors of a valid property in 
their own inventions at a reasonable cost, as is now advantageously 
done in Belgium, France, and other countries whose patent laws are 
in advance of those of this country. ' 186 
A similar attitude was adopted by the Inventors' Institute which commented 
that the Report appeared to them to have 'been distorted in order to favour 
the views of those persons who, finding themselves unable to obtain the 
abolition of the Patent Laws, are determined, if possible, to emasculate 
them'. 187 
By 1872 therefore, one question had been settled, i. e. that the patent 
system should continue to exist. Other questions, such as the form of the 
patent system and attitudes which were to govern its implimentation vis & vis 
new technology remained open. 
VII. Conclusion 
The defence of the patent system took place in a period of relative'social 
stability and economic growth. In this period the patent system was debated 
more vigorously than in any other period in British history. 
188 One is 
therefore able to follow the conflict between groups very clearly since, for 
the most part, their attempts to exercise power in order to advance their goals 
were open and deliberate. 
A feature of this conflict is that it was not only about how the law should 
be shaped but at the same time was a conflict in which the (existing) law was 
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used: as a resource. Thus, in Turk's terms, law in this period was clearly 
a source of 'ideological power'. 
189 'Legal' concepts such as property and 
contract were used by both sides, and competed for, since their legitimacy 
was established beyond doubt in the dominant common sense. At the same time, 
the existing patent law offered resources to contestants in some of the other 
spheres mentioned by Turk as well. The entrenched patent system was a source 
of economic power to the patent experts and perhaps also to a number of 
patentee-inventors who strongly defended the system. It is significant, 
that in this period when the patent system was under vigorous but unsuccessful 
attack in Britain it continued to be used by increasing numbers of patentees. 
In the Netherlands, where similar attacks led to its abolition in 1869, a sharp 
decline in the number of active patentees preceded its demise. 
190 
Even although active participation in the debate about patents was largely 
limited to members of the dominant class the defence of the patent system cannot 
be understood solely in terms of an intra-class clash of interest groups. As 
has been noted groups or fractions competed for support outside the framework 
of the dominant class. The reason for this is that in order to establish the 
hegemony of their arguments they"tried to gain acceptance for them in society 
as a whole. The relative success of the supporters of the patent system in 
achieving this meant that when, in a later period, economic circumstances 
changed so as to lead to a reconsideration of the principled opposition to 
patents they were in a strong position to dictate the shape of change. 
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CHAPTER 7- THE TRIUMPH OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 1873 - 1883 
Introduction 
In the period after 1873 a major change took place in the general economic 
conditions which had prevailed in the two decades preceding it. The 'Great 
Victorian Boom' with its optimistic belief in economic progress and growth was. 
followed by a slump, the so-called 'Great Depression', which lasted from 1873 
until virtually the end of the century. 
' 
There is some dispute amongst scholars about the extent of the 'Great 
Depression' and about its effect on economic and social structures both in 
Great Britain and in Western Europe. It is now generally accepted by economic 
historians that it was 'far from being uniformly a period of stagnation'. 
2 
Some have gone so far as to doubt whether, in a purely economic sense, it is 
justifiable to speak of a 'Great Depression' at all - even although they 
concede that it was a period of economic uncertainty. 
3 
Whatever the real extent of the depression the evidence is that 
contemporaries perceived the economic system as suffering from some malaise 
or crisis. 
4 Hobsbawm has argued that it is justifiable to use the term 
'depression' to refer to 'a pervasive -. and for the generations since 1850 
a new - state of mind of uneasiness and gloom about the prospects of the 
British economy'. 
5 Landes too has graphically described the changed 
perceptions of economic reality: 
'The years from 1873 to 1896 seemed to many contemporaries a 
startling departure from historical experience. ... The economic 
system appeared to be running down. '-6 
The change in the common-sense idea that economic progress could continue 
in perpetuity meant that other accepted common-sense ideas now became 
challengeable. One of these was the idea that 'free trade' would automatically 
produce prosperity. The concept of free trade was not abandoned but the idea 
that it implied a laissez-faire policy in which the state reduced its role to 
the absolute minimum was modified because of the crisis. A passage from a 
leading article in The Scientific and Literary Review (in which reforms of the 
patent s ystem were demanded) illustrates this subtle shift of emphasis: 
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'It is our national manufactures that want reviving; therefore, 
no mere commercial shuffling of cards under the name of Free 
Trade, actually pushing foreign workmanship into our markets 
whilst pretending to give some facility to British manufactures, 
will be anything but injurious to us, even though the whole 
range of Political Windbags stand forward in its support. ' 7 
This change in the accepted common sense made it easier to justify state 
intervention in a crisis-stricken area of the economy. 
The circumstances which underpinned the changes which were perceived 
as the 'Great Depression' were also directly significant in shaping the 
relationship between the state and the economy. According to one theory 
(which is advanced by Marxist writers) the tendency of the rate of profit 
to fall became manifest at this stage of the development of capitalism 
because the most readily accessible source of increased surplus, i. e. the 
intensive exploitation of labour, could not be developed any further. This 
then led to a crisis in capitalism in which the state was forced to intervene 
by means of legislative action. 
8 
Critics of this approach, such as Musson, have argued that the thesis 
cannot be upheld because the economic indicators (rates of growth in various 
industries, output etc. ) did not present a picture of an overall crisis in 
the economy. 
9 However, as Holloway and Picciotto point out, these critics 
often confuse the general predictions of Marxist theory with specific 
economic laws. 
10 
The Marxist argument is not that there will be a 'falling tendency' in 
profits at any particular time, but rather that the inherent tendency exists 
which will manifest itself in a period of crisis unless countered- Holloway 
and Picciotto suggest that some reorganization of capital relations did'take 
place in this period as a result of a (partially successful) attempt to 
counter the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. But they argue, that 
since such restructuring was done by the state it inevitably resulted in a 
blurring between the categories of 'the economic' and1the political'- between 
private and public law. 
" In the final section of this chapter the 
applicability of their model to the control of new technology during this 
period will be considered. 
Another (perhaps more specific) interpretation of the 'Great Depression' 
suggests that it was brought about by the fact that the simple' technological 
innovations which were made at the start of the industrial revolution and which 
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had produced spectacular rates of growth, had by the later l8th-century 
worked themselves out. 
12 This cannot be a complete explanation for the 
'Depression', because technological innovation depends on other factors such 
as education, the ideological 'drive' to innovate, and investment in research 
and development. Nevertheless, the valid point is made that the unevenness 
of technological development could itself induce a measure of crisis. 
It was in order to ward off the dangers and instability engendered by 
uncertain technological development that capitalists in this-period began 
to pay more attention to new technology. As the century had progressed 
invention had become increasingly based on science. Systematic 'scientific' 
research and development required large investments. As Landes, referring 
specifically to the period after 1873, has noted: 
'In general, there was a gradual institutionalization of 
technological advance. The more progressive industrial 
enterprises were no longer content to accept innovations 
and exploit them, but sought them by deliberate, planned 
experiment. ' 13 
In broad terms it can be posited that changed economic conditions after 
1873 served to strengthen the position of the supporters of. the patent system 
in two ways: '. 
(A) As research aimed at the production. of new technology became more 
widespread - in, for example, the chemical industries 
14 
_ it also became 
more expensive. Capitalists who in the past had opposed patents because they saw 
_them 
as-obstructive monopolies or because they hope_d to acqufre pew technology 
without expense, now themselves had costly 'units' of technology which they 
wished to protect. The patent system, and, to a lesser extent, the system 
of registration of industrial designs provided legal means of doing so. 
(B) The changes in the dominant common-sense attitude toward free trade 
made it easier for state organized control of new technology (by means of 
the patent system) to gain universal acceptance. Machlup and Penrose in 
their article, 'The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century', regard 
this change in the climate of opinion as the key factor in the success of the 
campaign for the retention of the patent system. They ascribe what they 
call 'the rather sudden disappearance of the antipatent movement after 1873', 
to the fact that 'ct3he idea of patent protection regained its public a ppeal 
when, after the crisis of 1873, protectionists won out over the free traders'. 
15 
Seen in isolation, however, this is not a sufficient explanation, for it does 
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not explain why increased legitimacy for the patent system should have been 
the specific means adopted to deal with the control of new technology in a 
situation of economic crisis. 
II.. Developments in the existing patent system 
The most obvious reason why the patent system was used as a means of 
combating (in the sphere of new technology) the crisis Of 1873, was that it 
already existed as a viable system within the apparatus of the state. The'' 
state, or more accurately, the agents who manned its organs, had become 
accustomed to operating a patent system as a (perceived) means of encouraging 
technological development and thus of expanding the type of capitalist society 
in which they had a vested interest. In time of stress therefore, they could 
be expected to attempt to improve (and thereby institutionalize) the existing 
well-tried system. 
16 In addition the patent system was backed by an 
enthusiastic body of supporters who had demonstrated that they could gain a 
measure of acceptance from members of all social classes for their ideological 
justification of it. 
In the immediate post-1872 period the acceptability and efficiency of the 
patent system Werefurther increased by reforms, emanating from within the state 
apparatus, whicn did away with some of the pre-modern elements of the system 
not removed by the changes of 1852. One of these was the abolition, shortly 
after the report of the 1872 Committee, of the practice whereby the Patent 
Commissioners were remunerated for all their various duties as Law Officers 
of the Crown from the fees paid by patentees. 
17 Even although this change 
did not lead to an immediate reduction in the overall cost of patent application 
(the fees were paid into the consolidated revenue account) it was an important 
symbolic change. The status of the commissioners vis-a-vis the patent system 
now became the same as that of any other bureaucrat expected to perform 
rationally theýduties entrusted to him. An important point of criticism, * 
that the patent system enabled a few specific members of government to profit 
from the fees paid by patentees, was removed. 
Two other administrative changes-deserve mention. In 1875 the administration 
18 of the Designs'Acts was incorporated in the Patent Office, as has been seen 
above, the bureaucracy which performed this task was of relatively recent 
origin and geared specifically to the effective application of the Designs"Acts. 
It therefore added an important element of purposive rationality to the 
tradition-bound Patent Office. 
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Of equal significance was the appointment to the Patent Office in 1878 
of a scientifically trained indexing staff. 
19 Whilst the compilation of 
indexes of inventions had been one of the achievements of the post-1852 
patent administration, the 1878 changes opened new possibilities. A body 
of officials who could determine whether patents in fact complied with both 
the procedural and substantive requirements of patent law had been created. 
The potential thus existed for the patent bureaucracy to carry out 'rationally' 
the demands which patent law might place on it. 
Finally, the court system, through which patent rights were enforced by 
means of actions against infringers, was reorganized in 1875.20 Actions 
remained part of the civil law. Trials by jury were eliminated and the 
patent action came to be treated largely as a question of the construction of 
documents. 21 This change served to defuse criticism that the enforcement of 
patent rights was a gamble because a jury would not be able to comprehend the 
technical issues involved. At the same time it served to isolate further 
the public from the whole process of patent law - leaving it entirely in the 
hands of legally trained experts. 
III. The international patent congresses 
In the period during which supporters of the patent system had been on the 
defensive, abolitionists were able to gain ideological support from actions 
of opponents of patents in European countries. In the 1870's this support 
became less vociferous. The proponents of the system were able to argue that 
there was an international trend in favour of patents and that this trend 
found its expression in a series of international congresses; at which 
international patent arrangements were discussed. 
The move towards-such arrangements can be related to the fact that the 
more complex new technology was increasingly being exploited on a trans- 
national basis. As Penrose, speaking of conditions in industrialized countries 
in the latter half of the 19th century, has noted: 
'Commercial interests are no respecters of national boundaries 
and while the laws of each country prevail only within the 
jurisdiction of that country, the interest of the patentees in 
the use of their inventions frequently extends beyond the 
jurisdiction of any one country. ' 22 
The matter came to a head with the Austrian International Exhibition of'1873. 
Various exhibitors felt that the Austrian patent system did not provide sufficient 
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protection for their exhibits which would lose their novelty throughout the 
industrial world by'being made public. As a result of diplomatic pressure, 
particularly by the American government, 
23 
amendments were made to the 
Austrian patent law, so that exhibits would be protected in Austria at least. 
At the same time an International Patent Congress was convened to coincide 
with the exhibition. The Congress can best be described as semi-official. 
The delegates did not formally represent governments but instead interest 
groups within nation states. Thus the British delegation included, 
24 for example, Dr Collyer, representing the Inventors' Institute , Thomas Webster, 
representing the Patent Commissioners, but not, it was explained to a sceptical 
House of Commons, the British government!, 
25 
and George Hazeltine, a leading 
London patent agent. 
26 
At the same time the anti-patent movement was still active in Europe. 
27 
Among the delegates to the Congress were included a number of German opponents 
of patents. 
28 It was therefore of symbolic importance that this 'international 
body' explicitly rejected the abolition of patents, deciding in its first 
resolution: 
'The protection of inventions is to be guaranteed by the laws 
of all civilised nations because: [the first of seven reasons] 
(a) The sense of right of civiliped nations demands the legal 
protection of intellectual work. ' 29 
In its third resolution the Congress took the first step towards an 
international agreement on patents. It stated: 
'In consideration of the great difference between the existing 
patent laws, and in consideration of the altered state of 
international communication, the necessity of reform becomes 
evident, and it is to be strongly recommended that the different 
Governments should endeavour to arrange, as soon as possible, 
an international understanding on the patent laws;. ' 30 
The Congress held in Vienna undoubtedly served to strengthen the 
reformist cause in Britain. The proceedings of the Congress were widely 
reported in Britain 
31 
and a British committee, the London Committee of the 
International Congress of Vienna, waý established to propagate the idea of 
international co-operation in the sphere of patents. 
32 The proceedings at 
Vienna provided a basis for discussion at the meeting of the British 
Association at Bradford in September 1873.33 This was followed by a meeting 
of the Bradford Chamber of Commerce. 
ý4 The initiative of the Bradford 
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Chamber in turn led to action within the Associated Chambers of Commerce. 
In March 1874 the Associated Chambers of Commerce 'assisted by London 
Members of the Executive Committee of the Vienna Patent Congress' sent a 
deputation to the Foreign Secretary 'to advocate the assimilation of the 
patent laws of all countries by an international convention'. 
35 
The deputation was coo. 11y' received by the Foreign Secretary, Lord Derby 
36 
(who, as Lord Stanley, had expressed his personal opposition to patents five 
years earlier 
37 ) but attempts to gain support for some form of international* 
patent system continued. In 1875 the English patent agent, W Lloyd Wise, 
read a paper on the assimilation of the patent laws of different countries 
before the Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations 
in The Hague. 38 This Association then appointed a Committee to investigate 
the matter. It reported to the meeting of the Association in Bremen in the 
following year, that it 'considered it abundantly established by experience 
that it is for the commercial interest of every nation to grant protection 
in the shape of patents to inventors'. 
39 The Committee recommended that the 
proposals of the 1873 Congress in Vienna be used as a basis for international 
agreement on patents. At the conference of the Association held at Antwerp 
in 1877 specific proposals were presented. 
40 The Association for the Reform 
and Codification of the Law of Nations was a body concerned not only with 
patent law but with law reform in general; but the fact that it took'ýup the 
question of patents in international law at this juncture provided further 
support for the notion that patents were almost universally accepted and 
acceptable. 
In 1878 a second major international patent law congress was held in 
Paris. It was sponsored by the French government but was of the same 'semi- 
official' status as its predecessor of 1873.41 As in Vienna an important 
function of the Congress was to demonstrate the acceptability of patent law. 
It did so by incorporating in its first resolution the ideologically charged 
concepts of a natural property right in inventions. It resolved: 
'The right of inventors to their works ... is a right of 
ownership; the civil law does not create it, but only 
subjects it to regulation. ' 42 
This formulation was adopted after lengthy debate. It was opposed 
inter alios by the Swiss delegate who suggested that the congress should 
stress that patents were a creation of civil. 1aw but a justifiable compftmise 
between the rights of the inventor and the public. 
43 (Switzerland did not 
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have a patent system at the time. 
44) The decisive defeat of the Swiss 
standpoint suggests that the resolution was formulated in terms of property 
rights in order to increase its ideological impact. Certainly it was 
i'hterpreted in this way by the delegate of the Inventors' Institute who later 
told the Institute's annual dinner, amid loud applause, that the resolution 
'recogniseidi that invention was the seed corn of industry, and required 
and deserved as much protection as the seed corn of our harvest has always 
45 
received from an intelligent government'. 
In its concrete proposals the Congress could not reach unanimity on a 
universal patent law. Penrose has explained that 'the conference was 
obliged to recognize the realism of those who had insisted that uniformity 
was impossible in a world of national states with different interests, 
different legal structures and different economic histories, aspirations 
and ideologies'. 
46 A Commission appointed by the Congress therefore 
produced more modest proposals for an international convention which would 
preserve national patent systems but would make provision for some measure 
of reciprocity. 
47 The further history of these proposals in the 1880's 
will be considered below. Th. e significance of the International Congresses 
in the 1870's lies primarily in the ideological support they provided for 
the permanent acceptance of national patent systems. 
IV. The final rounds 
The defeat which the abolition movement suffered in the findings of the 
1872 Committee of Tinquiry; the changed economic circumstances and the 
concomitant shift in the dominant common sense; the removal of 'obvious' 
abuses from the existing patent system; and changed climate of foreign 
opinion on patents all made it clear that outright abolition of the patent 
system was, for both instrumental and symbolic reasons, not a realistic 
alternative for the opponents of the patent system. The patent system would, 
they reluctantly admitted, remain a factor in the control of new technology 
in the foreseeable future. The topic had, in the words of a correspondent 
48 to The Times become 'a practical question'. 
De facto abolition 
Yet, the possibility of de facto abolition remained. In other words a 
patent system could be created in which the requirements for patentability 
were so strict that the bulk of economically significant new technology was 
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excluded from it, or the cost of patents could be made very high (although 
perhaps this was not a realistic option because of the demand for cheap 
government), or the rights of patentees could be diminished by a system 
of compulsory licences for other users. 
The first response by the government to the proposals of the 1872 
Committee of I'nquiry, which came early in 1875 in the face of growing 
agitation for reform from the same groups which before 1872 had composed 
the reformist hegemonic sector, 
49 demonstrated that the option of de facto 
abolition was still seriously considered and that no real consensus had yet 
been reached about what protection the patent system should offer 'possessors, 
of new technology. In his speech introducing the first reading of the 
government's comprehensive 'Patents for Inventions Bill', the Lord Chancellor, 
Lord Cairns, accepted that the decisions of the 1872 Committee and the 1873 
50 International Patent Congress were 'great landmarks' which had to be followed. 
Nevertheless, he rejected an argument that 'an invention be property' as a 
'palpW. e fallacy'51 and went on to propose a system which would restrict 
52 
patents in every possible way: Fees would not be reduced. A body of unpaid 
scientific referees and a number of trained, full-time examiners would be added 
to the existing Patent Commissioners so that they could examine applications 
strictly to see whether they described legally patentable inventions. 
53 
Patents not worked within two years would be subject to recall, i. e. could 
be cancelled. 
54 The normal period of patent protection would be reduced 
55 from fourteen years to seven years. The patentee would be forced, on 
pain of having his patent revoked, to grant licences on 'reasonable' terms 
so that a 'proper supply' of the patented article might be maintained, i. e. 
a system of compulsory licences would be introduced. 
55 The Lord Chancellor 
supported his specific proposals by describing the operation of arf extended 
patent system in the anti-monopolist tone adopted by the abolitionists: 
C 
'I cannot imagine anything more serious to the manufactures of 
the country than that 4,300 drag-nets, more or less, should be 
annually spread, every one'of them curtailing to some extent 
the area of those manufactures, and every one of them exposing 
manufacturers to litigation, or, perhaps, to the payment of 
blackmail if they would escape the irksome process of litigation 
for an alleged infringement of patent-right. ' 57 
Not surprisingly such a Bill was enthusiastically received by the diehard 
opponents of patents. It passed its second reading in the House of Lords with 
strong support from Lord Selbourne (formerly Sir Roundell Palmer) and 
Lord Granville - both long-standing opponents of state control of new technology. 
58 
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Both men were quite frank that they were supporting the Bill because it was 
a desirable first step on the road to aboliti . on. 
59 The Bill passed swiftly 
through all its stages in the House of Lords and was sent to the House of 
Commons. 60 
Outside parliament the Bill was also supported by abolitionists. 
61 
Amongst them was The Times which made it clear that it supported the Bill 
only because it would curtail the effects of the patent system and it was 
hoped, lead the way towards eventual abolition. It wrote: 
'The reduction in the number of Patents will operate to liberate 
manufacturing industry from many of the fetters the present 
system imposes on its development, but we are by no means 
satisfied that what is proposed to be done will be found sufficient 
or can be permanently maintained. The experiment must be tried, 
and the course of its working may perhaps indicate the steps yet 
to be taken which shall make new inventions freely available as 
soon as they are invented concurrently with the reservation of 
those royalties or privileges which are due to the inventor. ' 62 
The supporters of the patent system were quick to perceive the dangers 
which the Bill held for patentees. The Pall Mall Gazette saw the Bill as an 
attack on inventors as a 'class'. It wrote: 
'It Ethe second reading of the Billi made it clear enough 
that recognizing the issue raise'd as essentially one between 
inventors and manufacturers they would by no means permit a 
generous sympathy with genius to weaken their natural veneration 
for capital, and that they [the members of the House of Lords] 
would not for a moment allow the pretensions of the former to 
stand in the way of the interests of the latter. ' 63 
Interpretations of the Bill in this ideologically loaded way, in the 
64 Pall Mall Gazette and other newspapers and journals, served to mobilize 
sectorial support for the patent system. As in the earlier defence of the 
65 system, patent experts played a prominent role in co-ordinating the reaction. 
Petitions protesting against the Bill were submitted - inter alia by the 
Society of Arts and by the Inventors' Institute, supported by the Artizans 
and Inventors' Committee. 66 On 25 May 1875 a conference on the new Patent 
Law Bill was held at the rooms of the Society of Arts. 
67 The broad spectrum 
of representatives demonstrates to what extent patent reform was able to 
claim support from different classes and different fractions within classes. 
Represented were the London Patent Agents' Committee and the Institute of 
Civil Engineers (professional); the Society of Arts and Inventors' 
Institute (middle class with some aristocratic patronage); the Parliamentary 
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Committee of the Trades Congress, members of various Trades Councils 
(Manchester, Rochdale, Preston, Oldham, Sheffield, Walsall and Liverpool), 
and representatives of various trades (working class). 
68 The meeting 
strongly condemned the Bill as inimical to the interests of inventors. At 
'the same time the participants were keen to stress that they were not only 
concerned with the interests of a particular section. In their first 
resolution they held 'that if [the Bill3 passed as it now stands it will work 
69 injury, not only to inventors, but also the industrial progress of the country'. 
In the face of this widespread opposition the Bill was allowed to die 
quietly in the House of Commons. 
70 
In 1876 a substantially similar Bill was introduced in the House of Lords. 
71 
It made two concessions to the opponents of the 1875 Bill: The 14 year 
duration of patents was reinstated and the proposed referees were dropped. 
72 
Once more the Bill was passed in the House of Lords - although after far 
less debate than the previous year. 
73 Once more the opponents of the Bill 
organized and petitioned parliament. 
74 Once more the Bill was allowed to 
die in the House of Commons. 
75 The opponents of patents had been forced 
to give some ground in their efforts to have a restrictive patent system 
introduced but no real compromise had been reached. 
In 1877 the (Conservative) government made a third attempt to introduce 
a restrictive patent system - in this instance by means of a Bill introduced 
76 by the Attorney-General in the House of Commons. This Bill was even less 
successful than its predecessors, never reaching the stage of debate - its 
second reading postponed no less than eighteen times before it was finally 
withdrawn. 
77 It was heavily criticised by the organizations which supported 
patent reform. 
78 
The legislative attempts from 1875-7 demonstrate clearly that the 
depression of 1873 did not immediately result in a comprehensive reform of 
the patent system of the kind which would greatly increase the number of 
patents. The fact that the government tried to achieve just the opposite 
shows that the desire to abolish patents had not disappeared. The failure 
of the legislation can be attributed to the growing power of the reformists. 
B. Towards legislative compromise 
In the achievement of legislative compromise private membersibills were 
to play a large part. Eighteen-seventy seven saw the introduction by. Mr 
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Anderson, MP for Gl-asgow, of the first such Bill since the report. of the 
79 1872 Committee of Inquiry. The main object of this Bill, which received 
some support from the Inventors' Institute, 
80 
was to decrease the fees 
payable by patentees, but it also aimed at other improvements such as the 
lengthening of the duration of a patent from fourteen to twenty-one years. 
81 
It made no progress in parliament in 1877, but was re-introduced annually in- 
the following six years. 
82 
The move towards compromise was underpinned by the changed common-sense 
attitude to state intervention in economic activity. To some extent this 
is apparent in the 1875-7 attempts at legislation where even outspoken 
abolitionists did not feel that it was politically possible to have the 
state withdraw completely from the control of new technology. As the decade 
progressed reformers cdnstantly called on the state to intervene in the 
economy by encouraging new technology by means of a more liberal patent 
system. 
83 This call for stimulation of new technology was also taken 
up outside the circles of the established patent reformers. A significant 
volte-face was that of The Times in 1878. Commenting on the Paris Congress 
on international patents of that year, it rehearsed the arguments against 
patents. 
'But [it concluded3 want of natural right and questions of 
practical inexpediency have been altogether overruled by 
the demonstration of the general utility of a patent law to 
manufacturing interests themselves. The bribe of a patent 
is proved, especially by the example of the United States, 
to be so extraordinarily stimulating to ingenuity that the 
public has resigned its title to forbid monopolies. ' 84 
In effect The Times was here making explicit what had been imp]icit 
throughout the post-1873 period: a movement of the fractions of capital 
which had opposed patents towards accepting them in changed economic 
conditions. The change was also apparent in other countries, most notably 
in Germany where Bismarck's opposition to patents in the previous decade had 
been overcome by changed attitudes, particularly in the chemical industry, 
and legislation to reform the patent system was introduced in 1877.85 The 
form of the recantation by The Times is important as well for it indicates 
that, in Britain at least, arguments of principle, of natural law, had not 
triumphed. They had not been abandoned by enthusiastic supporters of the 
patent system but had simply been pushed aside by those who wished to 
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support the patent system for pragmatic reasons. It was this new-found 
flexibility which opened the way for legislative compromise. 
The change did not manifest itself immediately. A Bill introduced by 
the government in 187986 was still received fairly critically. 
87 It was not 
condemned as strongly as its predecessors by patent professionals88 but was 
nevertheless withdrawn without debate. 
89 The roots of compromise are 
apparent in the attitude of the Society of Arts to the 1879 Bill. In its 
annual report the Society noted that the Bill was unlikely to be reintroduced 
during that session. 
'However, [the report continued3 the feeling of the Council 
cof the Society of Artsi was, that this 118793 Bill being so 
great an improvement on former attempts in the same direction, 
it was probable that if some pressure were put on the government, 
a still better measure might be introduced at some future period; 
they therefore felt it their duty to impress upon the Home 
Secretary the views they entertained. ' 90 
Only in 1881 did the first major sign of compromise appear in a debate 
in the second reading of the (private member's) Anderson's Bill which had 
been prepared annually since 1877.91 Speakers were generally sympathetic to 
its major proposal that fees ought to be reduced (although Chamberlain, the 
main government spokesman, doubted whether the patent office would function 
on half its income 192 'Ideological' disputes about the 'legal' nature of 
patents were large ly ignored and the antagonisms between 'the manufacturer' 
and 'the inventor' which had featured so largely in earlier debates were 
played down. The Bill was allowed to progress to the stage of a second 
reading. 
93 
In 1882 a second private member's Bill sponsored by the Society- of Arts 
was introduced by Sir John Lubbock. 
94 Neither Lubbock's Bill nor Anderson's 95 
Bill. was debated on its merits and they were both allowed to lapse because 
insufficient parliamentary time was made available. 
96 
These private members' Bills are significant for they indicate a direct 
involvement in legislation of the bod ies which had long advocated reform 
of the patent system. Indeed Sir John Lubbock argued at the second reading 
of the Bill that a detailed discussion was unnecessary as it would surely 
be incorporated in the government's future legislation. 
97 
Organizations other than the Society of Art's who were directly involved 
in shaping these private Bills were the British Association and the, 'Inventors' 
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Institute. - The'former appointed a watchdog committee which co-operated 
98 
closely with the Society of Arts and made representations to the government. 
(Sir John Lubbock who introduced the Bill was the 1882 President of the 
British Association and Dr Siemens was 'one of the Society of Arts Committee 
which prepared the Bill' as well as a member of the British Associations 
Committee. 99 The Inventors' Institute supported Anderson's Bill. 
100 ) The 
result of these activities was that the gap which had existed between reformers 
and legislators in the 1875-7 period, was bridged. 
C. Compromise achieved 
Finally, in 1883, the (Liberal) government brought forward a Bill 
intended to reorganize comprehensively the law relating to Patents, Designs 
101 
and Trademaýks. In parliament its discussion took precedence over the 
two private members' Bills. 
102 The parliamentary debate which followed 
set the seal of public approval on the patent system (together with the 
system of registration of designs) as the 'obvious' way in which to 
organize the control of new technology. 
103 
The changed attitude towards patents is apparent from the speech of 
Chamberlain who, as President of the Board of Trade, introduced the second 
reading of the Bill on behalf of the government. 
'*He did not think it necessary to argue at any length in 
favour of a Patent Law; but he might remark that in recent 
years there had been a very great change of opinion on this 
subject. EHaving outlined the history of this change, Chamberlain 
continued3 He might proceed, then, on the assumption that the 
House would grant the necessity of a Patent Law. ' 104 
In the debate that followed the principle of a cheap and efficient 
patent system was accepted by all the participants. Samuelson, who had 
been Chairman of the 1872 Committee, declared that in the past some persons 
, 105 had been 'opposed to patents altogether, but that school was now defunct . 
Another speaker went even further, contending that 'the general question as 
to the expediency of granting patents was not, at the present moment, a 
practical question; in the present state of opinion it was a question more 
fit for a debating society than for the House of Commons'. 
106 
The Bill passed through all its stages in the House of Commons, and 
was sent to the House of Lords, 
107 
where the Lord Chancellor, Lord Selbourne, 
had to present it on behalf of the government. This was ironical because, as 
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Sir Roundell Palmer, he had been an outspoken opponent of patents. 
108 
Admitting that his opposition to patents was well known, he noted that 
'nearly 20 years had elapsed csince he had proposed the abolition of the 
patent system] and public opinion had not Yet proved favourable to any 
change in that direction'. 
109 In spite of the expressed doubts of its 
proposer, the Bill passed swiftly through the House of Lords and became 
law on 25 August 1883.110 
The acceptance of the legislation by parliament and by the press was 
almost uniformly favourable. 
111 Criticism such as I there was, was technical 
and muted. 
112 A compromise had been achieved in which patents were no 
longer a source of public controversy. The content of the compromise, 
outlined in the following section, provides some insight into what had 
become the significant forces in the law relating to new technology. 
V. Changes brought ýbout by the 1883 legislation and related developments 
The Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883, which came into effect 
on 31st December 1883,113 placed the administration of the law relating to 
new technology within a national bureaucratic framework. In the words of 
Boehm, the author of the standard text on British patent administration: 
'The 1883 Patents Act marks the beginning of modern patents administration'. 
114 
The key to the reorganization was the appointment of a full-time official, 
the comptroller, to take over the administrative control of the Patent Office 
from the Commissioners of Patents. 
115 The comptroller who, as a civil 
servant, served under the Board of Trade, was assisted by a body of full- 
116 time, specialist examiners. The examiners had a statutory duty to 
exami ne 
'whether the nature of the invention has been fairly 
described, and the application, specification, and 
drawings (iý any) have been prepared in the prescribed 
manner, and the title sufficiently indicates the subject 
matter of the invention'. 117 
They were to report their findings to the comptroller who could accept 
or refuse the application or order amendments to be made to it. 
118 The 
comptroller could also decide whether complete specifications were 
substantially similar to the provisional specifications submitted with the 
119 120 initial applications and he could adjudicate opposition proceedings 
i. e. proceedings in which an interested party wished to oppose the granting 
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of a patent. The comptroller had similar powers to allow or refuse the 
registration of industrial designs. 
121 
Although the decisions of the comptroller were appealable to the Law 
Officers of the Crown 
122 (or to the Board of Trade in the case of designs), 
123 
the effect was that the primary decisions on whether a patent or design 
complied with legal criteria were now made within the administration. The 
framework was therefore created whereby the state, through its bureaucratic 
agents, could determine which units of technology to protect. As introduced 
in 1883 the powers of the comptroller and his examiners were limited to 
relatively formal criteria but the specialist technical background enabled 
them later to conduct limited investigations into the novelty of new patents 
and so gradually to reduce the role of the courts primarily to the trial 
of infringement. 
124 
The drastic changes in the administration of patents were not paralleled 
by changes in substantive law. The definition of an 'invention' remained 
unchanged. The 1883 Act merely defined it as 'any manner of new manufacture 
the subject of letters patent and grant of privilege within section six of 
the Statute of Monopolies'. 
125 This definition allowed the existing body of 
judge-made law on the question to be perpetuated and developed further. 
126 
Procedural changes could, of course, affect substantive law. Thus s5 
provided for the first time that 'a complete specification must end with 
a distinct statement of the invention claimed'. In practice this meant that 
the determination of the scope of the invention now became a legal question 
of documentary interpretation rather than a question of fact. The result was 
that a whole body of law dealing with týe interpretation of patent-claims 
has been created since 1883.127 It is not clear what direct effect this 
has had on the patentability of inventions, but it has increased the power 
of patent law experts to define the content of patent protection. 
On the face of it, the Act did not accede to all the demands made by - or 
on behalf of - inventors. Property rights in patents were nowhere mentioned. 
The prerogative of the Crown to withhold the grant of a patent was maintained 
as a legal form 
128 thus implicitly denying a 'natural right' to a patent. 
The period of patent protection remained unchanged at 14 years129 thus 
making no concession to the idea that inventors should have 'perpetual 
property' in their patents. Fees were reduced but the 'steeplechase principle', 
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whereby stiff renewal fees were imposed after a number of years, was retained. 
130 
Provision was made for compulsory licences thus further limiting the 'right' 
of a patentee to do with his property as he wished. 
131 
In practice would-be patentees appear not to have been deterred by any 
limitations in the reforms. A rush to patent took place after the introduction 
of the new Act. 
132 Boehm has argued that 'Calfter 1883 there is a strong 
presumption that the barriers against applications had so far been lowered 
that the number of patent applications approximated to the number of 
133 Tt is patentable inventions for which patent protection was wanted'. I 
impossible to find direct evidence to support this argument but the dearth 
of argument, against the specific provisions of the 1883 Act, based on 
'principle', suggests that would-be patentees were fairly satisfied with 
the operation of the patent system. 
Two related developments during the same period served to confirm the 
permanence of the patent system as a means of controlling new technology: 
(A) In 1883 Britain became a signatory of the International Convention for 
the Protection of Industrial Property. 
134 This Convention was the product 
of the 1878 Paris-Congress. It did not directly shape the British patent 
system as it did not create. an 'international patent' as had initially been 
envisaged. Nevertheless, the right to priority granted to applicants who 
had already applied for patents in other states 
135 
and the reciprocal status 
to be granted to foreign nationals 
136 
served to demonstrate the virtual 
universality of patents. 
137 
(B) In 1882 the Institute of Patent Agents was founded. 
138 It re 
, 
placed the 
smaller organization of London Patent Agents and gradually took over from the 
ailing Inventors' Institute as the source of 'informed opinion' on patent 
matters. The aim of the Institute of Patent Agents was to con. solidate the 
profession and reinforce its powers vis-a-vis its clients. As its first 
chairman JH Johnson explained in his inaugural address: 
'C03ur desire cisi on the one hand, to provide a check against 
all irregularities in professional practice, and, on the other 
hand, to secure to the members of the Institute that fair 
consideration from their clients to which they are entitled. ' 139 
The Institute consolidated its power soon after the 1883 Act had greatly 
140 increased the demands for its services. In 1888 an Act of Parliament 
gave it a measure of legal control of patent agents. 
141 In 1891 its prestige 
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was enhanced by the attainment of a Royal Charter. 
142 The reinforcement 
of the status and power of patent agents and the acceptance of the patent 
system went hand in hand. 
VI. Conclusion 
The decade before 1883 saw a significant change in the economic conditions 
which had underpinned the rise of the abolitionist movement in the preceding 
period. The result of this crisis (a crisis at the Very least, of confidence) 
was that policies of extreme free trade lost some of their attractiveness 
in theory and were modified in practice. 
Under these conditions the ideological sector which had proposed the 
abolition of patents lost support from the hegemonic common sense; for extreme 
laissez-faire had been an important part of its ideological justification 
for the abolition of patents. It also lost support for instrumental reasons as 
the priorities of some fractions of capital moved from efforts to limit 
technological innovation or to appropriate technological advances without 
compensation, to programmes of systematic technological development. The 
abolitionist movement declined until, by the end of the decade, it could be 
di s regarded. 
Assisted by the demise of the abolitionists the hegemonic sector which 
had propagated a 'national(ised)' patent system demonstrably succeeded 
during this decade in having its ideology accepted as 'common sense' by all 
classes in society. This did not, however, mean that the concepts which it 
deployed were carried to their logical conclusion. Inventors were not 
granted absolute rights to or in patents. Instead a 'bureaucratic solution' 
143 
was produced. Through the introduction of rational bureaucratic procedures 
a compromise was achieved which enabled the state to provide machinery which 
granted large numbers of inventors relatively effective monopolies, without 
making any fundamental decisions on the 'true nature' of a patent. Concepts 
such as natural property rights were still used on occasion for ideological 
impact but without their content being considered seriously. To put the same 
proposition in another way: In this-period of the acceptance of the patent 
system the legal form of the control of new technology ceased to be a 
significant issue: it was replaced by a bureaucratically delimitated right. 
The legitimation of patent law thus followed the general pattern outlined by 
240. 
Weber in which a reformist concern for natural law is replaced by (legal) 
positivist respect for formal legal rationality. 
144 
Obvious beneficiaries of this 'solution' were the patent experts, who, 
as a profession, managed to place themselves in an impregnable position 
to mediate the relationship between inventor/capitalist and the state in the 
sphere of new technology. They managed to preserve this position - assisted 
by the fact that since 1883 they have had to deal with specialized bureaucrats 
(the-examiners) who also operated within the esoteric framework of the rules 
of patent law. 
145 
At a 'macro' level (if it is accepted that there was a 'crisis' in the 
decade after 1873) there is evidence to support Holloway and Picciotto's 
developmental model of the role of the state. After a period-of crisis 
state intervention was reorganized and intensified. The patent system was 
made more efficient and presumably, since the number of applications increased, 
served to control more technology. Public officials (the comptroller and the 
examiners) played a large part in determining the private rights of individuals 
to own patents. State intervention had effectively increased in a period in 
which the dominant common sense, as a general rule, still supported the notion 
that the state should not intervene in the economic sphere. 
The form of intervention cannot be explained only by the crisis of the 
1870's. The patent system was, as has been seen, the product of long 
historical development. The acceptance of the reformation of the patent system 
(after a relatively long delay) as the response to the crisis in the sphere of 
new technology must be understood as a response orchestrated by a strategically 
situated hegemonic sector-(the patent reformers, led by the patent experts) 
who seized the opportunities for change provided by the perceived economic 
crisis. 
The immediate popularity of the reformed patent system suggests that 
state intervention of this kind was not entirely opposed to the interests 
of capitalism in general. Clearly many capitalists thought that patents 
were worthwhile investments. The point was not lost on a leading inventor/ 
entrepreneur of the day, Sir Charles Siemens, who had suggested, prior to 
the enactment of the 1883 legislation, 'that if a patent can inventionj 
were found lying in a gutter, it would be in the interest of the State to 
take it up and assign an owner to it in order that it might be worked'. 
146 
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The significance of the paradox, that indirect state intervention in 
the control of new technology might be an essential basis for its exploitation 
in an advanced capitalist system, will be considered in the concluding 
chapter. 
242. 
CHAPTER 8- CONCLUSION 
I. Further history :a brief r6sum& 
The development of the national British patent system after 1883 
seems to confirm that the legislation of 1883 marked the general acceptance 
of the patent system as the common-sense way of apportioning control of new 
technology. While it is not the object of this section to describe these 
developments in detail some of them are highlighted in order to round off 
the historical analysis. 
Patents continue to be used as a primary means of controlling new 
technology. Thus in 1960 there were approximately three times as many 
patent applications and 'sealings' (patents granted) as in 1885.1 An 
empirical study conducted in the late 1960's shows that in certain sections 
of industry patents are still the key legal instrument in the control of 
technology. 2 
In the 20th century parallel institutions to the patent system other than 
the registration 6f designs came to play a role in the control of new 
technology. Although the registration of designs, in much the same form as 
it was cast by the 1883 Act, is still u sed, it has increasingly been joined by 
the law of copyright and of trade secrets. 
3 Copyright in machine drawings has 
become intertwined with the regis'tration of designs. 
4 The law of trade 
secrets, which had not really developed in the 19th century, has expanded to 
give employers an increasing sanction against employees who might wish to 
market their employers' (unpatented) technology. 
5 These changes-have not 
led to a diminution of the importance of patents. Instead patent professionals 
now tend to be experts in industrial property with additional legal resources 
for protecting their clients' interests in new technology. Patents remain 
the core of this protection. 
5 
The importance andinfluence of professionals, i. e. bureaucrats (patent 
examiners) and lawyers (patent barristers and agents), in the operation and 
development of the patent system has grown. 'In the daily operation of the 
system patentability is increasingly being decided by the professional skill 
of the patent examiner. Since 1907 they have conducted both a formal 
examination and a limited examination into the novelty of an invention for 
which a patent is sought. 
7 
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Although the validity-of a patent remains to be determined by the courts, 
in practice even after this limited examination, very few patent applications 
are accepted without being referred back to the patentee. 
8 The complexity 
of this process means that a would-be patentee himself needs professional 
assistance: A recent 'practical' text notes: 
'EI]f a patent is worth applying for at all, the difference 
made by practised drafting of the specifications and skilled 
negotiation with the examiner will be worth far more than a 
patent agent's fees. ' 9 
Changes introduced by the Patents Act 1977 10 further increase the 
power of the examiner. This Act retains the national British patent system 
but in addition makes provision for an EEC patent and a European patent. 
11 
Although the British Patent Office will continue,. -to function, a large part of 
the examination duties are being transferred to Munich.. The new examinations, 
both those in London and those in Munich, are more rigorous, apply more 
criteria 
12 
and are more expensive 
13 than those done by the British examiners 
prior to 1978. The result will probably be that eventually the validity of 
all patents will be determined bureaucratically by examiners - with the courts 
concentrating on infringement proceedings. The professional power of the 
bureaucratic patent experts undoubtedly continues to expand. 
Patent lawyers and patent agents have retained their power as well - 
at least in part because their skills are required in the negotiations with 
the bureaucrats. Other techniques of professionalization have also been 
used. Their professional organizations have retained their virtual monopoly 
on patent practice. 14Admission to the profession of patent agency is controlled 
by a system of examination. Their body of knowledge, the law of patenis, 
has remained esoteric - inaccessible to laymen. Important concepts remain 
embedded in the law developed by judges in long lines of complicated 
precedent. Legislative innovation has not changed this position. Thus, for 
example, the 1977 Patents Act introduced the first comprehensive definition 
of a patentable invention. Until then the definition of s6 of the Statute 
jF Monopolies, ' any manner of new manufacture', had simply been reproduced 
16 and a body of case law which extended and refined it, followed. The new 
definition, although it is phrased in a more modern way - that which is new, 
involves an inventive step, is capable of industrial application and is not 
specifically excluded from patentability 
17 
_ still requires to be applied 
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by a lawyer. Several of the concepts only have meaning in the light of 
interpretations given them by existing case law. 
18 There are indeed 
indications that the 1977 Patents Act, because of its 'enormous complexity'19 
makes the lawyer an even more essential figure than before in the creation and 
defence of units of new technology. 
The dominance of the professionals in the operation of the system has been 
reflected in the way in which change and development have taken place. 
Although the primary pressure for the introduction of the Patents Act of 1977 
came from multinational corporations who wanted simultaneous and effective 
control of new technology in several countries, 
20 the actual form of the 
changes and even the ideology on which they were based were directly derived 
from expert opinion. 
21 In spite of the fact that the 1977 Patents Act 
introduced the most far-reaching changes in the law of patents since 1883 the 
hegemonic acceptance of the system was not challenged. The Commission of 
inquiry which investigated the Patent system, 
22 
-the negotiations with 
European countries23 and the extensive parliamentary debates 
24 
which 
preceded the legislation, were all dominated by patent experts who successfully 
claimed that reforms were technical matters. The result is that they have 
been able to dictate specific changes and infuse the process of change with 
their professional ideology. 
Aspects of the patent system have been the subject of public debate. 
Supporters of the system remain sensitive to the charge that it creates 
monopolies. The provisions of the 1883 Act for compulsory licences if a 
patent was not being worked adequately have been retained. These provisions 
25 
were extended in 1949. In practice, however, compulsory licences are 
26 
relatively rarely granted. This suggests that their function might be largely 
cosmetic. One aspect of compulsory licencing became a political issue in the 
1970's. The 1949 Patents Act made specific provision for compulsory licences 
for the production of patented drugs and foodstuffs. The eventual removal 
of a similar provision in the 1977 Act in spite of the initially stated 
intention of the Labour government to retain it, followdd sustained pressure 
from the pharmaceutical industry. 
27 
_ 
This dispute revealed that fractions 
of capital could still be directly involved in shaping the patent system. 
The other potentially explosive modern issue, the right of employees to share 
28 in the patents which they produce for their employers, has been discussed 
but has not become a major political issue. 
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The comparative rarity of these disputes and the fact that the public 
debate about them accepts the continued existence of the patent system as 
a common-sense reality, serve to underline the hegemony which still exists 
on the whole matter of patents. The patent system in general is not 
perceived as an issue to be discussed in class terms. Abolitionists who 
still occasionally raise arguments about the contradictions inherent in 
state intervention in the control of new technology are virtually dismissed 
as cranks. 
29 
In the expansion of patent protection on an international basis these 
contradictions appear afresh. It is a problem for those who wish to create 
a free market economy within the European EconomicCommunity. Thus a recent 
book entitled. Industrial Property and Copyright in European Community Law- 
notes* 
'According to Article 2 of the EEC Treaty the creation of a 
common market is an objective of the Community. However, 
industrial protection rights, i. e. patents, plant varieties 
protection, utility models and designs protection, trade marks, 
copyright and related rights, in their traditional form conflict 
with this objective. ' 30 
Significantly it sees the solution to the conflict in the creation 
of new legal forms rather than in the removal of accepted state intervention 
of this kind. 
In sum: the modern patent system grants protection for a longer period 
(20 years), can be more easily extended to other countries, is more 
thoroughly examined by the 'State, and is more expensive than its 19th 
century forerunner; but is essentially still the same form of legal 
protection, subject to the same philosophical difficulties and justified 
by the. same arguments, although the pressures for change might now be 
coming from multinational rather than national capitals. 
II. A theory of technological commodities 
In its modern form the patent system is found in all capitalist states. 
For practical purposes there is no internal patent law in socialist states. 
31 
In developing countries patent systems provide a framework for the sale of 
technology to them. They do not serve to stimulate invention locally. 
32 
Even in developed capitalist systems evidence that patent systems stimulate 
invention remains inconclusive. 
33 What the patent system and related forms 
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of legal control of new technology undoubtedly do in industrial capitalism 
(and have done in Britain since the late 18th century) is to define technology 
in units which are marketable. In other words, the patent system makes 
technology into a commodity that can be bought, sold and even exported from 
-a significant feature of one country to another. Trade in technology i., 
modern industrial capitalism. 
This general insight about the role of patents derived both from this 
and other historical research and from an overview of present conditions 
can be described in the theoretical terms developed by Pashukanis and the 
'state derivationists' who, as outlined in the introductory chapter, 
34 
consider 
the necessity for state intervention in the form of law in capitalist societies. 
The exchange of the commodity, new technology, is not a simple barter 
arrangment as the state is required to constitute the commodity itself. It 
only exists through the intervention of the state Inherent in this is a 
contradiction, for ideally, according to the 'classical' distinction between 
private law and public law, commodity exchange should take place without 
the intervention of the state. The exchange of the commodity, new 
technology, is therefore qualitatively different from that of other commodities. 
It cannot be regulated solely by private iaw. The state cannot, even ideally, 
remain totally removed from this transaction. It is therefore forced to 
abandon its stance of merely guaranteeing commodity relations in the sphere 
of technology. One would therefore expect the intervention by the state to 
be characterized by a confusion of public law and private law categories. In 
other words, one would expect that there would be problems in justifying the 
intervention of the state (in its public law/overtly 'political' guise)-in 
the private law/economic' sphere of the exchange of the commodity , new 
technology. The present historical analysis shows that the problems that 
on the basis of this theory, one would expect to occur, did historically 
present themselves. 
If one now returns to Holloway and Picciotto's three part model of 
capitalist development 
35 it becomes clear why the contradictions were most 
keenly felt in the second period - the period of liberal capital from the 
latter half of the 18th century until the mid 1870's - (Chapters 3 to 6 
above) in which the role of the state was minimized and rationalized. 
In the first, mercantilist period the state intervened directly - even 
if not always effectively - to create commodity production. Although there 
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might be important struggles about the scope of the intervention (such as 
those surrounding the Statute of Monopolies), there was general acceptance 
of the principle of intervention wherecommodity production would really 
be stimulated: i. e. by the introduction of 'new manufactures' (industries). 
In the second period, the perception of the ideal role of the state 
changes - in the common sense of the dominant class at least. It is also 
supposed to provide conditions in which commodities (arguably including 
technology) could be freely exchanged in the market. Powerful fractions of 
the dominant class demand the intervention by the state which would secure 
exchangeable units of technology. This brings them into direct conflict 
with th*ose- fractions who do not want such intervention and who are 
supported by the 'common-sense' idea that the state should not intervene 
in the economy at all. This reveals a contradiction similar to that brought 
about by social conflicts which create social problems requiring the 
intervention of a specific body of laý supported by an administrative staff. 
In both cases 'concessions' to state intervention are somewhat reluctantly 
ma de. 
In the third period the conflict is less acute as a degree of state 
interventionism becomes more acceptable as a result of the necessity to 
restructure the mode of production in the light of the threat presented 
by the perceived crisis in capitalism. The patent system as a form of such- 
intervention is thus more easily accepted although it still remains a 
contradiction of the idea of a sphere of commodity circulation existing 
without state intervention. 
A possible conclusion based on this model of capitalist development, 
is that patents -a legal form which necessitated state intervention in 
the economic sector - presented a functional solution to a problem 
encountered in the development of capitalism. To use a slightly different 
terminology: It could be suggested that patents (and their related legal 
forms) provided a mode of reproduction of a part of the social order - 
the capitalist control Lnd exploitation of new technology. 
III. Emergence and choice 
As presented in the previous section the development of the patent 
system seems inevitable. This bold conclusion is not justified. The 
modern patent system was not introduced and accepted merely because capitalism 
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(as an abstract economic force) needed it, but because power was exercised, 
both directly and indirectly, by human agents. These agents acted in 
social groupings, themselves structured by the development of industrial 
capitalism, to have it moulded in a particular way and accepted as common 
sense. This is not to suggest that their goals were always clearly 
defined; but it-is to clai-m that this7 study ha§ demonstrated that men 
consciously strove to achieve particular solutio ns to the problems presented 
by the control of technology under a capitalist system and that the present 
system was the product of the hegemonic acceptance of their solutions to the 
problems. 
In the introduction it was suggested that this process of problem- 
solving was best understood as a dialectic between power and structure. 
Structure was interpreted widely to refer to the evolving social and 
institutional structures of the emerging (British) capitalist society as 
well as to the ideological forms within which members of this society 
shared and organized their perceptions of reality. The concept, power, 
was also interpreted widely to focus (following Lukes) on the various 
dimensions of its exercise and (following Turk) on various areas of social 
lifeý6 This approach has paid dividends for it has demonstrated that the 
body of law was not merely a formal device through which the control of 
technology was structured. Legal forms were part of the common sense of 
social classes and therefore partially constitutive of them (although, as 
was seen in Chapter 4, they were not always used in the same way by 
different classes). These forms were also a potential source of power to 
those who claimed that the common sense of the dominant class was part of 
their ideology. At the same time power was exercised to'modify this common 
sense so that it would be congruent with the ideology of a fraction or 
sector and thus provide support for or opposition to a particular view of 
the patent system in general or for specific modifications to it. The 
operation of the system in general, or specific modifications to itcould 
of course be sought for the instrumental advantage of specific fractions 
(as has been demonstrated). It is therefore clear that law can have 
symbolic as well as instrumental dim-ensions. The view that these qualities 
emerge in the course of the operation and evolution of a body of law is 
endorsed. This study has shown that the symbolic value-of a particular body 
of law or specific legal concept depends on its situation within an 
ideological structure. 
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A further insight derived from the dialectic between power and structure 
is that groups attempting to shape the law in a particular way are themselves 
products of the social structure and that their actions in manipulating 
legal forms develop the structure furtherboth by creating groupings and 
by articulating shared meanings. In particular this study concentrated 
on the role of patent professionals. It described how they emerged at an 
intersection of social forces and proceeded to influence the development 
of the pate nt system. It was explained how they were part of a general 
middle class movement towards professionalization and how, as a key fraction 
within this class, they shaped its attitude towards the patent system. 
The. role of specialized professions in the emergence of law is becoming 
better documented. To the findings of this study can be added those of 
Paulus on public analysts37 and Carson on factory inspectorsý8 In spite 
of the fact that these laws (or bodies of law) do not all follow the same 
39 
pattern of emergence it seems that one can advance the tentative 
generalization that where 'problems' emerge in the development of capitalism 
be they social problems such as the over-exploitation of labour in factories, 
consumers of food and drink, or even particular racial groups, or be they 
problems more directly linked to productive processes such as the control 
of new technology - the solution to the problem can be found in the 'neutral' 
expertise of a middle class profession related to the institutions of the 
state. This argument does not imply that the intervention of professions is 
totally determined by the needs of capitalism. Occupational groups choose 
to fulfil the professional role. ' As a profession they actively attempt 
to shape the law in a particular way. As was the case in the struggle with 
the abolitionists, they can do so successfully. The argument is that the 
opportunity to act as.,. a profession is structurally given and that the 
actions of the profession are within the framework of its own interests and 
of the common-sense framework of. the class of which it is part. 
Tentative generalizations similar to those about professions as a mode 
of social organization parallel to law, can be made about the relationship 
of legal forms to the state. The institutions of the state which existed, 
or were brought into existence, to a4minister a body of law provided a 
framework through which power could be exercised. Early entrepreneurs 
such as Watt and Arkwright used the framework directly for their personal 
ends. Patent professionals used state institutions more subtly - but they 
were nevertheless a source of their professional expertise. Again the 
relationship between power and (institutional) structure was dialectical. 
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In the course of being used the institutions of the state were themselves 
rationalized and reconstructed - often by the bureaucrats themselves 
40 
_- so 
that they would both be more effective instrumentally and, because of their 
apparent rationality, more acceptable symbolically. (Ideals of efficiency 
and rationality, as has been seen, formed part of the dominant ccmmon sense. ) 
In the course of being restructured institutions of the state came to be 
staffed by a bureaucracy which in turn developed a power base of its own. 
Because of the way in which it developed out of a pre-industrial (early 
modern) framework the emergence of the patent bureaucracy was more complicated 
than that of most legally related bureaucracies which were freshly created 
to serve a new piece of legislation. In this respect the patent system can 
perhaps best be compared to other early modern forms of administration which 
were remoulded under capitalist conditions. It is noteworthy that the 
existing 'early modern' bureaucracy of the patent system did not change 
at the same time as the major transformation of the legal form of patent law 
at the end of the 18th century. The simultaneous increase in the rationality 
of law and bureaucracy which Weber appears to have predicted 
41 did not take 
place. Early entrepreneurs were able to use a state apparatus which (at 
best) followed extrinsic formalities not directly related to the new 
function of the patent system. This indicates that a logically formal - 
rational bureaucracy is not an essential part of capitalist development. 
42 It lends support to the critics of Weber's work who have maintained that 
'rationality' was not (as Weber suggested) the crucial factor in the 
emergence of modern industrial capitalism. Arjalysis of the reform of the 
patent system (in Chapter 5 above) suggests that it was only when a changed 
social structure emerged that power could be exercised in order to remodel 
the institutional structure of the state. In the area of patent b-ureaucracy 
the notion of a bounded dialectic between the exercise of power by and 
through the patent bureaucrats and the operation of the institutional 
structure of the state remains salient. 
IV. The sociological conception of law 
In the introduction to this thesis it was said that a sociology 
of a specific field had the dual goals of providing sociological insights 
about its subject matter and contributing to the development of sociological 
theory. To what extent does this thesis succeed-in achieving these goals? 
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The most striking observation about the body of law which has been 
analysed is , that it is sociologically far more complex than the phenomenon 
referred to in the relatively limited conception of law usually employed by 
sociologists. The particular segment of law that has been analysed has been 
shown to be a significant (and changing) feature of social reality at a 
variety of different analytic levels: 
(A) As the framework within which new technology is castenabling it to be 
controlled and thus to be exploited. 
(B) As the organizing rules for the bureaucracy dealing with new technology. 
Thut'Boehm has noted that in the modern British-patent system,. -'Efjor all 
practical purposes, it is impossible to disentangle the purely legal from 
Jhe administrative elements in the processing and prod'. ction of patents'. 
43 
(C) As a source of power for professionals dealing in the control of new 
technology. 44 
(D) As part of the ideology of a sector of society (supporters of the patent 
- system). 
45 
(E) Nnally and most generally, as an emergent part of the hegemonically 
accepted common sense of contemporary capitalist society. 
In his analysis of the game laws of the 18th century EP Thompson comes . 
to a similar conclusion about the extent to which law is a significant social 
phenomenon: 
'First, analysis of the eighteenth century (and perhaps of 
other centuries) calls in question the validity of separating 
off the law as a whole and placing it in some typological 
superstructure. The law when considered as institution (the 
courts, with their class theatre and class procedures) or as 
personnel (the judges, the lawyers, the Justices of the-Peace) 
may very easily be assimilated to those of the ruling class. 
But all that is entailed in 'the law' is not subsumed in these 
institutions. The law may also be seen as ideology, or as 
particular rules and sanctions which stand in a definite and 
active relationship (often a field of conflict) to social 
norms; and, finally, it may be seen simply in terms of its 
own logic, rules and procedures - that is, simply as law. 
And it is not possible to conceive of any complex -ý-o`ciety 
without law. ' 46 
The conclusion of this thesis on the multi-faceted sociological nature 
of law parallels this view. At the same time it has attempted to examine in 
some detail the relationship of an industrializing society to a particular 
body of law. Its central contribution to social theory is to stress that 
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in this process law plays a crucial role in reproducing a social order - 
specifically that part of it which enables capitalists to use the institutions 
of the state to define units of technology (a key feature of the means of 
production) for them to contol. The fact that technological developments 
'so fortuitously and. frequently have effects favourable to the dominant 
economic class' 
47 is no longer a mystery. It can be explained by a 
developmental model of capitalism in which attention is paid to the 
way in which a specific body of law is created and entrenched so that 
capitalists are able to exploit the benefits of new technology. Creation of 
law for this purpose involves the alteration of the function of legal 
concepts, as Renner has suggested, but it also involves (as was shown in 
Chapter 3 above) the creation of new legal forms to deal with newly 
emergent aspects of the economic order. 
The reproduction of social order (of which law is a part) is further 
assisted by law itself. This thesis has shown how natural law arguments 
were used by middle class reformers as a vehicle for reform - for example 
the pronouncements of 'Vindicator' quoted in Chapter 5 above. 
48 " It was 
also demonstrated in Chapter 7 how the status quo could be justified by 
appealing not to natural law but to formal legal enactments. These findings 
support the suggestions of both Weber and Pashukanis, outlined in the 
introductory chapter, of how law in general operates as an ideology in 
developing capitalism. 
I 
V. Objectives for future research 
This study has focused on just one hitherto unexamined aspect of the 
relationship between law and the development of capitalism. In or-der to 
explore the relationship between the use and evolution of legal forms in 
industrial capitalism and their acceptance in common sense further studies 
need to be done of the development of legal institutions such as limited 
companies, insurance, etc. which sometimes contain apparent contradictions 
with the dominant ideologY49 but which are accepted nonetheless. In this 
way (particularly if developments in more than one nation state could be 
compared) generalizations could be made about the complex inter- 
relationship of law and the development of industrial capitalism. 
Further, more specific proposals for future research can also be made. 
A sociological understanding of the legal framework which reproduces the 
existing form of control of new technology should not accept the descriptions 
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of the operation of the patent system at face. value. One example of such 
sociological misconception is the acceptance, by the famous American 
criminologist, EH Sutherland, that patent infringements are a form of 
'theft' and should therefore be regarded as 'white collar crime' . 
50 It 
is. clear that the term theft historically was (and is) used primarily because 
it was thought that its common-sense links with the concept, property, would 
serve to legitimate patent grants. 
51 Particularly if both parties involved 
in an infringement action were powerful companies with expensive research and 
development programmes, a model which saw them competing for legal protection 
within a fram ework designed to ensure the control of technology, would 
contribute more to social theory than the emotive concept of crime which, 
in Sutherland's use of it, tends to elide the social context within which 
the law operates. 
In the case of patent infringements where, although the rhetoric of 
property, theft and crime has been invoked, criminal sanctions have not been 
created, the status of the 'offence' is particularly ambiguous. This 
ambiguity ought to be explained rather than simply ignored by a definitional 
fiat. Perhaps patent infringements are an extreme instance of what 
HS Becker and WG Carson have called 'conventional crime'. 
51 Not only, as 
in the case of infringement of the Factories Acts, is there no stigmatization 
and no enforcement of an effective sanction against its perpetrators, but the 
criminal justice system is not brought into play by patent infringements 
at all. The rhetorical cry 'theft' in the case of threatened infringements 
and during civil infringement proceedings serves to give patents the status of 
something defended by criminal law (and therefore supported by an implied 
consensus in society) without the infringer running the risk of coming into 
contact with the operation of the criminal law. An empirical investigation 
of infringement proceedings (and threats of such proceedings) which also 
considered the disputed nature of patent 'rights' would provide another52 
link between the study of white collar/conventional crime and the sociology 
of the emergence of law. 
A further and more ambitious line of research for which this study could 
serve as forerunner would be the sociological analysis of the legal framework 
for the international transfer of technology. In this respect development 
economists have already done the equivalent of 'gap' studies by pointing out 
that in developing countries patent systems do not perform their 'accepted' 
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function of stimulating invention but instead provide a legal means of 
ensuring that existing technology (which has often already been exploited 
in developing countries) be purchased at high prices. 
53 A sociological 
study would attempt to explain the adoption of a particular legal framework 
and the hegemonic acceptance of this framework as part of the system of 
international trade. It would enable the sociology of law to transcend 
its preoccupation with national systems of law and to investigate law 
in the context of international politics and multi-national corporations. 
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